The morality of retaliation in warfare

"An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." The concept of retribution has been present in conceptions of justice since ancient times, with perhaps the earliest known prescription of it found in the Hammurabi code of ancient Babylon. Though a literal interpretation of such codes now appears barbaric to most people and Jesus himself advised his followers to "turn to them the other cheek as well" if they were slapped, rather than seek an eye for an eye (Matthew 5:38-48), modern criminal justice continues to codify retribution. Though modern criminal justice is meant to fulfill three purposes, the other two being reform and deterrence, retribution itself is seen as just. If the law in any state focused purely on reform, those wronged by criminals would likely see this as unjust and might even seek vigilante justice for themselves. Retribution may thus even be necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the legal system and therefore social order itself. Retaliation, which is how retribution is carried out, can also serve the functions of deterrence and, through that, reform of its target. Retaliation for wrongs thus has a long-standing legitimacy in human society and serves several functions crucial to maintaining order. At the same time, however, it has long been recognized that retaliation can simply perpetuate feuds and fuel escalation rather than deterrence and reform. In international politics, moreover, the legitimacy of acts of retaliation will almost always be questioned or rejected by those at the receiving end, exacerbating these risks. If retaliation causes more violence rather than less, it is unjust. Furthermore, certain types of retaliation, e.g. against civilians, are never justified. Where do the lines of morality and utility lie? Is retaliation even useful or justifiable?

In the play Fiddler on the Roof, a villager cries "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth!" to which Tevye, the main character, replies "Very good. That way the whole world will be blind and toothless". This sums up nicely the view that retaliation is futile. After all, in a conflict situation, those on the receiving end of a reprisal will not view such a reprisal as legitimate because they are likely to view their own actions as legitimate—in opposition to the view on the other side. This is essentially the definition of conflict, after all. When seen as an illegitimate, us-versus-them act, retaliation often leads to new retaliation—i.e. to escalation. This leads liberal-minded people to posit that retaliation only makes things worse. Causing more anger and suffering on the other side is no way to create peace, the argument runs. Someone must break the cycle of violence instead.

This assessment of how to end a conflict is essentially correct. Eventually, the parties to a conflict must make peace and to do that, they must eventually stop retaliating and let go of grievances. An immediate shift from violence to peace, with both sides suddenly deciding to let bygones be bygones and to lay down their arms is often impossible, however. The deeps wells of anger and mistrust on both sides cannot so easily be pumped dry—even if seemingly everyone understands that this must eventually happen. History shows that most violent conflicts end only after one or both sides become exhausted or come to see continued fighting as futile—or perhaps dangerous. Two of the goals of retaliation, especially in warfare, are deterrence and compellence. Compellence is the threat of violence unless an opponent does something. Deterrence is the threat of violence only if an opponent does something. Compellence can be used during a period of violence to achieve a period of calm, with a deterrent threat used to maintain that calm thereafter. This is best achieved when one or both sides is/are capable of exacting a price unacceptable to the other side in response to an attack. If compellence and deterrence succeed in creating and maintaining a period of calm, trust can slowly be built and room can be created for the political negotiations that could eventually bring an end to the conflict itself.

The morality of retaliation thus depends on whether it can reduce violence. When rockets rained down on Israel from Gaza in increasing numbers in 2007 and 2008, Israel's violent response in the Gaza War of 2008-9 succeeded in bringing rocket launches almost completely to a halt. The calm lasted more than three years. Subsequent rounds of escalation brought renewed periods of calm after wars in 2012 and 2014. After each escalation, the Gaza Strip's Hamas rulers have arrested rocket launchers, called them "rebels", and shown that they were maintaining peace out of fear of retaliation—in other words, deterrence was working.¹ This shows that retaliation can be used to restore and maintain calm.

At the same time, the case of Israel and Hamas illustrates retaliation's limitations. As mentioned previously, retaliation can be used to compel and deter in order to create a peaceful space for negotiations. In this case, the first step has occurred, but the second step has not succeeded. An end to the conflict thus remains elusive. The shortened time between bouts of escalation is also worrying. As I have argued previously (here and again here), Israel's failure to make the status quo in the Palestinian territories more palatable (e.g. by easing the blockade of Gaza and halting settlement construction) increases the risk and frequency of violence by undermining the effects of deterrence and Palestinians' trust. Moreover, Hamas's capabilities have actually improved with each round, even as the perceived illegitimacy of Israel's attacks on Gaza, as well as that of its settlement activities, means Israel is increasingly hemmed in by media attention and condemnation of its actions.

Retaliation is thus not inherently moral or immoral. Used carefully against militant targets, it can create periods of calm that may facilitate a negotiated settlement that would be impossible during periods of heavy bloodshed. As John Bew has shown in the case of the Irish Republican Army vs. the UK Government, accepting peace negotiations during fighting can actually embolden militants by appearing weak, encouraging further violence. Faced with escalation, a leader may thus have few other choices but to retaliate in the hope of creating a period of calm. Critically, this would be true regardless of whom one might blame for an individual round of escalation or for initiating a feud in the first place. Not to retaliate might in fact be the immoral choice if it ended up prolonging a conflict. In the end, though, Jesus and Tevye are right. Retaliation itself will not bring lasting peace and does run the risk of further escalation if applied improperly (e.g. against civilians at any time or using disproportionate force during periods of relative calm) or without the necessary commitment and capability. Retaliation can be used as a step toward peace, however, and such use is deeply moral.

1. Toameh, Khaled Abu. “Hamas Crackdown on Islamic Jihad Rocket Squads Raises Tenstions in Gaza. Hamas: Some Palestinian Parties Trying to Create an Excuse for Israel to Resume Its Aggression.” The Jerusalem Post. March 11, 2009, sec. News. Nexis UK.

It's time (again) to ease the Gaza blockade

Photo credit: Flickr

The strictness of the Gaza blockade is dangerous for Israel and devastating for Gazans. Now is the time to change it.

Israel and Egypt let very few goods or people cross the border in or out of Gaza. Israel also restricts fishing to just a few miles offshore. When it was first put into place in 2007, the blockade was intended to punish Gazans for electing Hamas and to make running the territory difficult for it. The hope was that the West Bank would prosper and Gaza would not, convincing the latter's residents of the benefits of a Fatah-led government (the political party of the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and former President Arafat). Compelling people to do something via economic sanctions has always had a mixed record (Cuba is a case in point, though some successes are also touted, including apartheid South Africa). From a deterrence standpoint (i.e. for preventing attacks by Hamas), the blockade currently makes little sense.

Easing the blockade directly after the most recent Gaza war would have looked like victory for Hamas and could have undermined deterrence by giving the appearance that violence against Israel pays. Now, however, is a good time to ease. It is obvious that Hamas did not manage to force Israel to ease the blockade: It has not done so and the war is over--for now. Hamas currently shows little inclination towards renewing violence. It makes sense to reward quiet (and not just to punish violence). In addition, some of Israel's own defense officials fear that the worsening economic situation in Gaza could undermine the cease-fire and lead to renewed violence. It seems obvious that, if the blockade harms the Gazan economy and economic hardship may lead to a return to violence, then easing the blockade and bolstering Gaza's economy should prevent such violence.

This is because deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo and there are two ways to do that. The way most security types focus on is punishing deviations from the status quo and making doing so so unpleasant that the other side opts to keep things how they are. The other way is to make the status quo more palatable. This in itself encourages the other side to maintain the status quo, but it also creates more room for punishment should violence rise again.

