Is America still the world's lone hyperpower?

Recent US failures and infighting give the impression that the US is weaker than it is.

 

 

For a moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was talk of the United States as the "last superpower" or even the world's "hyperpower." At the time, it seemed the US was free to shape the world as it wished because there was no longer opposition from another country nearly as powerful as itself. This feeling persisted, Blackhawk Down notwithstanding, until the US seemed unable to finish the job in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sense of decline was then intensified by the financial and economic crises of the late 2000s and the political gridlock that has ensued in the US since 2010. The rise of China, with its growing military and tougher rhetoric, also seemed to suggest that a multipolar world had arrived. If the US can't get what it wants and is continually constrained abroad, can it really be a hyperpower?

The answer is "yes," and here is why. Throughout the world, countries have two choices: ally with a regional power or ally with the United States (or both if that regional power is also a US ally--a sign in and of itself). Countries that have an affinity for (or whose economies are perhaps too closely linked with) the regional power side with that power. If others are worried, they seek closer ties with other worried countries and with the United States as a guarantor of their security and interests. The fact that this occurs in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia shows that the US is seen globally as a power that can provide extra security. There is no other country that currently does this. So while there are regional powers that challenge US authority within one part of the globe, the single solution to regional fears remains the United States. Only when that changes (e.g. China begins to be seen as an alternative to an alliance with the US and this outside of China's backyard) will the world be multipolar.

The failure of the US military to solve political problems was a sign of US hubris, foolishness, and naivete, but it was not a sign of failing US power. Political problems require political solutions. Military force can defeat an enemy or clamp down on violence, but it cannot, in the end, provide a political solution, especially if that solution is supposed to be democracy rather than an iron-fisted dictatorship. This has always been the case. Without an internal readiness and cultural preparedness for democracy, democracy cannot come about. By its very nature (since it exists at the behest of the people), democracy cannot be forced. No amount of power in the world could have changed that. (State building may bring a country to democracy over years or decades, but it is an uncertain and incredibly intensive and expensive endeavor and requires civic education and institution-building--political solutions, in other words.)

Finally, that the US cannot always get what it wants and is constrained by international politics is also not in itself a sign that the US is not a hyperpower because this misunderstands the term. All states are subject to others' influence and demands and are not free to act as they please with complete impunity. States have varying degrees of freedom of action, however, and the US is freer than others due to its power. The US can, when it chooses, act alone militarily anywhere in the world. No other country can do this (except to a certain extent, perhaps, for Russia, which is however much weaker in other respects). When France and the UK got together to support rebels in Libya, their combined power was not enough: They needed US assistance to be effective.

The US is rightly chastened by its foolhardy experiment with neoconservatism and its inflated belief in the ability of the military to solve the world's problems. It has perhaps now swung too far in the opposite direction, but this is probably also temporary. In the end, however, its underlying power and ability to affect the world has only been lightly diminished, and this more by the damage to its reputation caused by the wars in the Middle East, political infighting in Washington, and its own (faulty) acceptance of its loss of power than by any real changes in fundamentals. US power still underwrites the international system and that will continue to be the case for at least another decade or two. Beyond that, anything could happen (even including a continued unipolar world with the US at its head--or not).

America Should Support Democracy... Right?

Obama has good reasons for going against America's principles in favor of cynical pragmatism. That doesn't mean it's the right decision.

The situation in Egypt provides a great example of the ethical conundrums that await any leader when dealing with foreign policy. What just happened in Egypt can only reasonably be called a military coup. US law requires the US to cut off aid to any country in which a democratically elected leader is overthrown by undemocratic means. In Egypt, the military issued an ultimatum--a military giving order to an elected government (the opposite of how things ought to work). When the government didn't fulfill the military's demands, it seized the president and appointed a caretaker government of its choosing. It also shut down media outlets sympathetic to the elected government, trampling on an essential ingredient for a successful democracy: a free press. Legally, then, the case for cutting off the US's annual aid of $1.3 billion to the Egyptian military is pretty clear-cut. So far, Obama has shied away from declaring that the coup was, in fact, a coup, in order to keep his options open.

Beyond the legality of US aid to the Egyptian military, moreover, there are also myriad moral issues at stake. How can the US honestly claim to support democracy when it only does so if it likes the regime that was overthrown? Not cutting off aid makes the US look like a complete hypocrite and undermines its moral authority when trying to push for democracy elsewhere. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where Islam-inspired political parties may now conclude that democracy won't work and that the only way to get to power is to seize power and shut down all opposition. The Middle East's experiment with democracy could be over before it starts.

