Dollars do not make people into zombies

The influence of the USA on the Maidan protests is grossly overestimated. Mass movements are not so easily bought—and the US has other priorities. BY ALICE BOTA, editor for the German weekly Die Zeit. Translated by Charles Kirchofer.

Originally published in German on 21 May 2015 at 07:26 AM CEST

© Private

These days, whenever a people somewhere rises up and a government falls, large sections of the left quickly identify who is responsible: It was the Americans. They were never too good for coup attempts when they were in their own interest, after all. They were willing to use any means, whether in Panama, Chile, Nicaragua, Iran—the list is long. So why should it be any different for the Maidan protests in Ukraine in 2014? Only that this time, the people were stirred up.

Many then like to point to the book The Grand Chessboard by the former US presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. In it, he refers to Ukraine as the “geopolitical linchpin” that determines the tectonics shifts of all of Europe—as if this were already evidence of American power politics rather than just theory.

The role of the US in Eastern and Central Europe is so overrated and overcharged that a short historical review can help to ground the assessment. This is because, like Ukraine today, one country in particular is familiar with disappointments and disenchantment when it comes to America, namely Poland.

In 1973, the publicist Juliusz Mieroszewski published an article in the Polish exile magazine Kultura about American “Ostpolitik” (“eastern policy”). Mieroszewski belonged to the milieu of intellectuals and writers who had to flee from Poland and fought with words from Paris for an independent homeland. Mieroszewski remarked bitterly that, while the Americans spent $120 billion for their anti-communist Vietnam War, the uprising in Hungary, also directed against a repressive communist regime, didn’t even receive $120.

Just like many Ukrainians today, back then, many oppositional Poles were convinced that America was their natural ally and would support them in the struggle against communism. Their hope was understandable, but it was in vain.

For the US, Ukraine Policy is mostly about symbolism

While the “Polish cause” was the Alpha and Omega of all politics for the Poles, Mieroszewski wrote, it does not even exist for the Americans. In the end, the equation was simple for him: The Soviets were both rivals and partners of the United States, so the Americans would never seriously attempt to change the political cartography of Eastern Europe. This informed their policies, not the uprisings in Budapest, Prague, and Gdansk, which were regarded with much sympathy, but nothing more. “Overall, it must be said that the American Ostpolitik on the European stage is purely defensive” Mieroszewski wrote. “This defensive strategy is based on preserving the status quo, not amending it.”

The publicist wrote these sentences in the early seventies, but not much has changed since then. Undoubtedly, Ukraine remains important to America—but it will never be so important to Barack Obama that he would risk a definitive split with Russia. And just as Richard Nixon eventually went to Moscow in 1972 and assured its rulers of their claim to power, so the US Secretary of State John Kerry also traveled to Russia and said things that must have been quite sobering for Ukrainians.

The Americans are convinced that they need Russia for their policies in the Middle East. Their current Ukraine Policy is mainly a bit of symbolism. They would rather the EU did the rest.

Questionable image of human beings on the Left

Those who are convinced that the Maidan uprising in Kiev was a fake bought by America will be unconvinced by remembering Mieroszewski. Thanks to foundations and organizations like USAID or the National Endowment for Democracy, the Americans have spent millions in Ukraine for decades; they have financed civil society NGOs, trained election observers, and advanced anti-corruption campaigns.

The foundation Renaissance in Ukraine, funded by the billionaire George Soros, has paid for the lawyers of arrested Maidan activists, coordinated civil society meetings, and provided financial support for care for the wounded. But this support is not enough to explain why thousands rose up in the middle of Kiev against their rulers in winter 2014.

The fixation on America’s power, the projection of a superior force, not only reflects a worldview that is often upheld by a portion of the nostalgic left that mourns for the old division of the world into blocs. Above all, it reveals a lot about their image of the human beings: that people are easily bought. That beliefs do not matter, but are the result of perfidious manipulation. That a few million dollars are enough to turn people into zombies who go out onto the streets and put their lives at risk.

Sometimes the truth does not lie "somewhere in between"

Many readers are irritated, including with my reporting on Ukraine. Their suspicion is legitimate. But not every view of the war is equally true.

BY ALICE BOTA, editor for the German weekly Die Zeit. Translated by Charles Kirchofer. Re-posted with the author's permission. The original article appeared in German on March 13, 2015.

A reader named "B." writes in. Complains that the reporting on Ukraine is misleading and false. I’ve been on location over the past few months and have reported on the Maidan (yes, including the right-wing extremists), on Ukrainian volunteer battalions , the shooting down of flight MH-17 , the elections , the war, the victims of Donetsk. His criticism also applies to me, which is why I write back. “What is so misleading?” I ask. What mistakes did I make? After all, I think it is quite possible, even probable, that I made mistakes—everyone makes mistakes. The question is how serious they are and how I can correct them. An error becomes a lie only when it is made intentionally to conceal and deceive.

B. answered in a way that I already know from other angry readers who attempt to express their criticism more precisely: How can I justify saying that Russia is involved in the war in eastern Ukraine? There is no evidence! 

