War between countries is over? Think again.

Source: Indian Navy, CC license

Liberals and idealists have declared the end of war many times before. In 1914, many believed that economic interdependence had made war in Europe unthinkable. After WWI, it was hoped that the League of Nations would stop war. The claim that interstate war has died out has now re-emerged yet again. Less sanguine than the idealists of the past, experts like the retired British General Sir Rupert Smith and the renowned Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argue not that war has ended, but that one type, interstate "industrial" war, is no longer. Instead, the world will fight more insurgencies and small wars against terrorists "amongst the people", to use Smith's phrase. Nuclear weapons are believed to have a limiting effect on conflict and to support the status quo. In addition, norms against violence have spread, just as globalization has reduced the need for states to fight over resources and territory. These latter points may be an effect, rather than a cause of the decline in interstate war, however. Another explanation is also possible: The structure of the international political system has shifted from multipolarity up until the World Wars, to bipolarity until the fall of the USSR, to unipolarity since. It is no coincidence that interstate wars have fallen at the same time. Unipolarity will not last forever, though. As it fades, we may see the return of interstate war.

Influential authors like historian Martin van Creveld have stated that "Large-scale, conventional war... may indeed be at its last gasp". British former General Sir Rupert Smith states bluntly that "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs... no longer exists". The latter argues that this type of war, which he terms "interstate industrial war", has been replaced by "war amongst the people": peace-keeping and state-building operations, counterinsurgencies, and the like, to which there can be no decisive end. This has indeed been the case for conflicts since at least the US's War on Terror and both authors show that the trend has been heading in this direction since the end of WWII. Western militaries are now responding to these trends, shifting capabilities away from interstate fighting and towards fighting insurgents and other smaller groups. Trends can change directions at any time, however, if the cause of such a change is not properly identified.

Smith and van Creveld offer numerous reasons for the decline of interstate warfare, such as changing norms about violence; the rise of different sorts of identity politics based on, for example, religion; the spread of the media into the hands of private individuals able to promote their causes and connext with other would-be militants; and, perhaps most notably, nuclear weapons. Except for the spread of nuclear weapons, which have indeed had a moderating influence on international politics, the other trends noted above could just as easily be effects of a shift away from interstate war rather causes of that shift. At a time when there is no need for large-scale interstate war, there is accordingly less desire for it (norms against the use of force grow stronger). Similarly, as external conflicts lose salience, internal ones grow in relative importance, allowing grievances based on religion or ethnicity to gain greater attention. Even the democratization of the media, which is certainly not due to the recent decline in interstate war, may still not end up limiting it: When the populations involved in such wars see them as necessary (potentially for survival), images of their effects may not help stop them. One thing not offered as a reason is the shift from a multipolar structure in international politics before the World Wars, when there were multiple "Great Powers" with considerable military might, to a bipolar structure during the Cold War, to a unipolar one thereafter. If the cause has been misdiagnosed, the disease of interstate war may return unexpectedly.

Massive interstate wars could be avoided in the period leading up to WWI only by maintaining a "balance of power" between competing Great Powers, all of which were based in Europe. When one state gained in power, alliances would shift to compensate or a small war might be carried out to restore the previous balance. In the early 20th century, however, Germany became so powerful in its own right that the alliance of all other Great Powers against it was not enough to constrain it.* The two World Wars knocked most of the European powers off the list of Great Powers, leaving only two "superpowers": the Soviet Union and the United States. States throughout the world aligned with one or the other superpower and would find one or the other (or both) taking a strong interest in their internal affairs.** Interstate wars continued, but they were often indecisive (Korea and Vietnam) and of uncertain necessity (Vietnam), leading to a great deal of questions about their legitimacy. Since the Cold War, the world has been left with just one "hyperpower": the United States.*** I have argued previously that the world is still unipolar, contrary to popular belief. Read this to see why. The Iraq Wars have shown how quickly the US can win interstate wars and, in the case of the second Iraq War, how quickly it can become bogged down in a "war amongst the people". But how much of this is related to unipolarity rather than a fundamental shift in the types of wars now possible?

