Right Reasons, Wrong Response? US Action against Islamic State

Photo: Creative Commons via Voice of America

Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL, aka ISIS) is a brutal, deadly organization operating in Syria and Iraq. It is intensifying the refugee crisis in the region, which in itself threatens to destabilize countries like Lebanon and Jordan, which the group also wishes to conquer. This instability and bloodshed alone would be reason enough for the US to take action, but America also has a certain responsibility to help Iraq, as the political situation there that allowed IS to gain a foothold in the country has come about partly through US (in)action. The fact that the Iraqis requested US help leaves little question of the legitimacy of action against Islamic State within Iraq. Conundrums abound, however, and it is easy to see why US President Barack Obama has been so hesitant to get involved.

The US is now involved, however, with the stated aim of leading a broad coalition to "roll back this terrorist threat" and to "degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy." Obama also vowed to "hunt down terrorists who threaten our country wherever they are," explicitly allowing airstrikes in Syria as well as Iraq. He announced that 475 additional US troops would be sent to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces. The air campaign in Iraq could be expanded and Syrian rebels would also be trained and funded to attack IS.

These actions may be effective in "rolling back" IS--i.e. pushing it back out of Iraq--and "degrading" it, but they are unlikely to "destroy" it anytime soon. Furthermore, even if they did the latter, there is no guarantee that another group would not take its place. Militant groups like IS require support from the populations in which they operate. The flip-side of that coin, however, is that it is nearly impossible to eliminate them as long as they have such support. Furthermore, that support needn't be from anything like a majority of the population as long as there are enough people to hide, supply, and fight for the group. Support for such groups comes for political reasons (such as anger at repression or at a lack of power for a given group). To "destroy" IS, then, requires eliminating as much support for it as possible. Eliminating support for it requires addressing the political issues that have led to that support--in other words: political solutions are needed for political problems. These do not really seem to be part of the "comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy" Obama announced.

Retired British General Rupert Smith points out that armies can be used to assist governments or populations in difficulties, or in order to contain a threat, "without knowing the desired political outcome" or necessarily having a strategy for how the situation ends.¹ Even without a political solution, then, the US would still stand some chance at "rolling back" and "degrading" IS. As pointed out, however, "destroying" it would require a political resolution. A more inclusive government and security service within Iraq may be able to resolve the political issues that fostered support for IS there (if indeed these changes really come about). The situation in Syria, however, is much worse. Smith notes that "destroy" missions that lacked political strategies have tended to slide into being "containment" missions instead. Such a mission may be able to stabilize Iraq and secure its border to Syria while the war there rages on and IS continues to operate and occasionally threaten neighboring countries and even its enemies abroad, like the US. This doesn't sound like the aim Obama set forth.

It is hard to envision destroying IS as long as the civil war in Syria continues. For America to achieve its final objective, then, the war must end. At the risk of gross understatement, this is highly problematic because there are basically only two ways the war could end, and neither is particularly appetizing. The first way is that one group or coalition could win the war and impose its will on the rest of the country. Supporting such an iron-fisted imposition of "peace" would be unpalatable to a democratic country like the United States. The second way the war could end would be with a democratic system of checks and balances that protects minorities and provides assurances to the country's various interest groups. This would require broad support within Syrian society and, crucially, trust among the various groups in that society in the fairness and stability of a democratic government. The civil war and a history of authoritarian rule, however, mean that trust is in seriously short supply in Syria. Creating the conditions for such trust, including a government and institutions worthy of it, would be an enormous undertaking.

The easiest way for the US to end the war in Syria would be to throw all its support behind the Assad regime. It could save face by finding a way to work with Russia and Iran to force Assad out while keeping the rest of his regime in place. After the atrocities the regime has committed, which outstrip those of IS in scale, this would be hard to stomach and would strain the US's relations with Sunni allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the breaking point.

