US President Obama has authorized limited air strikes against the "Islamic State" (IS), an extremist (to put it mildly) group that has taken control of much of northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. Some in his administration have apparently "toyed" with the idea of a limited troop deployment there to assist the Iraqi army as well, but Obama is a long way from approving this. If IS can be stopped without it, he is right to keep US troops out of harm's way, but it is not clear the Iraqi army is up to the challenge. If it isn't, being hesitant now could lead to heavier (and bloodier) US involvement later.
Many people fear another round of the Iraq War started by Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush. Others might think further back and fear another Vietnam. Afghanistan in the '90s might be a better nightmare scenario, and it is also often cited. If Obama is worried the US will get dragged into an unnecessary war, as it was in Vietnam, he should also keep in mind the old adage "a stitch in time saves nine." It may be much easier to defeat IS now than it will be in a year's time.
Syria provides a cautionary tale: for a while, Assad looked sure to fall. Now Syria is in such a mess (including much of it falling into the hands of IS) that many hope he doesn't, despite all the atrocities he has committed to stay in power. Not backing the moderates more heavily there means Assad is still in power and it has also allowed IS to flourish--the worst of both worlds. Not going to war is not always the option that leads to greater peace and it is not always more prudent. In Libya, there was no real alternative government (though I still believe, as I have argued here, that the limited intervention there was the right thing to do). Iraq is not Libya. It has a (albeit very imperfect) government. Furthermore, it is a government that the US helped bring to fruition. The US therefore carries some responsibility for aiding in its success if it can.
Going back to the Afghanistan analogy, there is a lesson there, too, that speaks in favor of being proactive (though one could hardly call missions against IS "proactive," they are now much closer to "re-active"): The US's failure to be concerned about Afghanistan once the Soviet "threat" there receded came back to haunt it. If IS continues to threaten Iraq, makes progress against the Kurds, or threatens Jordan, hesitation and "prudence," may come to seem very imprudent indeed.
Showing posts with label Iraq War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq War. Show all posts
Monday, August 11, 2014
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
What is terrorism?
The murder of a British soldier was terrorism. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, viewed as a whole, are not. The Western coalition may have used acts of terror in specific incidents in those wars, however.
The brutal murder of a British soldier in broad daylight in London a few weeks ago has sent shock waves through the United Kingdom and the world. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, was quick to call the sickening attack a "terrorist incident," while the Times (London) called it "the first terrorist murder in mainland Britain since 2005." At the same time, a writer for the Guardian (also London) questioned whether this could be called an act of terrorism or not and, if it was, how we could then not call the Western coalition's actions in Iraq and Afghanistan terrorism.
It's a fair question, though a reading of the Guardian article is likely to make many people angry (I found his quoting of Michael Moore particularly unfortunate). The reason for that is that the term terrorism has negative connotations in itself. The assumption is that it is an unacceptable form of violence (as opposed to the more "honorable" form of meeting your enemy on the battlefield or defending yourself in your own home, for example). Defining terrorism is extremely difficult. Trust me. If you don't want to, I suggest you read Richard English's Terrorism: How to Respond or Smith and Neumann's The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails.
I'll sum up a difficult topic with the best answer I can muster (though one that is not immune to further debate, as I agree with English that coming up with a perfect definition of terrorism probably isn't possible). Terrorism is the use or threat of violence against mainly symbolic targets for political ends (this is a paraphrase of Smith and Neumann's definition). Notice the absence of a definition of targets as "civilian." This is because of the difficulty of defining who is a civilian and the questionable logic behind that restriction. (Why wouldn't a politically-motivated attack on a bunch of unsuspecting soldiers at a base in America be considered terrorism, for example? Is a terrorist attack with mixed victims only terrorism for those among them who are civilians? There are many more issues as well.) A further issue is that it contributes to the normative connotation terrorism brings with it (i.e. it is wrong), which will ALWAYS be subjective, making terrorism impossible to define. If terrorism is always considered "wrong" or "illegitimate," the tendency will be for the side that disliked the attack to call it terrorism and for the side supporting the attack to view it as something else more "honorable."
All violence is scary, which is why I left out the "causing terror" part of the definition, which is still important (after all, it forms the root of the word!). The most important aspect left is the target type. When is a target "mostly symbolic"? When striking it serves little or no "strategic" purpose. The WTC attack is a good example: the US could not be brought down by that one attack, and there would have been better targets for strategic purposes (power stations, airports, military bases, arms contractors, etc.). The main point for the Twin Towers was their powerful symbolism.
So how about the London attack?