In times when military power is more evenly matched, states often cannot gain the decisive military victories that would pave the way towards state-building thereafter. Not only that, alliance partners could very well balk at the prospect of the balance of power then swinging too much in the other direction. If governments are left mostly in place, counterinsurgency and state-building remain the responsibility of the invaded, not their invaders. Wars with more limited objectives to restore the status quo would thus be seen as more necessary and may therefore become more common. The First Iraq War actually fit this model, though the US had the power to do much more. In a multipolar world, the US might retain that initial war-fighting capability, but would not necessarily have that choice to do more. The First Iraq War could become the rule rather than the exception. The world is militarily unipolar, but is economically multipolar already. This matters because economic strength is one critical foundation of military strength. As the wealth of other countries, like China, rises, so can their military spending and capability. The world's current unipolar structure may thus be replaced by a new bipolarity with China or, perhaps more likely, a more multipolar structure with China as a Great Power.

Though the moderating influence of nuclear weapons is not going away, the decline of interstate war has also come with the concentration of power in the hands of the United States. Other factors supposedly limiting interstate war, like changing values and increasing interdependence, may very well be the result of fewer wars rather than the cause, as the world has seemed safer for interdependence and as the declining necessity of war has allowed more peaceful values to flourish. Similarly, unipolarity has caused the US and its allies to expand the goals of wars to state-building and changing the way the world itself is ordered, giving rise to counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations, just as these have become more common as identity politics increase in salience in a world made "safe" for them by a lack of interstate wars. If this is the case, fewer poles may be the best explanation for fewer wars and a rise in state-building and counterinsurgency, rather than any permanent shift in war-fighting "paradigms". As the world swings back towards multipolarity, the resulting instability may give rise to new interstate wars as countries shift alliances to seek advantage and worry more about the relative power and security of their respective blocs. We should not declare victory over interstate war just yet.

*This is, of course, the simplified version of the story. Germany also felt the need to preempt the rise of Russia, was pulled into war by a weaker alliance partner, and the system of alliances had become too rigid and no longer so focused on balancing power.

** Some states explicitly refused to align with either, but this was a choice they could only make if they were deemed neutral enough, unimportant enough strategically, and didn't feel the need to ask for support from one of the superpowers.

***This, in turn, has reduced the number (because of a reduced view of their necessity) of the proxy wars common during the Cold War.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle. London: Penguin, 2012.

Van Creveld, Martin. On Future War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz. London: Brassey’s UK, 1991.

Is pushing people with intolerant views to resign just another form of intolerance?

When the CEO of Mozilla recently stepped down amid anger about his political views, many on the political left and right worried that this was a sign of intolerance, a sort of totalitarian progressivism. Is it?

 Philosophers call it the “paradox of tolerance”: defending tolerance may require intolerance of intolerance. Is this liberalism turning illiberal? 

Liberal democracies like the United States protect citizens’ freedom of speech, religion, and conscience. So you should be free to argue against gay marriage, right? Absolutely, at least as far as the government and laws are concerned. You are also free to believe and argue that all blacks should be deported to Africa if you like. Being a bigot is not a crime. But that doesn’t mean others cannot be angered by your beliefs and protest against them. Legal rights and protections put limits on the government, not the people. Views the majority in society see as distasteful will be punished in the court of public opinion. You are not protected from the consequences of your speech, only from the government trying to suppress it. That majority may be wrong, of course, but more on that below. 

The second problem is when people say things like “isn’t pushing a person out of a job because of his/her beliefs just as bad as doing the same to a gay person?” Frankly, no. Sexuality, like race, sex, gender, physical capabilities, ethnicity, etc. are immutable aspects of identity. They are NOT beliefs. Arguing with someone, pushing them out of a job, refusing them service, etc. on the basis of their identity is discrimination. It is unfair, unjustified, and unjustifiable in most circumstances (you may want a black actor to play a black role in a movie, so there are a few exceptions, of course). Beliefs are changeable and, unlike identities, they may be harmful to others. 