So why hasn't the US cut off aid? This is where it gets complicated. It started paying aid to Egypt in 1979 as part of its support of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Egypt agreed to sign the treaty and demilitarize the Sinai Peninsula, thereby fulfilling Israel's security needs. This was the right thing to do, as it supported peace, even though it was aid to the military of a dictatorship. It also helped shift Egypt out of the Soviet orbit during the Cold War. Over the years since, the US military has fostered close ties to its counterpart in Egypt. This is the strongest connection between the US and Egypt. During last year's uprising that brought down Mubarak, the US is said to have used the good relationship between the two countries' militaries to encourage, and to push for, democratic elections in Egypt. All good stuff, then.

The reasons for not cutting the aid are all related to this. Egypt has all the leverage with the aid. The aid is related to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. It it's cut, Egypt might retaliate by abrogating the treaty. This doesn't necessarily mean war with Israel or even re-militarization of Sinai, but it could be the first step in rising instability between the two of them. The aid lies at the root of the cooperation between the militaries of the US and Egypt, and that cooperation is the greatest source of influence between the two. Canceling the aid would thus most likely end the cooperation and thus the US's last source of influence in Egypt. That would mean the US would have less ability to encourage a return to democracy or peace with Israel. This is why it's so tricky to stay involved and to stay "morally" clean in this case.

There are no easy answers, but I think I have to side with John McCain on this one: Suspend aid. Suspend, not terminate. It should be known that aid will be restored as soon as free and fair elections have been held and providing Egypt sticks to the peace treaty with Israel. When aid is restored, back payments should also be made, so Egypt suffers no loss in the long term.

It's a risky strategy, admittedly. Egypt has enough difficulties at home that it would make no sense to start problems with Israel. This oft-cited fact is little comfort, however. It is precisely during times of great internal turmoil that rulers do unexpected, illogical, and dangerous things. After all, what better way to unite the Egyptian people behind the government than by ditching an unpopular treaty with Israel and possibly making aggressive noises towards it? Israel can definitely defend itself, but an escalation of that kind would still be dangerous for Israel, Egypt, and the whole region. If Obama seems indecisive about whether to stick to America's principles or go with cynical pragmatism, this is why.

America and Myanmar: Be Realist, but Be Liberal, Too

President Obama just got finished with a trip to Myanmar. This trip is of massive significance, because Myanmar has been a pariah state since the 1990s. The trip is a sort of reward to Myanmar for making positive changes. This is a situation in which sanctions seem to have worked: Myanmar did not like its pariah status, in part because strict Western sanctions meant that it had to rely heavily on China. Myanmar is now looking to diversify its options. This also comes at an opportune time for American policy: America is in the middle of a strategic “pivot” towards Asia. Sanctions have thus been in place for liberal reasons like promoting democracy and human rights and encouraging the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Removing some of those sanctions is also a way to encourage Myanmar to continue improving. At the same time, however, they also serve a strategic, realist purpose. Has the shift towards good relations with Myanmar been too fast? In other words: Is America getting overly concerned with balancing against China and leaving liberal causes by the wayside?

Myanmar has made some very positive changes towards more openness and democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi has also approved of these changes and the loosening of sanctions against Myanmar in order to support continued change. Myanmar's legislature now includes mostly elected politicians and it seems to have some real influence on governing, which is a welcome change to full-on dictatorship. However, these changes are still limited and, perhaps more importantly, imminently reversible. There are still problems with the repression and mistreatment of ethnic minorities and there are still conservative factions within the army that are opposed to further opening. Myanmar is thus not there yet. Some sanctions, however, are also still in place. They should not be fully removed until the country has arrived at liberal democracy. Are we moving too fast? It seems the most onerous sanctions are already gone. There is also a further danger: Myanmar may see the US “pivot” towards Asia as a reason the United States will want to embrace Myanmar no matter what it does. What's more, the country's leaders would have reason to think this.

