This blog has moved!

Hello all!

As part of a move to professionalize my internet presence, you can now find this blog (including all the old posts) at: www.charles-kirchofer.com.

See you there!

All the best,
Charles Kirchofer

It's the accumulating wealth at the top of the pyramid, stupid!

Photo by: Exothermic on Flickr

The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few can explain many of the rich world's current economic ills. The solution is redistribution, but not in the old, socialist style. It's time for a tax on non-productive assets, a removal of inefficient tax breaks, and the liberalization of laws on who can build what when, where, and how high.

Scholars from Marx, to Hobson and Lenin, to Keynes, to Thomas Piketty have recognized that wealth tends to accumulate among those who already have it. The reasons are simple: wealthy people have money left over that they do not need to spend. They can therefore invest this cash and get returns on it. What's more, their financial security allows them to take greater risks, with higher average returns, than those who are not as secure. For example, imagine you offer an average 40-year-old homeowner on an average American income the following: If she pays you $100,000 by mortgaging the house or borrowing from savings or friends, you will pay her $150,000 at the end of the year (and let's imagine she believes you), OR, she can give you $100,000 for a 50% chance of getting $300,000 at the end of the year, but with a 50% chance of losing all of it. Most people in her situation would choose the safe $150,000. It's a 50% annual return, so why not? A wealthy person, though, would almost certainly jump on the riskier option, especially if there was a possibility of "playing" more than once. After all, the average win is $200,000, a profit of $100,000 (or 100%) in a year (on AVERAGE!)! People who would not lose everything if they lost $100,000 can afford to take such risks when there is a high probability of great reward overall. So wealth accumulates at the top.

Is that bad? Beyond envy, it also seems unfair that some people can afford to take greater risks and get greater rewards than others, though it should be pointed out that, in the above (unrealistic) example, there'd be nothing preventing someone from "climbing the ladder" by starting at lower risk. Nevertheless, those who start life with more have greater opportunities. Some of them are lazy or incompetent and squander them, drifting down the wealth pyramid, and some at the bottom rise up, but study after study has shown that this is rare. There is thus already a moral case for increasing equality of opportunity. There is also a macroeconomic one, however, and it also claims to lay the blame for stagnant wages, rising debts, and financial crises at the door of wealth accumulation with the rich.

The macroeconomic case is as follows: The rich are the ones who invest in the capacity for the economy to produce things because they have the extra capital to do so. The workers and the poor, who need to spend most of what they earn to survive and have less money left over to risk on investments, etc., are thus the main consumers. They represent the demand in the economy, and the rich represent supply. When consumers buy things from firms, those firms become more successful, expand, hire more workers, and pay higher wages, increasing those workers' consumption, boosting other firms, etc. etc. The problem, as per Hobson and Lenin, is that, as wealth accumulates with the rich, and the rich consume less than they earn, investing the rest, production will grow faster than demand. Consumers won't be able to buy all the goods on offer at a price that would turn a profit for producers. The result is falling profits, collapsing wages, and crisis. The solution, as proposed by Hobson and Keynes, was to redistribute some of that extra wealth at the top to those at the bottom in order to boost demand and slow supply, keeping them in line with each other. The high inflation and stagnation of the '70s suggests countries may have done too much of this by the late '60s and '70s, and some countries never passed through the reforms of Britain and the US of the '80s, '90s, and 2000s and might still need more of them. For many parts of the rich world, especially Britain and the US, however, this explanation for crisis and stagnation is compelling.

Following this explanation, the financial crisis of 2008-9 was caused because of how the economy reacted to oversupply and lack of demand. With redistribution cut and other costs for working people rising, like healthcare and college tuition, leaving less money for consumption, the wealthy saw declining returns from boosting production. They sought other places to put their money, like subprime mortgage debt, real estate, gold, wine, and art (record prices being hit again right now for works of art). As mentioned, working class people tend to spend all that they earn. Redistribution in effect gives them extra earnings. In the 2000s, working class, poor, and middle-income people instead simply spent more than they earned and borrowed the difference. Those who had more savings than debt thus plowed money into loans, making them cheap. Interest rates were low. This allowed demand to continue to match supply for a time and gave investors two ways to make money: increasing supply and investing in debt. It was not sustainable, however, because debt levels obviously cannot rise forever. When they stopped rising, consumption no longer kept up with supply and a long period of crisis and weak demand followed. Today, wages and productivity are not rising as quickly as expected, whereas asset prices, like the prices for houses, penthouse apartments, works of art, and the like are all back to their rapid rises of the pre-crisis years. This is once again fueled by debt in the form of ultra-low interest rates and quantitative easing by central banks. In essence, we are trying to prop up demand by making borrowing artificially cheap again. This can work in the short term, but only if overall productivity and wages rise and consumption becomes sustainable. The Marx-Hobson-Keynes explanation of the crisis suggests this will not happen.

So what can be done? Higher income taxes blunt incentives to earn more and therefore hurt productivity and consumption. They therefore are not the best way forward. There are loads of tax exemptions for income however, and these ought to be removed. The most glaring of all is the capital gains tax (CGT). CGT is a tax on money earned from investments. Some argue it's unfair because it taxes money you've already earned. Nonsense. That's true of everything other than income tax and CGT. It taxes only money earned above what you invested. Wealthy people make loads of money through investments, yet these are taxed as if they were earning the wage of a secretary (as Warren Buffet pointed out). This is wrong.

In general, however, it makes the most sense to tax investments that are not contributing to the economy. Income (corporate or personal) is a good thing. If income is spent or invested in ways that boost productivity and the economy, this is a good thing. Taxes on all these should be relatively low. If income is spent on things that do not do this, however, this benefits only the asset holders (the rich). Since this reflects excess earning generated from the economy, there is a case for clawing back some of the value and investing it in things that improve equality of opportunity (like free child care for working parents, free preschool, and cheaper, better education). Mansions, penthouses and the like contribute nothing to the economy. A tax on the value of non-productive assets (like the proportion of the value of a home over the median value for homes in a state or city and a tax on the entire value of second and third homes, as well as ones on yachts, private jets, cars above the median value of cars, etc.) could be used to pay for these amenities, all of which should properly seen as investments in greater growth and prosperity for the future (notice they are NOT "wealthfare" or healthcare spending, both of which only boost consumption and are not investments in greater future growth).

Another thing that would help those in the bottom half of the pyramid would be relaxing restrictions on building and on building heights. Artificial restraints on these, particularly in prosperous cities, have crimped the supply of housing and caused house prices to skyrocket. Increasing the supply of housing, and therefore reducing its price, would reduce the cost of living for younger and poorer people, raising their standard of living and boosting consumption without the need even to raise wages. The problem is that the majority of Americans and Brits already own their homes and have no desire to see house prices fall (I wrote a post on the "new landed class" about this). In fact, due to all the mortgage debt, a fall in house prices could even be dangerous for the economy. A slowing in house price inflation, followed by a long stagnation, however, would be of immense help to future generations.

Wealth does accumulate at the top and this is a problem for everyone. The solutions needn't discourage work or "punish" the successful, but should instead steer cash from non-productive uses like property buying and luxury goods towards productive uses that help level the playing field a bit, above all to those that help working people get working more easily and help their kids climb the education ladder at low cost. It's time for a change.

Dollars do not make people into zombies

The influence of the USA on the Maidan protests is grossly overestimated. Mass movements are not so easily bought—and the US has other priorities. BY ALICE BOTA, editor for the German weekly Die Zeit. Translated by Charles Kirchofer.

Originally published in German on 21 May 2015 at 07:26 AM CEST

© Private

These days, whenever a people somewhere rises up and a government falls, large sections of the left quickly identify who is responsible: It was the Americans. They were never too good for coup attempts when they were in their own interest, after all. They were willing to use any means, whether in Panama, Chile, Nicaragua, Iran—the list is long. So why should it be any different for the Maidan protests in Ukraine in 2014? Only that this time, the people were stirred up.