The harm caused by beliefs is how we judge where to draw lines. This is highly problematic, however. Throughout history, people have been harassed, cast out of societies, and even killed because they held beliefs that challenged the status quo. This continues today, though in “liberal” countries people, thankfully, are usually not killed for their beliefs. We rightly condemn racist beliefs. We also limit freedom of religion and speech when these may harm others, for example when Christian Scientists deny their children life-saving medical treatment or when fundamentalists incite violence in the name of their god(s).

But people have been treated poorly for all manner of beliefs many in society thought were harmful at the time. Where do we draw the line? The test is harm. Does preventing gays from marrying cause harm? Those effected would surely say so (take me, who was prevented for 10 years from moving back to my home country due to marriage and immigration discrimination). Does believing the sun is at the center of the solar system? Not directly, but if it spread, it would damage the progress of knowledge that benefits humanity. Likewise, creationism is not harmful unless it spreads by being taught to children who are then deprived of a proper education. You are thus free to teach your children creationism, but the government should not teach things for which there is a consensus that they are not true. At the same time, such beliefs should not be “respected” in the sense that they remain unchallenged. This is how a liberal society functions.

 What do I mean by “challenge”? The judgment about which beliefs are harmful will always, to some extent, be subjective and relative to current social conditions. Try as we might, we cannot escape the societal context in which we exist and cannot see things completely “objectively.” Harm is a good guiding principle, but it is imperfect. In most cases, the best move is to counter ideas rather than people. The best way to do that is through open debate. This means exercising our right to free speech to call out things we consider harmful. Beyond what the law says, however, we also need to listen and take time to consider. 

As for Eich, a gay commentator on the Colbert Report, an American comedy talk show with a large following, recently opined that protesting against and boycotting the state of Arizona for its proposed anti-gay law was OK, but suggested that what happened to Eich was not. In fact, Mozilla customers angry about its CEO’s political views protested and boycotted, exercising their rights to free speech and their economic right to choose. There was nothing illiberal about it. A portion of the United States has come to realize that preventing same-sex couples from marrying is just as wrong as preventing any other two consenting adults from doing so. Saying otherwise is increasingly indefensible (literally: there are no good reasons for it, that side has lost the debate). That is free speech and open debate in action, resulting in intolerance of an intolerant view. A liberal democracy in action, in other words.

America Should Support Democracy... Right?

Obama has good reasons for going against America's principles in favor of cynical pragmatism. That doesn't mean it's the right decision.

The situation in Egypt provides a great example of the ethical conundrums that await any leader when dealing with foreign policy. What just happened in Egypt can only reasonably be called a military coup. US law requires the US to cut off aid to any country in which a democratically elected leader is overthrown by undemocratic means. In Egypt, the military issued an ultimatum--a military giving order to an elected government (the opposite of how things ought to work). When the government didn't fulfill the military's demands, it seized the president and appointed a caretaker government of its choosing. It also shut down media outlets sympathetic to the elected government, trampling on an essential ingredient for a successful democracy: a free press. Legally, then, the case for cutting off the US's annual aid of $1.3 billion to the Egyptian military is pretty clear-cut. So far, Obama has shied away from declaring that the coup was, in fact, a coup, in order to keep his options open.

Beyond the legality of US aid to the Egyptian military, moreover, there are also myriad moral issues at stake. How can the US honestly claim to support democracy when it only does so if it likes the regime that was overthrown? Not cutting off aid makes the US look like a complete hypocrite and undermines its moral authority when trying to push for democracy elsewhere. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where Islam-inspired political parties may now conclude that democracy won't work and that the only way to get to power is to seize power and shut down all opposition. The Middle East's experiment with democracy could be over before it starts.

