Sometimes the truth does not lie "somewhere in between"

Many readers are irritated, including with my reporting on Ukraine. Their suspicion is legitimate. But not every view of the war is equally true.

BY ALICE BOTA, editor for the German weekly Die Zeit. Translated by Charles Kirchofer. Re-posted with the author's permission. The original article appeared in German on March 13, 2015.

A reader named "B." writes in. Complains that the reporting on Ukraine is misleading and false. I’ve been on location over the past few months and have reported on the Maidan (yes, including the right-wing extremists), on Ukrainian volunteer battalions , the shooting down of flight MH-17 , the elections , the war, the victims of Donetsk. His criticism also applies to me, which is why I write back. “What is so misleading?” I ask. What mistakes did I make? After all, I think it is quite possible, even probable, that I made mistakes—everyone makes mistakes. The question is how serious they are and how I can correct them. An error becomes a lie only when it is made intentionally to conceal and deceive.

B. answered in a way that I already know from other angry readers who attempt to express their criticism more precisely: How can I justify saying that Russia is involved in the war in eastern Ukraine? There is no evidence! 

I usually write back in detail. There IS evidence, I write. There are Russian soldiers who return home in coffins from Ukraine and family members who are not allowed to talk about their suffering. There are Russian NGOs like the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, who are trying to find out how many of their sons have already died in Ukraine. There are reports such as that of the Armament Research Services, which were able to identify Russian (and other) weapons in eastern Ukraine—never mind the fact that one really has to wonder when, within a few months, a bunch of local insurgents has a more professional army than Ukraine.¹  There are Russian intelligence officers such as Igor Girkin, who was involved in the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine and speaks openly about Russian tactics.

The list could go on and on. The only thing missing is an admission by Russian President Vladimir Putin that he is waging war in eastern Ukraine. And for many, it seems, nothing is true that Putin himself has not confirmed. 

But even the word of the Russian President does not always seem to be enough. It’s been months since Putin admitted to having sent his soldiers to Crimea. But only now, after he spoke about it again on Russian television, has this fact really seemed to arrive in Germany.

Just a year ago, the media, especially public broadcasters, were attacked when they said the obvious: that Russian troops were occupying Crimea. Everyone who was there could see it for him/herself and could even ask the soldiers about it. But to say or write that? Insinuations! Prejudices! Lies! 

The letter from Mr. B. represents a phenomenon, namely, the flight into relativism when it comes to Russian politics. At times, this relativization is fed by the fear that Germany could be drawn into this war; sometimes by distrust of the Americans, sometimes out of hatred for them; sometimes by a perceived historical debt to Russia (which is, paradoxically, rarely seen to be owed the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles); at times by contempt for Europe; and that sometimes simply stems from being unable to cope.

Relativization is a principle of propaganda used by Russian television that has long since extended beyond Russian borders. Everything must appear feasible and even the obvious must seem to be just one variant of many. This is done by scattering many different, contradictory versions of stories (on the shooting of MH-17, it was said that the passengers were already dead, had been killed by the Americans, or that the rocket was intended for Putin) or by repeating false “facts” until they appear correct (for example, that American Blackwater mercenaries are fighting in Ukraine. So far, that is nonsense). Until nothing is true and everything seems possible, as the author Peter Pomerantsev called his book about modern Russia (Nothing is true and everything is possible, 2014).

Pomerantsev, who worked for many years as a TV producer in Russia, describes, among other things, how the Kremlin synthesizes Soviet-style control with western-style entertainment in order to numb society. “The news is the incense with which we praise Putin’s actions and make him president,” Pomarentsev cites Russian TV producers. Pomarentsev shows that TV news in Russia has nothing to do with reality—it is entertainment.

Russian state media make no mistakes, they simply lie. And they do not care when they are caught, as in the story of the child who was allegedly crucified by Ukrainian fascists.