In the autumn of last year, the Obama Administration announced a "pivot" towards Asia. The main reason for this strategic shift is that the Administration rightly sees Asia is the future. Specifically, though, it has seen that US allies in the region are increasingly nervous about the rising power of China. Since 1945, with a few glaring exceptions such as the Korean and Vietnam wars (which are not necessarily considered exceptions, but let's leave that for now), the Asia-Pacific region has experienced what is known as the “Pax Americana.” The US presence in the region, including important security guarantees to allies like Japan and South Korea, has meant that countries there have been free to concentrate on economic development and have not needed to worry about the military prowess of their neighbors. Japan has a military that, according to its own constitution, is purely for defensive purposes. It also has no nuclear weapons, though it certainly has the capability to develop them. This stability will be at risk if countries in the region feel that the United States can no longer maintain the status quo there and that they themselves must be able to defend themselves against a rising China.

It does not matter whether or not China or its neighbors actually seek war. What matters is that little bit of fear in the back of leaders' minds that makes them think they had better be prepared – just in case. The result could be a buildup of arms in the region, possibly including Japanese and South Korean nukes. Each build-up would then serve to make each country's immediate neighbors more nervous, encouraging them to build up as well. This conundrum is known as the "security dilemma.” The US presence in East Asia has so far prevented this outcome, and the Obama Administration seems to wish to continue doing so for as long as possible.

This focus on broader strategic goals is good. Over time, of course, the US may not be able to maintain the Pax Americana. But in the short to medium term, it makes sense to try (I won't discuss the pitfalls here). The risk in the case of Myanmar, however, is that the US places realist strategic goals ahead of liberal ones. Generally, if the choice comes down to those two, then I support realism. We do not yet have to choose, however. America can still pivot towards Asia and it doesn't necessarily need Myanmar to do so. What's more, balancing is occurring anyway. China's neighbors are uncomfortable with its power and with its maritime claims in the South China Sea. These countries have been cultivating better relations with each other and with America already. The region's other superpower, India, has also grown much closer to America. America's pivot towards Asia is therefore in many Asian countries' own self interest. America doesn't need to bribe them much (though it should cultivate good relations with them). There is thus no need yet to sacrifice liberal causes on the altar of strategic realism.

America can thus both stick to its principles of support for democracy and human rights while keeping an eye on important strategic goals like stability, security, and, in the end, peace. Hopefully, the Obama Administration and future American Administrations recognize this and will continue to keep the pressure on Myanmar whenever needed in order to keep rewarding it for moving in the right direction. Hopefully, too, both the leaders of the United States and Myanmar realize that the loosening of sanctions is every bit as reversible as Myanmar's own move towards democracy and its promotion of human rights.

The Difficulties of Deterrence

As my regular readers and friends will know, I am writing a PhD on the use and effectiveness of deterrent policies against terrorism. It's an important subject, because the way a state decides to fight terrorism can protect people from harm, but it can also cost vast sums of money, endanger the lives of soldiers, kill civilians, topple governments, cause global outcries, and quite possibly result in incentives leading to more terrorism, not less. It also might not even protect many people from much harm if the policy is flawed. In other words: it's a matter of life and death.

So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.

A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.

A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).

OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.

So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.

Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.

This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.

Realism and Terrorism

Political realism is a school of thought that believes that nation-states are the essential actors in the international system (not individuals, groups, or corporations) and that there are structural reasons that the world functions the way it does that are beyond the immediate influence even of world leaders and powerful nation-states themselves. Due to its focus on the "big picture" --the structure of the whole international system and the distribution of power among the nation-states within it-- many have argued that realism is becoming increasingly irrelevant in a world of asymmetric warfare with non-state actors like terrorists. Indeed, how can a model that, at its base, excludes all parties below the level of the nation-state have anything to say about terrorism?

It is true that realists have often ignored terrorism almost completely, preferring to view the problem as one of crime-fighting that can be addressed by nation-states, like ocean piracy in the 19th century (also something outside realist models). The structural realist model can be applied to terror groups, however. It simply has to be "translated" to the new environment. Doing so can yield some interesting insights and immediately suggests some policy responses (which are, luckily, already being put in place to some extent).

Reading Leah Farrall's article in Foreign Affairs, How al Qaeda Works, I was reminded of a somewhat similar article in International Security (Vol. 33, No. 2, Fall 2008) by Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni entitled “Strengths and Weaknesses of Networks: Why al-Qaeda may be Less Dangerous than Most Think.” These two make opposing arguments, with the former asserting that al Qaeda is stronger than ever and the latter calling this idea into question, as the title suggests. What they both agree on, however, is the way in which al Qaeda's network is structured. Farrall's article distinguishes between "franchises" and "branches" within the network, similar to the way McDonald's stores are usually owned and operated by franchisees, but are sometimes run by McDonald's directly (branches). The point is that the structure is highly decentralized. Minor established terror groups apparently apply for al Qaeda franchise status.