I usually write back in detail. There IS evidence, I write. There are Russian soldiers who return home in coffins from Ukraine and family members who are not allowed to talk about their suffering. There are Russian NGOs like the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, who are trying to find out how many of their sons have already died in Ukraine. There are reports such as that of the Armament Research Services, which were able to identify Russian (and other) weapons in eastern Ukraine—never mind the fact that one really has to wonder when, within a few months, a bunch of local insurgents has a more professional army than Ukraine.¹  There are Russian intelligence officers such as Igor Girkin, who was involved in the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine and speaks openly about Russian tactics.

The list could go on and on. The only thing missing is an admission by Russian President Vladimir Putin that he is waging war in eastern Ukraine. And for many, it seems, nothing is true that Putin himself has not confirmed. 

But even the word of the Russian President does not always seem to be enough. It’s been months since Putin admitted to having sent his soldiers to Crimea. But only now, after he spoke about it again on Russian television, has this fact really seemed to arrive in Germany.

Just a year ago, the media, especially public broadcasters, were attacked when they said the obvious: that Russian troops were occupying Crimea. Everyone who was there could see it for him/herself and could even ask the soldiers about it. But to say or write that? Insinuations! Prejudices! Lies! 

The letter from Mr. B. represents a phenomenon, namely, the flight into relativism when it comes to Russian politics. At times, this relativization is fed by the fear that Germany could be drawn into this war; sometimes by distrust of the Americans, sometimes out of hatred for them; sometimes by a perceived historical debt to Russia (which is, paradoxically, rarely seen to be owed the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles); at times by contempt for Europe; and that sometimes simply stems from being unable to cope.

Relativization is a principle of propaganda used by Russian television that has long since extended beyond Russian borders. Everything must appear feasible and even the obvious must seem to be just one variant of many. This is done by scattering many different, contradictory versions of stories (on the shooting of MH-17, it was said that the passengers were already dead, had been killed by the Americans, or that the rocket was intended for Putin) or by repeating false “facts” until they appear correct (for example, that American Blackwater mercenaries are fighting in Ukraine. So far, that is nonsense). Until nothing is true and everything seems possible, as the author Peter Pomerantsev called his book about modern Russia (Nothing is true and everything is possible, 2014).

Pomerantsev, who worked for many years as a TV producer in Russia, describes, among other things, how the Kremlin synthesizes Soviet-style control with western-style entertainment in order to numb society. “The news is the incense with which we praise Putin’s actions and make him president,” Pomarentsev cites Russian TV producers. Pomarentsev shows that TV news in Russia has nothing to do with reality—it is entertainment.

Russian state media make no mistakes, they simply lie. And they do not care when they are caught, as in the story of the child who was allegedly crucified by Ukrainian fascists.

When I respond to letters like that from Mr B., when I engage with his arguments, refute what is wrong, and say what seems to me to be correct, an interesting dialogue often develops. And mostly it becomes apparent that distrust and discomfort are the driving forces: What interests are the Americans pursuing in Ukraine? Isn’t Russia justified in feeling threatened? Haven’t the Europeans also made mistakes?

We can talk about all that and we need to write about it. But the truth, that great, so often abused word, does not always lie somewhere in between. You cannot track it down through relativizing. To broadcast everything to the world, even the worst nonsense, to give everyone a platform to speak without asking who speaks in what function and why--this is not plurality, but the illusion of it.

1. emphasis added

The morality of retaliation in warfare

"An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." The concept of retribution has been present in conceptions of justice since ancient times, with perhaps the earliest known prescription of it found in the Hammurabi code of ancient Babylon. Though a literal interpretation of such codes now appears barbaric to most people and Jesus himself advised his followers to "turn to them the other cheek as well" if they were slapped, rather than seek an eye for an eye (Matthew 5:38-48), modern criminal justice continues to codify retribution. Though modern criminal justice is meant to fulfill three purposes, the other two being reform and deterrence, retribution itself is seen as just. If the law in any state focused purely on reform, those wronged by criminals would likely see this as unjust and might even seek vigilante justice for themselves. Retribution may thus even be necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the legal system and therefore social order itself. Retaliation, which is how retribution is carried out, can also serve the functions of deterrence and, through that, reform of its target. Retaliation for wrongs thus has a long-standing legitimacy in human society and serves several functions crucial to maintaining order. At the same time, however, it has long been recognized that retaliation can simply perpetuate feuds and fuel escalation rather than deterrence and reform. In international politics, moreover, the legitimacy of acts of retaliation will almost always be questioned or rejected by those at the receiving end, exacerbating these risks. If retaliation causes more violence rather than less, it is unjust. Furthermore, certain types of retaliation, e.g. against civilians, are never justified. Where do the lines of morality and utility lie? Is retaliation even useful or justifiable?

