The Hillary Email Scandal: An Unenforceable Rule Serving an Undesirable Goal?

Photographer: Harald Dettenborn, CC license

Hillary Clinton used a personal email account and server for all official business while she was Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. Although she seems not to have broken any laws outright, she has certainly made it more difficult to process Freedom of Information Act requests lodged with the State Department, for example, and the State Department must comply with such requests and must make official correspondence available. She therefore does seem to have violated the spirit of such rules. Transparency is a big buzzword these days and it is seen as a way to combat corruption, crime, laziness, and dishonesty, all laudable targets. But enforcing these rules is difficult, to say the least, and it is also not clear that transparency is always the best thing for diplomacy.

According to politifact, federal rules state that it would have been OK for Clinton to use her personal email account in an “emergency.” While noting that she had not actually broken any laws because the rules were tightened only after she left office, experts say that EXCLUSIVE use of a personal account is not allowed. Where do we draw the line? How much use is then permitted? How can we know that that occasional "emergency" correspondence was not where she broke laws and committed corruption?

More problematic than the arbitrary percentages of personal email account use is the question of enforcement: Presumably, Clinton could use her personal account for any personal correspondence. But it would be Clinton herself who would judge what’s personal--which is exactly what she has been accused of by opponents. Since the personal emails are not looked at, who is to say whether they are personal or not? In effect, then, there is absolutely no difference between Clinton claiming to use her personal account only for personal emails and Clinton claiming to have deleted only personal emails from her records before handing over what she claims is everything else (which is the current situation). Opponents argue there is no way to verify this, but this would be the case if she had used her personal account only for personal emails, too, which would apparently have been perfectly fine. The rule thus appears pretty unenforceable unless all government officials were prohibited from ever having any private email correspondence.

This rule was meant to serve a seemingly laudable goal: transparency in, in this case, diplomacy. There have long been demands to end "secret diplomacy" because of suspicion of just what goes on behind closed doors. More crimes are committed in the dark than in the light of day, after all. In addition, how can a democracy function well if its people do not know what their government is doing? How can the people make themselves heard? Transparency at all levels, including diplomacy, is supposed to fix this.

The problem is that making negotiations, rather than just their outcomes, public can make diplomacy nearly impossible--and without diplomacy and negotiation, cooperation becomes nearly impossible as well. Without cooperation, everyone is worse off: shared economic benefits don't materialize, wars become more likely, collective action on pollution and climate change can't occur, etc. The reason is simple: Both sides need to be free to offer unpopular things in exchange for what they want. Deals often fall through. The public might accept slaying a sacred cow in exchange for a big deal, but revealing that a leader was willing to do so and did not achieve the hoped-for outcome could cause cries of “traitor!” Secret negotiations thus allow the two sides (or even two negotiators) to speak openly with one another without constantly worrying about how their domestic audiences are reacting to what they are saying and how this might affect their re-election chances or other aspects of political capital. Though a deal was not reached in the end anyway, the Camp David negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Auhtority President Yassir Arafat are illustrative: They both offered things in secret that they could not have offered if opposition back home had constantly been up in arms (e.g. both of them moved towards sharing Jerusalem, which, in public, neither had dared to say they could do).

Clinton went against the spirit, at least, of transparency regulations, but those regulations are inherently arbitrary and it is also easy to see why she would wish to skirt them. The negotiations leading to a deal (though not the deal itself) should be permitted to remain secret and be protected from the scrutiny of all but a few insiders, at least for a time. Doing the opposite would not only be impractical (as it would require ALL correspondence to be publicly available, as I have shown), it would be undesirable in the case of diplomacy.

Is there such a thing as "lone wolf" terrorism?

How we define terrorism impacts how we respond to it. Many "lone wolf" attacks probably do not qualify as terrorism. A definition free of value judgments is key.