The harder way would be to support a pro-democracy coalition within Syria and give it all the backing it needed to win. This is sort of the current plan, but there is plenty of room to question how "democratic" the US-backed rebels are. The US generally speaks of "moderate" rebels, whatever that means, but conspicuously leaves out any reference to their democratic intentions if they were to take power. If these rebels beat both IS and the Assad regime to take control of Syria, they would be coming to power with numerous backers, many of whom, such as those from the Gulf states, who would not be particularly interested in supporting democracy. In order to influence things in that direction, the rebels would need to be supported by, and rely most heavily on, the West. This would almost certainly mean US troops in Syria and a lengthy, large-scale operation to stabilize the country enough to allow trust to be rebuilt and give all the groups within the Syrian population a stake in the success of a new system. Given the constraints on the US, from its budget tightening to the overwhelming opposition of its population to greater involvement in the region, coupled with the US's poor record in state-building and democracy promotion at gunpoint, this option is inconceivable and success would be far from assured if it were.

In the end, then, Obama's goal to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS should probably be seen as having a greater emphasis on the "degrade" part. The "ultimately" portion, along with the difficulties of "destroying" IS without extensive involvement in Syria or making unpalatable decisions, suggests this is more of a wish than something that is actually planned at any time in the near future.  As such, the current operation is likely to end up being one of containment, which will be open-ended, only being resolved when someone wins the Syrian civil war. If American-backed rebels win it, tough decisions will still lie ahead. If they don't, even tougher ones may, along with a lot of recriminations. Even the cautious option Obama seems to have selected is fraught with peril and tens of thousands of lives will still likely be lost. Doing something may be better than doing nothing, but it is still not very good.

1. Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle Edition. London: Penguin, 2012, Chapter 7.

Want to Fight Extremism and Help Moves toward Middle East Peace? A Deal with Iran Might Help.

Photo: The Guardian - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/04/iran-suspend-uranium-enrichment

One of the reasons I have been arguing for action on Syria is because Iran is watching. If we're not willing to stop Syria from using chemical weapons, so the argument goes, Iran will know full well that we are not going to bomb it to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon. Now that our weak commitment to enforcing norms against weapons of mass destruction has become clear, however, it may be time to look for the bright side. In this case, the bright side has to do with the other half of the deterrence equation: the promise.

Most people focus on the threat side of deterrence because deterrence is, roughly, using contingent threats to prevent an adversary from taking a particular undesirable action. The "contingent" part (we will attack only if you do x) is often swiftly forgotten, but deterrence cannot work without it. "You won't like what we'll do to you if you do x" also means "if you DON'T do x, everything will be fine." Similarly, a lot of time is spent worrying about the credibility of threats, but almost no thought is given to the credibility of promises NOT to attack. This is a huge oversight, because if I believe you'll attack me either way, I have a strong incentive to hit you first, or do whatever it was you didn't like, in order to be stronger and appear defiant in the face of your threats.

I suspect so little attention is given to the credibility of promises because of an assumption made by deterrers that they are the good guys and are peace-loving, so of course our promise to be nice is believable, unlike conciliatory promises made by the other side, which, being the enemy, is not to be trusted. I'm not arguing that we should trust Iran. Everything about its nuclear program screams "weapons," despite its assertions to the contrary. What I AM saying is that we should not assume Iran ought to be able to trust us and that any concerns it claims to have are just posturing and nonsense.

Iran has at least two reasons to doubt the US. One is that we have successfully toppled its government once before (after a period of constant meddling my Russia and Britain) in the 1950s. The other is that the US has made no secret of its wish to see regime change in Iran ever since. The past two centuries of Iran's history have served as a lesson never to trust big foreign powers. What may seem to Americans like paranoia or fake worry looks to Iranians like sensible concerns about preventing subversion by foreigners.