Given that there is little to recommend the blockade for security purposes, maintaining it is also immoral. It blights Gazans' lives and robs them of opportunities, something that should also be seen as a security risk. Whether viewed from a humanitarian or security perspective (preferably both), the strictness of the current blockade on Gaza makes no sense. The time to move is now, not during or after the next war. Furthermore, moving now could delay or prevent the next war, as well as providing more ways to fight it and giving Israel some much-needed breathing room among its international allies, who increasingly view it as excessively aggressive. Netanyahu has showed little boldness or fresh thinking thus far, here's hoping he can surprise us.

Hamas in the back seat--for now

Photo: Flickr/Creative Commons/Marsmet543

Jerusalem is Israel's Achilles Heel and Palestinian resistance may have moved into a new phase. Hamas's involvement in this has been minimal so far. Its ability to affect politics remains, however.

Hamas has been one of the main drivers of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1990s. Events in the past decade and, especially, in the past few months seem to be changing this. The replacement of suicide bombing attacks with rockets and the subsequent deployment by Israel of its Iron Dome missile defence system have dramatically reduced Hamas’s violent effect on Israelis’ everyday lives, not just when compared to the horror of the early 2000s, but also when compared to the 1990s. In addition, since the most recent round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, there has been a surge of violence from within the Israeli side of its security barrier. This violence has been carried out by Palestinians (with gruesome reprisals from Jewish vigilantes) who live on that side of the barrier. It is also notable that these latest attacks are mostly not carried out at the behest of Hamas or any other militant group. Has the threat from Hamas receded? Is the new threat from within the ‘wall’ now greater?

Jerusalem is potentially Israel’s Achilles Heel. Palestinians living there are not separated from Israelis by a security barrier. They are not coordinated by a governing authority that could be targeted in the same way that Hamas in Gaza can. ‘Civil’ measures like policing and intelligence are the only possibilities for deterrence. These, along with Jerusalem Palestinians’ separation from those in the rest of the Occupied Territories and their generally better quality of life, seem to have worked thus far in keeping violence originating from Palestinians in Jerusalem and from Arab Israelis to a minimum. Punitive measures, like imprisonment and home demolitions, can actually undermine deterrence as the situation escalates, however: If security at holy sites intensifies to the detriment of Muslim worshippers and punitive measures damage Jerusalem Palestinians’ way of life, they may feel they have less to lose by turning to violence. Such a move would have little to do with Hamas.

Palestinian resistance has gone through several phases, but it has appeared recently to be settling on pushing for international pressure. As the Jerusalem specialist Michael Dumper points out, the sheer density of holy sites in Jerusalem ensures that there is constant international attention on the city. Israel is limited in the harshness of measures it can implement there without incurring international opprobrium. Escalation in Jerusalem would further increase international attention and reinvigorate drives to resolve the situation by establishing a Palestinian state that would incorporate majority-Palestinian portions of Jerusalem.

As attention focuses on Jerusalem, then, might Gaza and Hamas slip into the background? This is unlikely. The confrontation cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of who controls Gaza and its relationship to any future Palestinian state. As long as Hamas remains in power there, it will therefore remain relevant and be capable of influencing, and quite possibly scuppering, any deal. No solution can thus be found without dealing with Hamas. Hamas has so far always acted as a spoiler in the peace process and rejects two states as a final solution to the conflict. Violence undermines the moral force of Palestinian demands for statehood upon which much of current international actions by Palestinians are predicated. Rising violence in Jerusalem could have this effect, or it could come from Hamas. Hamas may therefore seem less important at present, but it remains in a position to influence events in the larger conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and no solution could succeed that ignored it. It is not irrelevant yet.

Israel: Harsh sentences for stone throwers are a bad idea

The Dome of the Rock, Jerusalem. Photo by the author, ©February 2013

Israel's Knesset should vote against harsh sentences for stone throwers—for security's sake

The Cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently backed a bill that would allow the government to imprison stone-throwing protesters for up to 10 years even if it cannot be proved that they intended to cause serious harm (with a separate provision intended to make it easier to imprison those shown to have intended to cause bodily harm for up to 20 years). Given recent tensions in Jerusalem, it is no surprise that Netanyahu's government is taking action, but this is not the right action.

To see why, consider the options of an aggravated protester. Given few, if any, options for influencing Jerusalem policy via the political process, protests become the only way to voice dissatisfaction. Peaceful protests are the best way to do this, in my view, both because violence and destruction are bad and, more importantly, because partaking in them reduces the moral strength behind the protests, weakening their positive message. It is often impossible, however, to ensure that no one shifts to any form of violence. This is where the law can provide an additional incentive: The specter of punishment for violence may reduce its likelihood. Harsh sentences for small offenses, however, can actually lead to greater violence, not less, undermining Israel's security and interests over the long term (in addition to hurting Palestinians).

This may sound counter-intuitive, but it is actually relatively straightforward. If a protester decides peaceful protest is not enough, there are myriad ways to give a violent voice to his or her anger. One of these is throwing stones or other small objects. Another would be knife, gun, or bomb attacks. Throwing stones is certainly easier than attacking someone with a knife, gun, or bomb, as it requires little preparation, stones are readily available, and it can be done from a relatively safe distance. It is also much less damaging, which means it is less violent and thus normally carries less severe penalties. If this is not the case, the incentive not to resort to more violent means is blunted. A protester might be jailed for ten years for a knife attack. Under the proposed bill, s/he might also be jailed for ten years for throwing a rock at a police vehicle. If a protester has a knife, what's the incentive to use a rock instead? The knife will cause greater harm to the perceived enemy and will incur the same punishment. The rock becomes pointless.

If you've ever stuck your finger in a garden hose when it was on, you are familiar with the concept: Reducing the possibilities for the water to come out makes it shoot out with much greater pressure through the smaller holes left. By cracking down at the lower end of the violence scale, Israel risks increasing pressure at the top end. Israel would, of course, respond to higher levels of violence harshly as well. The result would be yet another area of increased escalation. Jerusalem could end up in a continuing state of considerable unrest, limiting Israel to just a few, unpalatable options. None of these would improve Israel's image, encourage Western backing, or thus improve its security in the long run. Such a move therefore runs entirely against Israel's own interests. Too bad it, like many measures meant to display toughness, runs in favor of Netanyahu's short-term electoral interests.

Israel and Hamas: Moral questions

In my focus on deterrence, I have mostly taken a utilitarian approach to the conflict between Israel and Hamas (if your goal is X, then Y is or is not appropriate), intentionally avoiding moral questions. I could only advocate things that would enhance deterrence, however, if I believed deterrence to be a morally valid option (I may need to write a second post explaining why I think so). A recent Op-Ed by Alan Derschowitz, an American law professor at Harvard, in the Jerusalem Post led me to conclude that it was time to talk about morality. In the article, he asserts that there is no moral equivalence between Israel's actions and those of Hamas, because Hamas intentionally targets civilians and uses them as human shields, while Israel does the opposite. This is true, but does that mean Hamas bears 100% of the responsibility for the conflict and, as I will focus on here, for the current crisis? An analysis of the deterrence situation before the crisis, like that to be found in my article last Friday in Strife journal's blog, adds an additional dimension to the moral question.

