If you follow Iran's nuclear developments or Israeli politics even remotely, you'll have heard about the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's fight with US President Barak Obama over setting "red lines" for Iran's nuclear program. Netanyahu says he won't be able to relax or feel confident that the US will really prevent Iran from developing a bomb unless these "red lines" are drawn firmly by the United States. The US (and not just Barak Obama) refuses to do this.
Red lines are basically lines someone sets that tell an opponent "if you cross this line, X will happen." They're a way of communicating exactly what actions an opponent can expect in order to deter something very specific. In the case of Iran, the red line might be enrichment to a certain level, for example. The reason Netanyahu wants them is twofold: 1. They would make it clear to Iran that it cannot go beyond a certain point of no return or it will suffer consequences; 2. They would force the United States to make a specific commitment to act that would be hard to back down from. Basically, Netanyahu would like the US AND Iran to be backed against a clear wall in order to minimize uncertainty about the future.
This post is not about whether red lines are a good idea. But Netanyahu is right about their effects, which is precisely why the US refuses to set them. Obama does not want to create a situation where the US would be forced to act. He wishes to retain the US's freedom of maneuver. Netanyahu is therefore also right, I think, that the US is not really committed to stopping Iran from getting the bomb no matter what. If it would be too dangerous to stop it, US policymakers may privately be thinking that containment would be less bad than the threat of yet another war in the Middle East, one that would likely only delay Iran's bomb-making (while making Iran more determined to get one). They look around and note that some pretty belligerent foes (think North Korea) have yet to ever use nuclear weapons on their enemies.
As for me, I think Iran having a bomb would bad on several levels. Two examples are an arms race in the region and a more "leaky" anti-proliferation regime, as Iran might help its friends to develop nukes as well. It would also reduce Israel and the US's freedom of maneuver in the region as they would be deterred by Iran's bomb. This, I think, is the number one reason why Israel, above all, fears it. I too, though, am unconvinced that we should to anything and everything to stop Iran from getting the bomb. That doesn't mean I've decided, it just means that other outcomes might actually be worse and attacking Iran needs to be a definite last resort. Netanyahu and Obama, then, must agree to disagree for now. If Romney becomes president, I'm not sure that would change.
Monday, September 17, 2012
Thursday, September 13, 2012
Free Speech and Self-Censorship
The recent and ongoing protests (including the killing of the US Ambassador in Benghazi, Libya) in the Muslim world against the US because of an anti-Muslim amateur movie originating in America have brought the topic of free speech back to mind.
Everyone can remember the last time this happened (the cartoons). A few people I know remarked that it was a travesty because we have the freedom of speech and at least one asserted that Western government sshould have rallied around the cartoonists to support their right to free speech.
That sounds laudable. But is that really the issue? It feels bad if we discover that newspapers are self-censoring, not publishing things their readers would like to see. But is self-censorship akin to a loss of the right to free speech?
It certainly does mean people have to watch what they say, which is unfortunate in many ways. Still, you have to watch what you say in polite company and around children, too, or there might be protests in the "society" you find yourself in. Freedom of speech does not mean you will be free from the consequences of that speech. The government may not arrest you for saying something that rubs someone else the wrong way, but that person might very well kick you out of his house--as is surely his right, too.
We need to remain vigilant, of course, but in the US at the very least, free speech is very well protected, and the Supreme Court tends to err on the side of allowing speech when it is debatable. So we're free to say what we want, and we should say what needs to be said when it's important, but we also have to weigh consequences and benefits: Was this video important? Were the cartoons? Are they important enough to countenance violence, outrage, and diplomatic issues? That's a different topic entirely, and it doesn't really have that much to do with free speech.
Everyone can remember the last time this happened (the cartoons). A few people I know remarked that it was a travesty because we have the freedom of speech and at least one asserted that Western government sshould have rallied around the cartoonists to support their right to free speech.
That sounds laudable. But is that really the issue? It feels bad if we discover that newspapers are self-censoring, not publishing things their readers would like to see. But is self-censorship akin to a loss of the right to free speech?
It certainly does mean people have to watch what they say, which is unfortunate in many ways. Still, you have to watch what you say in polite company and around children, too, or there might be protests in the "society" you find yourself in. Freedom of speech does not mean you will be free from the consequences of that speech. The government may not arrest you for saying something that rubs someone else the wrong way, but that person might very well kick you out of his house--as is surely his right, too.
We need to remain vigilant, of course, but in the US at the very least, free speech is very well protected, and the Supreme Court tends to err on the side of allowing speech when it is debatable. So we're free to say what we want, and we should say what needs to be said when it's important, but we also have to weigh consequences and benefits: Was this video important? Were the cartoons? Are they important enough to countenance violence, outrage, and diplomatic issues? That's a different topic entirely, and it doesn't really have that much to do with free speech.
Friday, August 17, 2012
Hawks are not always the best deterrers
While considering where to look for evidence that Israel is deterred by Hamas, I thought of something that seems totally obvious once it is said: If the reward I offer you for not attacking me is worse than my attacks against you if you do, you will keep attacking me. In other words: Deterrence is not only about threats of punishment, it is also about rewarding "good" behavior. In order for Israel to decide not to attack Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has to offer something more enticing to Israel in return. If its alternative is "dissolve yourself," Israel is obviously not going to choose to be deterred.
Again, this may seem obvious, but it is an interesting nuance because most people associate policies of deterrence with so-called foreign policy hawks. This is because the main feature of the type of deterrence that has dominated world politics for decades is threats of unacceptable retaliation for attacks (think of the US and Soviet policy of Mutually Assured Destruction when it came to nuclear attacks). Deterrence is certainly not a cuddly, "let's let in the Age of Aquarius" sort of foreign policy stance. But the alternative to attacking the US in the case above was peace, since deterrence was mutual. Peace is a pretty nice alternative to nuclear war, so it stuck. Crucially, destroying the Soviet Union was not a US policy (though many in the US openly wished for it).
The case with the US also illustrates another factor: Further alternatives must be less palatable than accepting deterrence. The main alternative was wiping the US out before it could strike back, thus removing the threat and the constraint of US deterrence on Soviet policymaking. This policy was unrealistic, and the US explicitly made sure of this by ensuring that the Soviet Union could never be certain of wiping out the whole US nuclear arsenal, meaning its own destruction would likely be imminent if it attacked the US. No realistic alternative there.
The main things required to block the alternative route of wiping out an enemy are power and resilience (two things the US nuclear arsenal had and has in abundance). In light of this, Hamas's strengthening in recent years may actually be a blessing in disguise for peace in the Middle East, if not necessarily for Israel's ambitions. Hamas has shown that, with occupation or without it, Israel cannot eliminate the organization without taking measures that it would not consider (like wiping out the entire Gaza Strip). For a while in the early to mid-2000s, with Israeli security stopping the vast majority of suicide bombings by 2005, it looked like Israel might be able to defeat Hamas militarily and thus need not be bound by any Hamas attempts to deter it. Rocket attacks have changed this prospect. Bombers could be stopped from entering Israel, rockets cannot. Even the Iron Dome missile defense system could not stop a concerted effort: A massive number of rockets flying toward Israel would overwhelm the system.
It therefore seems that Israel would be extremely hard-pressed to either eliminate Hamas or deny it the ability to attack Israel. This means that the choice of accepting a sort of truce with Hamas has become more palatable.
Going back to the main point of this post, the "peaceful" alternative has also become more available from Hamas's side as it has moderated its actions (if not much of its rhetoric) over the years to allow for short- to medium-terms cease-fires with Israel. In other words, Hamas needed to become more dovish to stop Israeli attacks.
Will this be a permanent change? Anyone who tries to predict the future in the Middle East is a fool. Hamas's continued grip on the Gaza Strip is not assured, and there are other, less moderate groups, who are too Hawkish to deter Israel. Dovishness on the part of Hamas has also been encouraged by Israel's massive superiority. This differential, too, is not written in stone. Over time, things could change and destabilize the current situation. Finally, since this set-up is based on both sides' perceptions of their and their opponent's power and the credibility of their threats, a change simply in the perception of the situation could spark another round of violence. My guess would be that such a round would eventually return to a tenuous peace, but how peaceful is a situation that repeatedly erupts into violence every few years?
For these reasons, the future is dependent on whether or not Israel and Hamas take further steps towards cementing peace. Everyone knows this, so there is no need to discuss it. My hypothesis, however, is that deterrence may help give the two parties the breathing room they need to move forward--if they are bold enough.
Again, this may seem obvious, but it is an interesting nuance because most people associate policies of deterrence with so-called foreign policy hawks. This is because the main feature of the type of deterrence that has dominated world politics for decades is threats of unacceptable retaliation for attacks (think of the US and Soviet policy of Mutually Assured Destruction when it came to nuclear attacks). Deterrence is certainly not a cuddly, "let's let in the Age of Aquarius" sort of foreign policy stance. But the alternative to attacking the US in the case above was peace, since deterrence was mutual. Peace is a pretty nice alternative to nuclear war, so it stuck. Crucially, destroying the Soviet Union was not a US policy (though many in the US openly wished for it).
The case with the US also illustrates another factor: Further alternatives must be less palatable than accepting deterrence. The main alternative was wiping the US out before it could strike back, thus removing the threat and the constraint of US deterrence on Soviet policymaking. This policy was unrealistic, and the US explicitly made sure of this by ensuring that the Soviet Union could never be certain of wiping out the whole US nuclear arsenal, meaning its own destruction would likely be imminent if it attacked the US. No realistic alternative there.