How about the Guardian author's other question: Are the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan terrorism? Viewed as a whole, they are not. They are military operations in which targets are selected primarily for their strategic value in weakening the other side. Because terrorism is a tactic, however, that means that individual acts can be terrorism even if it cannot be said that the entire war in Iraq or Afghanistan is. The author mentions "Shock and Awe," the attack on Baghdad during the Second Iraq War. This was indeed meant to impress the Iraqi public and encourage them to help overthrow their leaders. It was a form of propaganda (often cited as an important secondary aspect of terrorism). Nevertheless, the operation's targets were not, I believe, primarily symbolic, so while there are some grounds for labeling this some sort of act of terror, I do not believe, on balance, that this was the case. Other incidents during the war, however, may very well fall under a label of terrorism by this definition. Each attack would have to be evaluated on its own.
The brutal murder of a British soldier in broad daylight in London a few weeks ago has sent shock waves through the United Kingdom and the world. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, was quick to call the sickening attack a "terrorist incident," while the Times (London) called it "the first terrorist murder in mainland Britain since 2005." At the same time, a writer for the Guardian (also London) questioned whether this could be called an act of terrorism or not and, if it was, how we could then not call the Western coalition's actions in Iraq and Afghanistan terrorism.
It's a fair question, though a reading of the Guardian article is likely to make many people angry (I found his quoting of Michael Moore particularly unfortunate). The reason for that is that the term terrorism has negative connotations in itself. The assumption is that it is an unacceptable form of violence (as opposed to the more "honorable" form of meeting your enemy on the battlefield or defending yourself in your own home, for example). Defining terrorism is extremely difficult. Trust me. If you don't want to, I suggest you read Richard English's Terrorism: How to Respond or Smith and Neumann's The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails.
I'll sum up a difficult topic with the best answer I can muster (though one that is not immune to further debate, as I agree with English that coming up with a perfect definition of terrorism probably isn't possible). Terrorism is the use or threat of violence against mainly symbolic targets for political ends (this is a paraphrase of Smith and Neumann's definition). Notice the absence of a definition of targets as "civilian." This is because of the difficulty of defining who is a civilian and the questionable logic behind that restriction. (Why wouldn't a politically-motivated attack on a bunch of unsuspecting soldiers at a base in America be considered terrorism, for example? Is a terrorist attack with mixed victims only terrorism for those among them who are civilians? There are many more issues as well.) A further issue is that it contributes to the normative connotation terrorism brings with it (i.e. it is wrong), which will ALWAYS be subjective, making terrorism impossible to define. If terrorism is always considered "wrong" or "illegitimate," the tendency will be for the side that disliked the attack to call it terrorism and for the side supporting the attack to view it as something else more "honorable."
All violence is scary, which is why I left out the "causing terror" part of the definition, which is still important (after all, it forms the root of the word!). The most important aspect left is the target type. When is a target "mostly symbolic"? When striking it serves little or no "strategic" purpose. The WTC attack is a good example: the US could not be brought down by that one attack, and there would have been better targets for strategic purposes (power stations, airports, military bases, arms contractors, etc.). The main point for the Twin Towers was their powerful symbolism.
So how about the London attack?
- It was certainly an act of violence
- It was for political reasons (the perpetrators were quoted as saying " The only reason we've done this is because Muslims are dying by British soldiers every day. ... You people will never be safe, remove your Government, they don't care about you."
- The target was not strategically significant, but was highly symbolic: a British soldier wearing a "Help for Heroes" shirt.
How about the Guardian author's other question: Are the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan terrorism? Viewed as a whole, they are not. They are military operations in which targets are selected primarily for their strategic value in weakening the other side. Because terrorism is a tactic, however, that means that individual acts can be terrorism even if it cannot be said that the entire war in Iraq or Afghanistan is. The author mentions "Shock and Awe," the attack on Baghdad during the Second Iraq War. This was indeed meant to impress the Iraqi public and encourage them to help overthrow their leaders. It was a form of propaganda (often cited as an important secondary aspect of terrorism). Nevertheless, the operation's targets were not, I believe, primarily symbolic, so while there are some grounds for labeling this some sort of act of terror, I do not believe, on balance, that this was the case. Other incidents during the war, however, may very well fall under a label of terrorism by this definition. Each attack would have to be evaluated on its own.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
A Libyan Ceasefire: What It Would Take
The Libyan conflict continues. The UN has proposed a ceasefire. NATO and the Libyan rebels are dubious: Gaddafi is still there, after all, and is not yet defeated. He could easily take advantage of a ceasefire to stage a comeback. The Economist interprets an announcement by Britain's Foreign Secretary William Hague as meaning that Britain may be open to reconsidering the idea of a ceasefire. Far from looking for a quick exit, Hague asserts that Britain is in it for the long haul.