In that article, I argue that the current round of escalation was not necessary from a deterrence standpoint unless Hamas's leadership had given the order to abduct the three Israeli teenagers later found murdered near Hebron. The murderers are indeed Hamas members and Hamas has talked about abducting Israeli soldiers and using them to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners and has apparently trained members in the West Bank to do so. Israel has presented no evidence to date, however, that would suggest that the Hamas leadership, external or, perhaps more importantly, within Gaza, ordered or authorized the kidnapping and murder. Instead, there is evidence that the kidnappers were members of a rogue Hamas branch that acted on its own. One has to wonder why the teens were murdered relatively shortly after their capture if the idea was to use them as bargaining chips. The fact that Hamas long said it did not desire an escalation with Israel, waited until after Israel struck several targets in the Gaza Strip before launching its first rockets at Israel in two years, and was already in a weakened state led me to conclude that the kidnapping probably was not planned, but a rogue action.

Be that as it may, surely Hamas must take responsibility for the actions of its members, even if they acted without authorization? Of course. We would expect this much from Israel or the United States as well, after all. The initial strikes against Hamas in Gaza thus made sense, as did an extensive search-and-rescue operation to find the teens. But Israel's response went beyond search-and-rescue, punishing the actual perpetrators, and making Hamas pay a price for its lack of control over its own militants. It instead ran an operation to attack Hamas "infrastructure" in the West Bank and continued to attack Hamas targets in Gaza. It arrested scores of Palestinians who were uninvolved in the kidnappings. Hamas is an organization that uses terrorism and intentionally targets civilians. Many of those arrested were in fact known terrorists who were re-arrested after having been released as part of a deal to free Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier Hamas held for ransom for several years. There is thus a moral logic to all of these Israeli actions.

At the same time, the escalation that has followed Operation Brother's Keeper (as the hunt for the three teens was known) and Operation Protective Edge (the current operation against Hamas in Gaza) has led to the death, so far, of nearly 100 Palestinians in Gaza and the wounding two Israeli soldiers (one seriously) as well as that of seven civilians injured in a rocket attack on the city of Ashdod. One must of course point out that Israel does not intend to kill civilians in Gaza and takes measures to prevent this, the opposite of what Hamas does when it launches rockets. Further, Hamas places rocket launchers and military facilities within civilian areas to try to prevent Israeli attacks. It also encourages Gazans to act as "human shields" against attacks. This means that if Israel did not use precision weaponry, the death toll would be even higher. Hamas actively tries to kill Israeli civilians and places its own civilians in harm's way to protect itself, while Israel actively tries not to kill Palestinian civilians while attempting to keep its own out of harm's way. Derschowitz is right that there is no equivalence between these two actions.

But if this is the fundamental moral level, then, as I've hinted, there is a second moral level as well. Some response to Hamas's involvement, even tacit, in the kidnappings makes moral sense as well as strategic sense from a deterrence perspective. But a response so large that Hamas sees no other option but to fight a losing battle against Israel is not just unnecessary, it is counterproductive. It undermines deterrence and, by leading to escalation, leads to unnecessary deaths. War, though always a tragedy, is sometimes necessary to protect the lives of the citizens represented by the military. This gives such wars a moral legitimacy. Unless Israel has good evidence of Hamas's involvement, this is an unnecessary war that destabilizes the situation and causes unnecessary death and injury on both sides. It thus lacks such moral legitimacy. Do I demand more of Israel than I do of Hamas? Of course I do. Israel is a liberal democracy. Hamas is a political/militant/social organization that advocates violence against civilians and the eventual destruction of the State of Israel. There ought to be no equivalency of standards between them.

The Unity Deal, Kidnappings, and a New Round of Escalation

About a month ago, I tweeted a link to an article in Haaretz that reflected a rather disturbing aspect of the recent deal between Hamas and Fatah to form a unity government. I was feeling cautiously optimistic about the prospect for this new government to be able to serve as the first unified partner in peace negotiations since Hamas's takeover of Gaza. Even now, this is still a possibility, but I could not shake the feeling that Hamas was attempting to have its cake and eat it to. As a Hamas source put it: "Hamas wants to avoid ministerial responsibility for civilian matters, but it wants to maintain its power as a popular-resistance group." This suggests Hamas wishes for the PA to take responsibility for any domestic difficulties while it avoids having to make tough choices about day-to-day government and can stick to "resistance." The problem with that, of course, is that Hamas's "return address" is still very clearly Gaza. This allowed me to remain cautiously optimistic, but if Hamas is behind the recent kidnapping of three Israeli teens, the unity government seems certain either not to last or to suffer a complete Israeli boycott.

At the same time, the PA has talked about the unity deal in terms of a "weakened" Hamas attempting to save face by running for the PA's protection. This comes across as crowing. With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu now saying that the PA is responsible for terror attacks emanating from any part of "its" territory, including Gaza (never mind that the PA's control over much of Palestine is tenuous at best and non-existent in Area C where the teens were kidnapped), the perceived humiliation of Hamas via the unity deal, Hamas's apparent desire to return to "resistance," and comments by Hamas's then-Prime Minister that kidnapping Israelis (particularly soldiers) was Hamas's "top priority" to use them as "bargaining chips," it would not be surprising if Hamas were responsible for the disappearance of the three teens kidnapped last Friday. It is a way of showing it is not a spent force, contrary to what the PA suggests, and it would make sense as part of Hamas's stated strategy. That said, Hamas has long said kidnappings were a priority and it's not clear that this would necessarily be the right time. Other Palestinian political groups are also annoyed at being excluded from the talks between the two largest factions, Fatah and Hamas. Some of them are quite well organized. This could just as easily be an attempt by one of them to express displeasure at the deal, weaken it, and score points for continuing "resistance." And who knows? It could be a group a criminals or an unaffiliated group of activists.

Israel's response has been swift (after initial delays, it seems) and forceful: It has run a large search operation throughout the West Bank, focusing in particular on Hebron and, later, Nablus. It has arrested 240 Palestinians since the start of the operation, 180 of them Hamas men. As part of these operations, Israeli soldiers have not always acted in a way that will win them friends among Palestinians. For example, I have heard that some Israeli soldiers had removed three Palestinian families from their homes so they could sleep there. Maybe there was no other option and maybe this was an isolated incident, but it is definitely something that will increase tensions rather than ease them. (Though one must admit that "easing tensions" is understandably not currently part of Israel's agenda.)

All of this may backfire strategically. The PA's president Abbas has said that the kidnap victims must be returned and he had previously said that security cooperation with Israel is "sacred." A Palestinian academic I recently spoke with on the subject related to me that Abbas risks being seen as a "collaborator," further damaging his legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians. The PA's apparent cooperation with Israel while the latter seems determined to root out Hamas in the West Bank is almost certain to drive a wedge between the two Palestinian groups and destroy the unity government. This may be what Netanyahu wants: To force Hamas back out of an arrangement with Fatah. But it is not clear that weak, divided, and desperate opponents are always the best option for peace and stability over the long term. Israel is right to do whatever it can to rescue its kidnapped citizens and the Palestinian side has often been disappointingly cynical, sometimes denying that the boys were even kidnapped and at other times suggesting that this is entirely equivalent to Palestinians held in Israeli jails. Nevertheless, Netanyahu risks sparking a new round of violence and uniting Palestinians in anger, rather than a mood for conciliation, with his current, divisive approach.