Many then like to point to the book The Grand Chessboard by the former US presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. In it, he refers to Ukraine as the “geopolitical linchpin” that determines the tectonics shifts of all of Europe—as if this were already evidence of American power politics rather than just theory.

The role of the US in Eastern and Central Europe is so overrated and overcharged that a short historical review can help to ground the assessment. This is because, like Ukraine today, one country in particular is familiar with disappointments and disenchantment when it comes to America, namely Poland.

In 1973, the publicist Juliusz Mieroszewski published an article in the Polish exile magazine Kultura about American “Ostpolitik” (“eastern policy”). Mieroszewski belonged to the milieu of intellectuals and writers who had to flee from Poland and fought with words from Paris for an independent homeland. Mieroszewski remarked bitterly that, while the Americans spent $120 billion for their anti-communist Vietnam War, the uprising in Hungary, also directed against a repressive communist regime, didn’t even receive $120.

Just like many Ukrainians today, back then, many oppositional Poles were convinced that America was their natural ally and would support them in the struggle against communism. Their hope was understandable, but it was in vain.

For the US, Ukraine Policy is mostly about symbolism

While the “Polish cause” was the Alpha and Omega of all politics for the Poles, Mieroszewski wrote, it does not even exist for the Americans. In the end, the equation was simple for him: The Soviets were both rivals and partners of the United States, so the Americans would never seriously attempt to change the political cartography of Eastern Europe. This informed their policies, not the uprisings in Budapest, Prague, and Gdansk, which were regarded with much sympathy, but nothing more. “Overall, it must be said that the American Ostpolitik on the European stage is purely defensive” Mieroszewski wrote. “This defensive strategy is based on preserving the status quo, not amending it.”

The publicist wrote these sentences in the early seventies, but not much has changed since then. Undoubtedly, Ukraine remains important to America—but it will never be so important to Barack Obama that he would risk a definitive split with Russia. And just as Richard Nixon eventually went to Moscow in 1972 and assured its rulers of their claim to power, so the US Secretary of State John Kerry also traveled to Russia and said things that must have been quite sobering for Ukrainians.

The Americans are convinced that they need Russia for their policies in the Middle East. Their current Ukraine Policy is mainly a bit of symbolism. They would rather the EU did the rest.

Questionable image of human beings on the Left

Those who are convinced that the Maidan uprising in Kiev was a fake bought by America will be unconvinced by remembering Mieroszewski. Thanks to foundations and organizations like USAID or the National Endowment for Democracy, the Americans have spent millions in Ukraine for decades; they have financed civil society NGOs, trained election observers, and advanced anti-corruption campaigns.

The foundation Renaissance in Ukraine, funded by the billionaire George Soros, has paid for the lawyers of arrested Maidan activists, coordinated civil society meetings, and provided financial support for care for the wounded. But this support is not enough to explain why thousands rose up in the middle of Kiev against their rulers in winter 2014.

The fixation on America’s power, the projection of a superior force, not only reflects a worldview that is often upheld by a portion of the nostalgic left that mourns for the old division of the world into blocs. Above all, it reveals a lot about their image of the human beings: that people are easily bought. That beliefs do not matter, but are the result of perfidious manipulation. That a few million dollars are enough to turn people into zombies who go out onto the streets and put their lives at risk.

Sometimes the truth does not lie "somewhere in between"

Many readers are irritated, including with my reporting on Ukraine. Their suspicion is legitimate. But not every view of the war is equally true.

BY ALICE BOTA, editor for the German weekly Die Zeit. Translated by Charles Kirchofer. Re-posted with the author's permission. The original article appeared in German on March 13, 2015.

A reader named "B." writes in. Complains that the reporting on Ukraine is misleading and false. I’ve been on location over the past few months and have reported on the Maidan (yes, including the right-wing extremists), on Ukrainian volunteer battalions , the shooting down of flight MH-17 , the elections , the war, the victims of Donetsk. His criticism also applies to me, which is why I write back. “What is so misleading?” I ask. What mistakes did I make? After all, I think it is quite possible, even probable, that I made mistakes—everyone makes mistakes. The question is how serious they are and how I can correct them. An error becomes a lie only when it is made intentionally to conceal and deceive.

B. answered in a way that I already know from other angry readers who attempt to express their criticism more precisely: How can I justify saying that Russia is involved in the war in eastern Ukraine? There is no evidence! 

I usually write back in detail. There IS evidence, I write. There are Russian soldiers who return home in coffins from Ukraine and family members who are not allowed to talk about their suffering. There are Russian NGOs like the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, who are trying to find out how many of their sons have already died in Ukraine. There are reports such as that of the Armament Research Services, which were able to identify Russian (and other) weapons in eastern Ukraine—never mind the fact that one really has to wonder when, within a few months, a bunch of local insurgents has a more professional army than Ukraine.¹  There are Russian intelligence officers such as Igor Girkin, who was involved in the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine and speaks openly about Russian tactics.

The list could go on and on. The only thing missing is an admission by Russian President Vladimir Putin that he is waging war in eastern Ukraine. And for many, it seems, nothing is true that Putin himself has not confirmed. 

But even the word of the Russian President does not always seem to be enough. It’s been months since Putin admitted to having sent his soldiers to Crimea. But only now, after he spoke about it again on Russian television, has this fact really seemed to arrive in Germany.

Just a year ago, the media, especially public broadcasters, were attacked when they said the obvious: that Russian troops were occupying Crimea. Everyone who was there could see it for him/herself and could even ask the soldiers about it. But to say or write that? Insinuations! Prejudices! Lies! 

The letter from Mr. B. represents a phenomenon, namely, the flight into relativism when it comes to Russian politics. At times, this relativization is fed by the fear that Germany could be drawn into this war; sometimes by distrust of the Americans, sometimes out of hatred for them; sometimes by a perceived historical debt to Russia (which is, paradoxically, rarely seen to be owed the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles); at times by contempt for Europe; and that sometimes simply stems from being unable to cope.

Relativization is a principle of propaganda used by Russian television that has long since extended beyond Russian borders. Everything must appear feasible and even the obvious must seem to be just one variant of many. This is done by scattering many different, contradictory versions of stories (on the shooting of MH-17, it was said that the passengers were already dead, had been killed by the Americans, or that the rocket was intended for Putin) or by repeating false “facts” until they appear correct (for example, that American Blackwater mercenaries are fighting in Ukraine. So far, that is nonsense). Until nothing is true and everything seems possible, as the author Peter Pomerantsev called his book about modern Russia (Nothing is true and everything is possible, 2014).

Pomerantsev, who worked for many years as a TV producer in Russia, describes, among other things, how the Kremlin synthesizes Soviet-style control with western-style entertainment in order to numb society. “The news is the incense with which we praise Putin’s actions and make him president,” Pomarentsev cites Russian TV producers. Pomarentsev shows that TV news in Russia has nothing to do with reality—it is entertainment.

Russian state media make no mistakes, they simply lie. And they do not care when they are caught, as in the story of the child who was allegedly crucified by Ukrainian fascists.

When I respond to letters like that from Mr B., when I engage with his arguments, refute what is wrong, and say what seems to me to be correct, an interesting dialogue often develops. And mostly it becomes apparent that distrust and discomfort are the driving forces: What interests are the Americans pursuing in Ukraine? Isn’t Russia justified in feeling threatened? Haven’t the Europeans also made mistakes?

We can talk about all that and we need to write about it. But the truth, that great, so often abused word, does not always lie somewhere in between. You cannot track it down through relativizing. To broadcast everything to the world, even the worst nonsense, to give everyone a platform to speak without asking who speaks in what function and why--this is not plurality, but the illusion of it.