So what does all this have to do with realism? Translate the structural nation-state model onto the individual terror units (franchises, branches, the al Qaeda core, and other unrelated terror groups) and you have what one might call a "terror system." Crucially, the al Qaeda franchises have local goals that are generally more important to them than the sweeping, global goals espoused by al Qaeda itself. To be a franchisee, however, these groups must help out with al Qaeda's global mission. In return, they gain expertise, funding, and other support for local terror operations largely of their own choosing. As long as their interests coincide in this arrangement, we can expect cooperation between local groups and the al Qaeda core.

The realist model, however, provides many insights into the formation of alliances and the reasons why groups' divergent interests may drag them away from cooperation, quite possibly in spite of their professed wishes for such cooperation. The point is: we must find ways to bring franchisees' interests out of alignment with those of al Qaeda, thus weakening the entire network.

This has apparently already been done in at least one case: against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Philippines. American and Filipino authorities worked to change incentives for the MILF, punishing it more heavily for working with al Qaeda, while using carrots to encourage it not to do so and to come to talks with the government about its local goals. Al Qaeda operatives have apparently stopped using the MILF's training camps in the Philippines. This was the successful application of a realist, divide-and-conquer deterrent strategy, one known since at least Roman times. This is also the topic of my coming PhD dissertation. More to come in about three years...

North Korea: Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain (China)

The situation with North Korea can seem confusing and infuriating. Why does North Korea provoke and then act friendly? Why is it so bent on getting nukes? Is Kim crazy? Why does China support North Korea, a would-be nuclear power in its backyard?

The answers to all these questions become pretty clear if you think of them as North Korean or Chinese leaders would. Why does North Korea yo-yo? Simple: it really wants nukes. Every time talks and improving relations get to the point where there's nowhere to go but giving them up, Kim starts the cycle from the beginning. He provokes, gets everyone riled up, then quiets down before a real mess starts and asks for negotiations again. All this buys time and has thus far avoided any real armed conflict. North Korea is closer to being able to launch nuclear warheads that can travel long distances, a considerable increase in its deterrent capability. At the same time, no one has attacked North Korea. A pretty successful strategy, from Kim's perspective.

But why is he so bent on getting nukes? This one is easy: no one invades a country with nukes, especially ones that pose a credible threat (they're borderline in North Korea, but still a risk), especially when no one is sure where they all are (the case in North Korea and Iran).

This leaves us with the last question: what's China's plan? Let's be China for a moment. What do we want? The same things most other countries want: autonomy in our internal affairs, security internationally, and to be able to trade freely with the rest of the world. North Korea would seem to cause insecurity, and America is a supporter of free trade, both ideologically and physically, with its naval presence in the western Pacific. This would seem to encourage China to take the US side on North Korea. It doesn't, because China dislikes US pressure to change its internal situation (criticism of the management of its exchange rate or its human rights record, for example) and sees its ability to project power in its region limited only by the US presence there, regardless of US intentions. These concerns seem to override, or at least ameliorate, China's worries over North Korea. The old diplomatic adage "let's you and him fight" applies here. China welcomes a distraction for America, while also free-riding on American action (it does not really want North Korea to become more powerful). China is also afraid of a collapse of the Kim regime because this might cause streams of refuges into China.

What should the US do? It is currently being duped by North Korea and China: paying for security in the region while not getting anywhere as far as its goals in the region. As I've argued previously, the US should make this China's problem. It should back up South Korea (and Japan) in the region where necessary, but it should not take the lead. This would force China to be more actively involved. It would make it impossible for China to free-ride on US peace-keeping and would also reduce the distraction-factor with regard to North Korea. It would also help to allay concerns about America's strong presence in the region because America would be speaking softly (while still carrying a "big stick"; Teddy Roosevelt would approve). China wishes to be a world power and claims to want peace. Here is its chance.

Why We Still Need the Military

A common theme to be heard when talking about the armed forces in Europe and America is that we spend too much money on them. "Where's the enemy?" someone I know asked. The answer is often along the lines of "the only enemies we have are ones made up by the military industrial complex to give itself a reason for existing." Since this spending is unnecessary, so the reasoning goes, the money would be much better spent elsewhere.