Easing the Gaza Blockade

Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel and Egypt have enforced a blockade on the territory. The intention was to weaken Hamas by cutting it off from weapons and other supplies and to weaken support for it by making life difficult for Gaza’s residents. Hamas has still succeeded in arming itself and, though support for the group has fallen, it is not clear that this is due to the blockade nor is Hamas’s imminent downfall apparent (though this is a region where attempting to predict the future often proves to be a foolhardy endeavor). The blockade thus does not seem to be working. Israel has instead entered a tenuous deterrence relationship with Hamas, whereby retaliations for Hamas violence against Israel have mostly kept that violence to a minimum. The prospects for continued deterrence, albeit with occasional outbreaks of hostilities, are reasonably good, but the blockade does not necessarily help them. Given the massive cost of the blockade in terms of lost opportunities and economic hardship for the residents of Gaza and the damage this does to Israel’s reputation, one wonders if the policy can safely be eased—to everyone’s benefit.

Deterrence relies on threats of punishment if an opponent alters the status quo. It also relies on a promise of no punishment if the status quo is maintained. This doesn’t mean a deterrer must reward an opponent for good behavior, but it doesn’t rule that out, either. What’s more, there are reasons that easing the blockade could even help bolster deterrence. This could work in three ways. Perhaps the most obvious is that, by making the status quo more tolerable, the threat of punishment becomes that much worse. An additional factor, however, and one that is often overlooked by overly hawkish deterrence practitioners and theorists alike, is that deterrence often breaks down due to “push” factors rather than due to opponents taking advantage of a perceived weakness. A Gaza resident I recently spoke to told me how Gazans felt in 2008 in the run-up to the 2008-09 Gaza war: People were so fed up and angry, and had grown so accustomed to the idea that a war with Israel was coming, that many felt that any change, even a war, was better than the status quo. If your opponent prefers a war with you to leaving things as they are, deterrence will be difficult to say the least, and an eventual reconciliation or peace deal even more so.

The final reason that easing the blockade can help deterrence is that it may grant Israel greater leeway in the case of future escalation. A gracious Israel that, despite having previously been attacked by its neighbor, eases restrictions on it, ought to have an easier time gaining support for future reprisals if it suffers violence. This also provides the opportunity to wrong-foot anti-Israel campaigners: If they continued to claim Israel was acting unjustly in Gaza, it would be clearer that their problem is more about what Israel is than what it does—a sign of prejudice behind a veil of humanitarianism.

Easing the blockade needn’t mean dealing with Hamas or easing sanctions on it. It needn’t happen all at once, either, and could be reversed in steps as easily as it is eased in steps, provided more possibilities for deterrence-related reprisals. This means there is little risk in easing the flow of goods and people across the border and much to gain in terms both of security and quality of life. One caveat though: Easing must only be done during periods of quiet and it should be done then. Easing after a period of escalation rewards that escalation. Given recent rocket barrages from Gaza, now wouldn’t be the best time, but if things settle down again soon, soon would be a good time.

Want to Fight Extremism and Help Moves toward Middle East Peace? A Deal with Iran Might Help.

Photo: The Guardian - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/04/iran-suspend-uranium-enrichment

One of the reasons I have been arguing for action on Syria is because Iran is watching. If we're not willing to stop Syria from using chemical weapons, so the argument goes, Iran will know full well that we are not going to bomb it to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon. Now that our weak commitment to enforcing norms against weapons of mass destruction has become clear, however, it may be time to look for the bright side. In this case, the bright side has to do with the other half of the deterrence equation: the promise.

Most people focus on the threat side of deterrence because deterrence is, roughly, using contingent threats to prevent an adversary from taking a particular undesirable action. The "contingent" part (we will attack only if you do x) is often swiftly forgotten, but deterrence cannot work without it. "You won't like what we'll do to you if you do x" also means "if you DON'T do x, everything will be fine." Similarly, a lot of time is spent worrying about the credibility of threats, but almost no thought is given to the credibility of promises NOT to attack. This is a huge oversight, because if I believe you'll attack me either way, I have a strong incentive to hit you first, or do whatever it was you didn't like, in order to be stronger and appear defiant in the face of your threats.

I suspect so little attention is given to the credibility of promises because of an assumption made by deterrers that they are the good guys and are peace-loving, so of course our promise to be nice is believable, unlike conciliatory promises made by the other side, which, being the enemy, is not to be trusted. I'm not arguing that we should trust Iran. Everything about its nuclear program screams "weapons," despite its assertions to the contrary. What I AM saying is that we should not assume Iran ought to be able to trust us and that any concerns it claims to have are just posturing and nonsense.

Iran has at least two reasons to doubt the US. One is that we have successfully toppled its government once before (after a period of constant meddling my Russia and Britain) in the 1950s. The other is that the US has made no secret of its wish to see regime change in Iran ever since. The past two centuries of Iran's history have served as a lesson never to trust big foreign powers. What may seem to Americans like paranoia or fake worry looks to Iranians like sensible concerns about preventing subversion by foreigners.

The fact that the US obviously does not want to get drawn any further into Middle East conflicts is thus a cause for Iran to relax: The US attempting to topple the Iranian regime seems quite unlikely at the moment. The question is now whether Iran wants the bomb to have greater power over its neighbors (in which case a more conciliatory US stance is unlikely to help) or because it mainly fears the US and its allies (some also in the region), which could be helped by a more peaceful-looking United States.

That question is basically moot, however, because I don't see the US attacking Iran any time soon. The question thus becomes: Now that we have limited our options, what is the path to the best possible outcome? Even if Iran is seeking regional hegemony, as many in Israel believe, getting a bomb may not be the best way to get there, especially if this causes other regional powers like Saudi Arabia to go nuclear as well. The current sanctions on Iran are very painful. They would continue and intensify if Iran got the bomb. This weakens Iran and makes its people unhappy, increasing risks for the regime. If Iran feels safe from US invasion and attacks by Israel, cooperation on several levels could be possible and be a way for Iran to grow stronger. Al Qaeda is one of Iran's biggest enemies, just as it is to the United States. The same goes for other Sunni extremist groups. Given the apparent recent resurgence in Al Qaeda's strength, cooperation with Iran on countering those groups could be useful. At the same time, Shia groups like Hezbollah defer heavily to Iran's leadership. Iran is thus a central player in Middle East politics involving terror groups and other non-state actors and is THE power when it comes to Shia Islam.

Iran's pride would need to be protected in any deal. One possibility would be to leave Iran "stalled" at near break-out capacity for creating a bomb (broadly where it is today). Iran has continually insisted it does not wish to build a bomb, so this would not have to seem a climb-down and would save face. At the same time, Iran would not have a bomb and could perhaps slowly climb down from having one through increased cooperation on a civilian program. This would meet US goals and save US face and credibility. Reducing tension between the West and Iran could also help in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as Hezbollah defers heavily to Iran and Hamas also listens to it, covering two of Israel's most difficult borders. A removal of tension may make Israel feel secure enough to negotiate.

It's not that far-fetched. Iran doesn't seem that sure on whether it wants to cross that final threshold and obtain a bomb. There's a decent chance it won't build one. The US and its allies should of course stick to the sanctions until concrete progress is made and make clear their commitment to protecting their allies in the region, including against nuclear threats. But if the US seizes such an opportunity, further cooperation would be more probable than at any time since 1979.

