The Hillary Email Scandal: An Unenforceable Rule Serving an Undesirable Goal?

Photographer: Harald Dettenborn, CC license

Hillary Clinton used a personal email account and server for all official business while she was Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. Although she seems not to have broken any laws outright, she has certainly made it more difficult to process Freedom of Information Act requests lodged with the State Department, for example, and the State Department must comply with such requests and must make official correspondence available. She therefore does seem to have violated the spirit of such rules. Transparency is a big buzzword these days and it is seen as a way to combat corruption, crime, laziness, and dishonesty, all laudable targets. But enforcing these rules is difficult, to say the least, and it is also not clear that transparency is always the best thing for diplomacy.

According to politifact, federal rules state that it would have been OK for Clinton to use her personal email account in an “emergency.” While noting that she had not actually broken any laws because the rules were tightened only after she left office, experts say that EXCLUSIVE use of a personal account is not allowed. Where do we draw the line? How much use is then permitted? How can we know that that occasional "emergency" correspondence was not where she broke laws and committed corruption?

More problematic than the arbitrary percentages of personal email account use is the question of enforcement: Presumably, Clinton could use her personal account for any personal correspondence. But it would be Clinton herself who would judge what’s personal--which is exactly what she has been accused of by opponents. Since the personal emails are not looked at, who is to say whether they are personal or not? In effect, then, there is absolutely no difference between Clinton claiming to use her personal account only for personal emails and Clinton claiming to have deleted only personal emails from her records before handing over what she claims is everything else (which is the current situation). Opponents argue there is no way to verify this, but this would be the case if she had used her personal account only for personal emails, too, which would apparently have been perfectly fine. The rule thus appears pretty unenforceable unless all government officials were prohibited from ever having any private email correspondence.

This rule was meant to serve a seemingly laudable goal: transparency in, in this case, diplomacy. There have long been demands to end "secret diplomacy" because of suspicion of just what goes on behind closed doors. More crimes are committed in the dark than in the light of day, after all. In addition, how can a democracy function well if its people do not know what their government is doing? How can the people make themselves heard? Transparency at all levels, including diplomacy, is supposed to fix this.

The problem is that making negotiations, rather than just their outcomes, public can make diplomacy nearly impossible--and without diplomacy and negotiation, cooperation becomes nearly impossible as well. Without cooperation, everyone is worse off: shared economic benefits don't materialize, wars become more likely, collective action on pollution and climate change can't occur, etc. The reason is simple: Both sides need to be free to offer unpopular things in exchange for what they want. Deals often fall through. The public might accept slaying a sacred cow in exchange for a big deal, but revealing that a leader was willing to do so and did not achieve the hoped-for outcome could cause cries of “traitor!” Secret negotiations thus allow the two sides (or even two negotiators) to speak openly with one another without constantly worrying about how their domestic audiences are reacting to what they are saying and how this might affect their re-election chances or other aspects of political capital. Though a deal was not reached in the end anyway, the Camp David negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Auhtority President Yassir Arafat are illustrative: They both offered things in secret that they could not have offered if opposition back home had constantly been up in arms (e.g. both of them moved towards sharing Jerusalem, which, in public, neither had dared to say they could do).

Clinton went against the spirit, at least, of transparency regulations, but those regulations are inherently arbitrary and it is also easy to see why she would wish to skirt them. The negotiations leading to a deal (though not the deal itself) should be permitted to remain secret and be protected from the scrutiny of all but a few insiders, at least for a time. Doing the opposite would not only be impractical (as it would require ALL correspondence to be publicly available, as I have shown), it would be undesirable in the case of diplomacy.

Is there such a thing as "lone wolf" terrorism?

How we define terrorism impacts how we respond to it. Many "lone wolf" attacks probably do not qualify as terrorism. A definition free of value judgments is key.

What is terrorism? It sounds like a simple question, and yet there are constant debates any time the label is used. Accusations of racism, imperialism, or other form of privileged bias often surface during such debates. The reason is that the word "terrorism" is very often used to refer to an illegitimate form of violence. A definition of terrorism that includes the types of people targeted (e.g. civilians, the targeting of which is illegitimate) or attackers (militant groups, etc., who are not sanctioned by governments and therefore seen by many as "illegitimate") will always carry a negative moral assessment with it. This matters because such a definition can never be universal and is also nearly meaningless (meaning only "violence we don't accept as legitimate"). A so-called "strategic" definition is therefore desirable. This sees terrorism as a logical tactic within a wider strategy. This definition includes three elements:

1. It causes fear (terror).
2. Its targets are mostly symbolic rather than strategically important, meaning it is primarily a psychological form of warfare rather than something that directly threatens the targeted state or group's survival or ability to fight.
3. It has a political intention: Attackers want a government or group to adopt (or abandon) a certain policy or policies.

When talking about so-called "lone wolf" terrorists (terrorists acting on their own as opposed to as part of a larger terrorist group), the first two elements from the definition pose no problems: Lone wolf attacks cause fear and their targets are usually mostly symbolic. The third part suggests many lone wolf attacks may not be terrorism. Terrorism as a tactic implies a larger strategy for effecting change beyond mere revenge or the desire to die in a blaze of glory. Lone wolves may have political intentions, but the fact that they are alone means that their attacks bleed into hate crimes or “senseless” attacks by “mad men.” They very often do not amount to planned-out attacks used as part of a wider strategy. This makes calling a lone wolf attack "terrorism" questionable and what name we give to such attacks is important because responding to terrorism should be different from responding to random acts of violence.