The fact that the US obviously does not want to get drawn any further into Middle East conflicts is thus a cause for Iran to relax: The US attempting to topple the Iranian regime seems quite unlikely at the moment. The question is now whether Iran wants the bomb to have greater power over its neighbors (in which case a more conciliatory US stance is unlikely to help) or because it mainly fears the US and its allies (some also in the region), which could be helped by a more peaceful-looking United States.

That question is basically moot, however, because I don't see the US attacking Iran any time soon. The question thus becomes: Now that we have limited our options, what is the path to the best possible outcome? Even if Iran is seeking regional hegemony, as many in Israel believe, getting a bomb may not be the best way to get there, especially if this causes other regional powers like Saudi Arabia to go nuclear as well. The current sanctions on Iran are very painful. They would continue and intensify if Iran got the bomb. This weakens Iran and makes its people unhappy, increasing risks for the regime. If Iran feels safe from US invasion and attacks by Israel, cooperation on several levels could be possible and be a way for Iran to grow stronger. Al Qaeda is one of Iran's biggest enemies, just as it is to the United States. The same goes for other Sunni extremist groups. Given the apparent recent resurgence in Al Qaeda's strength, cooperation with Iran on countering those groups could be useful. At the same time, Shia groups like Hezbollah defer heavily to Iran's leadership. Iran is thus a central player in Middle East politics involving terror groups and other non-state actors and is THE power when it comes to Shia Islam.

Iran's pride would need to be protected in any deal. One possibility would be to leave Iran "stalled" at near break-out capacity for creating a bomb (broadly where it is today). Iran has continually insisted it does not wish to build a bomb, so this would not have to seem a climb-down and would save face. At the same time, Iran would not have a bomb and could perhaps slowly climb down from having one through increased cooperation on a civilian program. This would meet US goals and save US face and credibility. Reducing tension between the West and Iran could also help in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as Hezbollah defers heavily to Iran and Hamas also listens to it, covering two of Israel's most difficult borders. A removal of tension may make Israel feel secure enough to negotiate.

It's not that far-fetched. Iran doesn't seem that sure on whether it wants to cross that final threshold and obtain a bomb. There's a decent chance it won't build one. The US and its allies should of course stick to the sanctions until concrete progress is made and make clear their commitment to protecting their allies in the region, including against nuclear threats. But if the US seizes such an opportunity, further cooperation would be more probable than at any time since 1979.

Syria: Prepare for Intervention

I have argued against US intervention in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, although not here in this blog. Unfortunately, things have now changed and I am being forced to rethink.

Reports have been coming in lately that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has used chemical weapons in Syria. Starting last August, President Barack Obama has stated that the use of chemical weapons, or their transfer to terrorist groups, would “change the equation” for Barack Obama and be a "grave mistake” for the Syrian regime. At the time the president first made these statements, the Syrian regime replied to them with its own deterrent demand, saying that it would never use chemical weapons unless Syria were invaded from the outside. Until now, that status quo seemed to be holding. Regardless of all the discussion over where the “red lines” actually lie, President Obama needs to give signs that the United States is actually serious about its threat not to allow the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Promises are important. This is because following through on past promises allows a person, state, or government to build a reputation for credibility. This, in turn, allows it to avoid, in this case, military action, and the death and destruction that come with it, in the future by simply being able to threaten action rather than constantly having to carry through with it.

The importance of promises can be overstated, however. There is evidence that, during the Cold War, the United States worried too much about its credibility and that this led it to act in an overly aggressive manner, leading to unnecessary escalation. Evidence from Soviet archives that opened up in the 1990s indicates that the Soviets actually rarely questioned US resolve when it came to core US interests (the safety of US territory, for example).