So why hasn't the US cut off aid? This is where it gets complicated. It started paying aid to Egypt in 1979 as part of its support of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Egypt agreed to sign the treaty and demilitarize the Sinai Peninsula, thereby fulfilling Israel's security needs. This was the right thing to do, as it supported peace, even though it was aid to the military of a dictatorship. It also helped shift Egypt out of the Soviet orbit during the Cold War. Over the years since, the US military has fostered close ties to its counterpart in Egypt. This is the strongest connection between the US and Egypt. During last year's uprising that brought down Mubarak, the US is said to have used the good relationship between the two countries' militaries to encourage, and to push for, democratic elections in Egypt. All good stuff, then.

The reasons for not cutting the aid are all related to this. Egypt has all the leverage with the aid. The aid is related to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. It it's cut, Egypt might retaliate by abrogating the treaty. This doesn't necessarily mean war with Israel or even re-militarization of Sinai, but it could be the first step in rising instability between the two of them. The aid lies at the root of the cooperation between the militaries of the US and Egypt, and that cooperation is the greatest source of influence between the two. Canceling the aid would thus most likely end the cooperation and thus the US's last source of influence in Egypt. That would mean the US would have less ability to encourage a return to democracy or peace with Israel. This is why it's so tricky to stay involved and to stay "morally" clean in this case.

There are no easy answers, but I think I have to side with John McCain on this one: Suspend aid. Suspend, not terminate. It should be known that aid will be restored as soon as free and fair elections have been held and providing Egypt sticks to the peace treaty with Israel. When aid is restored, back payments should also be made, so Egypt suffers no loss in the long term.

It's a risky strategy, admittedly. Egypt has enough difficulties at home that it would make no sense to start problems with Israel. This oft-cited fact is little comfort, however. It is precisely during times of great internal turmoil that rulers do unexpected, illogical, and dangerous things. After all, what better way to unite the Egyptian people behind the government than by ditching an unpopular treaty with Israel and possibly making aggressive noises towards it? Israel can definitely defend itself, but an escalation of that kind would still be dangerous for Israel, Egypt, and the whole region. If Obama seems indecisive about whether to stick to America's principles or go with cynical pragmatism, this is why.

America and Myanmar: Be Realist, but Be Liberal, Too

President Obama just got finished with a trip to Myanmar. This trip is of massive significance, because Myanmar has been a pariah state since the 1990s. The trip is a sort of reward to Myanmar for making positive changes. This is a situation in which sanctions seem to have worked: Myanmar did not like its pariah status, in part because strict Western sanctions meant that it had to rely heavily on China. Myanmar is now looking to diversify its options. This also comes at an opportune time for American policy: America is in the middle of a strategic “pivot” towards Asia. Sanctions have thus been in place for liberal reasons like promoting democracy and human rights and encouraging the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Removing some of those sanctions is also a way to encourage Myanmar to continue improving. At the same time, however, they also serve a strategic, realist purpose. Has the shift towards good relations with Myanmar been too fast? In other words: Is America getting overly concerned with balancing against China and leaving liberal causes by the wayside?

Myanmar has made some very positive changes towards more openness and democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi has also approved of these changes and the loosening of sanctions against Myanmar in order to support continued change. Myanmar's legislature now includes mostly elected politicians and it seems to have some real influence on governing, which is a welcome change to full-on dictatorship. However, these changes are still limited and, perhaps more importantly, imminently reversible. There are still problems with the repression and mistreatment of ethnic minorities and there are still conservative factions within the army that are opposed to further opening. Myanmar is thus not there yet. Some sanctions, however, are also still in place. They should not be fully removed until the country has arrived at liberal democracy. Are we moving too fast? It seems the most onerous sanctions are already gone. There is also a further danger: Myanmar may see the US “pivot” towards Asia as a reason the United States will want to embrace Myanmar no matter what it does. What's more, the country's leaders would have reason to think this.