What is terrorism? It sounds like a simple question, and yet there are constant debates any time the label is used. Accusations of racism, imperialism, or other form of privileged bias often surface during such debates. The reason is that the word "terrorism" is very often used to refer to an illegitimate form of violence. A definition of terrorism that includes the types of people targeted (e.g. civilians, the targeting of which is illegitimate) or attackers (militant groups, etc., who are not sanctioned by governments and therefore seen by many as "illegitimate") will always carry a negative moral assessment with it. This matters because such a definition can never be universal and is also nearly meaningless (meaning only "violence we don't accept as legitimate"). A so-called "strategic" definition is therefore desirable. This sees terrorism as a logical tactic within a wider strategy. This definition includes three elements:

1. It causes fear (terror).
2. Its targets are mostly symbolic rather than strategically important, meaning it is primarily a psychological form of warfare rather than something that directly threatens the targeted state or group's survival or ability to fight.
3. It has a political intention: Attackers want a government or group to adopt (or abandon) a certain policy or policies.

When talking about so-called "lone wolf" terrorists (terrorists acting on their own as opposed to as part of a larger terrorist group), the first two elements from the definition pose no problems: Lone wolf attacks cause fear and their targets are usually mostly symbolic. The third part suggests many lone wolf attacks may not be terrorism. Terrorism as a tactic implies a larger strategy for effecting change beyond mere revenge or the desire to die in a blaze of glory. Lone wolves may have political intentions, but the fact that they are alone means that their attacks bleed into hate crimes or “senseless” attacks by “mad men.” They very often do not amount to planned-out attacks used as part of a wider strategy. This makes calling a lone wolf attack "terrorism" questionable and what name we give to such attacks is important because responding to terrorism should be different from responding to random acts of violence.

Some ostensibly "lone" attacks may be more than that, however. Just who is a lone wolf? True lone wolves, especially if they plan or expect to die while carrying out their attacks, cannot reasonably see their attacks as part of a wider strategy. At most, they may hope that others will take up their cause and execute further attacks, but this is not a real strategy and calling their attacks “tactical” is quite dubious--which means calling them "terrorism" is inappropriate. Lone wolves may, however, act at the direction or suggestion of larger groups or militant leaders. Al-Baghdadi, head of Islamic State, has called for his followers to carry out attacks in Europe, particularly in France. Lone wolves deciding to do so would be executing attacks in the knowledge that this is indeed part of a wider plan. There are therefore good reasons for considering such attackers to be terrorists rather than just deranged. They are acting alone, but are not true lone wolves in that they are part of what are potentially a series of attacks, albeit ones that are only loosely coordinated.

In practice, of course, it may often be difficult to determine if a lone attacker believed him/herself to be acting as part of a wider campaign or simply on his/her own initiative. The implications for counterterrorism are significant. Lone attacks that are not part of a broader campaign may need little response beyond discussions of the cause of the attacker's deranged mental state. There is little else that can be done but, luckily, little that must be done.

Lone attacks that are part of a broader campaign are just as difficult to combat directly as true lone wolves are because the attacker(s) is(are) not directly associated with a larger group and will thus be hard to find. Efforts can still be directed at the instigating authority, however, and attention should also be paid to factors that may have caused the attackers to be attracted to the specific cause.

The only bright spot is that lone individuals and small groups are likely to be shorter-lived and less deadly than their larger counterparts, even though they may be harder to track down. This is simply because they will almost certainly lack the human and financial resources to sustain a devastating campaign over the longer term. A foreign policy centered on combating the instigating group (and encouraging its state sponsors, if any, to do the same) and, if possible, ameliorating factors pushing people to join terrorists, coupled with good police and community service work at home, can address such attacks.