1. emphasis added

The morality of retaliation in warfare

"An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." The concept of retribution has been present in conceptions of justice since ancient times, with perhaps the earliest known prescription of it found in the Hammurabi code of ancient Babylon. Though a literal interpretation of such codes now appears barbaric to most people and Jesus himself advised his followers to "turn to them the other cheek as well" if they were slapped, rather than seek an eye for an eye (Matthew 5:38-48), modern criminal justice continues to codify retribution. Though modern criminal justice is meant to fulfill three purposes, the other two being reform and deterrence, retribution itself is seen as just. If the law in any state focused purely on reform, those wronged by criminals would likely see this as unjust and might even seek vigilante justice for themselves. Retribution may thus even be necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the legal system and therefore social order itself. Retaliation, which is how retribution is carried out, can also serve the functions of deterrence and, through that, reform of its target. Retaliation for wrongs thus has a long-standing legitimacy in human society and serves several functions crucial to maintaining order. At the same time, however, it has long been recognized that retaliation can simply perpetuate feuds and fuel escalation rather than deterrence and reform. In international politics, moreover, the legitimacy of acts of retaliation will almost always be questioned or rejected by those at the receiving end, exacerbating these risks. If retaliation causes more violence rather than less, it is unjust. Furthermore, certain types of retaliation, e.g. against civilians, are never justified. Where do the lines of morality and utility lie? Is retaliation even useful or justifiable?

In the play Fiddler on the Roof, a villager cries "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth!" to which Tevye, the main character, replies "Very good. That way the whole world will be blind and toothless". This sums up nicely the view that retaliation is futile. After all, in a conflict situation, those on the receiving end of a reprisal will not view such a reprisal as legitimate because they are likely to view their own actions as legitimate—in opposition to the view on the other side. This is essentially the definition of conflict, after all. When seen as an illegitimate, us-versus-them act, retaliation often leads to new retaliation—i.e. to escalation. This leads liberal-minded people to posit that retaliation only makes things worse. Causing more anger and suffering on the other side is no way to create peace, the argument runs. Someone must break the cycle of violence instead.

This assessment of how to end a conflict is essentially correct. Eventually, the parties to a conflict must make peace and to do that, they must eventually stop retaliating and let go of grievances. An immediate shift from violence to peace, with both sides suddenly deciding to let bygones be bygones and to lay down their arms is often impossible, however. The deeps wells of anger and mistrust on both sides cannot so easily be pumped dry—even if seemingly everyone understands that this must eventually happen. History shows that most violent conflicts end only after one or both sides become exhausted or come to see continued fighting as futile—or perhaps dangerous. Two of the goals of retaliation, especially in warfare, are deterrence and compellence. Compellence is the threat of violence unless an opponent does something. Deterrence is the threat of violence only if an opponent does something. Compellence can be used during a period of violence to achieve a period of calm, with a deterrent threat used to maintain that calm thereafter. This is best achieved when one or both sides is/are capable of exacting a price unacceptable to the other side in response to an attack. If compellence and deterrence succeed in creating and maintaining a period of calm, trust can slowly be built and room can be created for the political negotiations that could eventually bring an end to the conflict itself.

The morality of retaliation thus depends on whether it can reduce violence. When rockets rained down on Israel from Gaza in increasing numbers in 2007 and 2008, Israel's violent response in the Gaza War of 2008-9 succeeded in bringing rocket launches almost completely to a halt. The calm lasted more than three years. Subsequent rounds of escalation brought renewed periods of calm after wars in 2012 and 2014. After each escalation, the Gaza Strip's Hamas rulers have arrested rocket launchers, called them "rebels", and shown that they were maintaining peace out of fear of retaliation—in other words, deterrence was working.¹ This shows that retaliation can be used to restore and maintain calm.

At the same time, the case of Israel and Hamas illustrates retaliation's limitations. As mentioned previously, retaliation can be used to compel and deter in order to create a peaceful space for negotiations. In this case, the first step has occurred, but the second step has not succeeded. An end to the conflict thus remains elusive. The shortened time between bouts of escalation is also worrying. As I have argued previously (here and again here), Israel's failure to make the status quo in the Palestinian territories more palatable (e.g. by easing the blockade of Gaza and halting settlement construction) increases the risk and frequency of violence by undermining the effects of deterrence and Palestinians' trust. Moreover, Hamas's capabilities have actually improved with each round, even as the perceived illegitimacy of Israel's attacks on Gaza, as well as that of its settlement activities, means Israel is increasingly hemmed in by media attention and condemnation of its actions.

Retaliation is thus not inherently moral or immoral. Used carefully against militant targets, it can create periods of calm that may facilitate a negotiated settlement that would be impossible during periods of heavy bloodshed. As John Bew has shown in the case of the Irish Republican Army vs. the UK Government, accepting peace negotiations during fighting can actually embolden militants by appearing weak, encouraging further violence. Faced with escalation, a leader may thus have few other choices but to retaliate in the hope of creating a period of calm. Critically, this would be true regardless of whom one might blame for an individual round of escalation or for initiating a feud in the first place. Not to retaliate might in fact be the immoral choice if it ended up prolonging a conflict. In the end, though, Jesus and Tevye are right. Retaliation itself will not bring lasting peace and does run the risk of further escalation if applied improperly (e.g. against civilians at any time or using disproportionate force during periods of relative calm) or without the necessary commitment and capability. Retaliation can be used as a step toward peace, however, and such use is deeply moral.

1. Toameh, Khaled Abu. “Hamas Crackdown on Islamic Jihad Rocket Squads Raises Tenstions in Gaza. Hamas: Some Palestinian Parties Trying to Create an Excuse for Israel to Resume Its Aggression.” The Jerusalem Post. March 11, 2009, sec. News. Nexis UK.

War between countries is over? Think again.

Source: Indian Navy, CC license

Liberals and idealists have declared the end of war many times before. In 1914, many believed that economic interdependence had made war in Europe unthinkable. After WWI, it was hoped that the League of Nations would stop war. The claim that interstate war has died out has now re-emerged yet again. Less sanguine than the idealists of the past, experts like the retired British General Sir Rupert Smith and the renowned Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argue not that war has ended, but that one type, interstate "industrial" war, is no longer. Instead, the world will fight more insurgencies and small wars against terrorists "amongst the people", to use Smith's phrase. Nuclear weapons are believed to have a limiting effect on conflict and to support the status quo. In addition, norms against violence have spread, just as globalization has reduced the need for states to fight over resources and territory. These latter points may be an effect, rather than a cause of the decline in interstate war, however. Another explanation is also possible: The structure of the international political system has shifted from multipolarity up until the World Wars, to bipolarity until the fall of the USSR, to unipolarity since. It is no coincidence that interstate wars have fallen at the same time. Unipolarity will not last forever, though. As it fades, we may see the return of interstate war.

Influential authors like historian Martin van Creveld have stated that "Large-scale, conventional war... may indeed be at its last gasp". British former General Sir Rupert Smith states bluntly that "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs... no longer exists". The latter argues that this type of war, which he terms "interstate industrial war", has been replaced by "war amongst the people": peace-keeping and state-building operations, counterinsurgencies, and the like, to which there can be no decisive end. This has indeed been the case for conflicts since at least the US's War on Terror and both authors show that the trend has been heading in this direction since the end of WWII. Western militaries are now responding to these trends, shifting capabilities away from interstate fighting and towards fighting insurgents and other smaller groups. Trends can change directions at any time, however, if the cause of such a change is not properly identified.