When I respond to letters like that from Mr B., when I engage with his arguments, refute what is wrong, and say what seems to me to be correct, an interesting dialogue often develops. And mostly it becomes apparent that distrust and discomfort are the driving forces: What interests are the Americans pursuing in Ukraine? Isn’t Russia justified in feeling threatened? Haven’t the Europeans also made mistakes?

We can talk about all that and we need to write about it. But the truth, that great, so often abused word, does not always lie somewhere in between. You cannot track it down through relativizing. To broadcast everything to the world, even the worst nonsense, to give everyone a platform to speak without asking who speaks in what function and why--this is not plurality, but the illusion of it.

1. emphasis added

Russia, Georgia, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine: Cold War Redux?

I study deterrence, mostly in its non-nuclear, non-Cold War variety. (Deterrence is, to oversimplify, using threats to discourage an opponent from taking certain undesirable actions. Ex: "I'll cut off your oil supply if you attack my neighbor.") I am not an expert on Ukraine or Russia, but I will try to analyze the situation using my knowledge of deterrence, as I think this can tell us a lot about Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. For the most part, it still has little to do with nuclear weapons, but, this being Russia vs. the United States in many ways, they are always lurking in the background.

Some of Barack Obama's critics in America, like John McCain, claim that Russia invaded Crimea because Putin knew America would do nothing about it. The reason Putin knew this was because America "lead from behind" in Libya, hesitant to get involved or commit, and, more importantly, issued a "red line" warning over chemical weapons in Syria and then failed to carry through with the ultimatum, which could weaken America's ability to deter other aggressors, as I myself argued in this blog last September. Is this true? Would Putin have been deterred if Obama appeared tougher or if, say, George W. Bush were still in the White House? Hardly.

I say this not because I twice voted for Barack Obama, but because to say it is his fault is either disingenuous, meant only to hit him politically, or betrays a complete lack of understanding of how deterrence works. As The Economist points out, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 while G.W. Bush was in the White House and has occupied 20% of the country ever since. Not only did the bellicose President Bush not deter Russia from invading, he also did little to punish it as a result. Russia is much more interested in Crimea and Ukraine than the United States is. What's more, and as can be seen on the map above, Russia has easy access to Crimea and the whole of Ukraine. It can easily launch an invasion or incursion, whereas the United States would require a massive logistical operation just to get troops, ships, and equipment to Ukraine. Considering Americans' war-weariness and financial constraints, such an operation was always unlikely, regardless of how committed the President seemed to other causes or how aggressive his rhetoric. Putin has still been careful, in some ways: He did not invade all of Ukraine and reinstall its ousted president, for example. He took control of an area of Ukraine with a majority Russian population that was long part of Russia and hosts its Black Sea Fleet. He rightly calculated that the US and Europe would be angry, but not so much that they felt forced to undertake real action. In sum: Russia could not have been deterred from this unless there had been US/NATO troops on the ground in Crimea and eastern Ukraine prior to the crisis--something that would never have happened because it would have angered Putin and brought on a crisis by itself and because the US and its allies have never cared enough to risk that. In other words: Russia has deterred NATO and Ukraine from expanding NATO to include Ukraine. And without having Ukraine in NATO, Russia could not have been deterred from taking over Crimea. This is not Obama's fault.

So deterrence has failed. Or has it? Deterrence never realistically applied to all of Ukraine, especially Crimea which, with its Russian population, "Autonomous Republic" status, and Russian bases, was always only tenuously controlled by Ukraine. Deterrence can now work to protect the rest of the country and this is where the US, NATO, and the EU must take a stand. There must be diplomatic consequences for the occupation of Crimea. There must be much more severe consequences for actions in the rest of Ukraine, including attempts to coerce it away from a deal with the EU again. This does not mean war. As I mentioned, Russian nukes are lurking in the background and Russia has a massive geopolitical advantage in Ukraine and an enormous and powerful army. The US should be careful never to threaten war, either, as this would then be a further empty promise it could not back up. An embargo on Russian oil and natural gas would be the biggest step for the most severe case: a Russian invasion of Ukraine (which Putin has darkly called a "last resort"). This would hurt Europe quite badly, particularly countries like Slovakia, who get almost all of their natural gas from Russia, but also Germany, which imports a great deal of it. If Russia invaded Ukraine, however, this would have to be done.