Some ostensibly "lone" attacks may be more than that, however. Just who is a lone wolf? True lone wolves, especially if they plan or expect to die while carrying out their attacks, cannot reasonably see their attacks as part of a wider strategy. At most, they may hope that others will take up their cause and execute further attacks, but this is not a real strategy and calling their attacks “tactical” is quite dubious--which means calling them "terrorism" is inappropriate. Lone wolves may, however, act at the direction or suggestion of larger groups or militant leaders. Al-Baghdadi, head of Islamic State, has called for his followers to carry out attacks in Europe, particularly in France. Lone wolves deciding to do so would be executing attacks in the knowledge that this is indeed part of a wider plan. There are therefore good reasons for considering such attackers to be terrorists rather than just deranged. They are acting alone, but are not true lone wolves in that they are part of what are potentially a series of attacks, albeit ones that are only loosely coordinated.

In practice, of course, it may often be difficult to determine if a lone attacker believed him/herself to be acting as part of a wider campaign or simply on his/her own initiative. The implications for counterterrorism are significant. Lone attacks that are not part of a broader campaign may need little response beyond discussions of the cause of the attacker's deranged mental state. There is little else that can be done but, luckily, little that must be done.

Lone attacks that are part of a broader campaign are just as difficult to combat directly as true lone wolves are because the attacker(s) is(are) not directly associated with a larger group and will thus be hard to find. Efforts can still be directed at the instigating authority, however, and attention should also be paid to factors that may have caused the attackers to be attracted to the specific cause.

The only bright spot is that lone individuals and small groups are likely to be shorter-lived and less deadly than their larger counterparts, even though they may be harder to track down. This is simply because they will almost certainly lack the human and financial resources to sustain a devastating campaign over the longer term. A foreign policy centered on combating the instigating group (and encouraging its state sponsors, if any, to do the same) and, if possible, ameliorating factors pushing people to join terrorists, coupled with good police and community service work at home, can address such attacks.

The Japanese-American Military Relationship: Call the Divorce Lawyer?

At the end of the Second World War, Japan was disarmed. Non-aggression clauses were even written into its constitution. Japan had no need of a large military because the United States vowed to protect it. At that time, the US was probably also the only force that would have been capable of attacking Japan in East Asia. Today, things look a bit different. Although China is rising and has been increasing military spending, Japan nonetheless remains a military lightweight, assured by security guarantees from the United States, much as Western Europe has been since the end of WWII.

Recently, however, there have been squabbles over American military bases in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. The previous government told the Americans the base could expand in size. Local residents, however, would rather see the base disappear altogether. Japan's new government at first agreed to review the case, putting off the Americans (though it has now reneged on this promise and plans to keep the base as previously planned). Is this a sign of further tensions down the road and the erosion of the Japanese-American security arrangement? In short: probably not. The Japanese know that the Americans insure not only their security, but the stability of the entire region. They are unlikely to kick them out any time soon, as evidenced by their eventual decision to let them stay, albeit possibly at a more remote location on the island. Even China has reason to wish for a US presence there. The strategic relationship is likely to recover and to remain at least as strong for the next two decades at a minimum. Whether the arrangement itself will be enough to stop an arms build-up and further tensions in the region, however, is in the stars.

America's presence in the Japanese archipelago is a central element in the area's security, part of the architecture of the modern "Pax Americana." Not only does it serve to protect Japan from outside attack, it also obviates Japan's need to build up its own defenses, which in turn makes other states in the region (notably both Koreas and China) feel less insecure and therefore less inclined toward military buildup themselves. South Korea's shipping lanes pass close to or through Japanese territorial waters and it is reliant on its trade links to the rest of the world.

It is not competition between Japan and South Korea, however, that is most worrisome. The elephant in the room is China. If the US were to depart from Japanese shores, is there any real doubt that the Japanese would start to feel nervous about their much larger neighbor to the west? The logical reaction to this insecurity would be a military buildup, of which Japan is certainly capable: it has the population (127 million), technology, and economic power. Japan's pursuit of security, however defensive its nature, would serve to make other countries in the region, namely China, but also both Koreas, feel less secure. Further insecurity in North Korea would make South Korea nervous. It is easy to see the chain reaction that would likely ensue.

Taiwan also relies almost exclusively on the United States to ensure that any change in its current status (in limbo between an independent state and a province of China) is not determined solely by the mainland Chinese. If Taiwan were to be wholly incorporated into the mainland, whether peaceably or not, this would extend China's reach into Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa (which in our extended scenario is no longer shielded by American forces). Leaving aside for a moment the worry that a democratic and open Taiwan might become an autocratic and oppressive Chinese province, this would be a serious destabilizing factor for the entire region.

Last but not least, China itself would not necessarily benefit from a US withdrawal. Although the Chinese would almost certainly rejoice if America removed its airbase from Taiwan and stopped supplying it with weapons, China, too, benefits from the Pax Americana. China would be faced with heightened diplomatic and military challenges if the region destabilized and Japan and the Koreas began building up their militaries. It would have to be very cautious not to drive on an arms race by becoming anxious and building its military might as well. The prospects for this restraint are not good. The security dilemma means tensions and even war would be hard to avoid in the absence of America's stabilizing power.

For all these reasons and more (habit, history, and cultural aspects), the Japanese-American connection is likely to remain strong as long as there are no truly severe (and foolish) diplomatic screw-ups. The only question then is: as America's (and Japan's) relative power declines in relation to China (assuming things continue to go well for China), how long will America's security guarantee remain credible? How long can America prevent a buildup and destabilization of East Asia? The continuation of strategic ties to the region may only delay the inevitable. The Pax Americana, like other paces before it (Britannica, Romana), will not last forever. The real issue is: what will replace it? Pax or bellum?