The main things required to block the alternative route of wiping out an enemy are power and resilience (two things the US nuclear arsenal had and has in abundance). In light of this, Hamas's strengthening in recent years may actually be a blessing in disguise for peace in the Middle East, if not necessarily for Israel's ambitions. Hamas has shown that, with occupation or without it, Israel cannot eliminate the organization without taking measures that it would not consider (like wiping out the entire Gaza Strip). For a while in the early to mid-2000s, with Israeli security stopping the vast majority of suicide bombings by 2005, it looked like Israel might be able to defeat Hamas militarily and thus need not be bound by any Hamas attempts to deter it. Rocket attacks have changed this prospect. Bombers could be stopped from entering Israel, rockets cannot. Even the Iron Dome missile defense system could not stop a concerted effort: A massive number of rockets flying toward Israel would overwhelm the system.
It therefore seems that Israel would be extremely hard-pressed to either eliminate Hamas or deny it the ability to attack Israel. This means that the choice of accepting a sort of truce with Hamas has become more palatable.
Going back to the main point of this post, the "peaceful" alternative has also become more available from Hamas's side as it has moderated its actions (if not much of its rhetoric) over the years to allow for short- to medium-terms cease-fires with Israel. In other words, Hamas needed to become more dovish to stop Israeli attacks.
Will this be a permanent change? Anyone who tries to predict the future in the Middle East is a fool. Hamas's continued grip on the Gaza Strip is not assured, and there are other, less moderate groups, who are too Hawkish to deter Israel. Dovishness on the part of Hamas has also been encouraged by Israel's massive superiority. This differential, too, is not written in stone. Over time, things could change and destabilize the current situation. Finally, since this set-up is based on both sides' perceptions of their and their opponent's power and the credibility of their threats, a change simply in the perception of the situation could spark another round of violence. My guess would be that such a round would eventually return to a tenuous peace, but how peaceful is a situation that repeatedly erupts into violence every few years?
For these reasons, the future is dependent on whether or not Israel and Hamas take further steps towards cementing peace. Everyone knows this, so there is no need to discuss it. My hypothesis, however, is that deterrence may help give the two parties the breathing room they need to move forward--if they are bold enough.
Friday, June 29, 2012
Switzerland: the Safe Investment that Isn't?
Economic conservatives often fret that loose monetary policy (low interest rates), like that seen in the US, Japan, the UK, and, to a certain extent, the eurozone, can be dangerous as it causes bubbles as investors seek higher returns in more risky assets elsewhere. It's been hard to see any bubbles in the economies mentioned, however, as they continue to stagnate and have difficulty digesting debt and uncertainty.
For a while, it seemed that stocks in emerging markets as well as global commodities might be the bubble. Emerging economies have cooled, however, and this has caused commodity prices to come down as well. The relaxed pace of both means that neither seems to have been a bubble in hindsight.
Well, I have a bubble prospect: Switzerland. The central bank in Switzerland has set its interest rate to between 0 and 0.25% (just like America). At the same time, I recently read that rents for shops on one of Zurich's main shopping streets have tripled over the past few years (real estate prices in the US have trended downwards, though there's been some pickup as late). This one anecdote is far too little information to spot a general real estate boom or bubble, of course, though a quick check of an online resource suggests that Swiss house prices are rising significantly faster than inflation. In addition, the currency is riding high as money floods into Switzerland seeking safety. Apparently not all that money has stayed in bank accounts but is instead flowing into investments within the country. The danger is that, when things finally calm down, the capital flow will reverse and the Swiss franc will lose value quickly.
Whether this will damage the economy on the whole is harder to say, as it will depend on whether exporters are able to survive the high currency value to then get a boost from a falling one and whether the economy turns to rely too heavily on consumption and imports during the current inflow boom. I wouldn't put my money there, though.
For a while, it seemed that stocks in emerging markets as well as global commodities might be the bubble. Emerging economies have cooled, however, and this has caused commodity prices to come down as well. The relaxed pace of both means that neither seems to have been a bubble in hindsight.
Well, I have a bubble prospect: Switzerland. The central bank in Switzerland has set its interest rate to between 0 and 0.25% (just like America). At the same time, I recently read that rents for shops on one of Zurich's main shopping streets have tripled over the past few years (real estate prices in the US have trended downwards, though there's been some pickup as late). This one anecdote is far too little information to spot a general real estate boom or bubble, of course, though a quick check of an online resource suggests that Swiss house prices are rising significantly faster than inflation. In addition, the currency is riding high as money floods into Switzerland seeking safety. Apparently not all that money has stayed in bank accounts but is instead flowing into investments within the country. The danger is that, when things finally calm down, the capital flow will reverse and the Swiss franc will lose value quickly.
Whether this will damage the economy on the whole is harder to say, as it will depend on whether exporters are able to survive the high currency value to then get a boost from a falling one and whether the economy turns to rely too heavily on consumption and imports during the current inflow boom. I wouldn't put my money there, though.
Tuesday, June 26, 2012
On the Way to War? NATO May Follow Turkey into War with Syria
"It's always a ship somewhere," a friend and former US diplomat once told me, referring to the point when the US enters wars. It's staggering how often this has been the case. This list covers all the incidents I can think of, but there may very well be more (I encourage comments to help make the list more comprehensive):
You may have heard that Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet allegedly flying in international airspace. The jet "had strayed over Syria very briefly and had been shot down after leaving Syrian territory." When it was shot down, it was located "13 nautical miles out of Syria, when Syrian territorial space is 12 miles," according to Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.1 So far, this has not led to Turkey invoking NATO's article 5, which would require all NATO members to join in to protect Turkey (the last invocation of this clause came after 9/11, when the US used it to start the NATO war in Afghanistan). But it's not over yet. Syria has apparently since opened fire on a second Turkish aircraft, this time a "reconnaissance plane searching for wreckage of the fighter jet downed last week." Although Syria claims it has "no intention of going to war over the matter," that is not entirely up to Syria. Turkey is apparently asserting that it could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, dragging much of Europe, Canada, and the US into a war with Syria.2 This is ominous.
This all could be a way for Turkey to act tough in the face of a Syrian attack (and it most likely is). Few in NATO look forward to getting involved in yet another Middle Eastern quagmire. Syria is a heavily divided country without a clear opposition that could be supported. Al Qaeda fighters have also moved in. Intervention there would not quickly bring peace. Although it might be possible to knock out the Assad regime, it is not clear what, if anything would take its place. It might simply lead to a long and bloody civil war (much as seems to be happening now, anyway). As the German newspaper Die Zeit put it, bloodshed will happen whether we intervene or not, and intervention might make it worse.
On the other hand, this could be the beginning of a more hawkish stance against Syria that could lead to a relatively slow escalation eventually ending in war. There is also always the possibility of the "tail wagging the dog," that is: that Turkey might drag the rest of the countries in NATO in without them really wanting to get involved. After all, tensions have been rising between Turkey and its southern neighbor for a while, with Turkey making "many veiled threats to move against Syria."3 Maybe it's always a ship--or a plane--somewhere?
- The Spanish-American War of 1898 began when the USS Maine exploded in the harbor of Havana, Cuba (then a colony fighting for independence from Spain). It later turned out that the ship had almost certainly blown up of its own accord, but that was of little interest to propagandists in the yellow press at the time.
- The US entered WWI after the sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania by a German U-boat (though this was not the main reason and did not occur immediately).
- In an example that doesn't fit the bill 100%, the US entered WWII when the Japanese sank a large number of US naval ships in Pearl Harbor.
- The "Gulf of Tonkin" incident, which included an attack that was probably just radar "ghosts," provided the impetus for the US Congress to authorize President Johnson to use conventional military forces in Southeast Asia, essentially beginning the Vietnam War (Wikipedia referenced for all of these).
You may have heard that Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet allegedly flying in international airspace. The jet "had strayed over Syria very briefly and had been shot down after leaving Syrian territory." When it was shot down, it was located "13 nautical miles out of Syria, when Syrian territorial space is 12 miles," according to Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.1 So far, this has not led to Turkey invoking NATO's article 5, which would require all NATO members to join in to protect Turkey (the last invocation of this clause came after 9/11, when the US used it to start the NATO war in Afghanistan). But it's not over yet. Syria has apparently since opened fire on a second Turkish aircraft, this time a "reconnaissance plane searching for wreckage of the fighter jet downed last week." Although Syria claims it has "no intention of going to war over the matter," that is not entirely up to Syria. Turkey is apparently asserting that it could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, dragging much of Europe, Canada, and the US into a war with Syria.2 This is ominous.
This all could be a way for Turkey to act tough in the face of a Syrian attack (and it most likely is). Few in NATO look forward to getting involved in yet another Middle Eastern quagmire. Syria is a heavily divided country without a clear opposition that could be supported. Al Qaeda fighters have also moved in. Intervention there would not quickly bring peace. Although it might be possible to knock out the Assad regime, it is not clear what, if anything would take its place. It might simply lead to a long and bloody civil war (much as seems to be happening now, anyway). As the German newspaper Die Zeit put it, bloodshed will happen whether we intervene or not, and intervention might make it worse.
On the other hand, this could be the beginning of a more hawkish stance against Syria that could lead to a relatively slow escalation eventually ending in war. There is also always the possibility of the "tail wagging the dog," that is: that Turkey might drag the rest of the countries in NATO in without them really wanting to get involved. After all, tensions have been rising between Turkey and its southern neighbor for a while, with Turkey making "many veiled threats to move against Syria."3 Maybe it's always a ship--or a plane--somewhere?
