War between countries is over? Think again.

Source: Indian Navy, CC license

Liberals and idealists have declared the end of war many times before. In 1914, many believed that economic interdependence had made war in Europe unthinkable. After WWI, it was hoped that the League of Nations would stop war. The claim that interstate war has died out has now re-emerged yet again. Less sanguine than the idealists of the past, experts like the retired British General Sir Rupert Smith and the renowned Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argue not that war has ended, but that one type, interstate "industrial" war, is no longer. Instead, the world will fight more insurgencies and small wars against terrorists "amongst the people", to use Smith's phrase. Nuclear weapons are believed to have a limiting effect on conflict and to support the status quo. In addition, norms against violence have spread, just as globalization has reduced the need for states to fight over resources and territory. These latter points may be an effect, rather than a cause of the decline in interstate war, however. Another explanation is also possible: The structure of the international political system has shifted from multipolarity up until the World Wars, to bipolarity until the fall of the USSR, to unipolarity since. It is no coincidence that interstate wars have fallen at the same time. Unipolarity will not last forever, though. As it fades, we may see the return of interstate war.

Influential authors like historian Martin van Creveld have stated that "Large-scale, conventional war... may indeed be at its last gasp". British former General Sir Rupert Smith states bluntly that "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs... no longer exists". The latter argues that this type of war, which he terms "interstate industrial war", has been replaced by "war amongst the people": peace-keeping and state-building operations, counterinsurgencies, and the like, to which there can be no decisive end. This has indeed been the case for conflicts since at least the US's War on Terror and both authors show that the trend has been heading in this direction since the end of WWII. Western militaries are now responding to these trends, shifting capabilities away from interstate fighting and towards fighting insurgents and other smaller groups. Trends can change directions at any time, however, if the cause of such a change is not properly identified.

Smith and van Creveld offer numerous reasons for the decline of interstate warfare, such as changing norms about violence; the rise of different sorts of identity politics based on, for example, religion; the spread of the media into the hands of private individuals able to promote their causes and connext with other would-be militants; and, perhaps most notably, nuclear weapons. Except for the spread of nuclear weapons, which have indeed had a moderating influence on international politics, the other trends noted above could just as easily be effects of a shift away from interstate war rather causes of that shift. At a time when there is no need for large-scale interstate war, there is accordingly less desire for it (norms against the use of force grow stronger). Similarly, as external conflicts lose salience, internal ones grow in relative importance, allowing grievances based on religion or ethnicity to gain greater attention. Even the democratization of the media, which is certainly not due to the recent decline in interstate war, may still not end up limiting it: When the populations involved in such wars see them as necessary (potentially for survival), images of their effects may not help stop them. One thing not offered as a reason is the shift from a multipolar structure in international politics before the World Wars, when there were multiple "Great Powers" with considerable military might, to a bipolar structure during the Cold War, to a unipolar one thereafter. If the cause has been misdiagnosed, the disease of interstate war may return unexpectedly.

Massive interstate wars could be avoided in the period leading up to WWI only by maintaining a "balance of power" between competing Great Powers, all of which were based in Europe. When one state gained in power, alliances would shift to compensate or a small war might be carried out to restore the previous balance. In the early 20th century, however, Germany became so powerful in its own right that the alliance of all other Great Powers against it was not enough to constrain it.* The two World Wars knocked most of the European powers off the list of Great Powers, leaving only two "superpowers": the Soviet Union and the United States. States throughout the world aligned with one or the other superpower and would find one or the other (or both) taking a strong interest in their internal affairs.** Interstate wars continued, but they were often indecisive (Korea and Vietnam) and of uncertain necessity (Vietnam), leading to a great deal of questions about their legitimacy. Since the Cold War, the world has been left with just one "hyperpower": the United States.*** I have argued previously that the world is still unipolar, contrary to popular belief. Read this to see why. The Iraq Wars have shown how quickly the US can win interstate wars and, in the case of the second Iraq War, how quickly it can become bogged down in a "war amongst the people". But how much of this is related to unipolarity rather than a fundamental shift in the types of wars now possible?