Smith and van Creveld offer numerous reasons for the decline of interstate warfare, such as changing norms about violence; the rise of different sorts of identity politics based on, for example, religion; the spread of the media into the hands of private individuals able to promote their causes and connext with other would-be militants; and, perhaps most notably, nuclear weapons. Except for the spread of nuclear weapons, which have indeed had a moderating influence on international politics, the other trends noted above could just as easily be effects of a shift away from interstate war rather causes of that shift. At a time when there is no need for large-scale interstate war, there is accordingly less desire for it (norms against the use of force grow stronger). Similarly, as external conflicts lose salience, internal ones grow in relative importance, allowing grievances based on religion or ethnicity to gain greater attention. Even the democratization of the media, which is certainly not due to the recent decline in interstate war, may still not end up limiting it: When the populations involved in such wars see them as necessary (potentially for survival), images of their effects may not help stop them. One thing not offered as a reason is the shift from a multipolar structure in international politics before the World Wars, when there were multiple "Great Powers" with considerable military might, to a bipolar structure during the Cold War, to a unipolar one thereafter. If the cause has been misdiagnosed, the disease of interstate war may return unexpectedly.

Massive interstate wars could be avoided in the period leading up to WWI only by maintaining a "balance of power" between competing Great Powers, all of which were based in Europe. When one state gained in power, alliances would shift to compensate or a small war might be carried out to restore the previous balance. In the early 20th century, however, Germany became so powerful in its own right that the alliance of all other Great Powers against it was not enough to constrain it.* The two World Wars knocked most of the European powers off the list of Great Powers, leaving only two "superpowers": the Soviet Union and the United States. States throughout the world aligned with one or the other superpower and would find one or the other (or both) taking a strong interest in their internal affairs.** Interstate wars continued, but they were often indecisive (Korea and Vietnam) and of uncertain necessity (Vietnam), leading to a great deal of questions about their legitimacy. Since the Cold War, the world has been left with just one "hyperpower": the United States.*** I have argued previously that the world is still unipolar, contrary to popular belief. Read this to see why. The Iraq Wars have shown how quickly the US can win interstate wars and, in the case of the second Iraq War, how quickly it can become bogged down in a "war amongst the people". But how much of this is related to unipolarity rather than a fundamental shift in the types of wars now possible?

In times when military power is more evenly matched, states often cannot gain the decisive military victories that would pave the way towards state-building thereafter. Not only that, alliance partners could very well balk at the prospect of the balance of power then swinging too much in the other direction. If governments are left mostly in place, counterinsurgency and state-building remain the responsibility of the invaded, not their invaders. Wars with more limited objectives to restore the status quo would thus be seen as more necessary and may therefore become more common. The First Iraq War actually fit this model, though the US had the power to do much more. In a multipolar world, the US might retain that initial war-fighting capability, but would not necessarily have that choice to do more. The First Iraq War could become the rule rather than the exception. The world is militarily unipolar, but is economically multipolar already. This matters because economic strength is one critical foundation of military strength. As the wealth of other countries, like China, rises, so can their military spending and capability. The world's current unipolar structure may thus be replaced by a new bipolarity with China or, perhaps more likely, a more multipolar structure with China as a Great Power.

Though the moderating influence of nuclear weapons is not going away, the decline of interstate war has also come with the concentration of power in the hands of the United States. Other factors supposedly limiting interstate war, like changing values and increasing interdependence, may very well be the result of fewer wars rather than the cause, as the world has seemed safer for interdependence and as the declining necessity of war has allowed more peaceful values to flourish. Similarly, unipolarity has caused the US and its allies to expand the goals of wars to state-building and changing the way the world itself is ordered, giving rise to counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations, just as these have become more common as identity politics increase in salience in a world made "safe" for them by a lack of interstate wars. If this is the case, fewer poles may be the best explanation for fewer wars and a rise in state-building and counterinsurgency, rather than any permanent shift in war-fighting "paradigms". As the world swings back towards multipolarity, the resulting instability may give rise to new interstate wars as countries shift alliances to seek advantage and worry more about the relative power and security of their respective blocs. We should not declare victory over interstate war just yet.

*This is, of course, the simplified version of the story. Germany also felt the need to preempt the rise of Russia, was pulled into war by a weaker alliance partner, and the system of alliances had become too rigid and no longer so focused on balancing power.

** Some states explicitly refused to align with either, but this was a choice they could only make if they were deemed neutral enough, unimportant enough strategically, and didn't feel the need to ask for support from one of the superpowers.

***This, in turn, has reduced the number (because of a reduced view of their necessity) of the proxy wars common during the Cold War.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle. London: Penguin, 2012.

Van Creveld, Martin. On Future War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz. London: Brassey’s UK, 1991.

The Hillary Email Scandal: An Unenforceable Rule Serving an Undesirable Goal?

Photographer: Harald Dettenborn, CC license

Hillary Clinton used a personal email account and server for all official business while she was Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. Although she seems not to have broken any laws outright, she has certainly made it more difficult to process Freedom of Information Act requests lodged with the State Department, for example, and the State Department must comply with such requests and must make official correspondence available. She therefore does seem to have violated the spirit of such rules. Transparency is a big buzzword these days and it is seen as a way to combat corruption, crime, laziness, and dishonesty, all laudable targets. But enforcing these rules is difficult, to say the least, and it is also not clear that transparency is always the best thing for diplomacy.

According to politifact, federal rules state that it would have been OK for Clinton to use her personal email account in an “emergency.” While noting that she had not actually broken any laws because the rules were tightened only after she left office, experts say that EXCLUSIVE use of a personal account is not allowed. Where do we draw the line? How much use is then permitted? How can we know that that occasional "emergency" correspondence was not where she broke laws and committed corruption?

More problematic than the arbitrary percentages of personal email account use is the question of enforcement: Presumably, Clinton could use her personal account for any personal correspondence. But it would be Clinton herself who would judge what’s personal--which is exactly what she has been accused of by opponents. Since the personal emails are not looked at, who is to say whether they are personal or not? In effect, then, there is absolutely no difference between Clinton claiming to use her personal account only for personal emails and Clinton claiming to have deleted only personal emails from her records before handing over what she claims is everything else (which is the current situation). Opponents argue there is no way to verify this, but this would be the case if she had used her personal account only for personal emails, too, which would apparently have been perfectly fine. The rule thus appears pretty unenforceable unless all government officials were prohibited from ever having any private email correspondence.

This rule was meant to serve a seemingly laudable goal: transparency in, in this case, diplomacy. There have long been demands to end "secret diplomacy" because of suspicion of just what goes on behind closed doors. More crimes are committed in the dark than in the light of day, after all. In addition, how can a democracy function well if its people do not know what their government is doing? How can the people make themselves heard? Transparency at all levels, including diplomacy, is supposed to fix this.

The problem is that making negotiations, rather than just their outcomes, public can make diplomacy nearly impossible--and without diplomacy and negotiation, cooperation becomes nearly impossible as well. Without cooperation, everyone is worse off: shared economic benefits don't materialize, wars become more likely, collective action on pollution and climate change can't occur, etc. The reason is simple: Both sides need to be free to offer unpopular things in exchange for what they want. Deals often fall through. The public might accept slaying a sacred cow in exchange for a big deal, but revealing that a leader was willing to do so and did not achieve the hoped-for outcome could cause cries of “traitor!” Secret negotiations thus allow the two sides (or even two negotiators) to speak openly with one another without constantly worrying about how their domestic audiences are reacting to what they are saying and how this might affect their re-election chances or other aspects of political capital. Though a deal was not reached in the end anyway, the Camp David negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Auhtority President Yassir Arafat are illustrative: They both offered things in secret that they could not have offered if opposition back home had constantly been up in arms (e.g. both of them moved towards sharing Jerusalem, which, in public, neither had dared to say they could do).