In the play Fiddler on the Roof, a villager cries "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth!" to which Tevye, the main character, replies "Very good. That way the whole world will be blind and toothless". This sums up nicely the view that retaliation is futile. After all, in a conflict situation, those on the receiving end of a reprisal will not view such a reprisal as legitimate because they are likely to view their own actions as legitimate—in opposition to the view on the other side. This is essentially the definition of conflict, after all. When seen as an illegitimate, us-versus-them act, retaliation often leads to new retaliation—i.e. to escalation. This leads liberal-minded people to posit that retaliation only makes things worse. Causing more anger and suffering on the other side is no way to create peace, the argument runs. Someone must break the cycle of violence instead.

This assessment of how to end a conflict is essentially correct. Eventually, the parties to a conflict must make peace and to do that, they must eventually stop retaliating and let go of grievances. An immediate shift from violence to peace, with both sides suddenly deciding to let bygones be bygones and to lay down their arms is often impossible, however. The deeps wells of anger and mistrust on both sides cannot so easily be pumped dry—even if seemingly everyone understands that this must eventually happen. History shows that most violent conflicts end only after one or both sides become exhausted or come to see continued fighting as futile—or perhaps dangerous. Two of the goals of retaliation, especially in warfare, are deterrence and compellence. Compellence is the threat of violence unless an opponent does something. Deterrence is the threat of violence only if an opponent does something. Compellence can be used during a period of violence to achieve a period of calm, with a deterrent threat used to maintain that calm thereafter. This is best achieved when one or both sides is/are capable of exacting a price unacceptable to the other side in response to an attack. If compellence and deterrence succeed in creating and maintaining a period of calm, trust can slowly be built and room can be created for the political negotiations that could eventually bring an end to the conflict itself.

The morality of retaliation thus depends on whether it can reduce violence. When rockets rained down on Israel from Gaza in increasing numbers in 2007 and 2008, Israel's violent response in the Gaza War of 2008-9 succeeded in bringing rocket launches almost completely to a halt. The calm lasted more than three years. Subsequent rounds of escalation brought renewed periods of calm after wars in 2012 and 2014. After each escalation, the Gaza Strip's Hamas rulers have arrested rocket launchers, called them "rebels", and shown that they were maintaining peace out of fear of retaliation—in other words, deterrence was working.¹ This shows that retaliation can be used to restore and maintain calm.

At the same time, the case of Israel and Hamas illustrates retaliation's limitations. As mentioned previously, retaliation can be used to compel and deter in order to create a peaceful space for negotiations. In this case, the first step has occurred, but the second step has not succeeded. An end to the conflict thus remains elusive. The shortened time between bouts of escalation is also worrying. As I have argued previously (here and again here), Israel's failure to make the status quo in the Palestinian territories more palatable (e.g. by easing the blockade of Gaza and halting settlement construction) increases the risk and frequency of violence by undermining the effects of deterrence and Palestinians' trust. Moreover, Hamas's capabilities have actually improved with each round, even as the perceived illegitimacy of Israel's attacks on Gaza, as well as that of its settlement activities, means Israel is increasingly hemmed in by media attention and condemnation of its actions.

Retaliation is thus not inherently moral or immoral. Used carefully against militant targets, it can create periods of calm that may facilitate a negotiated settlement that would be impossible during periods of heavy bloodshed. As John Bew has shown in the case of the Irish Republican Army vs. the UK Government, accepting peace negotiations during fighting can actually embolden militants by appearing weak, encouraging further violence. Faced with escalation, a leader may thus have few other choices but to retaliate in the hope of creating a period of calm. Critically, this would be true regardless of whom one might blame for an individual round of escalation or for initiating a feud in the first place. Not to retaliate might in fact be the immoral choice if it ended up prolonging a conflict. In the end, though, Jesus and Tevye are right. Retaliation itself will not bring lasting peace and does run the risk of further escalation if applied improperly (e.g. against civilians at any time or using disproportionate force during periods of relative calm) or without the necessary commitment and capability. Retaliation can be used as a step toward peace, however, and such use is deeply moral.

1. Toameh, Khaled Abu. “Hamas Crackdown on Islamic Jihad Rocket Squads Raises Tenstions in Gaza. Hamas: Some Palestinian Parties Trying to Create an Excuse for Israel to Resume Its Aggression.” The Jerusalem Post. March 11, 2009, sec. News. Nexis UK.

War between countries is over? Think again.

Source: Indian Navy, CC license

Liberals and idealists have declared the end of war many times before. In 1914, many believed that economic interdependence had made war in Europe unthinkable. After WWI, it was hoped that the League of Nations would stop war. The claim that interstate war has died out has now re-emerged yet again. Less sanguine than the idealists of the past, experts like the retired British General Sir Rupert Smith and the renowned Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argue not that war has ended, but that one type, interstate "industrial" war, is no longer. Instead, the world will fight more insurgencies and small wars against terrorists "amongst the people", to use Smith's phrase. Nuclear weapons are believed to have a limiting effect on conflict and to support the status quo. In addition, norms against violence have spread, just as globalization has reduced the need for states to fight over resources and territory. These latter points may be an effect, rather than a cause of the decline in interstate war, however. Another explanation is also possible: The structure of the international political system has shifted from multipolarity up until the World Wars, to bipolarity until the fall of the USSR, to unipolarity since. It is no coincidence that interstate wars have fallen at the same time. Unipolarity will not last forever, though. As it fades, we may see the return of interstate war.