Some promises are important, however. When it comes to US interests in far-off places that are not vital to the US economy and do not host US bases, for example, the will of the United States to intervene is indeed questionable. Furthermore, this particular promise is also especially important. The US is interested in using deterrence in areas far away from its core areas of interest. The most important and salient example of this in current politics is Iran's pursuit of a nuclear bomb. The US has warned several countries against getting a bomb in the past, and yet states like Pakistan and North Korea have obtained nuclear weapons without suffering any US military intervention to stop them. Barack Obama would like Iran to think that this time is different. If the US is unwilling to stand up to a regime terrorizing its citizens with chemical weapons, however, this makes Barack Obama’s alleged commitment to stopping Iran from getting the bomb appear more questionable.

The promise is also important in a narrower way. There is an overriding moral interest in condemning the use of chemical weapons, preventing their use over time, and thus establishing self-maintaining norms against their use. The less the use of chemical, biological, nuclear, and other destructive weapons is permitted, the greater the taboo against their use becomes. As one of the few states in the world with the ability to attempt to enforce such global norms, there is a strong moral argument for the US to act.

So what must be done? The first step is publicly to prepare to intervene. Barack Obama should begin working on plans for military action in Syria, possibly shifting resources towards the eastern Mediterranean in preparation. This will send the right message to the Syrian regime. In the meantime, the US administration should continue to gather evidence that chemical weapons have been used by the Syrian regime, but it must be satisfied with clear and convincing evidence rather than evidence that goes "beyond a reasonable doubt,” as this may not be forthcoming. In addition, Obama should inform the rebel leadership that intervention will come only if it agrees to an international tribunal for war crimes, helping to set up institutions and the rule of law afterwards. All this must be more than posturing, however. If this does not bring peace, or at least the cessation of the use of chemical weapons (I leave it to the US Government to decide on these goals, though once intervention has begun, the goal must be an end to the conflict and this should be publicly stated) the US should impose a no-fly zone, while continuing to issue warnings of escalation coupled with a way out for the regime, perhaps in the form of an amnesty for those who abandon it. Such an amnesty must now exclude Assad, however, for he has crossed the line and mustn't be let off.

Failure to surrender plus attacks on US planes will mean greater military involvement, at first with targeted bombings of regime military targets where possible (missile launchers are often located in heavily populated areas). The next step would be to increase the bombing, warning residents by dropping leaflets to evacuate areas targeted for attacks. All this should give the rebels the upper hand. If this fails to turn the tide, a ground operation, preferably with the support of other countries like Turkey, would then be necessary (Britain and France have also encouraged action and should be included).

With any luck, the above steps will not all be necessary. We must accept that they may be, however. There is much at stake in keeping to this promise and so it must be done. Allowing chemical weapons to be used offensively once again with impunity sends the wrong message to the world. And allowing aggressive regimes to cross red lines set by the US without suffering any consequences also sends the wrong message to the US’s adversaries and allies alike. There are many countries in the world that have refrained from building their militaries because of their faith in the US’s ability and willingness to protect them from external aggression. If those countries were to lose that faith, the world would become a much more unstable and dangerous place.

Saudi Arabia: The Elefant in the Room

The protests in Egypt, which now seem to be dying down, leaving the regime still in place, have sparked a lot of talk about what other countries in the Arab world might have their autocratic regimes toppled by protesters. Jordan and Yemen, having experienced protests already, are obvious candidates. Absent from most discussions, though, is Saudi Arabia. This is presumably because most view it to be rock-solid. Or is it because the idea of a revolution or civil war breaking out in Saudi Arabia is too frightening to contemplate?

Robert Baer famously argued in an article in the Atlantic Monthly back in 2003 that Saudi Arabia was not nearly as stable as many presumed/wished. Aside from concerns about Saudi money funding Islamist outfits all over the globe (read the article, it's an eye-opener), the assertions of the frailty of the regime, as well as of the importance of stability in Saudi Arabia for world political and economic security, are unnerving:

• "Saudi Arabia controls the largest share of the world's oil and serves as the market regulator for the global petroleum industry.
• If the Saudi oil spigot is shut off, by terrorism or by political revolution, the effect on the global economy... will be devastating.
• Saudi oil is controlled by an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional, and out-of-touch royal family that is hated by the people it rules and by the nations that surround its kingdom."