- Arsu, Sebnem, and Rod Nordland. “Turkey to Consult NATO Allies on Jet.” International Herald Tribune. Damascus, June 25, 2012, Kindle edition, sec. World News.
- Nordland, Rod. “Turkey Says Syria Opened Fire on a 2nd Aircraft.” International Herald Tribune. Ankara, June 26, 2012, Kindle edition, sec. Front Page.
- “Turkey’s foreign policy: Growing less mild.” The Economist. Ankara, April 14, 2012, Online edition, sec. Europe. http://www.economist.com/node/21552602.
Sunday, June 24, 2012
"Compassion? Why bother? Poor People Are Poor Because They Deserve It." A Rebuttal of Neal Boortz's Speech
Right wing advocates are winning the argument on economic morality by using an appealing line of reasoning that seems right on the surface. It is not, and anyone who cares about justice in any form cannot let this stand.
I recently received an email with an alleged "commencement speech" by Texas lawyer Neal Boortz. Maybe you received it, too. It turns out that he never gave that speech at an actual commencement (link). The issue here is not where the speech was given or even the fact that Boortz thinks it was "more widely distributed... than any commencement speech that actually has been delivered at any college or university in the past 50 years" (something the readers of Steve Jobs's speech might find hard to believe). The point is that a lot of people have read and heard the speech (it seems he read it out on his popular radio show). The speech bashes liberals on several fronts for being "imbeciles." There are two main ideas behind his, any many right wing advocates', argument: that government spending beyond a few bare necessities is wasteful and the related idea that people who receive government benefits are undeserving and are little better than thieves.
Let's start with that wasteful spending. All of us who've dealt with governments (the US is certainly included and may even be worse than most) can be pretty sure it is not spending every dollar wisely. Farmers, who are currently doing well, receive massive subsidies. Corn ethanol, which is no solution for energy dependence, is not much better than gasoline for the environment, and the production of which helps drive up world food prices, received loads of government funding, too (though this was sensibly scrapped, I believe). These are just a couple examples, though I'd say the fact that they are both related to agriculture is no coincidence. Our legislature seems to be designed for inefficient and complicated outcomes due to the over-representation of states with small populations in the senate (giving it different priorities from those of the House), the filibuster, gerrymandering of the House, etc. etc. Maybe government spending would be more efficient if Congress were. But I digress.
Boortz talks about the US Government backing dictators with foreign aid, funding stupid research, and paying for artists whose work no one wants to buy. The first argument is a bald-faced lie (or at least a tactical misrepresentation), and I simply cannot believe he doesn't know this. Dictators have received more support in defense spending and favorable weapons deals than with "liberal" foreign aid, spending for which accounts for around a paltry 1% of the federal budget (and thus only about 0.18% of the US's overall GDP, see link).
But what about all that frivolous research? As someone who has seen the process of applying for funding first-hand (albeit in the UK and not the US, but the UK, a more "social" place, is hardly going to be harsher than the US), I can tell you the idea that people are getting funding for all kinds of ridiculous things is laughable. There are review panels for this sort of thing, and any researcher applying for funding must show that the research is new, that the results will have a large benefit, and that the research provides good value for money (i.e. there isn't a simpler and cheaper way to reap similar benefits).
Government-funded research lead to such creations as the Internet, which has revolutionized the way the world stays in touch and does business, and the Human Genome Project, whose benefits to health and research cannot yet fully be known but which are already showing great promise. This sort of high-risk research that only occasionally brings extremely high rewards benefit lots of people. The economic benefits generally do not come back solely to those who engage in the research, making this sort of work unattractive to private companies. "Unattractive to private companies" does not, by any stretch of the imagination, equate to "not worth it," as just these two examples ought to show. Should we perform stringent tests on funding to determine who should get awards? Absolutely. Should we concentrate only on ones that will bring definite economic returns for the "investors"? Absolutely not.
Finally, those awful artists. I suspect Boortz is annoyed with the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). It funds "projects exhibiting artistic excellence." That means it's REALLY hard to get funding. And there isn't much funding to get: It's 2011 annual budget was just under $154.7 million. That may sound like a lot, but consider that the entire US federal budget for 2011 was $3,598,000 million (that's right: take the NEA's budget and multiply it by nearly 23,258!!!)! You might also consider the number of billionaires living in the US and note that the NEA's funding is likely to be less than 10% of any individual billionaire's net worth. Just to put things into perspective. For a final perspective: The US Government spent $227,000 million just paying interest on debts it had incurred previously. What's more likely to be bothering Boortz is the NEA's funding, from time-to-time, of art that conservatives don't like. (Wikipedia was my, admittedly somewhat unprofessional, source for all information in this paragraph.) If that's the issue, say so, rather than attacking "hippie artists" no one cares about.
So the government doesn't really waste as much as many seem to think (even if you consider measly spending on the arts and foreign aid a waste (the latter can be a helpful foreign policy tool as well)). But social security, medicaid, and medicare together make up about 43% of the federal budget, and I believe states pitch in some money for healthcare, too. Unemployment benefits come on top of that. That means something like 50% of spending is on so-called "entitlements." Boortz argues you're not entitled. "That bum sitting on a heating grate, smelling like a wharf rat? He's there by choice. He is there because of the sum total of the choices he has made in his life."
This is where the real problem is. Is it annoying to watch people constantly screw up and then ask us to bail them out? Sure it is. But there are two problems with this line of reasoning, and I'm sure Boortz is aware of this but just does not wish to accept it: That homeless guy is not receiving government money, and our lives are more than the sum total of our choices. Boortz is a successful guy. He points out that "nobody really wants to accept the blame for his or her position in life." The thing is, the opposite seems to be true for credit. Boortz believes he is successful because he is just so damn awesome. If he had been born in the vacuum of space, he undoubtedly would be at least as successful as he is now. After all, no hand-out receiving freeloaders would have taken his hard-earned money to line their own pockets. It was just his good choices. Just as it is always bad choices that make people poor.
This is where the real problem is. Is it annoying to watch people constantly screw up and then ask us to bail them out? Sure it is. But there are two problems with this line of reasoning, and I'm sure Boortz is aware of this but just does not wish to accept it: That homeless guy is not receiving government money, and our lives are more than the sum total of our choices. Boortz is a successful guy. He points out that "nobody really wants to accept the blame for his or her position in life." The thing is, the opposite seems to be true for credit. Boortz believes he is successful because he is just so damn awesome. If he had been born in the vacuum of space, he undoubtedly would be at least as successful as he is now. After all, no hand-out receiving freeloaders would have taken his hard-earned money to line their own pockets. It was just his good choices. Just as it is always bad choices that make people poor.
Is there personal responsibility? Absolutely, and philosophizing to the point where we question free will would cause society to collapse because the justice system could not function. People must take responsibility for their choices. But this only goes so far. What about the girl born into a poor family? What choice does she have? Can she choose to go the worst school in town? Can she choose to walk past drug dealers and gangs on her way home? Can she choose to do her homework by herself because her single father has to work long hours to pay rent and put food on the table? Is it any wonder that her teachers, who have long ago given up, partly out of fear of their own students, are not able to bring her to the next level? Maybe Boortz, who was born with an infinitely strong will and determination to succeed, which I guess had nothing to do with luck at all, would have thrived anyway. After all, some people do. That's the American Dream.
But how many actually do? The American Dream, it seems, is more of a reality in Scandinavia than in America. One very important factor correlated with economic success in later life in America (and Britain) is how much your parents earn. In Scandinavia and Canada (Germany's pretty good, too), this is much less important, meaning that more poor kids grow up to be wealthy and middle-class adults than in America. At the same time, more rich people move down the scale in Scandinavia than do in America. Are rich Scandinavians choosing to be poor more often than rich Americans? Obviously, the system makes a difference. The condition the American Dream requires is equality of opportunity (NOT equality of outcomes!). Everyone cannot and should not earn the same. It is also hard to see how everyone could be given the same opportunities in life. Surely it is rich parents' right to send their kids to private schools. The fact is, though, that opportunities in America are nowhere near equal. In fact, they're not even decent for the poorest 20%. (Source)
Boortz's attack on liberals' compassion for those undeserving of successful people's money is disingenuous. It is nice to be alleviated of the feeling of moral responsibility for those around us who are suffering. Unfortunately, though, we are all responsible for the government system we have helped to create, the same system that makes it extremely difficult for around 20% of the US population to get ahead in life. This doesn't mean the end of personal responsibility. On the contrary, we are ALL personally responsible for this sad state of affairs and the slow death of the American Dream. Do something about it. Do not let superficially plausible arguments convince you and your friends that people are rich because they deserve to be and poor for the same reason and that we should therefore cut off the poor leaches and leave them to their own devices. That's not just a lack of compassion, but the sort of lack of foresight that has brought down arrogant ruling classes throughout the centuries.
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Why Germans' Ideas on Inflation Are Delusional
Germans are inflation hawks. This is with good reason: The hyperinflation of the Weimar period is widely seen as contributing to the rise of Hitler, who promised to bring stability to Germany again. After WWII, the German Bundesbank was famous for its inflation fighting. Germans were rightly proud of their post-war currency, the Deutsche Mark, and were resistant to giving it up. Germany enjoyed low and stable inflation. This stability allowed the German government to borrow money at low interest rates (it also helped that the German government tended not to borrow much money in the first place, though).
Germany no longer controls its own interest rates, however. Interest rates are set for the entire euro area by the European Central Bank (ECB), headquartered, at Germany's behest, in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The ECB has done an "impeccable" job at maintaining stable inflation, its former head Trichet said. It's true: eurozone inflation has been stable since the euro was introduced. And yet Germans continue to warn of high inflation. The problem is, Germans don't seem to understand that inflation in Germany is only one part of the eurozone inflation picture.