Influential authors like historian Martin van Creveld have stated that "Large-scale, conventional war... may indeed be at its last gasp". British former General Sir Rupert Smith states bluntly that "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs... no longer exists". The latter argues that this type of war, which he terms "interstate industrial war", has been replaced by "war amongst the people": peace-keeping and state-building operations, counterinsurgencies, and the like, to which there can be no decisive end. This has indeed been the case for conflicts since at least the US's War on Terror and both authors show that the trend has been heading in this direction since the end of WWII. Western militaries are now responding to these trends, shifting capabilities away from interstate fighting and towards fighting insurgents and other smaller groups. Trends can change directions at any time, however, if the cause of such a change is not properly identified.

Smith and van Creveld offer numerous reasons for the decline of interstate warfare, such as changing norms about violence; the rise of different sorts of identity politics based on, for example, religion; the spread of the media into the hands of private individuals able to promote their causes and connext with other would-be militants; and, perhaps most notably, nuclear weapons. Except for the spread of nuclear weapons, which have indeed had a moderating influence on international politics, the other trends noted above could just as easily be effects of a shift away from interstate war rather causes of that shift. At a time when there is no need for large-scale interstate war, there is accordingly less desire for it (norms against the use of force grow stronger). Similarly, as external conflicts lose salience, internal ones grow in relative importance, allowing grievances based on religion or ethnicity to gain greater attention. Even the democratization of the media, which is certainly not due to the recent decline in interstate war, may still not end up limiting it: When the populations involved in such wars see them as necessary (potentially for survival), images of their effects may not help stop them. One thing not offered as a reason is the shift from a multipolar structure in international politics before the World Wars, when there were multiple "Great Powers" with considerable military might, to a bipolar structure during the Cold War, to a unipolar one thereafter. If the cause has been misdiagnosed, the disease of interstate war may return unexpectedly.

Massive interstate wars could be avoided in the period leading up to WWI only by maintaining a "balance of power" between competing Great Powers, all of which were based in Europe. When one state gained in power, alliances would shift to compensate or a small war might be carried out to restore the previous balance. In the early 20th century, however, Germany became so powerful in its own right that the alliance of all other Great Powers against it was not enough to constrain it.* The two World Wars knocked most of the European powers off the list of Great Powers, leaving only two "superpowers": the Soviet Union and the United States. States throughout the world aligned with one or the other superpower and would find one or the other (or both) taking a strong interest in their internal affairs.** Interstate wars continued, but they were often indecisive (Korea and Vietnam) and of uncertain necessity (Vietnam), leading to a great deal of questions about their legitimacy. Since the Cold War, the world has been left with just one "hyperpower": the United States.*** I have argued previously that the world is still unipolar, contrary to popular belief. Read this to see why. The Iraq Wars have shown how quickly the US can win interstate wars and, in the case of the second Iraq War, how quickly it can become bogged down in a "war amongst the people". But how much of this is related to unipolarity rather than a fundamental shift in the types of wars now possible?

In times when military power is more evenly matched, states often cannot gain the decisive military victories that would pave the way towards state-building thereafter. Not only that, alliance partners could very well balk at the prospect of the balance of power then swinging too much in the other direction. If governments are left mostly in place, counterinsurgency and state-building remain the responsibility of the invaded, not their invaders. Wars with more limited objectives to restore the status quo would thus be seen as more necessary and may therefore become more common. The First Iraq War actually fit this model, though the US had the power to do much more. In a multipolar world, the US might retain that initial war-fighting capability, but would not necessarily have that choice to do more. The First Iraq War could become the rule rather than the exception. The world is militarily unipolar, but is economically multipolar already. This matters because economic strength is one critical foundation of military strength. As the wealth of other countries, like China, rises, so can their military spending and capability. The world's current unipolar structure may thus be replaced by a new bipolarity with China or, perhaps more likely, a more multipolar structure with China as a Great Power.

Though the moderating influence of nuclear weapons is not going away, the decline of interstate war has also come with the concentration of power in the hands of the United States. Other factors supposedly limiting interstate war, like changing values and increasing interdependence, may very well be the result of fewer wars rather than the cause, as the world has seemed safer for interdependence and as the declining necessity of war has allowed more peaceful values to flourish. Similarly, unipolarity has caused the US and its allies to expand the goals of wars to state-building and changing the way the world itself is ordered, giving rise to counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations, just as these have become more common as identity politics increase in salience in a world made "safe" for them by a lack of interstate wars. If this is the case, fewer poles may be the best explanation for fewer wars and a rise in state-building and counterinsurgency, rather than any permanent shift in war-fighting "paradigms". As the world swings back towards multipolarity, the resulting instability may give rise to new interstate wars as countries shift alliances to seek advantage and worry more about the relative power and security of their respective blocs. We should not declare victory over interstate war just yet.

*This is, of course, the simplified version of the story. Germany also felt the need to preempt the rise of Russia, was pulled into war by a weaker alliance partner, and the system of alliances had become too rigid and no longer so focused on balancing power.