America and Myanmar: Be Realist, but Be Liberal, Too

President Obama just got finished with a trip to Myanmar. This trip is of massive significance, because Myanmar has been a pariah state since the 1990s. The trip is a sort of reward to Myanmar for making positive changes. This is a situation in which sanctions seem to have worked: Myanmar did not like its pariah status, in part because strict Western sanctions meant that it had to rely heavily on China. Myanmar is now looking to diversify its options. This also comes at an opportune time for American policy: America is in the middle of a strategic “pivot” towards Asia. Sanctions have thus been in place for liberal reasons like promoting democracy and human rights and encouraging the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Removing some of those sanctions is also a way to encourage Myanmar to continue improving. At the same time, however, they also serve a strategic, realist purpose. Has the shift towards good relations with Myanmar been too fast? In other words: Is America getting overly concerned with balancing against China and leaving liberal causes by the wayside?

Myanmar has made some very positive changes towards more openness and democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi has also approved of these changes and the loosening of sanctions against Myanmar in order to support continued change. Myanmar's legislature now includes mostly elected politicians and it seems to have some real influence on governing, which is a welcome change to full-on dictatorship. However, these changes are still limited and, perhaps more importantly, imminently reversible. There are still problems with the repression and mistreatment of ethnic minorities and there are still conservative factions within the army that are opposed to further opening. Myanmar is thus not there yet. Some sanctions, however, are also still in place. They should not be fully removed until the country has arrived at liberal democracy. Are we moving too fast? It seems the most onerous sanctions are already gone. There is also a further danger: Myanmar may see the US “pivot” towards Asia as a reason the United States will want to embrace Myanmar no matter what it does. What's more, the country's leaders would have reason to think this.

In the autumn of last year, the Obama Administration announced a "pivot" towards Asia. The main reason for this strategic shift is that the Administration rightly sees Asia is the future. Specifically, though, it has seen that US allies in the region are increasingly nervous about the rising power of China. Since 1945, with a few glaring exceptions such as the Korean and Vietnam wars (which are not necessarily considered exceptions, but let's leave that for now), the Asia-Pacific region has experienced what is known as the “Pax Americana.” The US presence in the region, including important security guarantees to allies like Japan and South Korea, has meant that countries there have been free to concentrate on economic development and have not needed to worry about the military prowess of their neighbors. Japan has a military that, according to its own constitution, is purely for defensive purposes. It also has no nuclear weapons, though it certainly has the capability to develop them. This stability will be at risk if countries in the region feel that the United States can no longer maintain the status quo there and that they themselves must be able to defend themselves against a rising China.

It does not matter whether or not China or its neighbors actually seek war. What matters is that little bit of fear in the back of leaders' minds that makes them think they had better be prepared – just in case. The result could be a buildup of arms in the region, possibly including Japanese and South Korean nukes. Each build-up would then serve to make each country's immediate neighbors more nervous, encouraging them to build up as well. This conundrum is known as the "security dilemma.” The US presence in East Asia has so far prevented this outcome, and the Obama Administration seems to wish to continue doing so for as long as possible.

This focus on broader strategic goals is good. Over time, of course, the US may not be able to maintain the Pax Americana. But in the short to medium term, it makes sense to try (I won't discuss the pitfalls here). The risk in the case of Myanmar, however, is that the US places realist strategic goals ahead of liberal ones. Generally, if the choice comes down to those two, then I support realism. We do not yet have to choose, however. America can still pivot towards Asia and it doesn't necessarily need Myanmar to do so. What's more, balancing is occurring anyway. China's neighbors are uncomfortable with its power and with its maritime claims in the South China Sea. These countries have been cultivating better relations with each other and with America already. The region's other superpower, India, has also grown much closer to America. America's pivot towards Asia is therefore in many Asian countries' own self interest. America doesn't need to bribe them much (though it should cultivate good relations with them). There is thus no need yet to sacrifice liberal causes on the altar of strategic realism.

America can thus both stick to its principles of support for democracy and human rights while keeping an eye on important strategic goals like stability, security, and, in the end, peace. Hopefully, the Obama Administration and future American Administrations recognize this and will continue to keep the pressure on Myanmar whenever needed in order to keep rewarding it for moving in the right direction. Hopefully, too, both the leaders of the United States and Myanmar realize that the loosening of sanctions is every bit as reversible as Myanmar's own move towards democracy and its promotion of human rights.