What's more, Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure is very vulnerable to attack. Shutting down just one or two major processing centers and pipelines could essentially stop the oil flow out of the kingdom. This could happen as a side-effect of a revolution (e.g. through neglect and a collapse in the support infrastructure between governments). Gasoline prices of $4 per gallon would then seem Utopian. The weak recoveries in the rich world could end with high inflation and higher interest rates. Unemployment would rise further.

Then there are the political consequences. Right now, US-backed Saudi Arabia can be counted on to act as a counterweight to Iran in the region and to ensure the free flow of oil and other goods off both of its coasts. Indeed, one theory about the reasoning behind the Iraq War was that some US policymakers feared the eventual collapse of Saudi Arabia and wanted to create an American ally (Iraq) to counterbalance Iran's influences in the region. If Egypt were ruled even by a moderate grouping including the Muslim Brotherhood, it could nonetheless be expected to take a decidedly less pro-Western stance. Now imagine losing Saudi Arabia as an ally, too, which has generally been willing to boost oil output when the US was in need and to provide a moderating political influence in the Middle East (at least through its official diplomacy, if not through the Islamist ventures it funds abroad!).

If Egypt and Saudi Arabia became real democracies (and this is a big "if," especially in the case of the latter), this would be something to celebrate, even as we learned to deal with the political and economic consequences as best we could. There is a whole range of possible scenarios. Some of them, though, border on the apocalyptic. Baer believes it's only a matter of time before Saudi Arabia collapses. It could be a turbulent and, at times, scary new world.

Add Credit Suisse to the Axis of Evil

I hope everyone has read the articles this week in the Times and WSJ reporting on the half-billion dollar settlement with Credit Suisse for laundering money for Iran. I am truly overwhelmed by this story, and was even more shocked when I read the terms of the settlement. I cannot understand why the U.S. Government has not treated this issue with more severity.

The basic story is that Credit Suisse has settled a case accusing the Bank of purposefully facilitating illegal wire transfers to the U.S. from Iran and other sanctioned countries by disguising the country code in the routing numbers. The case was brought by New York City District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, after a decade-long investigation. The plea levies a hefty fine on the second-largest bank in Switzerland in exchange for admitting fault and promising not to do it again. The only thing more disturbing than the idea of a bank actively circumventing a strict US sanction are the specific clients they had been doing it for: the Times reports that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Aerospace Industries Organization were two of the Bank's direct clients. Should it even be considered conjecture to assume this money was for materials related to nuclear weapons?

The biggest shocker about this story is the reaction of the U.S. Government. First, without making any assumptions, the Bank clearly violated economic sanctions that have been in effect for the better part of two decades. These sanctions are our only current resource to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. They are recognized, and may soon be matched by the international community, through the United Nations. How can this Bank even begin to justify ignoring this policy?

Secondly, to add insult to injury, it seems likely the Bank facilitated Iran's ability to purchase nuclear related goods and/or services. Does this Suisse have a shred of moral fiber? I understand this is a private, profit-driven institution, but at what cost? Keeping nuclear weapons out of Iran may actually be the only thing the majority of this world agrees on!

This plea deal is nothing short of lunacy. The U.S. is involved in a simmering conflict with Iran, a country with nuclear ambitions that funds and supports terrorism throughout the world. With sanctions, we are waging a war of economics and Suisse is aiding the enemy. At the very least I think the Treasury should be freezing the Bank's U.S. assets and bar the Bank from any U.S. operation. Credit Suisse clearly has total disregard for U.S. law and interests, and should see real ramifications for its actions. If a bank will do all this for money, I think it sends a pretty clear message when your company is now barred from doing business in the largest economy in the world.

President Obama, Hilary Clinton, you want more effective sanctions? I can't think of a better gift, use it.