In the autumn of last year, the Obama Administration announced a "pivot" towards Asia. The main reason for this strategic shift is that the Administration rightly sees Asia is the future. Specifically, though, it has seen that US allies in the region are increasingly nervous about the rising power of China. Since 1945, with a few glaring exceptions such as the Korean and Vietnam wars (which are not necessarily considered exceptions, but let's leave that for now), the Asia-Pacific region has experienced what is known as the “Pax Americana.” The US presence in the region, including important security guarantees to allies like Japan and South Korea, has meant that countries there have been free to concentrate on economic development and have not needed to worry about the military prowess of their neighbors. Japan has a military that, according to its own constitution, is purely for defensive purposes. It also has no nuclear weapons, though it certainly has the capability to develop them. This stability will be at risk if countries in the region feel that the United States can no longer maintain the status quo there and that they themselves must be able to defend themselves against a rising China.

It does not matter whether or not China or its neighbors actually seek war. What matters is that little bit of fear in the back of leaders' minds that makes them think they had better be prepared – just in case. The result could be a buildup of arms in the region, possibly including Japanese and South Korean nukes. Each build-up would then serve to make each country's immediate neighbors more nervous, encouraging them to build up as well. This conundrum is known as the "security dilemma.” The US presence in East Asia has so far prevented this outcome, and the Obama Administration seems to wish to continue doing so for as long as possible.

This focus on broader strategic goals is good. Over time, of course, the US may not be able to maintain the Pax Americana. But in the short to medium term, it makes sense to try (I won't discuss the pitfalls here). The risk in the case of Myanmar, however, is that the US places realist strategic goals ahead of liberal ones. Generally, if the choice comes down to those two, then I support realism. We do not yet have to choose, however. America can still pivot towards Asia and it doesn't necessarily need Myanmar to do so. What's more, balancing is occurring anyway. China's neighbors are uncomfortable with its power and with its maritime claims in the South China Sea. These countries have been cultivating better relations with each other and with America already. The region's other superpower, India, has also grown much closer to America. America's pivot towards Asia is therefore in many Asian countries' own self interest. America doesn't need to bribe them much (though it should cultivate good relations with them). There is thus no need yet to sacrifice liberal causes on the altar of strategic realism.

America can thus both stick to its principles of support for democracy and human rights while keeping an eye on important strategic goals like stability, security, and, in the end, peace. Hopefully, the Obama Administration and future American Administrations recognize this and will continue to keep the pressure on Myanmar whenever needed in order to keep rewarding it for moving in the right direction. Hopefully, too, both the leaders of the United States and Myanmar realize that the loosening of sanctions is every bit as reversible as Myanmar's own move towards democracy and its promotion of human rights.

Why Should Polygamy Be Illegal?

Anti-gay rights activists often ground their argument against gay marriage using the "slippery slope" analogy: If we allow this, soon we'll have to allow polygamy, pedophilia, and bestiality. This, of course, is silly (and gravely insulting). We don't "have" to do anything. Slippery slopes do exist, so the analogy is not always a red herring, but in this case it's a bit like arguing that we shouldn't allow women to vote because soon children, prison inmates, and farm animals will want the vote as well. Besides, the fundamental line of separation here is mercifully clear and uncontroversial: it's consent--at least for most of the cases. Children are not capable of consenting to sexual acts they (and their bodies) do not understand. Sex with children will thus always be unacceptable and a crime (all arguments about the age at which a person is mature enough to consent aside). Animals have no way of expressing consent and, at the risk of stating the obvious, there is little reason to think they would give it if they could! That leaves polygamy.

Polygamy (which includes polygyny and polyandry) is not socially acceptable in most places in "Western" countries. Even the Mormons no longer allow it. If we follow the consent principle, though, it is hard to find solid arguments for outlawing it. Let me make one thing clear right here: no good arguments for disallowing something does not equal good arguments for engaging in something. I'm not promoting polygamy (or even polyamory) here. What I am promoting is people's choice to be polygamous if they and their partners wish. It's about freedom and consent.