In times when military power is more evenly matched, states often cannot gain the decisive military victories that would pave the way towards state-building thereafter. Not only that, alliance partners could very well balk at the prospect of the balance of power then swinging too much in the other direction. If governments are left mostly in place, counterinsurgency and state-building remain the responsibility of the invaded, not their invaders. Wars with more limited objectives to restore the status quo would thus be seen as more necessary and may therefore become more common. The First Iraq War actually fit this model, though the US had the power to do much more. In a multipolar world, the US might retain that initial war-fighting capability, but would not necessarily have that choice to do more. The First Iraq War could become the rule rather than the exception. The world is militarily unipolar, but is economically multipolar already. This matters because economic strength is one critical foundation of military strength. As the wealth of other countries, like China, rises, so can their military spending and capability. The world's current unipolar structure may thus be replaced by a new bipolarity with China or, perhaps more likely, a more multipolar structure with China as a Great Power.

Though the moderating influence of nuclear weapons is not going away, the decline of interstate war has also come with the concentration of power in the hands of the United States. Other factors supposedly limiting interstate war, like changing values and increasing interdependence, may very well be the result of fewer wars rather than the cause, as the world has seemed safer for interdependence and as the declining necessity of war has allowed more peaceful values to flourish. Similarly, unipolarity has caused the US and its allies to expand the goals of wars to state-building and changing the way the world itself is ordered, giving rise to counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations, just as these have become more common as identity politics increase in salience in a world made "safe" for them by a lack of interstate wars. If this is the case, fewer poles may be the best explanation for fewer wars and a rise in state-building and counterinsurgency, rather than any permanent shift in war-fighting "paradigms". As the world swings back towards multipolarity, the resulting instability may give rise to new interstate wars as countries shift alliances to seek advantage and worry more about the relative power and security of their respective blocs. We should not declare victory over interstate war just yet.

*This is, of course, the simplified version of the story. Germany also felt the need to preempt the rise of Russia, was pulled into war by a weaker alliance partner, and the system of alliances had become too rigid and no longer so focused on balancing power.

** Some states explicitly refused to align with either, but this was a choice they could only make if they were deemed neutral enough, unimportant enough strategically, and didn't feel the need to ask for support from one of the superpowers.

***This, in turn, has reduced the number (because of a reduced view of their necessity) of the proxy wars common during the Cold War.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle. London: Penguin, 2012.

Van Creveld, Martin. On Future War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz. London: Brassey’s UK, 1991.

Want to Fight Extremism and Help Moves toward Middle East Peace? A Deal with Iran Might Help.

Photo: The Guardian - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/04/iran-suspend-uranium-enrichment

One of the reasons I have been arguing for action on Syria is because Iran is watching. If we're not willing to stop Syria from using chemical weapons, so the argument goes, Iran will know full well that we are not going to bomb it to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon. Now that our weak commitment to enforcing norms against weapons of mass destruction has become clear, however, it may be time to look for the bright side. In this case, the bright side has to do with the other half of the deterrence equation: the promise.

Most people focus on the threat side of deterrence because deterrence is, roughly, using contingent threats to prevent an adversary from taking a particular undesirable action. The "contingent" part (we will attack only if you do x) is often swiftly forgotten, but deterrence cannot work without it. "You won't like what we'll do to you if you do x" also means "if you DON'T do x, everything will be fine." Similarly, a lot of time is spent worrying about the credibility of threats, but almost no thought is given to the credibility of promises NOT to attack. This is a huge oversight, because if I believe you'll attack me either way, I have a strong incentive to hit you first, or do whatever it was you didn't like, in order to be stronger and appear defiant in the face of your threats.

I suspect so little attention is given to the credibility of promises because of an assumption made by deterrers that they are the good guys and are peace-loving, so of course our promise to be nice is believable, unlike conciliatory promises made by the other side, which, being the enemy, is not to be trusted. I'm not arguing that we should trust Iran. Everything about its nuclear program screams "weapons," despite its assertions to the contrary. What I AM saying is that we should not assume Iran ought to be able to trust us and that any concerns it claims to have are just posturing and nonsense.

Iran has at least two reasons to doubt the US. One is that we have successfully toppled its government once before (after a period of constant meddling my Russia and Britain) in the 1950s. The other is that the US has made no secret of its wish to see regime change in Iran ever since. The past two centuries of Iran's history have served as a lesson never to trust big foreign powers. What may seem to Americans like paranoia or fake worry looks to Iranians like sensible concerns about preventing subversion by foreigners.