As a final point for this story. Where are the FBI, the Treasury, and Homeland Security in all this? How on earth did the little old NYC District Attorney Robert Morgenthau (literally old: he is in his 90s) nail this case down? Is anyone watching these things? Is it really as simple as disguising a routing number? No wonder this has been completely ineffective foreign policy. Someone better be stepping it up soon because Morgenthau is set to retire January first. Who will watch out for money laundering from the "evil doers" once he is gone?

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Venezuela: Going Nowhere -- Fast

It has recently become clear that Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's president, is going about setting up a coalition with one goal in mind: bringing about the fall of "The Empire," i.e.: the United States. He plans to do this by forming alliances with every unsavory country in the world, from North Korea and Russia, to Syria and Iran. He recently announced a deal with Iran to cooperate on nuclear work. France reminded him that Iran was prohibited from exporting its nuclear technology. In return for nuclear aid, Chavez has promised Iran shipments of oil, even though Venezuela can hardly refine enough to supply itself.

Is this something the United States needs to worry about? The short answer is yes. All the U.S. needs is for Iran to be additionally strengthened and for an anti-American alliance to form with a powerful country like Russia involved. The long answer first requires answering another question: will this help Venezuela or Hugo Chavez?

It's hard to see how this could help Venezuela or its people. By forging an alliance that includes Iran and North Korea, Venezuela is headed on a path to international isolation. Perhaps Chavez thinks that if he makes deals with Russia (arms) and China (oil), this will prevent isolation. On the latter half of this bet, at least, he may actually be right. China is hungering for natural resources like oil. It is not improbable that China might protect Venezuela with its Security Council veto, but only if things don't get too dicey.

But even so, this would not prevent political isolation and isolation in other economic areas. True, oil is an important export, and Venezuela has a lot of it, but it requires foreign investment in order to develop the oil fields, some of them off shore. This investment could be blocked. Besides, making Venezuela even more reliant on oil exports, and therefore the whims of the global oil price, is not something Chavez should wish for. The current crisis saw a large drop in the oil price, bringing trouble for Venezuela's budget. If Venezuela can no longer receive foreign investment, its current fields will dry up (Venezuela's oil production capacity has steadily dropped since Chavez came to power. One would think that a man who increases his country's dependency on one export would ensure the viability of that export's future).

The country is already fighting inflation, as the government has kept fiscal and monetary policy looser than it ought to. This has caused the black-market trade in bolivares to soar. This market indicates that the bolivar is worth a fraction of what the Venezuelan government maintains it is worth. Strict capital controls are in place to prevent a massive slide and the emptying of the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. Domestic industries are already complaining that the strict limits on conversion to the dollar are making it all but impossible to do business by cutting off imports to the country (which has in turn spurred inflation as imports become much more expensive). Chavez is also consolidating the economy under the control of his clan, which of course receives generous exceptions from the dollar-limit regime and import restrictions. High inflation, blocked imports, and extremely restricted access to industry for everyone not associated with the Chavez clan hardly sounds like a good recipe for economic success. Far from the modern socialist revolution Chavez claims to be bringing about, his revolution sounds like many sad stories we have heard before.

This brings us back to our longer answer to the first question: should the U.S. worry about this? In the long run, these policies will ruin Venezuela, which is certainly nothing to hope for on account of the innocent lives that will be ruined along with it. A nuclear Venezuela, or even just a more heavily armed one, is cause for worry about stability in the region. The real concern is that this could spark a South American arms race. Arms races tend to lead to fear mongering and radicalism. It is therefore much more the future of South America that is at stake than that of the United States's alleged "empire." Venezuela will hardly be able to pose a military threat to the United States, even if it becomes nuclear (see my article on North Korea and compare), and the U.S. relies economically very little on Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, et al. The political and economic isolation that will be wrought upon Venezuela if it continues, including in South America (Mr. Chavez is not admired everywhere there, particularly in Colombia) will only serve to weaken Venezuela.