All of this is actually good news. It seems that everyone's heads are in the right place (except perhaps for the UN's, but this is no news -- at least its heart seems to be in the right place). A ceasefire agreement is possible, and, unless we're ready for a long siege of Tripoli with possible ground troop involvement and loads of casualties, it may be the only realistic way this can all end. But still: this cannot be cut-and-run, which is why Hague's assurances to the contrary are comforting.
Libya is not Iraq or Afghanistan. NATO is providing air support for a native rebellion. Time is on the coalition's side, not Gaddafi's (I have pointed out previously that time is on the Taliban's side, which is why I have little faith in a positive outcome for Afghanistan). NATO must make use of both of these aspects. Any ceasefire must be on terms decided by the coalition. In particular, these terms must be decided by Libya's National Transitional Council, as representatives, however tentative, of the Libyan people. They must set the guidelines by which this can happen. Compromise may happen in other areas, but these principles are not up for negotiation.
For example, one stipulation would surely be that Gaddafi is removed a long way from any power. A second one, that the West must strongly support for reasons of morality and political credibility, is that Libya holds elections and builds institutions like independent courts all that. The areas where compromise is possible: pardoning Gaddafi and going easy on current members of his regime. Those closest to him must not be allowed near power. Ones lower down may need to be left on for practical reasons -- only they may have experience in civil service.
It sounds awful to let Gaddafi get away scot-free, but let's not lose sight of the goal: getting him out of power and freeing up Libya for a brighter future. If Gaddafi can be enticed to give up the fight, this will save hundreds, possibly thousands of lives through reduced fighting, as well as lots of money, time, and Western leaders' political capital.
And what if Gaddafi doesn't accept? As I said: time is not on his side. Don't negotiate further. Return to the current war of attrition, and wait for him to come around or for the regime to utterly collapse around him. This is not as nice as a quicker ceasefire, but it is the only option. All in all, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic about Libya, at least over the medium term. Kind of refreshing after ages of Middle Eastern quagmire.
All of this is actually good news. It seems that everyone's heads are in the right place (except perhaps for the UN's, but this is no news -- at least its heart seems to be in the right place). A ceasefire agreement is possible, and, unless we're ready for a long siege of Tripoli with possible ground troop involvement and loads of casualties, it may be the only realistic way this can all end. But still: this cannot be cut-and-run, which is why Hague's assurances to the contrary are comforting.
Libya is not Iraq or Afghanistan. NATO is providing air support for a native rebellion. Time is on the coalition's side, not Gaddafi's (I have pointed out previously that time is on the Taliban's side, which is why I have little faith in a positive outcome for Afghanistan). NATO must make use of both of these aspects. Any ceasefire must be on terms decided by the coalition. In particular, these terms must be decided by Libya's National Transitional Council, as representatives, however tentative, of the Libyan people. They must set the guidelines by which this can happen. Compromise may happen in other areas, but these principles are not up for negotiation.
For example, one stipulation would surely be that Gaddafi is removed a long way from any power. A second one, that the West must strongly support for reasons of morality and political credibility, is that Libya holds elections and builds institutions like independent courts all that. The areas where compromise is possible: pardoning Gaddafi and going easy on current members of his regime. Those closest to him must not be allowed near power. Ones lower down may need to be left on for practical reasons -- only they may have experience in civil service.
It sounds awful to let Gaddafi get away scot-free, but let's not lose sight of the goal: getting him out of power and freeing up Libya for a brighter future. If Gaddafi can be enticed to give up the fight, this will save hundreds, possibly thousands of lives through reduced fighting, as well as lots of money, time, and Western leaders' political capital.
And what if Gaddafi doesn't accept? As I said: time is not on his side. Don't negotiate further. Return to the current war of attrition, and wait for him to come around or for the regime to utterly collapse around him. This is not as nice as a quicker ceasefire, but it is the only option. All in all, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic about Libya, at least over the medium term. Kind of refreshing after ages of Middle Eastern quagmire.
Thursday, March 24, 2011
Libyan Oil, Cynicism, and Anti-Americanism
"We can't be holier than the pope!"
Here we go, I thought to myself.
"America doesn't march into a country to rescue people being abused by their own government. If this were in Saudi Arabia it would never happen. The Americans are good friends with the Saudi rulers and wouldn't do a thing to help the people there."
Next came the inevitable: Libya has oil, so clearly that's what America wants because Americans all drive big cars, which leads them to march into every corner of the world and take every drop of oil they can get.
This diatribe was, unfortunately, from an Austrian acquaintance of mine, but it's easy enough to imagine an American arguing along similar lines. In fact, the nationality of the speaker is pretty irrelevant, because the theme is the same: America is not a force for peace, it is just interested in itself and, above all, getting more oil.