The fact that the US obviously does not want to get drawn any further into Middle East conflicts is thus a cause for Iran to relax: The US attempting to topple the Iranian regime seems quite unlikely at the moment. The question is now whether Iran wants the bomb to have greater power over its neighbors (in which case a more conciliatory US stance is unlikely to help) or because it mainly fears the US and its allies (some also in the region), which could be helped by a more peaceful-looking United States.

That question is basically moot, however, because I don't see the US attacking Iran any time soon. The question thus becomes: Now that we have limited our options, what is the path to the best possible outcome? Even if Iran is seeking regional hegemony, as many in Israel believe, getting a bomb may not be the best way to get there, especially if this causes other regional powers like Saudi Arabia to go nuclear as well. The current sanctions on Iran are very painful. They would continue and intensify if Iran got the bomb. This weakens Iran and makes its people unhappy, increasing risks for the regime. If Iran feels safe from US invasion and attacks by Israel, cooperation on several levels could be possible and be a way for Iran to grow stronger. Al Qaeda is one of Iran's biggest enemies, just as it is to the United States. The same goes for other Sunni extremist groups. Given the apparent recent resurgence in Al Qaeda's strength, cooperation with Iran on countering those groups could be useful. At the same time, Shia groups like Hezbollah defer heavily to Iran's leadership. Iran is thus a central player in Middle East politics involving terror groups and other non-state actors and is THE power when it comes to Shia Islam.

Iran's pride would need to be protected in any deal. One possibility would be to leave Iran "stalled" at near break-out capacity for creating a bomb (broadly where it is today). Iran has continually insisted it does not wish to build a bomb, so this would not have to seem a climb-down and would save face. At the same time, Iran would not have a bomb and could perhaps slowly climb down from having one through increased cooperation on a civilian program. This would meet US goals and save US face and credibility. Reducing tension between the West and Iran could also help in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as Hezbollah defers heavily to Iran and Hamas also listens to it, covering two of Israel's most difficult borders. A removal of tension may make Israel feel secure enough to negotiate.

It's not that far-fetched. Iran doesn't seem that sure on whether it wants to cross that final threshold and obtain a bomb. There's a decent chance it won't build one. The US and its allies should of course stick to the sanctions until concrete progress is made and make clear their commitment to protecting their allies in the region, including against nuclear threats. But if the US seizes such an opportunity, further cooperation would be more probable than at any time since 1979.

Waltz on Nuclear Defenses

"The best one can say about missile defenses is that they won't work. (If they did, an offense-defense race would result, with all too familiar consequences). Missile defenses are easily thwarted. In the nuclear business, offensive weapons are much cheaper than defensive ones. Other states can multiply their warheads; they can confound defenses by deploying decoys and spreading chaff; they can outflank defenses by delivering warheads in any of many different ways - by plane, by ships, by cruise missiles, by missiles fired on depressed trajectories. Missile defenses would be the most complicated system ever mounted, and the system would have to work with near perfection in meeting its first realistic test - the test of enemy fire. Some warheads may get through, and both the attacked and the attacker will know that. No president will rely on such a system but instead will avoid actions that might provoke an attack. With or without defenses, the restraints on American policy are the same."¹

So what could the point of the current missile defense shield in Europe be, including Obama's new plans for a primarily sea-based one? My guess is that it is purely a political gamble:

• Domestically: voters in the US like the idea of being "protected" from incoming nukes.
• Internationally: Bush and Obama might hope that Iran will scrap its nuclear ambitions if they can be made to believe that their weapons would be ineffective.

 This second idea seems unlikely. After all, Iran has nuclear ambitions because it feels insecure, not because it necessarily hopes to use the bomb. Anyway, it would be more likely to use its nukes against another Middle Eastern country (probably even excluding Israel!) than against the United States or Europe.

Conclusion? The "defense shield" is domestic political pandering for electoral gain. "But Bush couldn't get re-elected again after 2004, but continued to push the shield" you say? No problem, the shield was an aid to his party, and can still be used as evidence the republicans are tougher protectors of American safety than democrats (regardless of the fact that Obama's plans would eventually be more costly, but also more effective, than the land-based Bush plan).

Say "no" to "missile defense!" Say "yes" to arms control!

1. Waltz, Kenneth. "The Continuity of International Politics." In Realism and International Politics, 246-250. New York: Routledge, 2008.