Clinton went against the spirit, at least, of transparency regulations, but those regulations are inherently arbitrary and it is also easy to see why she would wish to skirt them. The negotiations leading to a deal (though not the deal itself) should be permitted to remain secret and be protected from the scrutiny of all but a few insiders, at least for a time. Doing the opposite would not only be impractical (as it would require ALL correspondence to be publicly available, as I have shown), it would be undesirable in the case of diplomacy.

It's time (again) to ease the Gaza blockade

Photo credit: Flickr

The strictness of the Gaza blockade is dangerous for Israel and devastating for Gazans. Now is the time to change it.

Israel and Egypt let very few goods or people cross the border in or out of Gaza. Israel also restricts fishing to just a few miles offshore. When it was first put into place in 2007, the blockade was intended to punish Gazans for electing Hamas and to make running the territory difficult for it. The hope was that the West Bank would prosper and Gaza would not, convincing the latter's residents of the benefits of a Fatah-led government (the political party of the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and former President Arafat). Compelling people to do something via economic sanctions has always had a mixed record (Cuba is a case in point, though some successes are also touted, including apartheid South Africa). From a deterrence standpoint (i.e. for preventing attacks by Hamas), the blockade currently makes little sense.

Easing the blockade directly after the most recent Gaza war would have looked like victory for Hamas and could have undermined deterrence by giving the appearance that violence against Israel pays. Now, however, is a good time to ease. It is obvious that Hamas did not manage to force Israel to ease the blockade: It has not done so and the war is over--for now. Hamas currently shows little inclination towards renewing violence. It makes sense to reward quiet (and not just to punish violence). In addition, some of Israel's own defense officials fear that the worsening economic situation in Gaza could undermine the cease-fire and lead to renewed violence. It seems obvious that, if the blockade harms the Gazan economy and economic hardship may lead to a return to violence, then easing the blockade and bolstering Gaza's economy should prevent such violence.

This is because deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo and there are two ways to do that. The way most security types focus on is punishing deviations from the status quo and making doing so so unpleasant that the other side opts to keep things how they are. The other way is to make the status quo more palatable. This in itself encourages the other side to maintain the status quo, but it also creates more room for punishment should violence rise again.

Given that there is little to recommend the blockade for security purposes, maintaining it is also immoral. It blights Gazans' lives and robs them of opportunities, something that should also be seen as a security risk. Whether viewed from a humanitarian or security perspective (preferably both), the strictness of the current blockade on Gaza makes no sense. The time to move is now, not during or after the next war. Furthermore, moving now could delay or prevent the next war, as well as providing more ways to fight it and giving Israel some much-needed breathing room among its international allies, who increasingly view it as excessively aggressive. Netanyahu has showed little boldness or fresh thinking thus far, here's hoping he can surprise us.

Is there such a thing as "lone wolf" terrorism?

How we define terrorism impacts how we respond to it. Many "lone wolf" attacks probably do not qualify as terrorism. A definition free of value judgments is key.

What is terrorism? It sounds like a simple question, and yet there are constant debates any time the label is used. Accusations of racism, imperialism, or other form of privileged bias often surface during such debates. The reason is that the word "terrorism" is very often used to refer to an illegitimate form of violence. A definition of terrorism that includes the types of people targeted (e.g. civilians, the targeting of which is illegitimate) or attackers (militant groups, etc., who are not sanctioned by governments and therefore seen by many as "illegitimate") will always carry a negative moral assessment with it. This matters because such a definition can never be universal and is also nearly meaningless (meaning only "violence we don't accept as legitimate"). A so-called "strategic" definition is therefore desirable. This sees terrorism as a logical tactic within a wider strategy. This definition includes three elements:

1. It causes fear (terror).
2. Its targets are mostly symbolic rather than strategically important, meaning it is primarily a psychological form of warfare rather than something that directly threatens the targeted state or group's survival or ability to fight.
3. It has a political intention: Attackers want a government or group to adopt (or abandon) a certain policy or policies.

When talking about so-called "lone wolf" terrorists (terrorists acting on their own as opposed to as part of a larger terrorist group), the first two elements from the definition pose no problems: Lone wolf attacks cause fear and their targets are usually mostly symbolic. The third part suggests many lone wolf attacks may not be terrorism. Terrorism as a tactic implies a larger strategy for effecting change beyond mere revenge or the desire to die in a blaze of glory. Lone wolves may have political intentions, but the fact that they are alone means that their attacks bleed into hate crimes or “senseless” attacks by “mad men.” They very often do not amount to planned-out attacks used as part of a wider strategy. This makes calling a lone wolf attack "terrorism" questionable and what name we give to such attacks is important because responding to terrorism should be different from responding to random acts of violence.

Some ostensibly "lone" attacks may be more than that, however. Just who is a lone wolf? True lone wolves, especially if they plan or expect to die while carrying out their attacks, cannot reasonably see their attacks as part of a wider strategy. At most, they may hope that others will take up their cause and execute further attacks, but this is not a real strategy and calling their attacks “tactical” is quite dubious--which means calling them "terrorism" is inappropriate. Lone wolves may, however, act at the direction or suggestion of larger groups or militant leaders. Al-Baghdadi, head of Islamic State, has called for his followers to carry out attacks in Europe, particularly in France. Lone wolves deciding to do so would be executing attacks in the knowledge that this is indeed part of a wider plan. There are therefore good reasons for considering such attackers to be terrorists rather than just deranged. They are acting alone, but are not true lone wolves in that they are part of what are potentially a series of attacks, albeit ones that are only loosely coordinated.

In practice, of course, it may often be difficult to determine if a lone attacker believed him/herself to be acting as part of a wider campaign or simply on his/her own initiative. The implications for counterterrorism are significant. Lone attacks that are not part of a broader campaign may need little response beyond discussions of the cause of the attacker's deranged mental state. There is little else that can be done but, luckily, little that must be done.

Lone attacks that are part of a broader campaign are just as difficult to combat directly as true lone wolves are because the attacker(s) is(are) not directly associated with a larger group and will thus be hard to find. Efforts can still be directed at the instigating authority, however, and attention should also be paid to factors that may have caused the attackers to be attracted to the specific cause.

The only bright spot is that lone individuals and small groups are likely to be shorter-lived and less deadly than their larger counterparts, even though they may be harder to track down. This is simply because they will almost certainly lack the human and financial resources to sustain a devastating campaign over the longer term. A foreign policy centered on combating the instigating group (and encouraging its state sponsors, if any, to do the same) and, if possible, ameliorating factors pushing people to join terrorists, coupled with good police and community service work at home, can address such attacks.

Hamas in the back seat--for now

Photo: Flickr/Creative Commons/Marsmet543

Jerusalem is Israel's Achilles Heel and Palestinian resistance may have moved into a new phase. Hamas's involvement in this has been minimal so far. Its ability to affect politics remains, however.

Hamas has been one of the main drivers of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1990s. Events in the past decade and, especially, in the past few months seem to be changing this. The replacement of suicide bombing attacks with rockets and the subsequent deployment by Israel of its Iron Dome missile defence system have dramatically reduced Hamas’s violent effect on Israelis’ everyday lives, not just when compared to the horror of the early 2000s, but also when compared to the 1990s. In addition, since the most recent round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, there has been a surge of violence from within the Israeli side of its security barrier. This violence has been carried out by Palestinians (with gruesome reprisals from Jewish vigilantes) who live on that side of the barrier. It is also notable that these latest attacks are mostly not carried out at the behest of Hamas or any other militant group. Has the threat from Hamas receded? Is the new threat from within the ‘wall’ now greater?