America Should Support Democracy... Right?

Obama has good reasons for going against America's principles in favor of cynical pragmatism. That doesn't mean it's the right decision.

The situation in Egypt provides a great example of the ethical conundrums that await any leader when dealing with foreign policy. What just happened in Egypt can only reasonably be called a military coup. US law requires the US to cut off aid to any country in which a democratically elected leader is overthrown by undemocratic means. In Egypt, the military issued an ultimatum--a military giving order to an elected government (the opposite of how things ought to work). When the government didn't fulfill the military's demands, it seized the president and appointed a caretaker government of its choosing. It also shut down media outlets sympathetic to the elected government, trampling on an essential ingredient for a successful democracy: a free press. Legally, then, the case for cutting off the US's annual aid of $1.3 billion to the Egyptian military is pretty clear-cut. So far, Obama has shied away from declaring that the coup was, in fact, a coup, in order to keep his options open.

Beyond the legality of US aid to the Egyptian military, moreover, there are also myriad moral issues at stake. How can the US honestly claim to support democracy when it only does so if it likes the regime that was overthrown? Not cutting off aid makes the US look like a complete hypocrite and undermines its moral authority when trying to push for democracy elsewhere. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where Islam-inspired political parties may now conclude that democracy won't work and that the only way to get to power is to seize power and shut down all opposition. The Middle East's experiment with democracy could be over before it starts.

So why hasn't the US cut off aid? This is where it gets complicated. It started paying aid to Egypt in 1979 as part of its support of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Egypt agreed to sign the treaty and demilitarize the Sinai Peninsula, thereby fulfilling Israel's security needs. This was the right thing to do, as it supported peace, even though it was aid to the military of a dictatorship. It also helped shift Egypt out of the Soviet orbit during the Cold War. Over the years since, the US military has fostered close ties to its counterpart in Egypt. This is the strongest connection between the US and Egypt. During last year's uprising that brought down Mubarak, the US is said to have used the good relationship between the two countries' militaries to encourage, and to push for, democratic elections in Egypt. All good stuff, then.

The reasons for not cutting the aid are all related to this. Egypt has all the leverage with the aid. The aid is related to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. It it's cut, Egypt might retaliate by abrogating the treaty. This doesn't necessarily mean war with Israel or even re-militarization of Sinai, but it could be the first step in rising instability between the two of them. The aid lies at the root of the cooperation between the militaries of the US and Egypt, and that cooperation is the greatest source of influence between the two. Canceling the aid would thus most likely end the cooperation and thus the US's last source of influence in Egypt. That would mean the US would have less ability to encourage a return to democracy or peace with Israel. This is why it's so tricky to stay involved and to stay "morally" clean in this case.

There are no easy answers, but I think I have to side with John McCain on this one: Suspend aid. Suspend, not terminate. It should be known that aid will be restored as soon as free and fair elections have been held and providing Egypt sticks to the peace treaty with Israel. When aid is restored, back payments should also be made, so Egypt suffers no loss in the long term.

It's a risky strategy, admittedly. Egypt has enough difficulties at home that it would make no sense to start problems with Israel. This oft-cited fact is little comfort, however. It is precisely during times of great internal turmoil that rulers do unexpected, illogical, and dangerous things. After all, what better way to unite the Egyptian people behind the government than by ditching an unpopular treaty with Israel and possibly making aggressive noises towards it? Israel can definitely defend itself, but an escalation of that kind would still be dangerous for Israel, Egypt, and the whole region. If Obama seems indecisive about whether to stick to America's principles or go with cynical pragmatism, this is why.

Israel V Hamas: Why Is the Violence Picking Up?

Hamas and Israel are currently duking it out against each other in the Middle East. The number of rockets launched at Israel from the Gaza Strip has risen sharply recently. Rockets so far this year total at least 1,197, with 396 having fallen on Israel since November 14th! What is going on? What explains this sudden uptick in violence?

Hamas seems to have been deterred after the 2008-09 Gaza war. The number of rocket attacks increased throughout the years 2007 and 2008 and then fell off a cliff in early 2009. Things were then quiet through 2010, and even in 2011 during the upheaval of the Arab spring, things still remained relatively quiet. In the past few months, however, this has changed. Why?

The simplest answer is that Hamas perceives its circumstances to have changed. These changes include a great improvement in its own capabilities – it now possesses rockets in greater numbers, including some that are much more advanced, capable of reaching Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, there are political changes in the world around the Gaza Strip and Israel. The most obvious of these is the changed situation in neighboring Egypt. The Egyptian government is now headed by Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother. At first, this didn't seem to have made much of a difference. But if anyone thought that things would continue as they were before, they were mistaken. One big sign of this change was the visit to Gaza of Qatar's Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. This was a huge show of support for Hamas, but it pales in significance when compared with the visit earlier this week by Egypt's Prime Minister Hesham Qandil.

To understand why, picture this: The Egyptian Prime Minister visits Gaza. During this time, Hamas launches rockets at Israel and Israel retaliates. (So far so good: All this happened.) Imagine that, during Israel's retaliation, the Egyptian Prime Minister was injured or killed. The political consequences for Israel would be dire. Egypt would have the pretext to turn wholly against Israel and, perhaps more importantly, Israel's allies might find it more difficult to provide Israel with solid backing. Under the circumstances, Egypt might not care about losing the vast aid that it receives from the United States. If it turned down this aid, that would remove substantial leverage that the United States has on Egypt that it has so far been able to use to moderate Egypt's position regarding Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Of course, none of this happened. Egypt's Prime Minister was in Gaza for only a very short time, no doubt because he had no intention of risking his life for the conflict. Nevertheless, all of this is symbolic of massive changes on the political front in the Middle East. Specifically, it shows Egypt is increasingly willing to throw its weight into the conflict on the side of Hamas. In my view, it is this, combined with the domestic pressures that Hamas faces, that have emboldened it to these unprecedented attacks on Israel, including never-before-seen attacks on Tel Aviv, Israel's main city. The chaos in Syria may also be playing a role: Bashar al-Assad's regime supported Hamas, and Hamas's external leadership long called Damascus its home. Hamas may thus be using a fight with a hated neighbor in order to distract from its involvement with a bloody regime in Syria and rising dissension at home within the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is this now testing the new limits it now perceives. How much can it get away with? How deep is its support within the Arab world? How much influence does the United States continue to have there? Overall: How much have things shifted in its favor? In essence, Hamas is attempting to change the "rules of the game" that were set in 2009 to gain itself more leverage. None of this bodes well for Israel, not only now, but also over the medium to long term.

Hawks are not always the best deterrers

While considering where to look for evidence that Israel is deterred by Hamas, I thought of something that seems totally obvious once it is said: If the reward I offer you for not attacking me is worse than my attacks against you if you do, you will keep attacking me. In other words: Deterrence is not only about threats of punishment, it is also about rewarding "good" behavior. In order for Israel to decide not to attack Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has to offer something more enticing to Israel in return. If its alternative is "dissolve yourself," Israel is obviously not going to choose to be deterred.