Countries like Greece, Spain, Italy, and Ireland all have to accept swingeing cuts to government spending and are suffering a credit crunch. This is likely to lead to low or even negative inflation rates in those countries (Ireland experienced deflation of 7% near the end of 2009!). The correct response from the ECB in that case, if this low inflation meant the average weighted inflation throughout the eurozone was under 2%, would be to cut interest rates and try to keep inflation from falling any lower. Because Germany is not suffering austerity or a credit crunch, it's economy is growing. Inflation there will be higher as a result. If Germany is the fastest-growing economy in the eurozone (as it currently is), it is not unreasonable to expect it to have one of the highest inflation rates (or the highest). If everyone else's inflation rate is 1%, Germany's would need to be significantly over 2% (maybe 3, 4, or even 5%) in order for eurozone inflation on the whole to average 2%.
This terrifies Germans, but it shouldn't. This is not the Weimar Republic. The ECB has not abandoned all orthodoxy (in fact, compared with the Fed, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan, it's still quite conservative). A decision to cut rates when inflation has fallen due to reduced domestic demand is not madness, it's sensible policy. Higher inflation in Germany is also sensible. The euro crisis occurred due to imbalances within the single currency. Wages and prices (inflation) rose too quickly in the crisis-hit countries. They lost competitiveness, importing and paying for it by borrowing (a bit like the US, but more extreme). Much of the money borrowed came from Germany and France, by the way. In any case, prices and wages in Greece, Spain, and Italy (Ireland's have fallen again a lot already) need to fall relative to those in Germany to restore competitiveness and ease the imbalances in the zone. For this to happen, inflation would have to be low or negative in those countries for quite some time, or higher in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland for quite some time. Or a little of both. If the ECB targets average inflation of 2% and Germany does not instate its own policies to try to cap inflation, that's what will happen.
Prices and wages need to rise faster in Germany and other "creditor" countries in the eurozone than in the debtor countries. That's just math. Allowing this to happen is not dangerous, it's sensible. Inflation is ugly, but deflation is even uglier. Germans need to accept this and let the ECB continue its "impeccable" management of the European economy. The euro crisis is the result of structural problems within the euro, which the ECB could not correct all by itself. It did not warn (or not enough) of the dangers of the bubbles in Spain and Greece (but neither did most other experts), so it's management has not been perfect, but as far as inflation is concerned, it has a good record. Germans have no reason to fear eurozone hyperinflation and should accept somewhat higher inflation in Germany. Germany has profited from the euro, too, though many seem to be unaware of this. I'll get to that in another post.
Germany no longer controls its own interest rates, however. Interest rates are set for the entire euro area by the European Central Bank (ECB), headquartered, at Germany's behest, in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The ECB has done an "impeccable" job at maintaining stable inflation, its former head Trichet said. It's true: eurozone inflation has been stable since the euro was introduced. And yet Germans continue to warn of high inflation. The problem is, Germans don't seem to understand that inflation in Germany is only one part of the eurozone inflation picture.
Countries like Greece, Spain, Italy, and Ireland all have to accept swingeing cuts to government spending and are suffering a credit crunch. This is likely to lead to low or even negative inflation rates in those countries (Ireland experienced deflation of 7% near the end of 2009!). The correct response from the ECB in that case, if this low inflation meant the average weighted inflation throughout the eurozone was under 2%, would be to cut interest rates and try to keep inflation from falling any lower. Because Germany is not suffering austerity or a credit crunch, it's economy is growing. Inflation there will be higher as a result. If Germany is the fastest-growing economy in the eurozone (as it currently is), it is not unreasonable to expect it to have one of the highest inflation rates (or the highest). If everyone else's inflation rate is 1%, Germany's would need to be significantly over 2% (maybe 3, 4, or even 5%) in order for eurozone inflation on the whole to average 2%.
This terrifies Germans, but it shouldn't. This is not the Weimar Republic. The ECB has not abandoned all orthodoxy (in fact, compared with the Fed, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan, it's still quite conservative). A decision to cut rates when inflation has fallen due to reduced domestic demand is not madness, it's sensible policy. Higher inflation in Germany is also sensible. The euro crisis occurred due to imbalances within the single currency. Wages and prices (inflation) rose too quickly in the crisis-hit countries. They lost competitiveness, importing and paying for it by borrowing (a bit like the US, but more extreme). Much of the money borrowed came from Germany and France, by the way. In any case, prices and wages in Greece, Spain, and Italy (Ireland's have fallen again a lot already) need to fall relative to those in Germany to restore competitiveness and ease the imbalances in the zone. For this to happen, inflation would have to be low or negative in those countries for quite some time, or higher in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland for quite some time. Or a little of both. If the ECB targets average inflation of 2% and Germany does not instate its own policies to try to cap inflation, that's what will happen.
Prices and wages need to rise faster in Germany and other "creditor" countries in the eurozone than in the debtor countries. That's just math. Allowing this to happen is not dangerous, it's sensible. Inflation is ugly, but deflation is even uglier. Germans need to accept this and let the ECB continue its "impeccable" management of the European economy. The euro crisis is the result of structural problems within the euro, which the ECB could not correct all by itself. It did not warn (or not enough) of the dangers of the bubbles in Spain and Greece (but neither did most other experts), so it's management has not been perfect, but as far as inflation is concerned, it has a good record. Germans have no reason to fear eurozone hyperinflation and should accept somewhat higher inflation in Germany. Germany has profited from the euro, too, though many seem to be unaware of this. I'll get to that in another post.
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
A Solution for Jerusalem
Blogs are great because you can do crazy things on them; like suggesting a solution for how Palestinians (from an as-yet non-existent Palestinian (or West Bank) state) and Israelis could share Jerusalem, allowing it serve as the capital for both countries. I like to focus on structure. The UN wished for Jerusalem to be an international zone administered by the UN itself (see General Assembly resolution 181). Funny, right? At the other extreme is just dividing the city in half. Considering the holy sites that are scattered around the city and are important to both sides and to other communities, that seems a terrible compromise. How about an essentially autonomous city-state partially influenced by the governments of Israel and Palestine, but designed to cater above all to the interests of Jerusalem itself?
It sounds crazy, I know. But it seems to me that the only way the two sides could co-exist in the Holy City is if those who live there are responsible for running it themselves. The only way the two sides would allow that, though, is if they had assurances that demographic changes, for example, wouldn't trample their interests there.
Here's how my little idea would look: Those who have had their main residence in Jerusalem for at least one year and are citizens of either Israel or Palestine would be eligible to vote in Jerusalem elections. Israelis would also be able to vote as usual in their own governments' elections, as would Palestinians. Jerusalem would have a mayor-governor elected by popular vote (using a run-off if necessary). This would hopefully make the mayor-governor a centrist character.
The legislature would need to be bicameral: A lower house would be elected using proportional representation of political parties. Any party getting at least 5% of the vote would be eligible for one of the 20 seats in this house. Eight candidates for the upper house would be appointed 50/50 by the governments of Israel and Palestine. The electorate would then select their favorite four of these to become the actual members of the upper house. This would allow those governments to rest assured that no laws would be passed in Jerusalem that would scare them (like changing voting laws or the constitution to one side's advantage). It also means that Palestinians would have the ability to vote on which Israeli-nominated candidates they liked and vice versa, somewhat reducing the likelihood of later gridlock and encouraging moderate candidates (much like the idea behind an open primary election as is being tried in Oregon and California).
Sound like a recipe for gridlock? Well, it might very well be, but the only way forward would be for the sides to find compromises. The way the system is designed, it should help to encourage moderates and discourage extremes while giving the two governments an emergency stop button if necessary. I don't see any way any of these facets could be changed.
Now on to the details: Jerusalem would be a semi-sovereign city-state. It would have no citizens, however, only residents. Furthermore, only its residents who were citizens of either Israel or Palestine would have the right to vote. There would be no checkpoints within the city, only on either side when leaving (though the Jerusalem police could put up entry checkpoints on either side, too, if it felt that necessary). If arriving by plane, for example, a visitor would have to have a valid visa for either Israel or Palestine. The statelet would have its own constitution, courts, and administration. People within Jerusalem would be subject to Jerusalem's laws, not those of either Israel or Palestine (though the two "parent" countries would obviously have some influence on laws passed there).
On to money: It's important to avoid coercion through government grants, so Jerusalem would have to have its own system of taxation. Residents would be exempt from income taxes in Israel and Palestine and subject to Jerusalem taxes instead. The only areas where Jerusalem would not be sovereign would be in foreign policy, trade policy, military, and on the grounds of the quarters of the two governments, who would both call Jerusalem their home.
Anything going into or out of Jerusalem via Israel would be subject to Israeli law, anything via Palestine to Palestinian law. This would likely make Jerusalem a competitive place alive with commerce, as customers and businesses could choose the best laws from the two countries as far as trade was concerned. Jerusalem could not make laws governing trade, as this would be the job of Israel and Palestine. It would likely have to share the Israeli and Palestinian currencies. People would have to get used to dealing with both. One might win out, however, as the government could decide freely which currency it would like to tax and spend in, giving one a competitive advantage. All these sorts of things could simply be left to fall into place.
This city would likely be a vibrant place, but also a wild one. Despite laws forbidding it, I can only imagine it would be teeming with intelligence agents from both sides and likely abroad as well (think Cold-War West Berlin). Years (or centuries, depending on how you count) of sectarian tensions would be unlikely to disappear over night. It would thus be important that the police and courts were appointed by the mayor-governor and approved by the upper chamber, ensuring that police actions were balanced between Israelis and Palestinians.