Now, I'm a realist and that makes me lean towards cynicism myself much of the time, but this goes above and beyond cynicism. The arguments are muddled and don't really make sense (I'll get to this below), which leads me to think the argument itself is secondary; it is the point that America is doing the wrong thing (again) that matters. When arguments are left out and the conclusion is the same regardless of the facts, we call this prejudice. It comes in many forms: racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, Islamophobia, and, in this case, anti-Americanism.
The anti-American argument in this case, as is usual, uses some good points. Does America put its own interests first? Sure, most of the time it does. Just as any other country, when it comes down to it, does. Is America addicted to oil? You betcha. Is that addiction a bad thing? Sure is. Would America attack Saudi Arabia? It would surely be extremely reluctant to do so, but the full answer to this is more subtle. As I answered at the time "it would depend on who had the upper hand." This is precisely what happened in Libya. (Read on!) Let's address the argument piece by piece.
First is the oil issue. There are a number of reasons why this argument makes no sense. First off: the world was receiving oil from Libya with Gaddafi in charge. If that's all the West had been interested in, surely it would have supported Gaddafi from the outset, rather than rebel protests that looked to destabilize a regime that had become quite friendly to the West. Second, Libya has a lot of reserves, but the shortfall of around 1.4 million b/d of oil from there can be made up for elsewhere. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and the UAE were set to pump an additional 1 million b/d to make up for most of the Libyan short fall on their own.
As an oil producer, Libya ranks behind the traditional oil producers Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and Russia, but also behind the United States, the EU, and Norway. Has the unrest and supply cut-off in Libya driven oil prices up? Sure, but so has the unrest in the Arab world in general and, more recently, fears that Japan's nuclear disaster will cause a move towards petroleum as a substitute energy source. It is simply not worth getting involved in yet another foreign military mission over 400,000 b/d of oil. Anyone who tells you that this is what America is doing is missing something.
The next point is about America's leadership role in all this. America has actually been keen to give up the leadership of the mission and have NATO take it on. The biggest advocate of action has been France's President Nicolas Sarkozy, not Barack Obama. It was France that first afforded diplomatic recognition to Libya's Interim Government, long before it had become clear that it had effective control over most of the territory and its citizens. (This is a custom in international relations/international law, albeit one that's been broken several times: Croatia and Kosovo spring to mind.) So why was this guy blaming America (again)? Is there a good reason for the no-fly zone and all the fuss?
As I've pointed out, my acquaintance was right that America does not always get involved when a government is mistreating its people. Two things, though. For one, this is not absolute. America's involvement against the genocide occurring in the Balkans was because Bill Clinton believed it was the right thing to do (and was pressured/guilt tripped into doing something). American involvement in Somalia was also meant to keep peace and rebuild the state. The "CNN syndrome" struck in Somalia, however: images went around the world of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets behind a pickup truck in Somalia. The American public was clear: if those people want to kill each other, then let them -- get our boys out of there. We did.
America will not usually react to human rights violations with force unless there are additional reasons (like national security) to do so or it is under heavy pressure. This may sound selfish, but the other half of the calculation involves whether or not a change is even reasonably achievable. We cannot topple every dictator, and even when we do, we may have a mess afterwards (as Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly shown). Last but certainly not least: American leaders must consider the costs to their own country, both in blood and treasure. America does well to choose its battles wisely.
So why Libya? It's not national security and, as I hope I've shown, it's not oil. So what is it? The Libyan situation is a simple case of having painted oneself into a corner. The US is acting because it feels heavy pressure to do so, from its allies in Europe, but also due to its, and its allies', actions. When it appeared the rebels were going to topple Gaddafi, supporting them was easy. Kind words were almost all that was required. An embargo was put in place. Gaddafi's accounts in America and (embarrassingly not until later) Europe were frozen. Then the tide turned in favor of Gaddafi.
The US, France, and Britain realized there was wet paint on the floor all around them and that the door behind them had just been closed. They had burned their bridges by making an enemy out of Gaddafi and declaring their support for the rebels. Now the rebels might lose. They basically had no choice but to step up their aid to the rebels. This would have occurred even in Saudi Arabia: If it long appeared the House of Saud was doomed to failure, the West would probably support rebels there. This is because that would be the most likely way to bring about longer-term stability and a quick, and therefore cheap, end to hostilities. They could, of course, fall into the same trap in that case if the tide turned there, too. Such are the problems that accompany marriages of convenience!
It helps in this case that the West is acting under the approval not only of the UN Security Council (in which Russia and China surprisingly decided to abstain rather than veto the no-fly-zone resolution), but also of the Arab League (though the latter is now more ambivalent since actual bombings have begun)! The operation has a level of international approval, and therefore legitimacy, not seen since perhaps Operation Desert Storm under Bush Senior.