Again, this may seem obvious, but it is an interesting nuance because most people associate policies of deterrence with so-called foreign policy hawks. This is because the main feature of the type of deterrence that has dominated world politics for decades is threats of unacceptable retaliation for attacks (think of the US and Soviet policy of Mutually Assured Destruction when it came to nuclear attacks). Deterrence is certainly not a cuddly, "let's let in the Age of Aquarius" sort of foreign policy stance. But the alternative to attacking the US in the case above was peace, since deterrence was mutual. Peace is a pretty nice alternative to nuclear war, so it stuck. Crucially, destroying the Soviet Union was not a US policy (though many in the US openly wished for it).

The case with the US also illustrates another factor: Further alternatives must be less palatable than accepting deterrence. The main alternative was wiping the US out before it could strike back, thus removing the threat and the constraint of US deterrence on Soviet policymaking. This policy was unrealistic, and the US explicitly made sure of this by ensuring that the Soviet Union could never be certain of wiping out the whole US nuclear arsenal, meaning its own destruction would likely be imminent if it attacked the US. No realistic alternative there.

The main things required to block the alternative route of wiping out an enemy are power and resilience (two things the US nuclear arsenal had and has in abundance). In light of this, Hamas's strengthening in recent years may actually be a blessing in disguise for peace in the Middle East, if not necessarily for Israel's ambitions. Hamas has shown that, with occupation or without it, Israel cannot eliminate the organization without taking measures that it would not consider (like wiping out the entire Gaza Strip). For a while in the early to mid-2000s, with Israeli security stopping the vast majority of suicide bombings by 2005, it looked like Israel might be able to defeat Hamas militarily and thus need not be bound by any Hamas attempts to deter it. Rocket attacks have changed this prospect. Bombers could be stopped from entering Israel, rockets cannot. Even the Iron Dome missile defense system could not stop a concerted effort: A massive number of rockets flying toward Israel would overwhelm the system.

It therefore seems that Israel would be extremely hard-pressed to either eliminate Hamas or deny it the ability to attack Israel. This means that the choice of accepting a sort of truce with Hamas has become more palatable.

Going back to the main point of this post, the "peaceful" alternative has also become more available from Hamas's side as it has moderated its actions (if not much of its rhetoric) over the years to allow for short- to medium-terms cease-fires with Israel. In other words, Hamas needed to become more dovish to stop Israeli attacks.

Will this be a permanent change? Anyone who tries to predict the future in the Middle East is a fool. Hamas's continued grip on the Gaza Strip is not assured, and there are other, less moderate groups, who are too Hawkish to deter Israel. Dovishness on the part of Hamas has also been encouraged by Israel's massive superiority. This differential, too, is not written in stone. Over time, things could change and destabilize the current situation. Finally, since this set-up is based on both sides' perceptions of their and their opponent's power and the credibility of their threats, a change simply in the perception of the situation could spark another round of violence. My guess would be that such a round would eventually return to a tenuous peace, but how peaceful is a situation that repeatedly erupts into violence every few years?

For these reasons, the future is dependent on whether or not Israel and Hamas take further steps towards cementing peace. Everyone knows this, so there is no need to discuss it. My hypothesis, however, is that deterrence may help give the two parties the breathing room they need to move forward--if they are bold enough.

A Solution for Jerusalem

Blogs are great because you can do crazy things on them; like suggesting a solution for how Palestinians (from an as-yet non-existent Palestinian (or West Bank) state) and Israelis could share Jerusalem, allowing it serve as the capital for both countries. I like to focus on structure. The UN wished for Jerusalem to be an international zone administered by the UN itself (see General Assembly resolution 181). Funny, right? At the other extreme is just dividing the city in half. Considering the holy sites that are scattered around the city and are important to both sides and to other communities, that seems a terrible compromise. How about an essentially autonomous city-state partially influenced by the governments of Israel and Palestine, but designed to cater above all to the interests of Jerusalem itself?

It sounds crazy, I know. But it seems to me that the only way the two sides could co-exist in the Holy City is if those who live there are responsible for running it themselves. The only way the two sides would allow that, though, is if they had assurances that demographic changes, for example, wouldn't trample their interests there.

Here's how my little idea would look: Those who have had their main residence in Jerusalem for at least one year and are citizens of either Israel or Palestine would be eligible to vote in Jerusalem elections. Israelis would also be able to vote as usual in their own governments' elections, as would Palestinians. Jerusalem would have a mayor-governor elected by popular vote (using a run-off if necessary). This would hopefully make the mayor-governor a centrist character.

The legislature would need to be bicameral: A lower house would be elected using proportional representation of political parties. Any party getting at least 5% of the vote would be eligible for one of the 20 seats in this house. Eight candidates for the upper house would be appointed 50/50 by the governments of Israel and Palestine. The electorate would then select their favorite four of these to become the actual members of the upper house. This would allow those governments to rest assured that no laws would be passed in Jerusalem that would scare them (like changing voting laws or the constitution to one side's advantage). It also means that Palestinians would have the ability to vote on which Israeli-nominated candidates they liked and vice versa, somewhat reducing the likelihood of later gridlock and encouraging moderate candidates (much like the idea behind an open primary election as is being tried in Oregon and California).

Sound like a recipe for gridlock? Well, it might very well be, but the only way forward would be for the sides to find compromises. The way the system is designed, it should help to encourage moderates and discourage extremes while giving the two governments an emergency stop button if necessary. I don't see any way any of these facets could be changed.

Now on to the details: Jerusalem would be a semi-sovereign city-state. It would have no citizens, however, only residents. Furthermore, only its residents who were citizens of either Israel or Palestine would have the right to vote. There would be no checkpoints within the city, only on either side when leaving (though the Jerusalem police could put up entry checkpoints on either side, too, if it felt that necessary). If arriving by plane, for example, a visitor would have to have a valid visa for either Israel or Palestine. The statelet would have its own constitution, courts, and administration. People within Jerusalem would be subject to Jerusalem's laws, not those of either Israel or Palestine (though the two "parent" countries would obviously have some influence on laws passed there).

On to money: It's important to avoid coercion through government grants, so Jerusalem would have to have its own system of taxation. Residents would be exempt from income taxes in Israel and Palestine and subject to Jerusalem taxes instead. The only areas where Jerusalem would not be sovereign would be in foreign policy, trade policy, military, and on the grounds of the quarters of the two governments, who would both call Jerusalem their home.

Anything going into or out of Jerusalem via Israel would be subject to Israeli law, anything via Palestine to Palestinian law. This would likely make Jerusalem a competitive place alive with commerce, as customers and businesses could choose the best laws from the two countries as far as trade was concerned. Jerusalem could not make laws governing trade, as this would be the job of Israel and Palestine. It would likely have to share the Israeli and Palestinian currencies. People would have to get used to dealing with both. One might win out, however, as the government could decide freely which currency it would like to tax and spend in, giving one a competitive advantage. All these sorts of things could simply be left to fall into place.

This city would likely be a vibrant place, but also a wild one. Despite laws forbidding it, I can only imagine it would be teeming with intelligence agents from both sides and likely abroad as well (think Cold-War West Berlin). Years (or centuries, depending on how you count) of sectarian tensions would be unlikely to disappear over night. It would thus be important that the police and courts were appointed by the mayor-governor and approved by the upper chamber, ensuring that police actions were balanced between Israelis and Palestinians.

If sharing is possible (and that's an admittedly big "if"), it is only within a framework that promotes compromise while safeguarding core concerns. This is my attempt to suggest one.