If sharing is possible (and that's an admittedly big "if"), it is only within a framework that promotes compromise while safeguarding core concerns. This is my attempt to suggest one.
It sounds crazy, I know. But it seems to me that the only way the two sides could co-exist in the Holy City is if those who live there are responsible for running it themselves. The only way the two sides would allow that, though, is if they had assurances that demographic changes, for example, wouldn't trample their interests there.
Here's how my little idea would look: Those who have had their main residence in Jerusalem for at least one year and are citizens of either Israel or Palestine would be eligible to vote in Jerusalem elections. Israelis would also be able to vote as usual in their own governments' elections, as would Palestinians. Jerusalem would have a mayor-governor elected by popular vote (using a run-off if necessary). This would hopefully make the mayor-governor a centrist character.
The legislature would need to be bicameral: A lower house would be elected using proportional representation of political parties. Any party getting at least 5% of the vote would be eligible for one of the 20 seats in this house. Eight candidates for the upper house would be appointed 50/50 by the governments of Israel and Palestine. The electorate would then select their favorite four of these to become the actual members of the upper house. This would allow those governments to rest assured that no laws would be passed in Jerusalem that would scare them (like changing voting laws or the constitution to one side's advantage). It also means that Palestinians would have the ability to vote on which Israeli-nominated candidates they liked and vice versa, somewhat reducing the likelihood of later gridlock and encouraging moderate candidates (much like the idea behind an open primary election as is being tried in Oregon and California).
Sound like a recipe for gridlock? Well, it might very well be, but the only way forward would be for the sides to find compromises. The way the system is designed, it should help to encourage moderates and discourage extremes while giving the two governments an emergency stop button if necessary. I don't see any way any of these facets could be changed.
Now on to the details: Jerusalem would be a semi-sovereign city-state. It would have no citizens, however, only residents. Furthermore, only its residents who were citizens of either Israel or Palestine would have the right to vote. There would be no checkpoints within the city, only on either side when leaving (though the Jerusalem police could put up entry checkpoints on either side, too, if it felt that necessary). If arriving by plane, for example, a visitor would have to have a valid visa for either Israel or Palestine. The statelet would have its own constitution, courts, and administration. People within Jerusalem would be subject to Jerusalem's laws, not those of either Israel or Palestine (though the two "parent" countries would obviously have some influence on laws passed there).
On to money: It's important to avoid coercion through government grants, so Jerusalem would have to have its own system of taxation. Residents would be exempt from income taxes in Israel and Palestine and subject to Jerusalem taxes instead. The only areas where Jerusalem would not be sovereign would be in foreign policy, trade policy, military, and on the grounds of the quarters of the two governments, who would both call Jerusalem their home.
Anything going into or out of Jerusalem via Israel would be subject to Israeli law, anything via Palestine to Palestinian law. This would likely make Jerusalem a competitive place alive with commerce, as customers and businesses could choose the best laws from the two countries as far as trade was concerned. Jerusalem could not make laws governing trade, as this would be the job of Israel and Palestine. It would likely have to share the Israeli and Palestinian currencies. People would have to get used to dealing with both. One might win out, however, as the government could decide freely which currency it would like to tax and spend in, giving one a competitive advantage. All these sorts of things could simply be left to fall into place.
This city would likely be a vibrant place, but also a wild one. Despite laws forbidding it, I can only imagine it would be teeming with intelligence agents from both sides and likely abroad as well (think Cold-War West Berlin). Years (or centuries, depending on how you count) of sectarian tensions would be unlikely to disappear over night. It would thus be important that the police and courts were appointed by the mayor-governor and approved by the upper chamber, ensuring that police actions were balanced between Israelis and Palestinians.
If sharing is possible (and that's an admittedly big "if"), it is only within a framework that promotes compromise while safeguarding core concerns. This is my attempt to suggest one.
Friday, May 4, 2012
When Privatization Makes Sense--and When It Doesn't
Governments are often bad at running businesses, but when there's no actual market, they may still be a better choice.
I was just reading about Bolivia's privatization of Transportadora de Electricidad (TDE), it's national power transmission grid. There's been a trend (again) towards nationalization of industries in South America. Argentina recently nationalized an oil company there owned by a Spanish company. Bolivia is paying the Spanish firm for the nationalization, however, whereas Argentina just expropriated the parent company's property.The moral questions about confiscating property aside, however, there's a more important issue: Is private ownership always better? If not, when is it better for a government to own something? As hinted in the subtitle, it has to do with whether there's a market or not.
There are certain areas, like transportation networks, utilities, and infrastructure, where natural monopolies tend to arise. Monopolies are bad news because people are forced to buy from them, giving them too much power to jack up prices to whatever they want and make a ton of money. That obviously hurts everyone else. Think about city streets. Imagine if private companies ran them and had toll booths for their use. Not only would it be really irritating, but you would be forced to use certain streets. There wouldn't really be competition between "providers." You have to use the street you live on or cross that bridge into town. This is why it makes sense for governments to build and maintain roads. Some highways are privatized, but you can often use other roads and the pricing is generally controlled by a government authority.
Ports (including airports), suppliers of water, electricity, and telecommunications, public transportation, and rail networks (i.e. the tracks the trains use if not the train operators) are other good examples. It doesn't make sense to have five different companies running subway lines competing with each other, each with their own tracks. It would be wasteful and the price would be higher. It makes sense in such a case to have the government running it. Government provision of water and sewage treatment is also sensible. (Notice that waste collection is good in private hands, as the companies drive to consumers and can compete fiercely with each other.) Electricity grids, if not the providers, can also be sensibly placed in government hands. If they're not, the alternative is that the government sets rules on the prices the companies may charge to transmit competitors' electricity. The point is: there has to be a functioning, competitive market, regulation, or government ownership.
Bolivia's privatization of its power grid, therefore, is not necessarily unreasonable. If it is capable of doing a decent job expanding and maintaining it, and doesn't give special prices to favored power generators, then it may be an improvement. It would probably have been easier to solve any problems with targeted regulation instead, however.
Argentina's nationalization of an oil company, by contrast, makes no sense from the start (if the point is to improve things for consumers, that is). Oil producers compete heavily with each other. There are loads of them. If the government felt too much money from oil extraction in its territory was going abroad, it could have raised the taxes on oil companies (much as Australia has raised taxes on mining companies). Nationalizing an oil company serves no purpose except that the government can get its hands on a bunch of cash and assets without paying for them. In other contexts we call that what it is: theft. There are also other dangers: if the Argentinian government fails to invest in production, the oil company will return less and less money (Mexico and Venezuela are cases in point). This would reduce world oil supplies and rob Argentina of a viable industry, killing jobs along the way.
So privatization is no panacea. It makes sense in most cases as long as there is a real market (Britain's privatization of its water supply was probably a mistake, for example). If there's a competitive market, private companies will almost certainly do a better job than the government at providing goods and services efficiently. Where there's no market, however, there can be good arguments in favor of public provision. US Republicans would do well to remember that toll booths on sidewalks are silly and that some government money is needed to make sure bridges don't collapse. Privatizing all of them instead is, at best, a second-rate solution.
Saturday, April 28, 2012
The Power of Passive Resistance
Passive resistance may very well be more effective than terrorism
Looking back over the history of modern terrorism, one of the most notable aspects is that is almost always fails to achieve its objectives.1 In fact, terrorism used by itself has only ever been effective in a strict anti-colonial context. In colonies throughout the world, terrorism was sometimes capable of raising the costs of occupation enough to reduce the benefits to the point where the colonial power decided staying wasn't worth it. Other groups have sought to emulate these successes in other contexts and have failed miserably. Examples include the IRA, RAF, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and just about any other group you can think of.None of these groups are anti-colonial. The IRA viewed Northern Ireland in a colonial context, but it was wrong: The majority of the Northern Irish viewed themselves as British and wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. This was a case of majority rule. Colonies consist of a minority ruling over a majority from far away. The Northern Irish were represented in the UK Parliament and the majority of the population wished things to stay that way. The IRA failed in the end because it failed to understand that Northern Ireland was not a British colony.
Palestinian terror groups have made the same mistake. Israel is not a colony; it is a nation-state ruled by the state's citizen residents. Demanding Palestinian control of Israel is demanding that Israelis agree to destroy their own state. That's something they will never agree to, and that should be obvious to anyone.
But what about the Occupied Territories? These do resemble colonies: They're controlled from afar and the majority of those in the territories is not represented and does not agree with the occupation. Some Palestinian groups have been using terrorism for decades to try to end the occupation, but they haven't really been successful. Why?
Two reasons. One: their goals have been total, including the destruction of Israel. This has made it difficult for any Israeli government to negotiate with them because the very existence of these groups is seen as a threat to the survival of Israel itself. Two: they are using terrorism, which is violent and robs them of support and sympathy in many people's eyes.
One could argue that Hamas has actually achieved success in Gaza: The occupation there has ended and Hamas controls the Strip. Imagine if the groups used only passive resistance, however. Passive resistance is also only likely to work in an anti-colonial context, but that means it would be appropriate to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Terror groups suffer two problems stemming from their use of terror: They scare people enough to cause voters and governments to desire to wipe them out rather than negotiate, and they lack legitimacy. Civil disobedience would, like terrorism, make continued occupation of the territories more difficult, raising its cost. Refraining from violence, however, would also remove one of the benefits of the occupation: security. One reason for the continued occupation at the moment is that every time Israel pulls out (as with autonomy agreements implemented during the '90s or the withdrawal from Gaza), violence against Israelis increases. If this were not an issue, one significant incentive for the occupation would be removed. Finally, with passive resistance, no one would question the morals or objectives of Palestinians peacefully protesting and practicing civil disobedience. The actions would attain a level of legitimacy and sympathy that terrorist actions cannot.