So to recap: the US has reluctantly stepped in and taken up a (temporary, it hopes) leadership role in implementing a no-fly-zone with air strikes over Libya. It is doing so in support of rebels against a dictator, but probably would not be if it had not painted itself in a corner. It is acting with a great deal of international support and a UN mandate. It is not about oil.
All in all, while room for cynicism remains about the US and the West's final decision to act, the reasons for this mission are pretty darn good. Whether its a good mission in the sense of the likelihood to succeed, whether it will drag on forever, and how bloody it will get, is another discussion entirely. To imply that this is just another optional war waged by America to slake its oil thirst (or perhaps its alleged thirst for violence) is simply wrong and speaks of ignorance -- or just plain old anti-Americanism.
Here we go, I thought to myself.
"America doesn't march into a country to rescue people being abused by their own government. If this were in Saudi Arabia it would never happen. The Americans are good friends with the Saudi rulers and wouldn't do a thing to help the people there."
Next came the inevitable: Libya has oil, so clearly that's what America wants because Americans all drive big cars, which leads them to march into every corner of the world and take every drop of oil they can get.
This diatribe was, unfortunately, from an Austrian acquaintance of mine, but it's easy enough to imagine an American arguing along similar lines. In fact, the nationality of the speaker is pretty irrelevant, because the theme is the same: America is not a force for peace, it is just interested in itself and, above all, getting more oil.
Now, I'm a realist and that makes me lean towards cynicism myself much of the time, but this goes above and beyond cynicism. The arguments are muddled and don't really make sense (I'll get to this below), which leads me to think the argument itself is secondary; it is the point that America is doing the wrong thing (again) that matters. When arguments are left out and the conclusion is the same regardless of the facts, we call this prejudice. It comes in many forms: racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, Islamophobia, and, in this case, anti-Americanism.
The anti-American argument in this case, as is usual, uses some good points. Does America put its own interests first? Sure, most of the time it does. Just as any other country, when it comes down to it, does. Is America addicted to oil? You betcha. Is that addiction a bad thing? Sure is. Would America attack Saudi Arabia? It would surely be extremely reluctant to do so, but the full answer to this is more subtle. As I answered at the time "it would depend on who had the upper hand." This is precisely what happened in Libya. (Read on!) Let's address the argument piece by piece.
First is the oil issue. There are a number of reasons why this argument makes no sense. First off: the world was receiving oil from Libya with Gaddafi in charge. If that's all the West had been interested in, surely it would have supported Gaddafi from the outset, rather than rebel protests that looked to destabilize a regime that had become quite friendly to the West. Second, Libya has a lot of reserves, but the shortfall of around 1.4 million b/d of oil from there can be made up for elsewhere. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and the UAE were set to pump an additional 1 million b/d to make up for most of the Libyan short fall on their own.
As an oil producer, Libya ranks behind the traditional oil producers Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and Russia, but also behind the United States, the EU, and Norway. Has the unrest and supply cut-off in Libya driven oil prices up? Sure, but so has the unrest in the Arab world in general and, more recently, fears that Japan's nuclear disaster will cause a move towards petroleum as a substitute energy source. It is simply not worth getting involved in yet another foreign military mission over 400,000 b/d of oil. Anyone who tells you that this is what America is doing is missing something.
The next point is about America's leadership role in all this. America has actually been keen to give up the leadership of the mission and have NATO take it on. The biggest advocate of action has been France's President Nicolas Sarkozy, not Barack Obama. It was France that first afforded diplomatic recognition to Libya's Interim Government, long before it had become clear that it had effective control over most of the territory and its citizens. (This is a custom in international relations/international law, albeit one that's been broken several times: Croatia and Kosovo spring to mind.) So why was this guy blaming America (again)? Is there a good reason for the no-fly zone and all the fuss?
As I've pointed out, my acquaintance was right that America does not always get involved when a government is mistreating its people. Two things, though. For one, this is not absolute. America's involvement against the genocide occurring in the Balkans was because Bill Clinton believed it was the right thing to do (and was pressured/guilt tripped into doing something). American involvement in Somalia was also meant to keep peace and rebuild the state. The "CNN syndrome" struck in Somalia, however: images went around the world of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets behind a pickup truck in Somalia. The American public was clear: if those people want to kill each other, then let them -- get our boys out of there. We did.
America will not usually react to human rights violations with force unless there are additional reasons (like national security) to do so or it is under heavy pressure. This may sound selfish, but the other half of the calculation involves whether or not a change is even reasonably achievable. We cannot topple every dictator, and even when we do, we may have a mess afterwards (as Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly shown). Last but certainly not least: American leaders must consider the costs to their own country, both in blood and treasure. America does well to choose its battles wisely.