The Power of Passive Resistance

Passive resistance may very well be more effective than terrorism

Looking back over the history of modern terrorism, one of the most notable aspects is that is almost always fails to achieve its objectives.¹ In fact, terrorism used by itself has only ever been effective in a strict anti-colonial context. In colonies throughout the world, terrorism was sometimes capable of raising the costs of occupation enough to reduce the benefits to the point where the colonial power decided staying wasn't worth it. Other groups have sought to emulate these successes in other contexts and have failed miserably. Examples include the IRA, RAF, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and just about any other group you can think of.

None of these groups are anti-colonial. The IRA viewed Northern Ireland in a colonial context, but it was wrong: The majority of the Northern Irish viewed themselves as British and wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. This was a case of majority rule. Colonies consist of a minority ruling over a majority from far away. The Northern Irish were represented in the UK Parliament and the majority of the population wished things to stay that way. The IRA failed in the end because it failed to understand that Northern Ireland was not a British colony.


Palestinian terror groups have made the same mistake. Israel is not a colony; it is a nation-state ruled by the state's citizen residents. Demanding Palestinian control of Israel is demanding that Israelis agree to destroy their own state. That's something they will never agree to, and that should be obvious to anyone.


But what about the Occupied Territories? These do resemble colonies: They're controlled from afar and the majority of those in the territories is not represented and does not agree with the occupation. Some Palestinian groups have been using terrorism for decades to try to end the occupation, but they haven't really been successful. Why?


Two reasons. One: their goals have been total, including the destruction of Israel. This has made it difficult for any Israeli government to negotiate with them because the very existence of these groups is seen as a threat to the survival of Israel itself. Two: they are using terrorism, which is violent and robs them of support and sympathy in many people's eyes.


One could argue that Hamas has actually achieved success in Gaza: The occupation there has ended and Hamas controls the Strip. Imagine if the groups used only passive resistance, however. Passive resistance is also only likely to work in an anti-colonial context, but that means it would be appropriate to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Terror groups suffer two problems stemming from their use of terror: They scare people enough to cause voters and governments to desire to wipe them out rather than negotiate, and they lack legitimacy. Civil disobedience would, like terrorism, make continued occupation of the territories more difficult, raising its cost. Refraining from violence, however, would also remove one of the benefits of the occupation: security. One reason for the continued occupation at the moment is that every time Israel pulls out (as with autonomy agreements implemented during the '90s or the withdrawal from Gaza), violence against Israelis increases. If this were not an issue, one significant incentive for the occupation would be removed. Finally, with passive resistance, no one would question the morals or objectives of Palestinians peacefully protesting and practicing civil disobedience. The actions would attain a level of legitimacy and sympathy that terrorist actions cannot.


I haven't done the necessary work on passive resistance to make solid claims about its comparative effectiveness, but I bet that the Palestinians would have their own state by now if they had opted for civil disobedience instead of terrorism. Terrorism is not the "only option," chosen out of desperation, as many groups pretend. There are others, and they may be more effective. There is one nagging problem, however: Passive resistance more obviously stands no chance of turning Israel into Palestine and would require all groups, even extreme ones, to give up that goal. So we're back where we started, because that is a core issue. Still, food for thought.


1. For an excellent book on this, see: Peter R. Neumann, and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works, and Why It Fails, Contemporary Terrorism Studies, London: Routledge, 2008.

The Difficulties of Deterrence

As my regular readers and friends will know, I am writing a PhD on the use and effectiveness of deterrent policies against terrorism. It's an important subject, because the way a state decides to fight terrorism can protect people from harm, but it can also cost vast sums of money, endanger the lives of soldiers, kill civilians, topple governments, cause global outcries, and quite possibly result in incentives leading to more terrorism, not less. It also might not even protect many people from much harm if the policy is flawed. In other words: it's a matter of life and death.

So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.

A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.

A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).

OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.

So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.

Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.

This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.

Israel and Palestine: What's the Strategy?

I have argued before (and I'm not the only one) that it is impossible for a conflict to be settled if one side thinks it would do better to continue the conflict. My previous example was Afghanistan, in which all Afghans, including the Taliban, know that the US will not remain forever (see post). The Taliban know that time is on their side. Whenever a disagreement seems intractable, something like this probably lies behind the scenes.

Take the long fight between the Israeli government and authorities representing the Palestinians. There seems to be no ending this fight. But why? It is easy to see why Palestinians believe time is on their side, if for none other than demographic reasons: the Palestinian population of the region, including inside of Israel proper, is increasing more quickly than the Israeli population. Beyond that, there seems to be a general, but gradual, shift in world politics away from unquestioning support of Israel. This has a couple reasons, among them a relative decline of the "West" along with the slow slippage of the Holocaust into something only read about in history books.

In this environment, it would seem wise for Israel to talk tough but to try to find a solution as quickly as possible, allowing it time to mend relations with antagonistic neighbors. Instead, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that Israel will not accept a path to peace that his predecessor had already essentially agreed upon. In effect holding up hopes, then changing the terms at the last minute. There seems to be no rush for peace. What is going on here? There are a few possible explanations:

1. Israelis, too, feel that time is on their side and that the Palestinians will eventually give up hoping for a better solution. This may also fit in with creating "facts on the ground" by continuing settlements on the West Bank, making their eventual removal politically all but impossible in the future. This is like a game of chicken.
2. Another possibility, and this is one that I seem to hear coming from Israel, is the one I call the panic strategy. Israelis are well aware that time is not on their side. Furthermore, they do not believe that even a two-state solution will convince their hostile neighbors to leave them alone. Better, then, to try to push for all concessions they can, now, while they still have clout This, too, is a somewhat different game of chicken.

One of the most important concessions for Israel, and one that is entirely understandable, is that Hamas renounce the use of violence and recognize Israel's right to exist before it even begins to negotiate with it. Ironically, diminished US and European support for Israel might actually end up helping Israel in this regard: as long as the US was seen to be 100% behind Israel, the Palestinians did not feel there was any way to be sure that their concessions would be met with real concessions from Israel. With President Obama putting public pressure on Israel, while still leaving no doubt as to his support for Israel's security, Palestinians may become less uncomfortable with making concessions, while still seeing that Israel is not about to be weakened to the point of making more concessions than it has hinted at in the past.

In such an unstable place, a little more trust could go a long way.

Palestinian elections in the West Bank: An opportunity for Fatah AND Israel

There has been talk of legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank, which would occur in September. This is an opportunity for Fatah to strengthen its mandate. It is also an opportunity for Israel. The reason? Hamas is refusing to go along with elections. This is good news for moderates for two reasons:

1. Hamas cannot come to power in the West Bank if it does not run. The idea of Hamas actually coming to power there gives Israelis chills.
2. It shows Palestinians that Hamas is not a viable alternative. Hamas's failure to hold elections lays bare its lack of democratic credentials.

If done right, then, the Palestinian Authority can show that it is the legitimate representative of the people, at least in the West Bank, while calling Hamas's credibility into question, including within the Gaza Strip. Israel and the West would do well to support free and fair elections and to respect their outcome. The alternative would likely be Palestinian unrest caused by an increasing sense that their (nominal) government is not respecting their wishes. This would be bad news for Israel, too.