While there is probably scope to cut spending in America, which spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined, the idea that much too much is spent on the armed forces in general is flawed. America only spends about 4% of its GDP on the military, less than it spent during the Cold War and much less than a great deal of other countries. Military expenditures in Europe have also been declining for decades as a percentage of GDP.

All very well, you might say, but why even have a military at all? It may come as a surprise that the first reason, while perhaps the most obvious, is the less important one: there are enemies. Just think of Iran and North Korea. Ask Eastern European countries how they feel about Russia, and they will tell you they are still nervous about its influence and its sheer capabilities. But aren't we just making these enemies? If world leaders were younger and more female, the world would surely be a better place (someone recently argued this to me).

This brings me to the second, and more important, reason why we still need a military: stability. Whether Iran is an enemy or a friend is something that can change over time. Surely no person of sound mind would argue that Iran, in the sense of Iranians themselves, are the "enemy." The primary driving force behind the existence of militaries is not, as many believe, a desire for power. The quest for power is more of a byproduct of the actual cause: fear. How do we know what the intentions of any given state are? In a changing world, how can we be sure that these intentions will not change? The world is an anarchic place. There is no global police force that will come help countries if they are attacked by others. Just look at Georgia. The UN cannot fill this role and was never designed to be able to. It is a club of nation-states and cannot rise above them.

This policing role has fallen to certain countries over the centuries. Britain had it until WWI, the United States has taken it on since WWII. "But who says the world wants the US to go around policing it? How arrogant!" Yup, I've heard that (and indeed, as a younger man, have said it myself), too. In fact, the US tried to just mind its own business and let everyone get on with their own business. The problem was, Britain had been keeping order but wasn't able to after WWI. The result? WWII. There was no one there to check German power or make European countries feel more secure. The US learned from this. Since WWII, it has been committed to providing stability, at first focusing on Europe, and now, increasingly, on Asia.

Take Japan. Japan has not spent much on its military, freeing it to spend money on social programs and the like. All very nice for Japan. The reason it has felt safe enough to do this, however, is because the US has long guaranteed its security. China is increasing its military spending and has an enormous population. This makes Japan nervous. For now, however, the US has the capability to make Japan (and South Korea and others) feel secure enough. If the US were to withdraw from Asia, those countries would look at the regional giant, China, and know that China could really boss them around if it wanted to and they, as much smaller countries without credible militaries, would be able to do little about it.

The point is not that China is the enemy (nor even that Iran is). The point is that China is (becoming) powerful. Will it remain peaceful? Will is always respect others wishes, even if contrary to its own needs? It might. The historical record indicates otherwise, however. The US provides stability, for now, in an uncertain world. Its military is needed to do that. We may think it would be nice to live in a world without militaries, but there is just no way to do that. That is not (yet) the world we live in.

Liberalism and the Rise of China

"Liberalism" is a word with sometimes contradictory meanings. In international relations, it refers to a school of thought that supports internationalism: free trade, international institutions and laws, and, by association, the decline of realism, with its concepts of power, national interests, and the nation-state in a world of anarchy. The United States, many or most European states, and other "western" countries like Canada and Australia are, more or less, liberal powers (though all of them bow to the exigencies of realpolitik when they deem it necessary). China, too, is liberal, at least in the sense of free trade. It was quick to understand the benefits and reap the rewards of free trade. On foreign relations, however, China is decidedly realist.

While the EU and the U.S. often make trade and aid agreements contingent on certain human rights standards being met, China relates with other states as it suits it, largely ignoring what is going on within those states. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two excellent examples. China has helped Pakistan build several nuclear reactors, even though China's membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means it has a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons and is barred from providing nuclear assistance of any kind to non-members of the treaty (such as Pakistan). Admittedly, this is partly a response to America's bending of the rules (nonetheless the "proper way," by getting a legal exception to them passed) to do the same for India, Pakistan's arch rival and also a non-member of the NPT. (America did this largely because it sees China as a counterweight to India in the Indian Ocean and in the world.)

In Sri Lanka, China has been selling weapons at low prices and donating handsomely to infrastructure investment programs there, no strings attached. The U.S. and the EU had halted such activity after concerns arose about alleged war crimes being committed by government forces when fighting (and finally, after decades) defeating the Tamil Tigers, a separatist militia group. China's generosity has more than made up for the West's cutoff, so Sri Lanka was unconcerned about the West's threats. Will the West have any influence anymore?