I haven't done the necessary work on passive resistance to make solid claims about its comparative effectiveness, but I bet that the Palestinians would have their own state by now if they had opted for civil disobedience instead of terrorism. Terrorism is not the "only option," chosen out of desperation, as many groups pretend. There are others, and they may be more effective. There is one nagging problem, however: Passive resistance more obviously stands no chance of turning Israel into Palestine and would require all groups, even extreme ones, to give up that goal. So we're back where we started, because that is a core issue. Still, food for thought.
1. For an excellent book on this, see: Peter R. Neumann, and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works, and Why It Fails, Contemporary Terrorism Studies, London: Routledge, 2008.
Saturday, April 14, 2012
Why Should Polygamy Be Illegal?
Anti-gay rights activists often ground their argument against gay marriage using the "slippery slope" analogy: If we allow this, soon we'll have to allow polygamy, pedophilia, and bestiality. This, of course, is silly (and gravely insulting). We don't "have" to do anything. Slippery slopes do exist, so the analogy is not always a red herring, but in this case it's a bit like arguing that we shouldn't allow women to vote because soon children, prison inmates, and farm animals will want the vote as well. Besides, the fundamental line of separation here is mercifully clear and uncontroversial: it's consent--at least for most of the cases. Children are not capable of consenting to sexual acts they (and their bodies) do not understand. Sex with children will thus always be unacceptable and a crime (all arguments about the age at which a person is mature enough to consent aside). Animals have no way of expressing consent and, at the risk of stating the obvious, there is little reason to think they would give it if they could! That leaves polygamy.
Polygamy (which includes polygyny and polyandry) is not socially acceptable in most places in "Western" countries. Even the Mormons no longer allow it. If we follow the consent principle, though, it is hard to find solid arguments for outlawing it. Let me make one thing clear right here: no good arguments for disallowing something does not equal good arguments for engaging in something. I'm not promoting polygamy (or even polyamory) here. What I am promoting is people's choice to be polygamous if they and their partners wish. It's about freedom and consent.
"Polygyny is degrading to women." I'll admit on an emotional level it sure seems odd to share one man among several women. In the end, though, this comes down to claiming to know what's good for others better than they know it themselves. This is always tricky. We do accept such paternalism as the norm in some cases, however. Seatbelt laws are just one example. The reason we have them is because they save lives because we are all apparently too shortsighted to save our lives without laws mandating that we do so! So do people always make the best choices for themselves? Obviously not. But the harm in polygamy is not clear, or at least not clear enough to make it criminal. It seems to me your family and friends (if anyone) should be the ones telling you not to do it, not the state. Besides, we're talking about polygamy as a whole here. Is polyandry degrading to men? Are men considered equally incapable of judging what is good for them? If not, then the whole argument about banning polygamy because it is degrading to women centers on women being incapable of thinking for themselves. Who's degrading women now?
This reminds me a bit (tangentially) of calls to ban Islamic face coverings and head scarves. Some also consider these to be degrading to women. Once again, though: How do we pick out those who are pressured into wearing them by their husbands and fathers and those who choose to do so out of a personal sense of piety? (I have known some women in the latter group.) This topic is less controversial in the US, with its strict tradition of freedom of religion and religious expression, than in Europe. But as one woman in an English class I taught in Austria pointed out (she was the only one in the class against banning face coverings): "Prohibiting women from covering their faces is just as bad as forcing them to cover them. No matter what, they are not free to choose."
So bans on polygamy are based in religious tradition and paternalism and are thus overly restrictive of individual freedoms in my book (you all know I'm a social--but not economic--libertarian). Thoughts?
Polygamy (which includes polygyny and polyandry) is not socially acceptable in most places in "Western" countries. Even the Mormons no longer allow it. If we follow the consent principle, though, it is hard to find solid arguments for outlawing it. Let me make one thing clear right here: no good arguments for disallowing something does not equal good arguments for engaging in something. I'm not promoting polygamy (or even polyamory) here. What I am promoting is people's choice to be polygamous if they and their partners wish. It's about freedom and consent.
"Polygyny is degrading to women." I'll admit on an emotional level it sure seems odd to share one man among several women. In the end, though, this comes down to claiming to know what's good for others better than they know it themselves. This is always tricky. We do accept such paternalism as the norm in some cases, however. Seatbelt laws are just one example. The reason we have them is because they save lives because we are all apparently too shortsighted to save our lives without laws mandating that we do so! So do people always make the best choices for themselves? Obviously not. But the harm in polygamy is not clear, or at least not clear enough to make it criminal. It seems to me your family and friends (if anyone) should be the ones telling you not to do it, not the state. Besides, we're talking about polygamy as a whole here. Is polyandry degrading to men? Are men considered equally incapable of judging what is good for them? If not, then the whole argument about banning polygamy because it is degrading to women centers on women being incapable of thinking for themselves. Who's degrading women now?
This reminds me a bit (tangentially) of calls to ban Islamic face coverings and head scarves. Some also consider these to be degrading to women. Once again, though: How do we pick out those who are pressured into wearing them by their husbands and fathers and those who choose to do so out of a personal sense of piety? (I have known some women in the latter group.) This topic is less controversial in the US, with its strict tradition of freedom of religion and religious expression, than in Europe. But as one woman in an English class I taught in Austria pointed out (she was the only one in the class against banning face coverings): "Prohibiting women from covering their faces is just as bad as forcing them to cover them. No matter what, they are not free to choose."
So bans on polygamy are based in religious tradition and paternalism and are thus overly restrictive of individual freedoms in my book (you all know I'm a social--but not economic--libertarian). Thoughts?
Monday, April 9, 2012
Taiwan's Fate Is Sealed
Taiwan will become a de facto (and not just de jure) part of China--the only question is how
Taiwan's chances of becoming a fully independent state are essentially nill. The island is currently only recognized by a very few countries as an independent state. For most of the world, then, Taiwan is already a de jure (by law) part of China. Taiwan is de facto sovereign, however, deciding over all its own affairs. The United States has taken it upon itself to protect this state of affairs. In a series of communiques during the 1970s, the United States agreed that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. The catch for China is that both it and the US agreed that neither Taiwan nor China was to decide on a change in the status quo between Taiwan and China unilaterally or by force. This means that the US cannot support Taiwanese de jure independence, but that China would theoretically be barred from "reunifying" Taiwan with the mainland by force. As long as everyone sticks to the bargain, things are OK, even if they are quite messy from an international relations or international law viewpoint.
The thing is, China expects unification with Taiwan to occur eventually and does not seem willing to wait forever for this to happen: "In 2005 China passed the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law, which commits it to a military response should Taiwan ever declare independence or even if the government in Beijing thinks all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" (The Economist, Apr 7 2012). This seems to be rather close to violating those communiques, since the latter part, at least, would be a unilateral Chinese move toward unification. On the other hand, the US was supposed to slowly reduce its arms sales to Taiwan over time--it has not. As is distressingly often the case in international politics, a tiny political entity has the power to set a frightening chain of events into motion.
What if Taiwan were to declare independence? This came close to happening under Taiwan's President Chen in 2002, when he declared that there was "one country on either side of the Taiwan Strait."1 Disaster was averted, however, when US President Bush began to reign Chen in, making it clear that the US's stance on unilateral changes to Taiwan's status applied to Taiwan as well as China.
The people of Taiwan eventually voted Chen out, partly out of fear that his loose talk could prompt a Chinese attack. Fear that China would attack and clear signals from Washington that the US would not back Taiwan if it declared independence should be enough to prevent it from doing so. (At least, I hope those signals from Washington are clear!)
But what happens if China decides that "all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" and decides to forcefully annex Taiwan? At the moment, this still seems unlikely due to the US's power in the region. But China is increasing its capabilities in its backyard quite quickly. It's not a case of China needing to achieve military parity with the US. It's only a case of being able to defend itself against a US attack on its immediate coastal area including Taiwan. That is considerably easier than achieving parity. Would the US really be able, or willing, to stand up against China for the sake of Taiwan?
The US policy on the topic is "strategic ambiguity," which basically means it says it could get pissed off about a number of things, it just won't tell anyone what things would lead to which responses. The advantage of this is flexibility and the belief that this uncertainty will make the Chinese wary of provoking the US. What it actually is, in my view, is a way for the US to prevent admitting that it could not stop China from taking Taiwan if the former really wanted to, especially if China decides to do this in, say, 10 years or so when its capabilities will have grown much greater. The US is a long way from Taiwan, but China's entire military force could easily and quickly be brought to bear on the island. Over the medium to long term, there is little the US could do to stop such an occurrence. "Strategic ambiguity" is a sponginess that allows the US to convince all parties that they will get what they want and deserve, while knowing full well that this is impossible.
Taiwan's chances of becoming a fully independent state are essentially nill. The island is currently only recognized by a very few countries as an independent state. For most of the world, then, Taiwan is already a de jure (by law) part of China. Taiwan is de facto sovereign, however, deciding over all its own affairs. The United States has taken it upon itself to protect this state of affairs. In a series of communiques during the 1970s, the United States agreed that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. The catch for China is that both it and the US agreed that neither Taiwan nor China was to decide on a change in the status quo between Taiwan and China unilaterally or by force. This means that the US cannot support Taiwanese de jure independence, but that China would theoretically be barred from "reunifying" Taiwan with the mainland by force. As long as everyone sticks to the bargain, things are OK, even if they are quite messy from an international relations or international law viewpoint.