** Some states explicitly refused to align with either, but this was a choice they could only make if they were deemed neutral enough, unimportant enough strategically, and didn't feel the need to ask for support from one of the superpowers.

***This, in turn, has reduced the number (because of a reduced view of their necessity) of the proxy wars common during the Cold War.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle. London: Penguin, 2012.

Van Creveld, Martin. On Future War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz. London: Brassey’s UK, 1991.

The Hillary Email Scandal: An Unenforceable Rule Serving an Undesirable Goal?

Photographer: Harald Dettenborn, CC license

Hillary Clinton used a personal email account and server for all official business while she was Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. Although she seems not to have broken any laws outright, she has certainly made it more difficult to process Freedom of Information Act requests lodged with the State Department, for example, and the State Department must comply with such requests and must make official correspondence available. She therefore does seem to have violated the spirit of such rules. Transparency is a big buzzword these days and it is seen as a way to combat corruption, crime, laziness, and dishonesty, all laudable targets. But enforcing these rules is difficult, to say the least, and it is also not clear that transparency is always the best thing for diplomacy.

According to politifact, federal rules state that it would have been OK for Clinton to use her personal email account in an “emergency.” While noting that she had not actually broken any laws because the rules were tightened only after she left office, experts say that EXCLUSIVE use of a personal account is not allowed. Where do we draw the line? How much use is then permitted? How can we know that that occasional "emergency" correspondence was not where she broke laws and committed corruption?

More problematic than the arbitrary percentages of personal email account use is the question of enforcement: Presumably, Clinton could use her personal account for any personal correspondence. But it would be Clinton herself who would judge what’s personal--which is exactly what she has been accused of by opponents. Since the personal emails are not looked at, who is to say whether they are personal or not? In effect, then, there is absolutely no difference between Clinton claiming to use her personal account only for personal emails and Clinton claiming to have deleted only personal emails from her records before handing over what she claims is everything else (which is the current situation). Opponents argue there is no way to verify this, but this would be the case if she had used her personal account only for personal emails, too, which would apparently have been perfectly fine. The rule thus appears pretty unenforceable unless all government officials were prohibited from ever having any private email correspondence.

This rule was meant to serve a seemingly laudable goal: transparency in, in this case, diplomacy. There have long been demands to end "secret diplomacy" because of suspicion of just what goes on behind closed doors. More crimes are committed in the dark than in the light of day, after all. In addition, how can a democracy function well if its people do not know what their government is doing? How can the people make themselves heard? Transparency at all levels, including diplomacy, is supposed to fix this.

The problem is that making negotiations, rather than just their outcomes, public can make diplomacy nearly impossible--and without diplomacy and negotiation, cooperation becomes nearly impossible as well. Without cooperation, everyone is worse off: shared economic benefits don't materialize, wars become more likely, collective action on pollution and climate change can't occur, etc. The reason is simple: Both sides need to be free to offer unpopular things in exchange for what they want. Deals often fall through. The public might accept slaying a sacred cow in exchange for a big deal, but revealing that a leader was willing to do so and did not achieve the hoped-for outcome could cause cries of “traitor!” Secret negotiations thus allow the two sides (or even two negotiators) to speak openly with one another without constantly worrying about how their domestic audiences are reacting to what they are saying and how this might affect their re-election chances or other aspects of political capital. Though a deal was not reached in the end anyway, the Camp David negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Auhtority President Yassir Arafat are illustrative: They both offered things in secret that they could not have offered if opposition back home had constantly been up in arms (e.g. both of them moved towards sharing Jerusalem, which, in public, neither had dared to say they could do).

Clinton went against the spirit, at least, of transparency regulations, but those regulations are inherently arbitrary and it is also easy to see why she would wish to skirt them. The negotiations leading to a deal (though not the deal itself) should be permitted to remain secret and be protected from the scrutiny of all but a few insiders, at least for a time. Doing the opposite would not only be impractical (as it would require ALL correspondence to be publicly available, as I have shown), it would be undesirable in the case of diplomacy.

Russia, Georgia, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine: Cold War Redux?

I study deterrence, mostly in its non-nuclear, non-Cold War variety. (Deterrence is, to oversimplify, using threats to discourage an opponent from taking certain undesirable actions. Ex: "I'll cut off your oil supply if you attack my neighbor.") I am not an expert on Ukraine or Russia, but I will try to analyze the situation using my knowledge of deterrence, as I think this can tell us a lot about Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. For the most part, it still has little to do with nuclear weapons, but, this being Russia vs. the United States in many ways, they are always lurking in the background.

Some of Barack Obama's critics in America, like John McCain, claim that Russia invaded Crimea because Putin knew America would do nothing about it. The reason Putin knew this was because America "lead from behind" in Libya, hesitant to get involved or commit, and, more importantly, issued a "red line" warning over chemical weapons in Syria and then failed to carry through with the ultimatum, which could weaken America's ability to deter other aggressors, as I myself argued in this blog last September. Is this true? Would Putin have been deterred if Obama appeared tougher or if, say, George W. Bush were still in the White House? Hardly.