So why Libya? It's not national security and, as I hope I've shown, it's not oil. So what is it? The Libyan situation is a simple case of having painted oneself into a corner. The US is acting because it feels heavy pressure to do so, from its allies in Europe, but also due to its, and its allies', actions. When it appeared the rebels were going to topple Gaddafi, supporting them was easy. Kind words were almost all that was required. An embargo was put in place. Gaddafi's accounts in America and (embarrassingly not until later) Europe were frozen. Then the tide turned in favor of Gaddafi.
The US, France, and Britain realized there was wet paint on the floor all around them and that the door behind them had just been closed. They had burned their bridges by making an enemy out of Gaddafi and declaring their support for the rebels. Now the rebels might lose. They basically had no choice but to step up their aid to the rebels. This would have occurred even in Saudi Arabia: If it long appeared the House of Saud was doomed to failure, the West would probably support rebels there. This is because that would be the most likely way to bring about longer-term stability and a quick, and therefore cheap, end to hostilities. They could, of course, fall into the same trap in that case if the tide turned there, too. Such are the problems that accompany marriages of convenience!
It helps in this case that the West is acting under the approval not only of the UN Security Council (in which Russia and China surprisingly decided to abstain rather than veto the no-fly-zone resolution), but also of the Arab League (though the latter is now more ambivalent since actual bombings have begun)! The operation has a level of international approval, and therefore legitimacy, not seen since perhaps Operation Desert Storm under Bush Senior.
So to recap: the US has reluctantly stepped in and taken up a (temporary, it hopes) leadership role in implementing a no-fly-zone with air strikes over Libya. It is doing so in support of rebels against a dictator, but probably would not be if it had not painted itself in a corner. It is acting with a great deal of international support and a UN mandate. It is not about oil.
All in all, while room for cynicism remains about the US and the West's final decision to act, the reasons for this mission are pretty darn good. Whether its a good mission in the sense of the likelihood to succeed, whether it will drag on forever, and how bloody it will get, is another discussion entirely. To imply that this is just another optional war waged by America to slake its oil thirst (or perhaps its alleged thirst for violence) is simply wrong and speaks of ignorance -- or just plain old anti-Americanism.
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Afghanistan: It's a game of chicken, and the U.S. doesn't seem to know the rules.
There has been some talk recently about a possible dialog between Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and the Afghan government and/or the Americans. This has generally been welcomed, though most seem to realize that this is not the beginning of real peace negotiations. The problem is: the beginning of peace negotiations is not going to begin anytime soon, and never on U.S. terms. The reason is simple: Afghanistan is a game of chicken. The Taliban understand this. The U.S., it seems, does not.
For those unfamiliar with chicken, it's a fantastically (and idiotically) macho game wherein two men (usually, but let's not be sexist, there are plenty of idiot women out there, too) get in cars and drive at each other full throttle. The first one to swerve loses. Of course, if neither swerves, both lose a lot more than the game: they lose their lives. The stakes are high for two individuals in the game of chicken. In the Afghan version, they are high for millions of individuals.
There are a couple strategies for winning the game of chicken. One is to limit your options by, say, removing your steering wheel and letting the other side know you cannot swerve. This will simplify the game for them: lose the game or lose your life. Simple equation.
The other is to appear to be crazy. If the other side really believes you would rather die than lose the game, they will swerve first.
The Taliban have almost no reason to agree to a settlement on anything other than their own terms. The reason? The U.S. has played the game using the opposite of the second strategy above: everyone knows the U.S. will not stay there forever, no matter the cost. Obama wishes to start pulling out next year. The Taliban know this. The Taliban on the other hand, while not crazy (fanatic, perhaps, but not crazy), can much more convincingly assert that they will fight to the bitter end, regardless of the cost.
The choices here, then, are also simplified: the Taliban can fight for another year, maybe two, or they can just give up now. That's it -- they must only hold out a year. The U.S., on the other hand, can fight until it's bled dry, or it can cut its losses and run. The winner is predetermined here because the U.S. has shown all of its cards (and yes, I'm aware of the mixed metaphor with poker, just go with it).
If you were a Taliban leader, when would you chose to negotiate a peace agreement? "How about never, is never good for you?" seems a likely response.
For those unfamiliar with chicken, it's a fantastically (and idiotically) macho game wherein two men (usually, but let's not be sexist, there are plenty of idiot women out there, too) get in cars and drive at each other full throttle. The first one to swerve loses. Of course, if neither swerves, both lose a lot more than the game: they lose their lives. The stakes are high for two individuals in the game of chicken. In the Afghan version, they are high for millions of individuals.
There are a couple strategies for winning the game of chicken. One is to limit your options by, say, removing your steering wheel and letting the other side know you cannot swerve. This will simplify the game for them: lose the game or lose your life. Simple equation.
The other is to appear to be crazy. If the other side really believes you would rather die than lose the game, they will swerve first.