Jerusalem is potentially Israel’s Achilles Heel. Palestinians living there are not separated from Israelis by a security barrier. They are not coordinated by a governing authority that could be targeted in the same way that Hamas in Gaza can. ‘Civil’ measures like policing and intelligence are the only possibilities for deterrence. These, along with Jerusalem Palestinians’ separation from those in the rest of the Occupied Territories and their generally better quality of life, seem to have worked thus far in keeping violence originating from Palestinians in Jerusalem and from Arab Israelis to a minimum. Punitive measures, like imprisonment and home demolitions, can actually undermine deterrence as the situation escalates, however: If security at holy sites intensifies to the detriment of Muslim worshippers and punitive measures damage Jerusalem Palestinians’ way of life, they may feel they have less to lose by turning to violence. Such a move would have little to do with Hamas.

Palestinian resistance has gone through several phases, but it has appeared recently to be settling on pushing for international pressure. As the Jerusalem specialist Michael Dumper points out, the sheer density of holy sites in Jerusalem ensures that there is constant international attention on the city. Israel is limited in the harshness of measures it can implement there without incurring international opprobrium. Escalation in Jerusalem would further increase international attention and reinvigorate drives to resolve the situation by establishing a Palestinian state that would incorporate majority-Palestinian portions of Jerusalem.

As attention focuses on Jerusalem, then, might Gaza and Hamas slip into the background? This is unlikely. The confrontation cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of who controls Gaza and its relationship to any future Palestinian state. As long as Hamas remains in power there, it will therefore remain relevant and be capable of influencing, and quite possibly scuppering, any deal. No solution can thus be found without dealing with Hamas. Hamas has so far always acted as a spoiler in the peace process and rejects two states as a final solution to the conflict. Violence undermines the moral force of Palestinian demands for statehood upon which much of current international actions by Palestinians are predicated. Rising violence in Jerusalem could have this effect, or it could come from Hamas. Hamas may therefore seem less important at present, but it remains in a position to influence events in the larger conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and no solution could succeed that ignored it. It is not irrelevant yet.

Israel: Harsh sentences for stone throwers are a bad idea

The Dome of the Rock, Jerusalem. Photo by the author, ©February 2013

Israel's Knesset should vote against harsh sentences for stone throwers—for security's sake

The Cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently backed a bill that would allow the government to imprison stone-throwing protesters for up to 10 years even if it cannot be proved that they intended to cause serious harm (with a separate provision intended to make it easier to imprison those shown to have intended to cause bodily harm for up to 20 years). Given recent tensions in Jerusalem, it is no surprise that Netanyahu's government is taking action, but this is not the right action.

To see why, consider the options of an aggravated protester. Given few, if any, options for influencing Jerusalem policy via the political process, protests become the only way to voice dissatisfaction. Peaceful protests are the best way to do this, in my view, both because violence and destruction are bad and, more importantly, because partaking in them reduces the moral strength behind the protests, weakening their positive message. It is often impossible, however, to ensure that no one shifts to any form of violence. This is where the law can provide an additional incentive: The specter of punishment for violence may reduce its likelihood. Harsh sentences for small offenses, however, can actually lead to greater violence, not less, undermining Israel's security and interests over the long term (in addition to hurting Palestinians).

This may sound counter-intuitive, but it is actually relatively straightforward. If a protester decides peaceful protest is not enough, there are myriad ways to give a violent voice to his or her anger. One of these is throwing stones or other small objects. Another would be knife, gun, or bomb attacks. Throwing stones is certainly easier than attacking someone with a knife, gun, or bomb, as it requires little preparation, stones are readily available, and it can be done from a relatively safe distance. It is also much less damaging, which means it is less violent and thus normally carries less severe penalties. If this is not the case, the incentive not to resort to more violent means is blunted. A protester might be jailed for ten years for a knife attack. Under the proposed bill, s/he might also be jailed for ten years for throwing a rock at a police vehicle. If a protester has a knife, what's the incentive to use a rock instead? The knife will cause greater harm to the perceived enemy and will incur the same punishment. The rock becomes pointless.

If you've ever stuck your finger in a garden hose when it was on, you are familiar with the concept: Reducing the possibilities for the water to come out makes it shoot out with much greater pressure through the smaller holes left. By cracking down at the lower end of the violence scale, Israel risks increasing pressure at the top end. Israel would, of course, respond to higher levels of violence harshly as well. The result would be yet another area of increased escalation. Jerusalem could end up in a continuing state of considerable unrest, limiting Israel to just a few, unpalatable options. None of these would improve Israel's image, encourage Western backing, or thus improve its security in the long run. Such a move therefore runs entirely against Israel's own interests. Too bad it, like many measures meant to display toughness, runs in favor of Netanyahu's short-term electoral interests.

Right Reasons, Wrong Response? US Action against Islamic State

Photo: Creative Commons via Voice of America

Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL, aka ISIS) is a brutal, deadly organization operating in Syria and Iraq. It is intensifying the refugee crisis in the region, which in itself threatens to destabilize countries like Lebanon and Jordan, which the group also wishes to conquer. This instability and bloodshed alone would be reason enough for the US to take action, but America also has a certain responsibility to help Iraq, as the political situation there that allowed IS to gain a foothold in the country has come about partly through US (in)action. The fact that the Iraqis requested US help leaves little question of the legitimacy of action against Islamic State within Iraq. Conundrums abound, however, and it is easy to see why US President Barack Obama has been so hesitant to get involved.

The US is now involved, however, with the stated aim of leading a broad coalition to "roll back this terrorist threat" and to "degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy." Obama also vowed to "hunt down terrorists who threaten our country wherever they are," explicitly allowing airstrikes in Syria as well as Iraq. He announced that 475 additional US troops would be sent to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces. The air campaign in Iraq could be expanded and Syrian rebels would also be trained and funded to attack IS.

These actions may be effective in "rolling back" IS--i.e. pushing it back out of Iraq--and "degrading" it, but they are unlikely to "destroy" it anytime soon. Furthermore, even if they did the latter, there is no guarantee that another group would not take its place. Militant groups like IS require support from the populations in which they operate. The flip-side of that coin, however, is that it is nearly impossible to eliminate them as long as they have such support. Furthermore, that support needn't be from anything like a majority of the population as long as there are enough people to hide, supply, and fight for the group. Support for such groups comes for political reasons (such as anger at repression or at a lack of power for a given group). To "destroy" IS, then, requires eliminating as much support for it as possible. Eliminating support for it requires addressing the political issues that have led to that support--in other words: political solutions are needed for political problems. These do not really seem to be part of the "comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy" Obama announced.

Retired British General Rupert Smith points out that armies can be used to assist governments or populations in difficulties, or in order to contain a threat, "without knowing the desired political outcome" or necessarily having a strategy for how the situation ends.¹ Even without a political solution, then, the US would still stand some chance at "rolling back" and "degrading" IS. As pointed out, however, "destroying" it would require a political resolution. A more inclusive government and security service within Iraq may be able to resolve the political issues that fostered support for IS there (if indeed these changes really come about). The situation in Syria, however, is much worse. Smith notes that "destroy" missions that lacked political strategies have tended to slide into being "containment" missions instead. Such a mission may be able to stabilize Iraq and secure its border to Syria while the war there rages on and IS continues to operate and occasionally threaten neighboring countries and even its enemies abroad, like the US. This doesn't sound like the aim Obama set forth.

It is hard to envision destroying IS as long as the civil war in Syria continues. For America to achieve its final objective, then, the war must end. At the risk of gross understatement, this is highly problematic because there are basically only two ways the war could end, and neither is particularly appetizing. The first way is that one group or coalition could win the war and impose its will on the rest of the country. Supporting such an iron-fisted imposition of "peace" would be unpalatable to a democratic country like the United States. The second way the war could end would be with a democratic system of checks and balances that protects minorities and provides assurances to the country's various interest groups. This would require broad support within Syrian society and, crucially, trust among the various groups in that society in the fairness and stability of a democratic government. The civil war and a history of authoritarian rule, however, mean that trust is in seriously short supply in Syria. Creating the conditions for such trust, including a government and institutions worthy of it, would be an enormous undertaking.