What happens if Hamas, recognizing that it is being shown up, decides to hold elections in the Gaza Strip and to campaign in the West Bank? This is Israel's nightmare scenario, ending with Hamas winning both Palestinian territories. It doesn't have to end that way, however. It is not certain that Hamas would win. Israel and the West cannot continue with the cognitive dissonance of claiming to support democracy and human rights and then refusing to recognize elected governments, however.

This does not mean it should sit idly by. Many Western governments provide financial support to Fatah in the West Bank. They should continue to do so to support its campaign there, while underlining Hamas's failings. Concessions from Israel would help put Fatah in a better light as well. Isn't this outside influence just another form of meddling in "free" elections? Yes, but the choice and power would still be with the voters in the end. Under normal circumstances, this sort of meddling would be unacceptable, but these are not normal circumstances, I think we can all agree.

What if Hamas participated and won both territories? I'm not sure how likely that is, especially if other things are done right. Still, it is a possibility. One positive result would be Palestinian unity that would give Hamas a stake in the outcome of talks regarding all Palestinian land. Sure, this strengthening of their position would by default mean a weakening of Israel's. I would note, however, that Hamas has actually done a good job of keeping violence at bay in the Gaza Strip and promoting stability there. Hamas's rhetoric is still horridly anti-Israeli and sounds dangerous. It would be naive to underestimate this. Still, we are seeing an age-old effect: once the terrorist-insurgent group becomes a government, it has a stake in stability and non-violence. Controlling a state tends to have a moderating effect if one looks past rhetoric.

Why? It's hard to threaten an insurgent group. Invade? Big deal. We're guerrilla fighters and want to bring down the state anyway! That would only HELP us! If a group controls a country, however, the calculus looks decidedly different. Now there is someone who can answer for misdeeds who is a legitimate representative of the people there. They can be held to account more easily.

There are dangers, but the situation will only get more heated over time anyway. It's not now or never, but it is now or at some-unexpected-and-inconvenient-time-in-the-future-selected-by-revolutionaries. It's a choice between risky but principled vs. dangerous and fiery-ideological. I know what I'd pick...

Unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian State may seem like a good idea -- it isn't

As Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem forever unable to settle their differences and agree to live side-by-side, and as Israeli settlements continue to go up in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, some states have begun to recognize a State of Palestine. In fact, the EU recently even seemed to imply that recognizing Israel implicitly meant recognizing Palestine. Wouldn't recognizing Palestine be a way to strong-arm the two sides into finally coming to an agreement and letting everybody get on with their lives? How likely is such an action?

As you may have guessed from the title, the answers are "not really" and "not very." First off, how good of an idea is unilateral recognition really? Recognition is a discretionary act. States are generally free to (not) recognize whomever they wish. Usually, though, one standard for recognition is that a state has a government that effectively controls its territory and the people in it. That can't be said for a would-be Palestine. There are three governments involved: the Palestinian Authority (Fatah), Israel, and Hamas.

"This is just legal doctrine," you might say. "Who cares?" It matters. By recognizing a Palestinian State, this would imply that relations between us and the Palestinian state are state-to-state. This would cause quite a legal pickle. States have a right to sovereignty and non-intervention. Doing business with Israel, whose presence would almost certainly be undesired within the new Palestine, could then be viewed as supporting an illegal breach of Palestinian sovereignty. This could conceivably allow the Palestinian Government to sue in, say, German courts companies and other organizations doing business with Israel deemed to support the government's occupation of another State.


This would force governments into uncomfortable situations. They should not recognize a Palestinian State unless they are ready for these situations and ready to be consistent with the implications for foreign policy. Most states in the "West" are not ready for this. They know this, too, which makes such a declaration unlikely until they are closer to being ready.

The other issue is more pragmatic: who would states do business with? Would they consider the PA the government of all of Palestine and ignore Hamas in Gaza (broadly in line with current policy)? Recognition by a majority of states around the globe might indeed force Israel out of Palestine, especially (and particularly) if the US were on board. This would cause a power vacuum, giving the PA and Hamas an opportunity to fight for control, but also opening up the possibility to further, smaller groups. International action could be required to stop the country from collapsing into violence, and Israel might simply go right back in.

In short: declaring that a Palestinian State exists would do nothing to solve immediate Palestinian problems. There still would be no unity and no viable government there. The border issue would still be unresolved, no matter what borders recognizing countries might unilaterally decide to recognize (if any, this is not a requirement of recognition). It would put additional pressure on Israel, which might cause less moderate groups to gain more power there, polarizing the situation further. Finally, it would cause legal conundrums at home. What would be the point of all that?

It is time to put more pressure on both sides to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But the issues must be resolved from the ground up, starting with borders. A top-down approach based on unilateral recognition is messy, risky, and quite possibly counterproductive. There are no shortcuts when real resolve is what is really needed.

Time to Recognize Hamas

An article from this week's edition of The Economist provides a startling look into Hamas's success at providing the Gaza Strip with just about everything it needs. Prices have fallen, businesses have flourished, cafés and universities have re-opened. This adds yet another reason to the list of why the "West," insofar as it has not already done so (I believe Norway already has, for example), should recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Gaza Strip. It exercises de facto control over the territory and has apparently succeeded in bringing security and a degree of economic prosperity (when compared with the past few years) to the area. No other group (including the UN and the Israelis) could make this claim. These accomplishments have also made Hamas popular in the Gaza Strip, further diminishing prospects that Fatah could ever enjoy any real influence there again without serious (and deleterious) changes to conditions in Gaza. What are the other reasons Hamas should be recognized and worked with?

• It has moved away from the West and relies on other contacts for its stability and prosperity. This is working (comparatively speaking). While economic and personal security in Gaza are certainly to be welcomed, from a western political standpoint, this indicates that western influence in Gaza has waned even more than it had previously. If the Israelis and the US hope to have more influence in Gaza, they must engage with Hamas, which has effective control there. Furthermore, trying to force influence by removing Hamas would be transparent (i.e. Gazans would know what was going on and resent the action, making it counterproductive) and would lead to chaos and suffering, while carrying a very high risk of ultimate failure. Keeping Hamas in isolation would only further push it into the arms of other actors the West would rather it not deal with (e.g. Iran).
• Terrorists and extremest organizations become more moderate when they achieve real power. This could be seen with the PLO as well, which was also initially shunned by the West but was later accepted (albeit too late, I would argue, as its acceptance among the people it claimed to represent was already in decline). Hamas is now responsible for providing not just physical protection for the residents of Gaza, but also for their economic welfare. The constraints of power are already moderating its actions, if not its rhetoric.
• As The Economist mentions, Hamas may soon be embroiled in competition with Muslim extremist groups in Gaza. This implies that Hamas is a relatively moderate force there now (as would be expected from the logic of the point above). Denying recognition to Hamas will make it more likely that extremer forces will take hold in Gaza, making the situation there even worse for the people of Gaza and further harming any chance at cooperation with Israel and/or the US and their allies. As mentioned, this was the case with the PLO as well.

In conclusion, I am arguing to recognize Hamas not because I am an idealist and believe in the good of all people. On the contrary, I am a realist and believe that recognizing Hamas is in everyone's interests. It's a win-win situation, and Israel, the US, the UK, France, etc. would be fools not to take advantage of it. It is sure to be a short-lived opportunity in an ever-unstable Middle East. True, it is by no means a guarantee of success, but letting idealistic notions like "we don't negotiate with terrorists" get in the way of what is, granted, only a shimmer of hope for progress, would be reckless and unconscionable.