The thing is, China expects unification with Taiwan to occur eventually and does not seem willing to wait forever for this to happen: "In 2005 China passed the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law, which commits it to a military response should Taiwan ever declare independence or even if the government in Beijing thinks all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" (The Economist, Apr 7 2012). This seems to be rather close to violating those communiques, since the latter part, at least, would be a unilateral Chinese move toward unification. On the other hand, the US was supposed to slowly reduce its arms sales to Taiwan over time--it has not. As is distressingly often the case in international politics, a tiny political entity has the power to set a frightening chain of events into motion.
What if Taiwan were to declare independence? This came close to happening under Taiwan's President Chen in 2002, when he declared that there was "one country on either side of the Taiwan Strait."1 Disaster was averted, however, when US President Bush began to reign Chen in, making it clear that the US's stance on unilateral changes to Taiwan's status applied to Taiwan as well as China.
The people of Taiwan eventually voted Chen out, partly out of fear that his loose talk could prompt a Chinese attack. Fear that China would attack and clear signals from Washington that the US would not back Taiwan if it declared independence should be enough to prevent it from doing so. (At least, I hope those signals from Washington are clear!)
But what happens if China decides that "all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" and decides to forcefully annex Taiwan? At the moment, this still seems unlikely due to the US's power in the region. But China is increasing its capabilities in its backyard quite quickly. It's not a case of China needing to achieve military parity with the US. It's only a case of being able to defend itself against a US attack on its immediate coastal area including Taiwan. That is considerably easier than achieving parity. Would the US really be able, or willing, to stand up against China for the sake of Taiwan?
The US policy on the topic is "strategic ambiguity," which basically means it says it could get pissed off about a number of things, it just won't tell anyone what things would lead to which responses. The advantage of this is flexibility and the belief that this uncertainty will make the Chinese wary of provoking the US. What it actually is, in my view, is a way for the US to prevent admitting that it could not stop China from taking Taiwan if the former really wanted to, especially if China decides to do this in, say, 10 years or so when its capabilities will have grown much greater. The US is a long way from Taiwan, but China's entire military force could easily and quickly be brought to bear on the island. Over the medium to long term, there is little the US could do to stop such an occurrence. "Strategic ambiguity" is a sponginess that allows the US to convince all parties that they will get what they want and deserve, while knowing full well that this is impossible.
1.Dumbaugh, Kerry. “CRS Report for Congress.”
Federation of American Scientists. 20 April 2007. 14 Jun.
2008 <http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33684.pdf> cited in
Kirchofer, Charles. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests Reharding Tensions in the Taiwan Strait”. Webster University, Vienna, July 10, 2008. http://www.english4you.biz/papers/taiwan.pdf.
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Would Energy Independence Insulate the US from Oil Price Spikes and Reduce Wars in the Middle East?
What energy independence would mean--and what it wouldn't
The US's dependence on foreign oil is often cited as the root of several evils. The two most prominent are the ones in the title. The short answer to the first one is "probably not, but potentially." The answer to the second is "no."
Let's put aside the shear difficulties involved in becoming energy independent for a moment to concentrate on this hypothetical situation. In an apolitical and amoral world, an energy independent United States could halt oil exports and insulate itself from rising prices by cutting off the excess demand for US oil and using it exclusively for the domestic market, for which there would be enough oil to go around (hence prices would not rise). We don't live in an apolitical and amoral world however. Here's why that matters: cutting off exports is known as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The reason is that it would benefit American oil consumers while harming consumers in the rest of the world. That is because some additional supply would be removed from world markets, driving up the oil price still further.
Not only does this rub against our moral sensibilities, the political (and economic) backlash would be huge. And it wouldn't just be about higher oil prices. The US has encouraged free trade for decades and built up a global economic system based upon that idea. A move like that would be hypocritical and seriously undermine the US's credibility. The result could be a trade war, with other countries erecting trade barriers as well, slowing global trade, driving up consumer prices, and killing the world economy. In other words, the result could very well be worse than higher energy prices themselves would have been. So it would be better if the US didn't use its (fictional) energy independence in this way to keep its own prices low.
On to war in the Middle East (ME). Hasn't US involvement there been based on its thirst for the region's oil? Hasn't this led to wars? This is unfair. US involvement in the Middle East is due in no small part to the region's oil. To deny this would be a bald-faced lie. But I think many people assume that US involvement would somehow be proportional to the amount of its oil it gets from the region. This is a misunderstanding of economics. The US imports less than 25% of its oil from the Middle East (that's including the entire "rest of the world" statistic as being all from the Middle East, which surely drastically overstates things). But this is completely irrelevant. The oil price is determined by global supply and global demand. It doesn't matter if your traditional suppliers still have the same amount of oil. If another supplier doesn't, demand for oil from your suppliers will rise, and so will the price. Even if the US didn't import any oil from the ME, that region would still be among the world's most important suppliers, if not the most important one. It could therefore never be ignored.
This means that the US and every oil consuming country in the world has an interest in ensuring that ME oil keeps flowing. The US, however, is one of the few countries with the power to do so--so it does. Does this cause wars? I actually don't really think so. The US is guilty of promoting "stability" in the region over the years, which has often meant doing business with, and at times outright supporting, Arab dictators. As I've explained in other posts, though, these were marriages of convenience. As the Arab Spring has shown, if all other things are equal, the US will support democracy. Usually all other things are NOT equal, however. The alternative to doing business with dictators is not doing business with dictators, who will then do business with others and stay in power. This would mean the US would also have little influence on those countries (influence it could use for good) and would be more beholden to a smaller number of suppliers, putting its energy supplies at risk and artificially raising its oil prices, damaging its economy. In short, everyone would be worse off. I personally think following rigid and allegedly moral principles to the point that everyone suffers is a false, and facile, morality.
So energy independence doesn't make sense? Well, that's not entirely true, either. In an emergency, it would mean the US could ban exports as detailed above, or threaten to do so, giving it more leverage. That's the sort of "political dark arts" side of it. More cheerfully, energy independence would probably have to mean more green technology--efficiency improvements, renewables, etc., which are a good thing in their own right because of climate change, for one. Efficiency gains are also good because they reduce the energy intensity of the US economy. That means the US would require less energy for each dollar of GDP it produces. THAT really would make the US economy more resilient against rises in the oil price. Why? It's like this: if the US requires one barrel of oil for $2,000 of GDP, a rise in the oil price will have a greater effect than if a barrel of oil can generate $4,000 of GDP simply because the oil price will make up a smaller proportion of total costs in the economy. In the end, then, energy independence as a goal in its own right is not so important, which explains why the US hasn't pushed that hard for it. Reducing US dependence on oil by reducing the economy's energy intensity would provide the greatest benefits of all at a reasonable price.
And we're in luck: US oil consumption has fallen since 2005, despite rising GDP and a larger population. That means its oil intensity is falling (and actually, its overall energy intensity has been falling, too). This will make the US economy more resilient to energy price shocks over time. That can only be a good thing, because energy prices don't look set to fall much in the coming decades (except maybe for natural gas, but even that is uncertain). Just don't expect that to bring peace to the Middle East or to reduce US involvement there. Democracy just might, though, you never know...
The US's dependence on foreign oil is often cited as the root of several evils. The two most prominent are the ones in the title. The short answer to the first one is "probably not, but potentially." The answer to the second is "no."
Let's put aside the shear difficulties involved in becoming energy independent for a moment to concentrate on this hypothetical situation. In an apolitical and amoral world, an energy independent United States could halt oil exports and insulate itself from rising prices by cutting off the excess demand for US oil and using it exclusively for the domestic market, for which there would be enough oil to go around (hence prices would not rise). We don't live in an apolitical and amoral world however. Here's why that matters: cutting off exports is known as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The reason is that it would benefit American oil consumers while harming consumers in the rest of the world. That is because some additional supply would be removed from world markets, driving up the oil price still further.
Not only does this rub against our moral sensibilities, the political (and economic) backlash would be huge. And it wouldn't just be about higher oil prices. The US has encouraged free trade for decades and built up a global economic system based upon that idea. A move like that would be hypocritical and seriously undermine the US's credibility. The result could be a trade war, with other countries erecting trade barriers as well, slowing global trade, driving up consumer prices, and killing the world economy. In other words, the result could very well be worse than higher energy prices themselves would have been. So it would be better if the US didn't use its (fictional) energy independence in this way to keep its own prices low.
On to war in the Middle East (ME). Hasn't US involvement there been based on its thirst for the region's oil? Hasn't this led to wars? This is unfair. US involvement in the Middle East is due in no small part to the region's oil. To deny this would be a bald-faced lie. But I think many people assume that US involvement would somehow be proportional to the amount of its oil it gets from the region. This is a misunderstanding of economics. The US imports less than 25% of its oil from the Middle East (that's including the entire "rest of the world" statistic as being all from the Middle East, which surely drastically overstates things). But this is completely irrelevant. The oil price is determined by global supply and global demand. It doesn't matter if your traditional suppliers still have the same amount of oil. If another supplier doesn't, demand for oil from your suppliers will rise, and so will the price. Even if the US didn't import any oil from the ME, that region would still be among the world's most important suppliers, if not the most important one. It could therefore never be ignored.