I say this not because I twice voted for Barack Obama, but because to say it is his fault is either disingenuous, meant only to hit him politically, or betrays a complete lack of understanding of how deterrence works. As The Economist points out, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 while G.W. Bush was in the White House and has occupied 20% of the country ever since. Not only did the bellicose President Bush not deter Russia from invading, he also did little to punish it as a result. Russia is much more interested in Crimea and Ukraine than the United States is. What's more, and as can be seen on the map above, Russia has easy access to Crimea and the whole of Ukraine. It can easily launch an invasion or incursion, whereas the United States would require a massive logistical operation just to get troops, ships, and equipment to Ukraine. Considering Americans' war-weariness and financial constraints, such an operation was always unlikely, regardless of how committed the President seemed to other causes or how aggressive his rhetoric. Putin has still been careful, in some ways: He did not invade all of Ukraine and reinstall its ousted president, for example. He took control of an area of Ukraine with a majority Russian population that was long part of Russia and hosts its Black Sea Fleet. He rightly calculated that the US and Europe would be angry, but not so much that they felt forced to undertake real action. In sum: Russia could not have been deterred from this unless there had been US/NATO troops on the ground in Crimea and eastern Ukraine prior to the crisis--something that would never have happened because it would have angered Putin and brought on a crisis by itself and because the US and its allies have never cared enough to risk that. In other words: Russia has deterred NATO and Ukraine from expanding NATO to include Ukraine. And without having Ukraine in NATO, Russia could not have been deterred from taking over Crimea. This is not Obama's fault.

So deterrence has failed. Or has it? Deterrence never realistically applied to all of Ukraine, especially Crimea which, with its Russian population, "Autonomous Republic" status, and Russian bases, was always only tenuously controlled by Ukraine. Deterrence can now work to protect the rest of the country and this is where the US, NATO, and the EU must take a stand. There must be diplomatic consequences for the occupation of Crimea. There must be much more severe consequences for actions in the rest of Ukraine, including attempts to coerce it away from a deal with the EU again. This does not mean war. As I mentioned, Russian nukes are lurking in the background and Russia has a massive geopolitical advantage in Ukraine and an enormous and powerful army. The US should be careful never to threaten war, either, as this would then be a further empty promise it could not back up. An embargo on Russian oil and natural gas would be the biggest step for the most severe case: a Russian invasion of Ukraine (which Putin has darkly called a "last resort"). This would hurt Europe quite badly, particularly countries like Slovakia, who get almost all of their natural gas from Russia, but also Germany, which imports a great deal of it. If Russia invaded Ukraine, however, this would have to be done.

Barring that horror scenario, freezes on assets held abroad by Russian oligarchs in its parliament or close to Putin would be a first step. Visa bans on travel to the US, EU, and other allied countries would be another significant step. These could be used in response to threats on Ukraine or attempts to manipulate it. At the same time, the US and EU should provide Ukraine with economic and technical assistance and promote a functioning democracy there.

In the end, Russia will probably keep Crimea, as it has Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This should come at a price, but Putin surely expects this and is willing to pay it. Further damage and influence over Ukraine can and should be prevented, however. Deterrence can only work when you have the power to back up your threats. This means it's important to chose your threats wisely and not to overplay your hand. Threats of visa bans, asset freezes, and sanctions are credible, and the latter would be quite severe. War is not, and is this is a good thing. There is hope for Ukraine yet.

And what about the title? It is possible that this crisis could lead to steady hardening of positions, especially if it gets carried over into negotiations with Syria and Iran, the former of which Russia supports directly, the latter of which Russia supports more indirectly as a bargaining chip. This would be a much-diminished "iron curtain," however, and Russia is not looking to retreat into economic or political isolation behind it. If you've read this, however, then the "Cold War Redux" part of the title did its job ;-).

Is America still the world's lone hyperpower?

Recent US failures and infighting give the impression that the US is weaker than it is.

 

 

For a moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was talk of the United States as the "last superpower" or even the world's "hyperpower." At the time, it seemed the US was free to shape the world as it wished because there was no longer opposition from another country nearly as powerful as itself. This feeling persisted, Blackhawk Down notwithstanding, until the US seemed unable to finish the job in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sense of decline was then intensified by the financial and economic crises of the late 2000s and the political gridlock that has ensued in the US since 2010. The rise of China, with its growing military and tougher rhetoric, also seemed to suggest that a multipolar world had arrived. If the US can't get what it wants and is continually constrained abroad, can it really be a hyperpower?

The answer is "yes," and here is why. Throughout the world, countries have two choices: ally with a regional power or ally with the United States (or both if that regional power is also a US ally--a sign in and of itself). Countries that have an affinity for (or whose economies are perhaps too closely linked with) the regional power side with that power. If others are worried, they seek closer ties with other worried countries and with the United States as a guarantor of their security and interests. The fact that this occurs in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia shows that the US is seen globally as a power that can provide extra security. There is no other country that currently does this. So while there are regional powers that challenge US authority within one part of the globe, the single solution to regional fears remains the United States. Only when that changes (e.g. China begins to be seen as an alternative to an alliance with the US and this outside of China's backyard) will the world be multipolar.