"Polygyny is degrading to women." I'll admit on an emotional level it sure seems odd to share one man among several women. In the end, though, this comes down to claiming to know what's good for others better than they know it themselves. This is always tricky. We do accept such paternalism as the norm in some cases, however. Seatbelt laws are just one example. The reason we have them is because they save lives because we are all apparently too shortsighted to save our lives without laws mandating that we do so! So do people always make the best choices for themselves? Obviously not. But the harm in polygamy is not clear, or at least not clear enough to make it criminal. It seems to me your family and friends (if anyone) should be the ones telling you not to do it, not the state. Besides, we're talking about polygamy as a whole here. Is polyandry degrading to men? Are men considered equally incapable of judging what is good for them? If not, then the whole argument about banning polygamy because it is degrading to women centers on women being incapable of thinking for themselves. Who's degrading women now?

This reminds me a bit (tangentially) of calls to ban Islamic face coverings and head scarves. Some also consider these to be degrading to women. Once again, though: How do we pick out those who are pressured into wearing them by their husbands and fathers and those who choose to do so out of a personal sense of piety? (I have known some women in the latter group.) This topic is less controversial in the US, with its strict tradition of freedom of religion and religious expression, than in Europe. But as one woman in an English class I taught in Austria pointed out (she was the only one in the class against banning face coverings): "Prohibiting women from covering their faces is just as bad as forcing them to cover them. No matter what, they are not free to choose."

So bans on polygamy are based in religious tradition and paternalism and are thus overly restrictive of individual freedoms in my book (you all know I'm a social--but not economic--libertarian). Thoughts?

Liberalism and the Rise of China

"Liberalism" is a word with sometimes contradictory meanings. In international relations, it refers to a school of thought that supports internationalism: free trade, international institutions and laws, and, by association, the decline of realism, with its concepts of power, national interests, and the nation-state in a world of anarchy. The United States, many or most European states, and other "western" countries like Canada and Australia are, more or less, liberal powers (though all of them bow to the exigencies of realpolitik when they deem it necessary). China, too, is liberal, at least in the sense of free trade. It was quick to understand the benefits and reap the rewards of free trade. On foreign relations, however, China is decidedly realist.

While the EU and the U.S. often make trade and aid agreements contingent on certain human rights standards being met, China relates with other states as it suits it, largely ignoring what is going on within those states. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two excellent examples. China has helped Pakistan build several nuclear reactors, even though China's membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means it has a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons and is barred from providing nuclear assistance of any kind to non-members of the treaty (such as Pakistan). Admittedly, this is partly a response to America's bending of the rules (nonetheless the "proper way," by getting a legal exception to them passed) to do the same for India, Pakistan's arch rival and also a non-member of the NPT. (America did this largely because it sees China as a counterweight to India in the Indian Ocean and in the world.)

In Sri Lanka, China has been selling weapons at low prices and donating handsomely to infrastructure investment programs there, no strings attached. The U.S. and the EU had halted such activity after concerns arose about alleged war crimes being committed by government forces when fighting (and finally, after decades) defeating the Tamil Tigers, a separatist militia group. China's generosity has more than made up for the West's cutoff, so Sri Lanka was unconcerned about the West's threats. Will the West have any influence anymore?

The difficulty with liberalism is that it requires worldwide cooperation (at least until a world authority, replete with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions arises to run and enforce things, a simultaneously Utopian- and somewhat frightening-sounding idea). Even one systemically important straggler can bring the liberal system to its knees. During the world's brief "unipolar moment," in which the fall of the USSR has left the United States the world's only "hyperpower," this has been less problematic. The U.S. has had the resources and the lack of opposition necessary to push for such cooperation. However, this has never been a complete success, and unipolarity is ending (aided in part by a broad interpretation of U.S. goals leading to overstretch of its resources). China is on the rise, India and Brazil are possible future Great Powers, and Russia is insistent on not being forgotten. Economically, the EU is a Great Power, but it lacks the political, foreign policy, and military unity to have a real enforcement-related presence in the world. As the center of economic and military gravity shifts away from the U.S. and the EU (in relative terms), it will be increasingly harder for the West to make sanctions stick if other powers do not cooperate. It will also become ever harder to cajole them into cooperation.