The Taliban have almost no reason to agree to a settlement on anything other than their own terms. The reason? The U.S. has played the game using the opposite of the second strategy above: everyone knows the U.S. will not stay there forever, no matter the cost. Obama wishes to start pulling out next year. The Taliban know this. The Taliban on the other hand, while not crazy (fanatic, perhaps, but not crazy), can much more convincingly assert that they will fight to the bitter end, regardless of the cost.
The choices here, then, are also simplified: the Taliban can fight for another year, maybe two, or they can just give up now. That's it -- they must only hold out a year. The U.S., on the other hand, can fight until it's bled dry, or it can cut its losses and run. The winner is predetermined here because the U.S. has shown all of its cards (and yes, I'm aware of the mixed metaphor with poker, just go with it).
If you were a Taliban leader, when would you chose to negotiate a peace agreement? "How about never, is never good for you?" seems a likely response.
Sunday, June 14, 2009
How Structural Realism Shows America Needs a More Liberal, Multilateral Approach to Foreign Policy
By Charles Kirchofer, Dec. 17th, 2008
I actually should be finishing work on part two of my series (if you can call something that when it only has one part) on the big issues for Barack Obama in foreign policy. Or I could work on my planned article on why the stock market is not a casino, even now. Instead, I want to take a few moments to do something unorthodox. If you were thrown off by the title of this article (thinking "what the f$!k is 'structural realism'?!"), have no fear: I'm not about to get all theoretical on you. What I will say, however, is this: there are two major schools of thought on international politics (and maybe a third or possibly fourth, depending whom you ask). These are realism and liberalism. Realists believe nation states are the central players on the international scene and that these states live in a competitive environment. Liberals believe the world is becoming ever more integrated, that NGOs, international organizations, and transnational corporations have seriously reduced the influence of nation states on world affairs, and that there is something called the "international community," whose desires may be universal and are to be put above national interests. OK, that's it for the theory. Here's the unorthodox part: rubbish, I say. I'm about to argue for a more liberal American approach to foreign policy for realist reasons. That's right: the two terms are a false dichotomy, which is why I say they're both right and therefore both wrong, which means we are free to combine reasoning from both "schools" as they fit.
The realist foundation
OK, maybe there's going to be more theory than I promised, but stay with me. Structural realism holds that the number of great powers in the world (called "poles") decide the system's structure, which, in turn, influences outcomes. For example: the world before 1945 was multipolar, with most of the great powers right next to each other in Europe. Because the competitors were next to each other and relied on each other for resources because they were all relatively small, it was very unlikely that there would be any lasting European cooperation. Indeed, though they tried, this was the case. After 1945 the world became bipolar, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the great powers. Now, with none of the great powers in Western Europe, the countries there were no longer in a position where they had to compete with each other. Cooperation was then possible. The result? The European Community and later the EU, complete with a shared currency. Liberals would say the Europeans just finally learned their lesson and learned to cooperate, but everyone thought that in the late 19th century and after WWI, too. Do ideas and public opinion matter? Sure, but I think this structural explanation explains the timing better and is the more likely underlying enabler (combined with factors the liberals point out).
Nice history lesson, so what's this have to do with anything?
Good question. The world today is no longer bipolar, it's become unipolar, or possibly multipolar. Militarily, at least, the world is definitely unipolar, with America the military superpower (it's military spending is more than the spending of the next five top military spenders combined). Good for the U.S., right? Well, not really. Realists predict that states always move toward balancing power. This would mean essentially everyone else would align against, or at the very least refuse to cooperate with, the United States. European countries may not have agreed with the Vietnam war, either, and yet cooperation remained high because the system was bipolar. It was the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Faced with that decision, they largely stuck with the U.S. Diplomats will tell you cooperation has become more difficult. Realists would argue this process was set in motion after the fall of the Soviet Union (meaning the tendency would be present even without the Iraq war).
That said, I think we can agree the Iraq war certainly helped to ally states against the U.S. This is bad news. The U.S. was used to playing the world police force during the Cold War. It was indirectly encouraged to do so by the presence of the other pole (the U.S.S.R.), and it was also constricted by the Soviet presence, which checked U.S. power. In the 90's, the U.S. suddenly saw itself changed from a superpower to what some called a "hyperpower." With all this power sitting around, some felt it was time to use it to change the world according to their own standards, just as realists would have predicted (because there was no longer any check on American power), which is not to say they all necessarily would have recommended it (indeed, many realists spoke out against the war as being unnecessary and too risky). Hence: the Iraq War.