But weak states can become even more radicalized and dangerous. For this reason Venezuela, unlike North Korea, is not something the U.S. should write off. Its approach, however, must be multilateral. Unilateralism would play into Chavez's hands, who claims to be battling the evil that is the United States. Better would be to work to convince Chavez's potential allies that the U.S. is not the bad guy, but that Chavez, indeed, is. This can be done via a higher degree of cooperation and other incentives (free trade agreements, etc.). This would do nothing to convince Russia and China, of course, but I posit that they need little convincing anyway. Venezuela is being used by both. China and Russia (and all other countries) will act in their own interests, and these are unlikely to align with Chavez's that often. The point, then, is for the U.S. to make sure that other countries, who can be more effected by U.S. incentives, are convinced that it is not in their best interests to side with Chavez. Given Chavez's poor policies and overt hotheadedness, this should not even be particularly hard, particularly if the U.S. works to cultivate as broad an international consensus as possible. Venezuela is on a road to nowhere, that doesn't mean we all have to go along for the ride.

Obama and Iran: The (U.S.) President Has the Right Idea

Street protests have broken out in Iran, at times becoming violent. They will probably get more so, especially if the government decides to crack down on protesters, which it probably will. This has all happened due to the Iranian presidential election, which is believed to have been rigged so that the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was declared the winner a suspiciously short time after the polls closed.

Ah, a new Iranian revolution? The moment we've been waiting for? Time for America to rush in? Some seem to think so. That would be asinine.

President Obama's current course (he expressed doubts about the election and that he would support free elections in Iran, but stated that it was up to Iranians to decide who would lead Iran) is the right one. What would those who disagree have him do? Speaking out in favor of the opposition would endanger that very opposition by making it look like it was backed by America, something that would not go over well in a country with a fairly high degree of anti-American sentiment (sentiment left over from when the CIA toppled their democratically elected leader and installed a more West-friendly monarch who ruled over the country for decades and bashed any oppositional voices, though his abuses arguably pale in comparison to the current regime's). What's more, it is unlikely the opposition candidate will come to power, and Barack Obama will have to deal with whomever is in power, probably Ahmadinejad. Acting to back the opposition in any way would make relations with him even more difficult.

Buit even leaving all that aside for a moment: what practical choice does he have? Since no words, whether harsh or soothing, will change the course of events in Iran, the only option would be some sort of intervention. Does anyone really think the U.S. is in a position to intervene in a country several times the size of Iraq that cannot in any way be conceived to wish for this intervention when it is already fighting wars on two fronts and running up a massive bill trying to rescue its own economy from collapse? Not to mention the long-term negative effects yet another Middle East intervention would have on the U.S.'s ability to cooperate with and influence other nations. It would increase anti-Americanism, making any progress in problem areas impossible, and further alienate our allies.

Intervention would be madness, and choosing sides would clearly do more harm than good. Plus, implying support (physically) for a revolution and not being able to back up the promises with actions would endanger the lives of thousands of Iranians if they started a civil war expecting the U.S. to intervene (which is albeit unlikely, since they do not wish to see any U.S. intervention anyway, regardless of what happens).

Given the utter lack of viable alternatives, Obama seems to have chosen the best (or least bad) policy. The greatest thing that Obama has shown since becoming president is not whether he is left or center, but that he is a pragmatist and understands the complexity of the situations that he could so direly influence. For me, at least, this is a relief.

The protests in Iran are heartening because they prove what many have said: Iran is not monolithic, and many of its citizens would like to see bigger reforms and more freedoms. That's a critical first step, but these things have to go inside-out. For now, our focus needs to be on getting Iran to become a better global citizen externally. Easing tensions between Iran, (would-be) Palestine, Israel, and the United States is where we need to focus our attention now. A patient who has no pulse and has broken a leg is best helped by addressing the stopped heart first, we can handle the broken leg later if the patient can be resucitated.