The easiest way for the US to end the war in Syria would be to throw all its support behind the Assad regime. It could save face by finding a way to work with Russia and Iran to force Assad out while keeping the rest of his regime in place. After the atrocities the regime has committed, which outstrip those of IS in scale, this would be hard to stomach and would strain the US's relations with Sunni allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the breaking point.

The harder way would be to support a pro-democracy coalition within Syria and give it all the backing it needed to win. This is sort of the current plan, but there is plenty of room to question how "democratic" the US-backed rebels are. The US generally speaks of "moderate" rebels, whatever that means, but conspicuously leaves out any reference to their democratic intentions if they were to take power. If these rebels beat both IS and the Assad regime to take control of Syria, they would be coming to power with numerous backers, many of whom, such as those from the Gulf states, who would not be particularly interested in supporting democracy. In order to influence things in that direction, the rebels would need to be supported by, and rely most heavily on, the West. This would almost certainly mean US troops in Syria and a lengthy, large-scale operation to stabilize the country enough to allow trust to be rebuilt and give all the groups within the Syrian population a stake in the success of a new system. Given the constraints on the US, from its budget tightening to the overwhelming opposition of its population to greater involvement in the region, coupled with the US's poor record in state-building and democracy promotion at gunpoint, this option is inconceivable and success would be far from assured if it were.

In the end, then, Obama's goal to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS should probably be seen as having a greater emphasis on the "degrade" part. The "ultimately" portion, along with the difficulties of "destroying" IS without extensive involvement in Syria or making unpalatable decisions, suggests this is more of a wish than something that is actually planned at any time in the near future.  As such, the current operation is likely to end up being one of containment, which will be open-ended, only being resolved when someone wins the Syrian civil war. If American-backed rebels win it, tough decisions will still lie ahead. If they don't, even tougher ones may, along with a lot of recriminations. Even the cautious option Obama seems to have selected is fraught with peril and tens of thousands of lives will still likely be lost. Doing something may be better than doing nothing, but it is still not very good.

1. Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle Edition. London: Penguin, 2012, Chapter 7.

For Shame!

Shame is a powerful weapon. Like all powerful weapons, it should be used with great caution.

"Don't worry about it. He's just a builder. He probably doesn't even have a bachelor's degree."

I heard words similar to this (it was two years ago and I can't remember what I had for breakfast 30 minutes ago) when one of my coworkers "comforted" another after a brief exchange of words with a stand builder at a trade show. I was angry. My father used to be a builder and he is one of the smartest people I know. I later kicked myself for not having told him off. What made him think he was so much better than a builder? I should have put him in his place.

While I do still wish I had said something, I am now glad I did not "put him in his place." Shame is a powerful weapon. "Naming and shaming" is a diplomatic and political tool used by NGOs to get governments to do liberal things, after all, and it works surprisingly often. One need only look at reports by Amnesty International of the prisoners of conscience they have gotten released through no means other than torrents of pleading letters and bad global publicity. The World Bank even uses it to encourage governments to streamline their bureaucracies to make it easier for people in their countries to start a business. If I had snapped at my coworker, I'm sure it would have left a lasting impression. And I was right and he deserved it, right?

Those who live in glass houses...

I can very clearly recall the awful feeling of having said or done something offensive, inappropriate, or insensitive and being confronted (perhaps publicly) about it. It certainly does leave a lasting impression. Increasingly, though, that sinking feeling is accompanied by anger. Why? People say things they shouldn't, or in a tone or context they shouldn't, all the time. I don't think anyone is immune to this. So what right do we have to make other people feel ashamed? Presumably, the goal is to "enlighten" the other person and to make them think before saying something that could hurt others in the future. A lofty goal, perhaps. But is "enlightenment" and the prevention of future offense worth immediate shame? Too often, I fear that much of the real goal is the feeling of moral superiority and strength that comes from telling someone off. No lofty goal.

If our aim is to enlighten and raise the level of respect people have for others, surely we should begin with respect towards the person who, this time around, is "unenlightened"? In my experience, statements like the one above about the builder come more from a lack of thought than from malice. There is no need to use a sledgehammer. A joke can often be the best method. If you're not spontaneously funny enough, a non-public chat can also work. "Enlighten" comes from "light." It's supposed to be a positive thing. I try (try!) to think of how I might make someone aware that they've said something hurtful or ignorant without making them feel mean or stupid. Again, the goal is to make ourselves better, not put people down. It's what I'd like people to do when I say something hurtful or ignorant.

In fact, we have a right to expect that from others. So if someone shames you, tell them that, while their criticism may be valid, their approach could use some work. I know, it's not immediately as gratifying as verbally bashing them and sticking up for yourself, but trust me, this will raise the level of respect and comfort within your circle of acquaintances and you will all soon feel able to discuss anything with each other without fear of retribution. It is not about "not saying offensive things." There should be no risk of people feeling that they now "can't say anything." Quite the opposite: You are free to say what you think, safe in the knowledge that, if you are wrong, you will be swiftly corrected without being personally attacked. There are few things more gratifying than that.

P.S.: Acting in this way, too, is a work in progress. Which means: shaming someone for shaming someone is also not the best way to make the world a better place ;)

When military action is the more "peaceful" option

US President Obama has authorized limited air strikes against the "Islamic State" (IS), an extremist (to put it mildly) group that has taken control of much of northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. Some in his administration have apparently "toyed" with the idea of a limited troop deployment there to assist the Iraqi army as well, but Obama is a long way from approving this. If IS can be stopped without it, he is right to keep US troops out of harm's way, but it is not clear the Iraqi army is up to the challenge. If it isn't, being hesitant now could lead to heavier (and bloodier) US involvement later.

Many people fear another round of the Iraq War started by Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush. Others might think further back and fear another Vietnam. Afghanistan in the '90s might be a better nightmare scenario, and it is also often cited. If Obama is worried the US will get dragged into an unnecessary war, as it was in Vietnam, he should also keep in mind the old adage "a stitch in time saves nine." It may be much easier to defeat IS now than it will be in a year's time.

Syria provides a cautionary tale: for a while, Assad looked sure to fall. Now Syria is in such a mess (including much of it falling into the hands of IS) that many hope he doesn't, despite all the atrocities he has committed to stay in power. Not backing the moderates more heavily there means Assad is still in power and it has also allowed IS to flourish--the worst of both worlds. Not going to war is not always the option that leads to greater peace and it is not always more prudent. In Libya, there was no real alternative government (though I still believe, as I have argued here, that the limited intervention there was the right thing to do). Iraq is not Libya. It has a (albeit very imperfect) government. Furthermore, it is a government that the US helped bring to fruition. The US therefore carries some responsibility for aiding in its success if it can.

Going back to the Afghanistan analogy, there is a lesson there, too, that speaks in favor of being proactive (though one could hardly call missions against IS "proactive," they are now much closer to "re-active"): The US's failure to be concerned about Afghanistan once the Soviet "threat" there receded came back to haunt it. If IS continues to threaten Iraq, makes progress against the Kurds, or threatens Jordan, hesitation and "prudence," may come to seem very imprudent indeed.

Israel and Hamas: Moral questions

In my focus on deterrence, I have mostly taken a utilitarian approach to the conflict between Israel and Hamas (if your goal is X, then Y is or is not appropriate), intentionally avoiding moral questions. I could only advocate things that would enhance deterrence, however, if I believed deterrence to be a morally valid option (I may need to write a second post explaining why I think so). A recent Op-Ed by Alan Derschowitz, an American law professor at Harvard, in the Jerusalem Post led me to conclude that it was time to talk about morality. In the article, he asserts that there is no moral equivalence between Israel's actions and those of Hamas, because Hamas intentionally targets civilians and uses them as human shields, while Israel does the opposite. This is true, but does that mean Hamas bears 100% of the responsibility for the conflict and, as I will focus on here, for the current crisis? An analysis of the deterrence situation before the crisis, like that to be found in my article last Friday in Strife journal's blog, adds an additional dimension to the moral question.