Barring that horror scenario, freezes on assets held abroad by Russian oligarchs in its parliament or close to Putin would be a first step. Visa bans on travel to the US, EU, and other allied countries would be another significant step. These could be used in response to threats on Ukraine or attempts to manipulate it. At the same time, the US and EU should provide Ukraine with economic and technical assistance and promote a functioning democracy there.

In the end, Russia will probably keep Crimea, as it has Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This should come at a price, but Putin surely expects this and is willing to pay it. Further damage and influence over Ukraine can and should be prevented, however. Deterrence can only work when you have the power to back up your threats. This means it's important to chose your threats wisely and not to overplay your hand. Threats of visa bans, asset freezes, and sanctions are credible, and the latter would be quite severe. War is not, and is this is a good thing. There is hope for Ukraine yet.

And what about the title? It is possible that this crisis could lead to steady hardening of positions, especially if it gets carried over into negotiations with Syria and Iran, the former of which Russia supports directly, the latter of which Russia supports more indirectly as a bargaining chip. This would be a much-diminished "iron curtain," however, and Russia is not looking to retreat into economic or political isolation behind it. If you've read this, however, then the "Cold War Redux" part of the title did its job ;-).

On the Way to War? NATO May Follow Turkey into War with Syria

"It's always a ship somewhere," a friend and former US diplomat once told me, referring to the point when the US enters wars. It's staggering how often this has been the case. This list covers all the incidents I can think of, but there may very well be more (I encourage comments to help make the list more comprehensive):

• The Spanish-American War of 1898 began when the USS Maine exploded in the harbor of Havana, Cuba (then a colony fighting for independence from Spain). It later turned out that the ship had almost certainly blown up of its own accord, but that was of little interest to propagandists in the yellow press at the time.
• The US entered WWI after the sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania by a German U-boat (though this was not the main reason and did not occur immediately).
• In an example that doesn't fit the bill 100%, the US entered WWII when the Japanese sank a large number of US naval ships in Pearl Harbor.
• The "Gulf of Tonkin" incident, which included an attack that was probably just radar "ghosts," provided the impetus for the US Congress to authorize President Johnson to use conventional military forces in Southeast Asia, essentially beginning the Vietnam War (Wikipedia referenced for all of these).

Why always ships? My diplomat friend suggested, obliquely, that the reason was that ships are isolated and so it is hard to deny the official story of what happened. Pretty cynical, but pretty believable, too. In any case, that description fits aircraft, too, especially aircraft flying over the ocean.

You may have heard that Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet allegedly flying in international airspace. The jet "had strayed over Syria very briefly and had been shot down after leaving Syrian territory." When it was shot down, it was located "13 nautical miles out of Syria, when Syrian territorial space is 12 miles," according to Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.¹ So far, this has not led to Turkey invoking NATO's article 5, which would require all NATO members to join in to protect Turkey (the last invocation of this clause came after 9/11, when the US used it to start the NATO war in Afghanistan). But it's not over yet. Syria has apparently since opened fire on a second Turkish aircraft, this time a "reconnaissance plane searching for wreckage of the fighter jet downed last week." Although Syria claims it has "no intention of going to war over the matter," that is not entirely up to Syria. Turkey is apparently asserting that it could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, dragging much of Europe, Canada, and the US into a war with Syria.² This is ominous.