The failure of the US military to solve political problems was a sign of US hubris, foolishness, and naivete, but it was not a sign of failing US power. Political problems require political solutions. Military force can defeat an enemy or clamp down on violence, but it cannot, in the end, provide a political solution, especially if that solution is supposed to be democracy rather than an iron-fisted dictatorship. This has always been the case. Without an internal readiness and cultural preparedness for democracy, democracy cannot come about. By its very nature (since it exists at the behest of the people), democracy cannot be forced. No amount of power in the world could have changed that. (State building may bring a country to democracy over years or decades, but it is an uncertain and incredibly intensive and expensive endeavor and requires civic education and institution-building--political solutions, in other words.)

Finally, that the US cannot always get what it wants and is constrained by international politics is also not in itself a sign that the US is not a hyperpower because this misunderstands the term. All states are subject to others' influence and demands and are not free to act as they please with complete impunity. States have varying degrees of freedom of action, however, and the US is freer than others due to its power. The US can, when it chooses, act alone militarily anywhere in the world. No other country can do this (except to a certain extent, perhaps, for Russia, which is however much weaker in other respects). When France and the UK got together to support rebels in Libya, their combined power was not enough: They needed US assistance to be effective.

The US is rightly chastened by its foolhardy experiment with neoconservatism and its inflated belief in the ability of the military to solve the world's problems. It has perhaps now swung too far in the opposite direction, but this is probably also temporary. In the end, however, its underlying power and ability to affect the world has only been lightly diminished, and this more by the damage to its reputation caused by the wars in the Middle East, political infighting in Washington, and its own (faulty) acceptance of its loss of power than by any real changes in fundamentals. US power still underwrites the international system and that will continue to be the case for at least another decade or two. Beyond that, anything could happen (even including a continued unipolar world with the US at its head--or not).

Libyan Oil, Cynicism, and Anti-Americanism

"We can't be holier than the pope!"
Here we go, I thought to myself.
"America doesn't march into a country to rescue people being abused by their own government. If this were in Saudi Arabia it would never happen. The Americans are good friends with the Saudi rulers and wouldn't do a thing to help the people there."
Next came the inevitable: Libya has oil, so clearly that's what America wants because Americans all drive big cars, which leads them to march into every corner of the world and take every drop of oil they can get.

This diatribe was, unfortunately, from an Austrian acquaintance of mine, but it's easy enough to imagine an American arguing along similar lines. In fact, the nationality of the speaker is pretty irrelevant, because the theme is the same: America is not a force for peace, it is just interested in itself and, above all, getting more oil.

Now, I'm a realist and that makes me lean towards cynicism myself much of the time, but this goes above and beyond cynicism. The arguments are muddled and don't really make sense (I'll get to this below), which leads me to think the argument itself is secondary; it is the point that America is doing the wrong thing (again) that matters. When arguments are left out and the conclusion is the same regardless of the facts, we call this prejudice. It comes in many forms: racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, Islamophobia, and, in this case, anti-Americanism.

The anti-American argument in this case, as is usual, uses some good points. Does America put its own interests first? Sure, most of the time it does. Just as any other country, when it comes down to it, does. Is America addicted to oil? You betcha. Is that addiction a bad thing? Sure is. Would America attack Saudi Arabia? It would surely be extremely reluctant to do so, but the full answer to this is more subtle. As I answered at the time "it would depend on who had the upper hand." This is precisely what happened in Libya. (Read on!) Let's address the argument piece by piece.

First is the oil issue. There are a number of reasons why this argument makes no sense. First off: the world was receiving oil from Libya with Gaddafi in charge. If that's all the West had been interested in, surely it would have supported Gaddafi from the outset, rather than rebel protests that looked to destabilize a regime that had become quite friendly to the West. Second, Libya has a lot of reserves, but the shortfall of around 1.4 million b/d of oil from there can be made up for elsewhere. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and the UAE were set to pump an additional 1 million b/d to make up for most of the Libyan short fall on their own.

As an oil producer, Libya ranks behind the traditional oil producers Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and Russia, but also behind the United States, the EU, and Norway. Has the unrest and supply cut-off in Libya driven oil prices up? Sure, but so has the unrest in the Arab world in general and, more recently, fears that Japan's nuclear disaster will cause a move towards petroleum as a substitute energy source. It is simply not worth getting involved in yet another foreign military mission over 400,000 b/d of oil. Anyone who tells you that this is what America is doing is missing something.

The next point is about America's leadership role in all this. America has actually been keen to give up the leadership of the mission and have NATO take it on. The biggest advocate of action has been France's President Nicolas Sarkozy, not Barack Obama. It was France that first afforded diplomatic recognition to Libya's Interim Government, long before it had become clear that it had effective control over most of the territory and its citizens. (This is a custom in international relations/international law, albeit one that's been broken several times: Croatia and Kosovo spring to mind.) So why was this guy blaming America (again)? Is there a good reason for the no-fly zone and all the fuss?