What does this mean for us now? Regardless of whether the world is (still) unipolar or if it has become multipolar, cooperation is likely to become more difficult. My conclusion? Start thinking like liberals. Start welcoming cooperation, rely more on "soft power" ("winning over the hearts and minds" of the world, making them want to be more like us and want to cooperate with us), encourage reform in, and support the workings of, international organizations (particularly the UN and NATO). As I've mentioned before, it's time to dust off the old-time art of diplomacy, because coercion is simply going to meet with ever more resistance and become ever more counterproductive for global and U.S. aims.
In the end, the realists accurately describe how the world works, but the liberals accurately prescribe what we should do in the current environment. So we should speak softly and be more friendly, everyone already knows we're carrying a big stick (and the realist in me would advise keeping it).
I actually should be finishing work on part two of my series (if you can call something that when it only has one part) on the big issues for Barack Obama in foreign policy. Or I could work on my planned article on why the stock market is not a casino, even now. Instead, I want to take a few moments to do something unorthodox. If you were thrown off by the title of this article (thinking "what the f$!k is 'structural realism'?!"), have no fear: I'm not about to get all theoretical on you. What I will say, however, is this: there are two major schools of thought on international politics (and maybe a third or possibly fourth, depending whom you ask). These are realism and liberalism. Realists believe nation states are the central players on the international scene and that these states live in a competitive environment. Liberals believe the world is becoming ever more integrated, that NGOs, international organizations, and transnational corporations have seriously reduced the influence of nation states on world affairs, and that there is something called the "international community," whose desires may be universal and are to be put above national interests. OK, that's it for the theory. Here's the unorthodox part: rubbish, I say. I'm about to argue for a more liberal American approach to foreign policy for realist reasons. That's right: the two terms are a false dichotomy, which is why I say they're both right and therefore both wrong, which means we are free to combine reasoning from both "schools" as they fit.
The realist foundation
OK, maybe there's going to be more theory than I promised, but stay with me. Structural realism holds that the number of great powers in the world (called "poles") decide the system's structure, which, in turn, influences outcomes. For example: the world before 1945 was multipolar, with most of the great powers right next to each other in Europe. Because the competitors were next to each other and relied on each other for resources because they were all relatively small, it was very unlikely that there would be any lasting European cooperation. Indeed, though they tried, this was the case. After 1945 the world became bipolar, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the great powers. Now, with none of the great powers in Western Europe, the countries there were no longer in a position where they had to compete with each other. Cooperation was then possible. The result? The European Community and later the EU, complete with a shared currency. Liberals would say the Europeans just finally learned their lesson and learned to cooperate, but everyone thought that in the late 19th century and after WWI, too. Do ideas and public opinion matter? Sure, but I think this structural explanation explains the timing better and is the more likely underlying enabler (combined with factors the liberals point out).
Nice history lesson, so what's this have to do with anything?
Good question. The world today is no longer bipolar, it's become unipolar, or possibly multipolar. Militarily, at least, the world is definitely unipolar, with America the military superpower (it's military spending is more than the spending of the next five top military spenders combined). Good for the U.S., right? Well, not really. Realists predict that states always move toward balancing power. This would mean essentially everyone else would align against, or at the very least refuse to cooperate with, the United States. European countries may not have agreed with the Vietnam war, either, and yet cooperation remained high because the system was bipolar. It was the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Faced with that decision, they largely stuck with the U.S. Diplomats will tell you cooperation has become more difficult. Realists would argue this process was set in motion after the fall of the Soviet Union (meaning the tendency would be present even without the Iraq war).
That said, I think we can agree the Iraq war certainly helped to ally states against the U.S. This is bad news. The U.S. was used to playing the world police force during the Cold War. It was indirectly encouraged to do so by the presence of the other pole (the U.S.S.R.), and it was also constricted by the Soviet presence, which checked U.S. power. In the 90's, the U.S. suddenly saw itself changed from a superpower to what some called a "hyperpower." With all this power sitting around, some felt it was time to use it to change the world according to their own standards, just as realists would have predicted (because there was no longer any check on American power), which is not to say they all necessarily would have recommended it (indeed, many realists spoke out against the war as being unnecessary and too risky). Hence: the Iraq War.
What does this mean for us now? Regardless of whether the world is (still) unipolar or if it has become multipolar, cooperation is likely to become more difficult. My conclusion? Start thinking like liberals. Start welcoming cooperation, rely more on "soft power" ("winning over the hearts and minds" of the world, making them want to be more like us and want to cooperate with us), encourage reform in, and support the workings of, international organizations (particularly the UN and NATO). As I've mentioned before, it's time to dust off the old-time art of diplomacy, because coercion is simply going to meet with ever more resistance and become ever more counterproductive for global and U.S. aims.
In the end, the realists accurately describe how the world works, but the liberals accurately prescribe what we should do in the current environment. So we should speak softly and be more friendly, everyone already knows we're carrying a big stick (and the realist in me would advise keeping it).
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