This all could be a way for Turkey to act tough in the face of a Syrian attack (and it most likely is). Few in NATO look forward to getting involved in yet another Middle Eastern quagmire. Syria is a heavily divided country without a clear opposition that could be supported. Al Qaeda fighters have also moved in. Intervention there would not quickly bring peace. Although it might be possible to knock out the Assad regime, it is not clear what, if anything would take its place. It might simply lead to a long and bloody civil war (much as seems to be happening now, anyway). As the German newspaper Die Zeit put it, bloodshed will happen whether we intervene or not, and intervention might make it worse.

On the other hand, this could be the beginning of a more hawkish stance against Syria that could lead to a relatively slow escalation eventually ending in war. There is also always the possibility of the "tail wagging the dog," that is: that Turkey might drag the rest of the countries in NATO in without them really wanting to get involved. After all, tensions have been rising between Turkey and its southern neighbor for a while, with Turkey making "many veiled threats to move against Syria."³ Maybe it's always a ship--or a plane--somewhere?

1. Arsu, Sebnem, and Rod Nordland. “Turkey to Consult NATO Allies on Jet.” International Herald Tribune. Damascus, June 25, 2012, Kindle edition, sec. World News.
2. Nordland, Rod. “Turkey Says Syria Opened Fire on a 2nd Aircraft.” International Herald Tribune. Ankara, June 26, 2012, Kindle edition, sec. Front Page.
3. “Turkey’s foreign policy: Growing less mild.” The Economist. Ankara, April 14, 2012, Online edition, sec. Europe. http://www.economist.com/node/21552602.

A Libyan Ceasefire: What It Would Take

The Libyan conflict continues. The UN has proposed a ceasefire. NATO and the Libyan rebels are dubious: Gaddafi is still there, after all, and is not yet defeated. He could easily take advantage of a ceasefire to stage a comeback. The Economist interprets an announcement by Britain's Foreign Secretary William Hague as meaning that Britain may be open to reconsidering the idea of a ceasefire. Far from looking for a quick exit, Hague asserts that Britain is in it for the long haul.

All of this is actually good news. It seems that everyone's heads are in the right place (except perhaps for the UN's, but this is no news -- at least its heart seems to be in the right place). A ceasefire agreement is possible, and, unless we're ready for a long siege of Tripoli with possible ground troop involvement and loads of casualties, it may be the only realistic way this can all end.  But still: this cannot be cut-and-run, which is why Hague's assurances to the contrary are comforting.

Libya is not Iraq or Afghanistan. NATO is providing air support for a native rebellion. Time is on the coalition's side, not Gaddafi's (I have pointed out previously that time is on the Taliban's side, which is why I have little faith in a positive outcome for Afghanistan). NATO must make use of both of these aspects. Any ceasefire must be on terms decided by the coalition. In particular, these terms must be decided by Libya's National Transitional Council, as representatives, however tentative, of the Libyan people. They must set the guidelines by which this can happen. Compromise may happen in other areas, but these principles are not up for negotiation.

For example, one stipulation would surely be that Gaddafi is removed a long way from any power. A second one, that the West must strongly support for reasons of morality and political credibility, is that Libya holds elections and builds institutions like independent courts all that. The areas where compromise is possible: pardoning Gaddafi and going easy on current members of his regime. Those closest to him must not be allowed near power. Ones lower down may need to be left on for practical reasons -- only they may have experience in civil service.

It sounds awful to let Gaddafi get away scot-free, but let's not lose sight of the goal: getting him out of power and freeing up Libya for a brighter future. If Gaddafi can be enticed to give up the fight, this will save hundreds, possibly thousands of lives through reduced fighting, as well as lots of money, time, and Western leaders' political capital.

And what if Gaddafi doesn't accept? As I said: time is not on his side. Don't negotiate further. Return to the current war of attrition, and wait for him to come around or for the regime to utterly collapse around him. This is not as nice as a quicker ceasefire, but it is the only option. All in all, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic about Libya, at least over the medium term. Kind of refreshing after ages of Middle Eastern quagmire.