The difficulty with liberalism is that it requires worldwide cooperation (at least until a world authority, replete with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions arises to run and enforce things, a simultaneously Utopian- and somewhat frightening-sounding idea). Even one systemically important straggler can bring the liberal system to its knees. During the world's brief "unipolar moment," in which the fall of the USSR has left the United States the world's only "hyperpower," this has been less problematic. The U.S. has had the resources and the lack of opposition necessary to push for such cooperation. However, this has never been a complete success, and unipolarity is ending (aided in part by a broad interpretation of U.S. goals leading to overstretch of its resources). China is on the rise, India and Brazil are possible future Great Powers, and Russia is insistent on not being forgotten. Economically, the EU is a Great Power, but it lacks the political, foreign policy, and military unity to have a real enforcement-related presence in the world. As the center of economic and military gravity shifts away from the U.S. and the EU (in relative terms), it will be increasingly harder for the West to make sanctions stick if other powers do not cooperate. It will also become ever harder to cajole them into cooperation.

The question that presents itself is: how much longer will it make sense to attach strings to aid and trade? If the strings mean both are turned down, and the presence of generous, no-strings-attached opportunities from elsewhere means the deals are not effective in shaping the world, then what is the point? The passed-over deals would benefit China and other realist opportunists and hurt the U.S. and the EU. At some point, concern about this loss of influence, and about China's rising military and economic might, will cause a shift to more realism in foreign and economic policy.

Realists are not prescriptive. It's not that they think things should be this way, it's that they assess that they are, whether or not we like it. In such circumstances, unfortunately, sometimes looking out for one's own interests, narrowly defined, is the best anyone can do. This will likely be the future of the world in the coming decades.

Time to Recognize Hamas

An article from this week's edition of The Economist provides a startling look into Hamas's success at providing the Gaza Strip with just about everything it needs. Prices have fallen, businesses have flourished, cafés and universities have re-opened. This adds yet another reason to the list of why the "West," insofar as it has not already done so (I believe Norway already has, for example), should recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Gaza Strip. It exercises de facto control over the territory and has apparently succeeded in bringing security and a degree of economic prosperity (when compared with the past few years) to the area. No other group (including the UN and the Israelis) could make this claim. These accomplishments have also made Hamas popular in the Gaza Strip, further diminishing prospects that Fatah could ever enjoy any real influence there again without serious (and deleterious) changes to conditions in Gaza. What are the other reasons Hamas should be recognized and worked with?

• It has moved away from the West and relies on other contacts for its stability and prosperity. This is working (comparatively speaking). While economic and personal security in Gaza are certainly to be welcomed, from a western political standpoint, this indicates that western influence in Gaza has waned even more than it had previously. If the Israelis and the US hope to have more influence in Gaza, they must engage with Hamas, which has effective control there. Furthermore, trying to force influence by removing Hamas would be transparent (i.e. Gazans would know what was going on and resent the action, making it counterproductive) and would lead to chaos and suffering, while carrying a very high risk of ultimate failure. Keeping Hamas in isolation would only further push it into the arms of other actors the West would rather it not deal with (e.g. Iran).
• Terrorists and extremest organizations become more moderate when they achieve real power. This could be seen with the PLO as well, which was also initially shunned by the West but was later accepted (albeit too late, I would argue, as its acceptance among the people it claimed to represent was already in decline). Hamas is now responsible for providing not just physical protection for the residents of Gaza, but also for their economic welfare. The constraints of power are already moderating its actions, if not its rhetoric.
• As The Economist mentions, Hamas may soon be embroiled in competition with Muslim extremist groups in Gaza. This implies that Hamas is a relatively moderate force there now (as would be expected from the logic of the point above). Denying recognition to Hamas will make it more likely that extremer forces will take hold in Gaza, making the situation there even worse for the people of Gaza and further harming any chance at cooperation with Israel and/or the US and their allies. As mentioned, this was the case with the PLO as well.

In conclusion, I am arguing to recognize Hamas not because I am an idealist and believe in the good of all people. On the contrary, I am a realist and believe that recognizing Hamas is in everyone's interests. It's a win-win situation, and Israel, the US, the UK, France, etc. would be fools not to take advantage of it. It is sure to be a short-lived opportunity in an ever-unstable Middle East. True, it is by no means a guarantee of success, but letting idealistic notions like "we don't negotiate with terrorists" get in the way of what is, granted, only a shimmer of hope for progress, would be reckless and unconscionable.