The question that presents itself is: how much longer will it make sense to attach strings to aid and trade? If the strings mean both are turned down, and the presence of generous, no-strings-attached opportunities from elsewhere means the deals are not effective in shaping the world, then what is the point? The passed-over deals would benefit China and other realist opportunists and hurt the U.S. and the EU. At some point, concern about this loss of influence, and about China's rising military and economic might, will cause a shift to more realism in foreign and economic policy.

Realists are not prescriptive. It's not that they think things should be this way, it's that they assess that they are, whether or not we like it. In such circumstances, unfortunately, sometimes looking out for one's own interests, narrowly defined, is the best anyone can do. This will likely be the future of the world in the coming decades.

Liberal Europe?

It doesn't matter who you talk to: Europe is considered to be "liberal." Republicans dislike it for that reasons, democrats plan trips there for that reason. But is Europe really so liberal? Before we begin, it's important to note that there is no "Europe" as a single concept. It seems most people seem to be referring to France when they speak of it. There are a lot of countries over there though.

My first example: 2nd and co-parent adoption laws regarding same-sex couples. As far as I know, there is no country in Europe where they are legal. Yet in my home region of the US, legislation passed almost uncontroversially around a decade ago in numerous states allowing gays to adopt children together as a couple. Even in the few countries that have allowed same-sex marriages (like the Netherlands and Spain), adoptions are not part of the deal. "Separate but equal?"

Then let's take religious expression. France has been a bastion of illiberalism in this regard for a while. Recently, a committee recommended banning the burqa in many public spaces in France. Supporters contend that this is merely an assertion of France's long-standing separation of church and state. I like separating church and state and don't feel that any religion should have anything to do with any government decisions. I am disturbed when political candidates talk about their faith (or even go so far as to say they talk to god themselves). But banning freedom of religious expression takes this too far. After all, the result might be that the women are then not permitted to leave the house by their ultra-conservative husbands. The problem is a spread of fundamental Islamic ideas. It makes absolutely no sense to fight illiberalism with illiberalism!

The next point is racism, integration, and acceptance of other people. Here, Europe scores poorly once again. True, this is mostly for historical reasons ("French" and "German" are nationalities, not just citizenships). Europeans claim they are not used to immigration. There is some truth to this, but it is no excuse for the xenophobia immigrants can experience there. Immigrants living in Germany and France take a much longer time to feel at home in their host countries than those in the United States, and many of them never feel at home at all, stuck instead between two worlds. This is largely the source of unrest among immigrant communities in Europe (think of burning cars on the outskirts of Paris or increasing criminal difficulties in Neukölln in Berlin).

Finally, there are inheritance laws. In most, if not all, of continental Europe, you have to bequeath property to all your children. You could not, say, decide to leave all your possessions to your best friend, who had looked after you better than your deadbeat kids. You HAVE to give your property to your kids. This is in the name of "fairness" and was originally intended to break up aristocracies by splitting land into smaller pieces. This may have made sense in the past, but it seems alarmingly un-free now. And yet: there is no desire to change these laws. Continental Europeans are content with them.

Keeping all this in mind, perhaps you ought to be careful next time you talk about Europe being a "liberal" place. Just because there may be bare breasts in some advertisements there does NOT make it "liberal"!