As I've pointed out, my acquaintance was right that America does not always get involved when a government is mistreating its people. Two things, though. For one, this is not absolute. America's involvement against the genocide occurring in the Balkans was because Bill Clinton believed it was the right thing to do (and was pressured/guilt tripped into doing something). American involvement in Somalia was also meant to keep peace and rebuild the state. The "CNN syndrome" struck in Somalia, however: images went around the world of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets behind a pickup truck in Somalia. The American public was clear: if those people want to kill each other, then let them -- get our boys out of there. We did.

America will not usually react to human rights violations with force unless there are additional reasons (like national security) to do so or it is under heavy pressure. This may sound selfish, but the other half of the calculation involves whether or not a change is even reasonably achievable. We cannot topple every dictator, and even when we do, we may have a mess afterwards (as Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly shown). Last but certainly not least: American leaders must consider the costs to their own country, both in blood and treasure. America does well to choose its battles wisely.

So why Libya? It's not national security and, as I hope I've shown, it's not oil. So what is it? The Libyan situation is a simple case of having painted oneself into a corner. The US is acting because it feels heavy pressure to do so, from its allies in Europe, but also due to its, and its allies', actions. When it appeared the rebels were going to topple Gaddafi, supporting them was easy. Kind words were almost all that was required. An embargo was put in place. Gaddafi's accounts in America and (embarrassingly not until later) Europe were frozen. Then the tide turned in favor of Gaddafi.

The US, France, and Britain realized there was wet paint on the floor all around them and that the door behind them had just been closed. They had burned their bridges by making an enemy out of Gaddafi and declaring their support for the rebels. Now the rebels might lose. They basically had no choice but to step up their aid to the rebels. This would have occurred even in Saudi Arabia: If it long appeared the House of Saud was doomed to failure, the West would probably support rebels there. This is because that would be the most likely way to bring about longer-term stability and a quick, and therefore cheap, end to hostilities. They could, of course, fall into the same trap in that case if the tide turned there, too. Such are the problems that accompany marriages of convenience!

It helps in this case that the West is acting under the approval not only of the UN Security Council (in which Russia and China surprisingly decided to abstain rather than veto the no-fly-zone resolution), but also of the Arab League (though the latter is now more ambivalent since actual bombings have begun)! The operation has a level of international approval, and therefore legitimacy, not seen since perhaps Operation Desert Storm under Bush Senior.

So to recap: the US has reluctantly stepped in and taken up a (temporary, it hopes) leadership role in implementing a no-fly-zone with air strikes over Libya. It is doing so in support of rebels against a dictator, but probably would not be if it had not painted itself in a corner. It is acting with a great deal of international support and a UN mandate. It is not about oil.

All in all, while room for cynicism remains about the US and the West's final decision to act, the reasons for this mission are pretty darn good. Whether its a good mission in the sense of the likelihood to succeed, whether it will drag on forever, and how bloody it will get, is another discussion entirely. To imply that this is just another optional war waged by America to slake its oil thirst (or perhaps its alleged thirst for violence) is simply wrong and speaks of ignorance -- or just plain old anti-Americanism.

Afghanistan: It's a game of chicken, and the U.S. doesn't seem to know the rules.

There has been some talk recently about a possible dialog between Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and the Afghan government and/or the Americans. This has generally been welcomed, though most seem to realize that this is not the beginning of real peace negotiations. The problem is: the beginning of peace negotiations is not going to begin anytime soon, and never on U.S. terms. The reason is simple: Afghanistan is a game of chicken. The Taliban understand this. The U.S., it seems, does not.

For those unfamiliar with chicken, it's a fantastically (and idiotically) macho game wherein two men (usually, but let's not be sexist, there are plenty of idiot women out there, too) get in cars and drive at each other full throttle. The first one to swerve loses. Of course, if neither swerves, both lose a lot more than the game: they lose their lives. The stakes are high for two individuals in the game of chicken. In the Afghan version, they are high for millions of individuals.

There are a couple strategies for winning the game of chicken. One is to limit your options by, say, removing your steering wheel and letting the other side know you cannot swerve. This will simplify the game for them: lose the game or lose your life. Simple equation.

The other is to appear to be crazy. If the other side really believes you would rather die than lose the game, they will swerve first.

The Taliban have almost no reason to agree to a settlement on anything other than their own terms. The reason? The U.S. has played the game using the opposite of the second strategy above: everyone knows the U.S. will not stay there forever, no matter the cost. Obama wishes to start pulling out next year. The Taliban know this. The Taliban on the other hand, while not crazy (fanatic, perhaps, but not crazy), can much more convincingly assert that they will fight to the bitter end, regardless of the cost.

The choices here, then, are also simplified: the Taliban can fight for another year, maybe two, or they can just give up now. That's it -- they must only hold out a year. The U.S., on the other hand, can fight until it's bled dry, or it can cut its losses and run. The winner is predetermined here because the U.S. has shown all of its cards (and yes, I'm aware of the mixed metaphor with poker, just go with it).

If you were a Taliban leader, when would you chose to negotiate a peace agreement? "How about never, is never good for you?" seems a likely response.