North Korea: Don't Worry

It's a totalitarian state with nuclear technology and an ideological slant against the rest of the world that also continually threatens the rest of the world with rockets and other attacks. Sounds scary. And indeed, North Korea shouldn't be underestimated. All of these things are true, and it has been launching ineffective rockets that may very well get more effective in the coming years. Still, I'm not worried.

There are a number of reasons why we should just roll our eyes and carry on with our business while Kim Jong-Il throws yet another tantrum. While it is true that assuming that foreign leaders are rational can be dangerous, it holds true in the overwhelming majority of situations. Although Kim and his forefathers have done many things that could be considered irrational from the point of view of the welfare of the citizens of North Korea, from the standpoint of keeping control of an entire country, they have actually been rather successful. There is little to suggest that Kim Jong-Il or anyone else in North Korea would like to see North Korea wiped out. Thus, I think we can fairly safely assume Kim is rational, if somewhat misguided.

Assuming he is rational, he has very few options. Who would North Korea attack and what could it possibly hope to gain from such an action? The easiest target would be Seoul South Korea, mere miles from the border to North Korea. But again, what would that get North Korea? It would likely result in a UN-sanctioned attack on North Korea, something Obama would not shy away from with widespread international support. Besides, there does seem to be some feeling of brotherhood with their relatives to the south, so killing millions hardly seems likely. How about Japan or the United States, two countries North Korea loathes? Again, wrath, probably much more so than even with an attack against South Korea. This could lead to the re-militarization of Japan and the destabilization of the entire region, something China would desperately seek to hinder. So what about China? China is the closest thing North Korea has to an ally. It would be madness to attack it and that therefore seems highly unlikely. I'm sure anyone can imagine the result if North Korea really succeeded in attacking the United States, especially if Americans were killed. The United States may have shown itself not to be omnipotent, but a country would still be incredibly foolhardy to provoke an attack from it.

Taking all this into account, North Korea is fenced in. It may sometimes seem that China is helping North Korea, but this isn't really true. China pushes other countries to respect North Korean sovereignty for two reasons: it wishes others to do the same with China, and it has no interest in seeing North Korea collapse and then having to deal with a flood of refugees over the border into China. At the same time, China has no desire to have a nuclear competitor as a neighbor. Its siding with North Korea may also stem partly from a desire to snub the West a bit, but at the end of the day, China wants to maintain its predominance (shared with the U.S.) in the region and doesn't want any new dangerous competitors. It may be happy, though, to play North Korea off the West and Japan in the meantime to deflect attention away from itself. This is also all purely rational. Although China's interests are not 100% in line with those of the U.S., they are also not really against them.

A student of mine (Austrian) also let me in on what he was more afraid of: that the U.S. would be hasty and attack North Korea. Here, too, I told him, he could relax. The reason? China, once again. China would be extremely angered by such a move and has too much leverage in the region. No president would endanger relations with such a powerful and important trading partner. Even George Bush realized that. For that reason, an unprovoked (by which I mean that North Korea does not openly attack the U.S. or Americans) U.S. invasion or military engagement against North Korea is extremely unlikely, even before looking at other factors. These factors include the massive debt the U.S. has built and its large deficits, its fighting (or nation-building/peacekeeping, whatever you'd like to call it) on two fronts (Iraq and Afghanistan), and, finally, Barack Obama's presidency, which promises to be a more thoughtful, cautious, and calculating one. All of these factors make it almost inconceivable that the U.S. would do anything militarily against North Korea. Kim Jong-Il knows this, and is pushing his limits and showing his muscle. But that's all it is: show, a demand for more respect.

In the meantime, I propose a sliding scale system of benefits for North Korea, which, once established, would be non-negotiable. This would let North Korea know that it will always be rewarded for doing good things, punished for doing bad, and this always automatically, non-negotiably, instantaneously, and in a predictable and transparent manner. This would prevent North Korea's leaders, current or future, from using tantrums to try to extract more goodies. The only way they could get more would be by improving. Those same benefits would then automatically and immediately be eliminated if things devolved again.

North Korea probably won't stay like this forever, but it is anyone's guess as to how much longer it will remain as it is. Maybe change will come with Kim Jong-Il's passing - maybe not. In the meantime, we should engage North Korea, but not pander to it. By being clear on exactly what consequences which moves will have, we can make it more likely that North Korea will respond positively. If not, it's Kim's loss, not ours. It may be a pity, but that's the way it is. In any case, its threat, though not to be underestimated, especially for its destabilizing effects for the region, should also not be exaggerated.