In that article, I argue that the current round of escalation was not necessary from a deterrence standpoint unless Hamas's leadership had given the order to abduct the three Israeli teenagers later found murdered near Hebron. The murderers are indeed Hamas members and Hamas has talked about abducting Israeli soldiers and using them to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners and has apparently trained members in the West Bank to do so. Israel has presented no evidence to date, however, that would suggest that the Hamas leadership, external or, perhaps more importantly, within Gaza, ordered or authorized the kidnapping and murder. Instead, there is evidence that the kidnappers were members of a rogue Hamas branch that acted on its own. One has to wonder why the teens were murdered relatively shortly after their capture if the idea was to use them as bargaining chips. The fact that Hamas long said it did not desire an escalation with Israel, waited until after Israel struck several targets in the Gaza Strip before launching its first rockets at Israel in two years, and was already in a weakened state led me to conclude that the kidnapping probably was not planned, but a rogue action.

Be that as it may, surely Hamas must take responsibility for the actions of its members, even if they acted without authorization? Of course. We would expect this much from Israel or the United States as well, after all. The initial strikes against Hamas in Gaza thus made sense, as did an extensive search-and-rescue operation to find the teens. But Israel's response went beyond search-and-rescue, punishing the actual perpetrators, and making Hamas pay a price for its lack of control over its own militants. It instead ran an operation to attack Hamas "infrastructure" in the West Bank and continued to attack Hamas targets in Gaza. It arrested scores of Palestinians who were uninvolved in the kidnappings. Hamas is an organization that uses terrorism and intentionally targets civilians. Many of those arrested were in fact known terrorists who were re-arrested after having been released as part of a deal to free Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier Hamas held for ransom for several years. There is thus a moral logic to all of these Israeli actions.

At the same time, the escalation that has followed Operation Brother's Keeper (as the hunt for the three teens was known) and Operation Protective Edge (the current operation against Hamas in Gaza) has led to the death, so far, of nearly 100 Palestinians in Gaza and the wounding two Israeli soldiers (one seriously) as well as that of seven civilians injured in a rocket attack on the city of Ashdod. One must of course point out that Israel does not intend to kill civilians in Gaza and takes measures to prevent this, the opposite of what Hamas does when it launches rockets. Further, Hamas places rocket launchers and military facilities within civilian areas to try to prevent Israeli attacks. It also encourages Gazans to act as "human shields" against attacks. This means that if Israel did not use precision weaponry, the death toll would be even higher. Hamas actively tries to kill Israeli civilians and places its own civilians in harm's way to protect itself, while Israel actively tries not to kill Palestinian civilians while attempting to keep its own out of harm's way. Derschowitz is right that there is no equivalence between these two actions.

But if this is the fundamental moral level, then, as I've hinted, there is a second moral level as well. Some response to Hamas's involvement, even tacit, in the kidnappings makes moral sense as well as strategic sense from a deterrence perspective. But a response so large that Hamas sees no other option but to fight a losing battle against Israel is not just unnecessary, it is counterproductive. It undermines deterrence and, by leading to escalation, leads to unnecessary deaths. War, though always a tragedy, is sometimes necessary to protect the lives of the citizens represented by the military. This gives such wars a moral legitimacy. Unless Israel has good evidence of Hamas's involvement, this is an unnecessary war that destabilizes the situation and causes unnecessary death and injury on both sides. It thus lacks such moral legitimacy. Do I demand more of Israel than I do of Hamas? Of course I do. Israel is a liberal democracy. Hamas is a political/militant/social organization that advocates violence against civilians and the eventual destruction of the State of Israel. There ought to be no equivalency of standards between them.

The Unity Deal, Kidnappings, and a New Round of Escalation

About a month ago, I tweeted a link to an article in Haaretz that reflected a rather disturbing aspect of the recent deal between Hamas and Fatah to form a unity government. I was feeling cautiously optimistic about the prospect for this new government to be able to serve as the first unified partner in peace negotiations since Hamas's takeover of Gaza. Even now, this is still a possibility, but I could not shake the feeling that Hamas was attempting to have its cake and eat it to. As a Hamas source put it: "Hamas wants to avoid ministerial responsibility for civilian matters, but it wants to maintain its power as a popular-resistance group." This suggests Hamas wishes for the PA to take responsibility for any domestic difficulties while it avoids having to make tough choices about day-to-day government and can stick to "resistance." The problem with that, of course, is that Hamas's "return address" is still very clearly Gaza. This allowed me to remain cautiously optimistic, but if Hamas is behind the recent kidnapping of three Israeli teens, the unity government seems certain either not to last or to suffer a complete Israeli boycott.

At the same time, the PA has talked about the unity deal in terms of a "weakened" Hamas attempting to save face by running for the PA's protection. This comes across as crowing. With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu now saying that the PA is responsible for terror attacks emanating from any part of "its" territory, including Gaza (never mind that the PA's control over much of Palestine is tenuous at best and non-existent in Area C where the teens were kidnapped), the perceived humiliation of Hamas via the unity deal, Hamas's apparent desire to return to "resistance," and comments by Hamas's then-Prime Minister that kidnapping Israelis (particularly soldiers) was Hamas's "top priority" to use them as "bargaining chips," it would not be surprising if Hamas were responsible for the disappearance of the three teens kidnapped last Friday. It is a way of showing it is not a spent force, contrary to what the PA suggests, and it would make sense as part of Hamas's stated strategy. That said, Hamas has long said kidnappings were a priority and it's not clear that this would necessarily be the right time. Other Palestinian political groups are also annoyed at being excluded from the talks between the two largest factions, Fatah and Hamas. Some of them are quite well organized. This could just as easily be an attempt by one of them to express displeasure at the deal, weaken it, and score points for continuing "resistance." And who knows? It could be a group a criminals or an unaffiliated group of activists.

Israel's response has been swift (after initial delays, it seems) and forceful: It has run a large search operation throughout the West Bank, focusing in particular on Hebron and, later, Nablus. It has arrested 240 Palestinians since the start of the operation, 180 of them Hamas men. As part of these operations, Israeli soldiers have not always acted in a way that will win them friends among Palestinians. For example, I have heard that some Israeli soldiers had removed three Palestinian families from their homes so they could sleep there. Maybe there was no other option and maybe this was an isolated incident, but it is definitely something that will increase tensions rather than ease them. (Though one must admit that "easing tensions" is understandably not currently part of Israel's agenda.)

All of this may backfire strategically. The PA's president Abbas has said that the kidnap victims must be returned and he had previously said that security cooperation with Israel is "sacred." A Palestinian academic I recently spoke with on the subject related to me that Abbas risks being seen as a "collaborator," further damaging his legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians. The PA's apparent cooperation with Israel while the latter seems determined to root out Hamas in the West Bank is almost certain to drive a wedge between the two Palestinian groups and destroy the unity government. This may be what Netanyahu wants: To force Hamas back out of an arrangement with Fatah. But it is not clear that weak, divided, and desperate opponents are always the best option for peace and stability over the long term. Israel is right to do whatever it can to rescue its kidnapped citizens and the Palestinian side has often been disappointingly cynical, sometimes denying that the boys were even kidnapped and at other times suggesting that this is entirely equivalent to Palestinians held in Israeli jails. Nevertheless, Netanyahu risks sparking a new round of violence and uniting Palestinians in anger, rather than a mood for conciliation, with his current, divisive approach.