The Difficulties of Deterrence

As my regular readers and friends will know, I am writing a PhD on the use and effectiveness of deterrent policies against terrorism. It's an important subject, because the way a state decides to fight terrorism can protect people from harm, but it can also cost vast sums of money, endanger the lives of soldiers, kill civilians, topple governments, cause global outcries, and quite possibly result in incentives leading to more terrorism, not less. It also might not even protect many people from much harm if the policy is flawed. In other words: it's a matter of life and death.

So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.

A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.

A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).

OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.

So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.

Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.

This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.

Liberalism and the Rise of China

"Liberalism" is a word with sometimes contradictory meanings. In international relations, it refers to a school of thought that supports internationalism: free trade, international institutions and laws, and, by association, the decline of realism, with its concepts of power, national interests, and the nation-state in a world of anarchy. The United States, many or most European states, and other "western" countries like Canada and Australia are, more or less, liberal powers (though all of them bow to the exigencies of realpolitik when they deem it necessary). China, too, is liberal, at least in the sense of free trade. It was quick to understand the benefits and reap the rewards of free trade. On foreign relations, however, China is decidedly realist.

While the EU and the U.S. often make trade and aid agreements contingent on certain human rights standards being met, China relates with other states as it suits it, largely ignoring what is going on within those states. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two excellent examples. China has helped Pakistan build several nuclear reactors, even though China's membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means it has a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons and is barred from providing nuclear assistance of any kind to non-members of the treaty (such as Pakistan). Admittedly, this is partly a response to America's bending of the rules (nonetheless the "proper way," by getting a legal exception to them passed) to do the same for India, Pakistan's arch rival and also a non-member of the NPT. (America did this largely because it sees China as a counterweight to India in the Indian Ocean and in the world.)

In Sri Lanka, China has been selling weapons at low prices and donating handsomely to infrastructure investment programs there, no strings attached. The U.S. and the EU had halted such activity after concerns arose about alleged war crimes being committed by government forces when fighting (and finally, after decades) defeating the Tamil Tigers, a separatist militia group. China's generosity has more than made up for the West's cutoff, so Sri Lanka was unconcerned about the West's threats. Will the West have any influence anymore?

The difficulty with liberalism is that it requires worldwide cooperation (at least until a world authority, replete with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions arises to run and enforce things, a simultaneously Utopian- and somewhat frightening-sounding idea). Even one systemically important straggler can bring the liberal system to its knees. During the world's brief "unipolar moment," in which the fall of the USSR has left the United States the world's only "hyperpower," this has been less problematic. The U.S. has had the resources and the lack of opposition necessary to push for such cooperation. However, this has never been a complete success, and unipolarity is ending (aided in part by a broad interpretation of U.S. goals leading to overstretch of its resources). China is on the rise, India and Brazil are possible future Great Powers, and Russia is insistent on not being forgotten. Economically, the EU is a Great Power, but it lacks the political, foreign policy, and military unity to have a real enforcement-related presence in the world. As the center of economic and military gravity shifts away from the U.S. and the EU (in relative terms), it will be increasingly harder for the West to make sanctions stick if other powers do not cooperate. It will also become ever harder to cajole them into cooperation.

The question that presents itself is: how much longer will it make sense to attach strings to aid and trade? If the strings mean both are turned down, and the presence of generous, no-strings-attached opportunities from elsewhere means the deals are not effective in shaping the world, then what is the point? The passed-over deals would benefit China and other realist opportunists and hurt the U.S. and the EU. At some point, concern about this loss of influence, and about China's rising military and economic might, will cause a shift to more realism in foreign and economic policy.

Realists are not prescriptive. It's not that they think things should be this way, it's that they assess that they are, whether or not we like it. In such circumstances, unfortunately, sometimes looking out for one's own interests, narrowly defined, is the best anyone can do. This will likely be the future of the world in the coming decades.