How Structural Realism Shows America Needs a More Liberal, Multilateral Approach to Foreign Policy

By Charles Kirchofer, Dec. 17^th, 2008

I actually should be finishing work on part two of my series (if you can call something that when it only has one part) on the big issues for Barack Obama in foreign policy. Or I could work on my planned article on why the stock market is not a casino, even now. Instead, I want to take a few moments to do something unorthodox. If you were thrown off by the title of this article (thinking "what the f$!k is 'structural realism'?!"), have no fear: I'm not about to get all theoretical on you. What I will say, however, is this: there are two major schools of thought on international politics (and maybe a third or possibly fourth, depending whom you ask). These are realism and liberalism. Realists believe nation states are the central players on the international scene and that these states live in a competitive environment. Liberals believe the world is becoming ever more integrated, that NGOs, international organizations, and transnational corporations have seriously reduced the influence of nation states on world affairs, and that there is something called the "international community," whose desires may be universal and are to be put above national interests. OK, that's it for the theory. Here's the unorthodox part: rubbish, I say. I'm about to argue for a more liberal American approach to foreign policy for realist reasons. That's right: the two terms are a false dichotomy, which is why I say they're both right and therefore both wrong, which means we are free to combine reasoning from both "schools" as they fit.


The realist foundation
OK, maybe there's going to be more theory than I promised, but stay with me. Structural realism holds that the number of great powers in the world (called "poles") decide the system's structure, which, in turn, influences outcomes. For example: the world before 1945 was multipolar, with most of the great powers right next to each other in Europe. Because the competitors were next to each other and relied on each other for resources because they were all relatively small, it was very unlikely that there would be any lasting European cooperation. Indeed, though they tried, this was the case. After 1945 the world became bipolar, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the great powers. Now, with none of the great powers in Western Europe, the countries there were no longer in a position where they had to compete with each other. Cooperation was then possible. The result? The European Community and later the EU, complete with a shared currency. Liberals would say the Europeans just finally learned their lesson and learned to cooperate, but everyone thought that in the late 19th century and after WWI, too. Do ideas and public opinion matter? Sure, but I think this structural explanation explains the timing better and is the more likely underlying enabler (combined with factors the liberals point out).


Nice history lesson, so what's this have to do with anything?
Good question. The world today is no longer bipolar, it's become unipolar, or possibly multipolar. Militarily, at least, the world is definitely unipolar, with America the military superpower (it's military spending is more than the spending of the next five top military spenders combined). Good for the U.S., right? Well, not really. Realists predict that states always move toward balancing power. This would mean essentially everyone else would align against, or at the very least refuse to cooperate with, the United States. European countries may not have agreed with the Vietnam war, either, and yet cooperation remained high because the system was bipolar. It was the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Faced with that decision, they largely stuck with the U.S. Diplomats will tell you cooperation has become more difficult. Realists would argue this process was set in motion after the fall of the Soviet Union (meaning the tendency would be present even without the Iraq war).

That said, I think we can agree the Iraq war certainly helped to ally states against the U.S. This is bad news. The U.S. was used to playing the world police force during the Cold War. It was indirectly encouraged to do so by the presence of the other pole (the U.S.S.R.), and it was also constricted by the Soviet presence, which checked U.S. power. In the 90's, the U.S. suddenly saw itself changed from a superpower to what some called a "hyperpower." With all this power sitting around, some felt it was time to use it to change the world according to their own standards, just as realists would have predicted (because there was no longer any check on American power), which is not to say they all necessarily would have recommended it (indeed, many realists spoke out against the war as being unnecessary and too risky). Hence: the Iraq War.

What does this mean for us now? Regardless of whether the world is (still) unipolar or if it has become multipolar, cooperation is likely to become more difficult. My conclusion? Start thinking like liberals. Start welcoming cooperation, rely more on "soft power" ("winning over the hearts and minds" of the world, making them want to be more like us and want to cooperate with us), encourage reform in, and support the workings of, international organizations (particularly the UN and NATO). As I've mentioned before, it's time to dust off the old-time art of diplomacy, because coercion is simply going to meet with ever more resistance and become ever more counterproductive for global and U.S. aims.

In the end, the realists accurately describe how the world works, but the liberals accurately prescribe what we should do in the current environment. So we should speak softly and be more friendly, everyone already knows we're carrying a big stick (and the realist in me would advise keeping it).