How Structural Realism Shows America Needs a More Liberal, Multilateral Approach to Foreign Policy

By Charles Kirchofer, Dec. 17^th, 2008

I actually should be finishing work on part two of my series (if you can call something that when it only has one part) on the big issues for Barack Obama in foreign policy. Or I could work on my planned article on why the stock market is not a casino, even now. Instead, I want to take a few moments to do something unorthodox. If you were thrown off by the title of this article (thinking "what the f$!k is 'structural realism'?!"), have no fear: I'm not about to get all theoretical on you. What I will say, however, is this: there are two major schools of thought on international politics (and maybe a third or possibly fourth, depending whom you ask). These are realism and liberalism. Realists believe nation states are the central players on the international scene and that these states live in a competitive environment. Liberals believe the world is becoming ever more integrated, that NGOs, international organizations, and transnational corporations have seriously reduced the influence of nation states on world affairs, and that there is something called the "international community," whose desires may be universal and are to be put above national interests. OK, that's it for the theory. Here's the unorthodox part: rubbish, I say. I'm about to argue for a more liberal American approach to foreign policy for realist reasons. That's right: the two terms are a false dichotomy, which is why I say they're both right and therefore both wrong, which means we are free to combine reasoning from both "schools" as they fit.


The realist foundation
OK, maybe there's going to be more theory than I promised, but stay with me. Structural realism holds that the number of great powers in the world (called "poles") decide the system's structure, which, in turn, influences outcomes. For example: the world before 1945 was multipolar, with most of the great powers right next to each other in Europe. Because the competitors were next to each other and relied on each other for resources because they were all relatively small, it was very unlikely that there would be any lasting European cooperation. Indeed, though they tried, this was the case. After 1945 the world became bipolar, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the great powers. Now, with none of the great powers in Western Europe, the countries there were no longer in a position where they had to compete with each other. Cooperation was then possible. The result? The European Community and later the EU, complete with a shared currency. Liberals would say the Europeans just finally learned their lesson and learned to cooperate, but everyone thought that in the late 19th century and after WWI, too. Do ideas and public opinion matter? Sure, but I think this structural explanation explains the timing better and is the more likely underlying enabler (combined with factors the liberals point out).


Nice history lesson, so what's this have to do with anything?
Good question. The world today is no longer bipolar, it's become unipolar, or possibly multipolar. Militarily, at least, the world is definitely unipolar, with America the military superpower (it's military spending is more than the spending of the next five top military spenders combined). Good for the U.S., right? Well, not really. Realists predict that states always move toward balancing power. This would mean essentially everyone else would align against, or at the very least refuse to cooperate with, the United States. European countries may not have agreed with the Vietnam war, either, and yet cooperation remained high because the system was bipolar. It was the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Faced with that decision, they largely stuck with the U.S. Diplomats will tell you cooperation has become more difficult. Realists would argue this process was set in motion after the fall of the Soviet Union (meaning the tendency would be present even without the Iraq war).

That said, I think we can agree the Iraq war certainly helped to ally states against the U.S. This is bad news. The U.S. was used to playing the world police force during the Cold War. It was indirectly encouraged to do so by the presence of the other pole (the U.S.S.R.), and it was also constricted by the Soviet presence, which checked U.S. power. In the 90's, the U.S. suddenly saw itself changed from a superpower to what some called a "hyperpower." With all this power sitting around, some felt it was time to use it to change the world according to their own standards, just as realists would have predicted (because there was no longer any check on American power), which is not to say they all necessarily would have recommended it (indeed, many realists spoke out against the war as being unnecessary and too risky). Hence: the Iraq War.

What does this mean for us now? Regardless of whether the world is (still) unipolar or if it has become multipolar, cooperation is likely to become more difficult. My conclusion? Start thinking like liberals. Start welcoming cooperation, rely more on "soft power" ("winning over the hearts and minds" of the world, making them want to be more like us and want to cooperate with us), encourage reform in, and support the workings of, international organizations (particularly the UN and NATO). As I've mentioned before, it's time to dust off the old-time art of diplomacy, because coercion is simply going to meet with ever more resistance and become ever more counterproductive for global and U.S. aims.

In the end, the realists accurately describe how the world works, but the liberals accurately prescribe what we should do in the current environment. So we should speak softly and be more friendly, everyone already knows we're carrying a big stick (and the realist in me would advise keeping it).