This means that the US and every oil consuming country in the world has an interest in ensuring that ME oil keeps flowing. The US, however, is one of the few countries with the power to do so--so it does. Does this cause wars? I actually don't really think so. The US is guilty of promoting "stability" in the region over the years, which has often meant doing business with, and at times outright supporting, Arab dictators. As I've explained in other posts, though, these were marriages of convenience. As the Arab Spring has shown, if all other things are equal, the US will support democracy. Usually all other things are NOT equal, however. The alternative to doing business with dictators is not doing business with dictators, who will then do business with others and stay in power. This would mean the US would also have little influence on those countries (influence it could use for good) and would be more beholden to a smaller number of suppliers, putting its energy supplies at risk and artificially raising its oil prices, damaging its economy. In short, everyone would be worse off. I personally think following rigid and allegedly moral principles to the point that everyone suffers is a false, and facile, morality.
So energy independence doesn't make sense? Well, that's not entirely true, either. In an emergency, it would mean the US could ban exports as detailed above, or threaten to do so, giving it more leverage. That's the sort of "political dark arts" side of it. More cheerfully, energy independence would probably have to mean more green technology--efficiency improvements, renewables, etc., which are a good thing in their own right because of climate change, for one. Efficiency gains are also good because they reduce the energy intensity of the US economy. That means the US would require less energy for each dollar of GDP it produces. THAT really would make the US economy more resilient against rises in the oil price. Why? It's like this: if the US requires one barrel of oil for $2,000 of GDP, a rise in the oil price will have a greater effect than if a barrel of oil can generate $4,000 of GDP simply because the oil price will make up a smaller proportion of total costs in the economy. In the end, then, energy independence as a goal in its own right is not so important, which explains why the US hasn't pushed that hard for it. Reducing US dependence on oil by reducing the economy's energy intensity would provide the greatest benefits of all at a reasonable price.
And we're in luck: US oil consumption has fallen since 2005, despite rising GDP and a larger population. That means its oil intensity is falling (and actually, its overall energy intensity has been falling, too). This will make the US economy more resilient to energy price shocks over time. That can only be a good thing, because energy prices don't look set to fall much in the coming decades (except maybe for natural gas, but even that is uncertain). Just don't expect that to bring peace to the Middle East or to reduce US involvement there. Democracy just might, though, you never know...
Saturday, March 3, 2012
Sandra Fluke, Rush Limbaugh, Contraception, and Clashing Values
Quite often when I write a post, I get a nervous feeling: I'm about to write something that could potentially piss people off, both on the right and left ends of the spectrum. This is especially acute with such emotionally charged (in the US at least) issues as contraception in all its forms. The antidote to this, to some degree, is to remain respectful and fair, and that's just the solution to the problem, as I will now argue.
Sandra Fluke is a law student at Georgetown, a prestigious catholic university. She testified before Congress in support of mandating that insurance companies pay for contraception for women. In this case, I believe the contraception specifically in question was birth control pills. Her argument centered around the costs of birth control during a student's time in law school (up to $3,000 according to her estimate) and the fact that birth control pills can be used to treat other medical issues, such as ovarian cysts. This condition caused a fellow student of hers to lose an ovary, and the implication was that, had Georgetown been willing to fund birth control pills, she would not have had to suffer that loss. Fluke argued "It's not about church and state, it's about women's health."1
Rush Limbaugh attacked her on character grounds, saying that asking for others to pay her so she could have sex made her a "slut" and a "prostitute." Don't worry, I'm not about to defend him. Georgetown University President John DeGioia said it best when he called Limbaugh's remarks "misogynistic, vitriolic, and a misrepresentation of the position of our student."2
So where's the controversy? It's that I'm on the fence in this debate, though Obama has apparently already suggested the sensible thing in exempting religious organizations from the rule and putting the onus on insurance companies to offer free contraception.
The thing is: contraception can only cost $3,000 if you're using birth control pills. Why not use condoms? They'd be cheaper unless you're having a lot of sex. If you are, fine by me, but I also am not sure other people should help pay for condoms if you're using so many you can't afford them yourself. But this talk is bringing the debate dangerously toward Limbaugh's position, which is not at all what it's about. Let's bring it back to more likely condom use. One argument would be that condoms can break. Well, then use the morning after pill. Condom failure is really not an issue if women have access to the whole palette of contraceptive options, which they should, in my view. And there's another argument for condoms: only they can prevent the spread of most STDs. Birth control will not, so only using that is a risk to women's (and everyone's) health by itself.
There are other reasons for using birth control. Many may use it for health reasons (like for ovarian cysts). So be it, surely an exception for medical necessity ought not to be the vitriolic debate starter it is.
So what am I arguing? I am NOT arguing against birth control and certainly not against contraception in any of its forms. I AM arguing against mandating that all insurance companies must always pay for one of the more expensive forms of contraception whenever a woman wishes to have it: birth control pills. They might instead be required to cover funding for condoms... or not, they ought to be cheap enough and many organizations give them away for free. Birth control pills ought to be offered by insurance companies in cases of other medical necessity on the recommendation of a doctor.
What would this look like in practice? If you're a woman and want birth control pills, you would be free to choose an insurance provider who would pay for them (or buy them yourself, of course). If the plan is too expensive, you'd have two options: switch to condoms or convince your doctor you need them for health reasons. If you really do, then obviously that would be the route you should take, no questions asked. If you don't really need it for your health, I'd personally recommend the first choice because of my views on honesty.
In short: women should have a right to contraception and be free to choose whatever form of it they wish. However, it does not follow from that line that all forms of contraception must be made available free of charge, regardless of the relative merits and costs of other forms. In an age of rising health care costs and increasing government austerity, we should be looking at ways to save public money where this is feasible and does not cause undo harm. This seems like an okay area to do so. If only we could have a sane conversation about it...
As always, I welcome your comments. I actively encourage everyone to express whatever views they have, but please keep the discourse respectful and stick to the facts.
1: “Obama Calls Student Insulted by Talk Show Host.” Yahoo!, n.d. http://uk.news.yahoo.com/obama-calls-student-insulted-talk-show-host-034907306.html.
2: “Obama Calls Student in Slut Slur.” BBC, March 2, 2012, sec. US & Canada. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17241803.
Sandra Fluke is a law student at Georgetown, a prestigious catholic university. She testified before Congress in support of mandating that insurance companies pay for contraception for women. In this case, I believe the contraception specifically in question was birth control pills. Her argument centered around the costs of birth control during a student's time in law school (up to $3,000 according to her estimate) and the fact that birth control pills can be used to treat other medical issues, such as ovarian cysts. This condition caused a fellow student of hers to lose an ovary, and the implication was that, had Georgetown been willing to fund birth control pills, she would not have had to suffer that loss. Fluke argued "It's not about church and state, it's about women's health."1
Rush Limbaugh attacked her on character grounds, saying that asking for others to pay her so she could have sex made her a "slut" and a "prostitute." Don't worry, I'm not about to defend him. Georgetown University President John DeGioia said it best when he called Limbaugh's remarks "misogynistic, vitriolic, and a misrepresentation of the position of our student."2
So where's the controversy? It's that I'm on the fence in this debate, though Obama has apparently already suggested the sensible thing in exempting religious organizations from the rule and putting the onus on insurance companies to offer free contraception.
The thing is: contraception can only cost $3,000 if you're using birth control pills. Why not use condoms? They'd be cheaper unless you're having a lot of sex. If you are, fine by me, but I also am not sure other people should help pay for condoms if you're using so many you can't afford them yourself. But this talk is bringing the debate dangerously toward Limbaugh's position, which is not at all what it's about. Let's bring it back to more likely condom use. One argument would be that condoms can break. Well, then use the morning after pill. Condom failure is really not an issue if women have access to the whole palette of contraceptive options, which they should, in my view. And there's another argument for condoms: only they can prevent the spread of most STDs. Birth control will not, so only using that is a risk to women's (and everyone's) health by itself.
There are other reasons for using birth control. Many may use it for health reasons (like for ovarian cysts). So be it, surely an exception for medical necessity ought not to be the vitriolic debate starter it is.
So what am I arguing? I am NOT arguing against birth control and certainly not against contraception in any of its forms. I AM arguing against mandating that all insurance companies must always pay for one of the more expensive forms of contraception whenever a woman wishes to have it: birth control pills. They might instead be required to cover funding for condoms... or not, they ought to be cheap enough and many organizations give them away for free. Birth control pills ought to be offered by insurance companies in cases of other medical necessity on the recommendation of a doctor.
What would this look like in practice? If you're a woman and want birth control pills, you would be free to choose an insurance provider who would pay for them (or buy them yourself, of course). If the plan is too expensive, you'd have two options: switch to condoms or convince your doctor you need them for health reasons. If you really do, then obviously that would be the route you should take, no questions asked. If you don't really need it for your health, I'd personally recommend the first choice because of my views on honesty.
In short: women should have a right to contraception and be free to choose whatever form of it they wish. However, it does not follow from that line that all forms of contraception must be made available free of charge, regardless of the relative merits and costs of other forms. In an age of rising health care costs and increasing government austerity, we should be looking at ways to save public money where this is feasible and does not cause undo harm. This seems like an okay area to do so. If only we could have a sane conversation about it...
As always, I welcome your comments. I actively encourage everyone to express whatever views they have, but please keep the discourse respectful and stick to the facts.
1: “Obama Calls Student Insulted by Talk Show Host.” Yahoo!, n.d. http://uk.news.yahoo.com/obama-calls-student-insulted-talk-show-host-034907306.html.
2: “Obama Calls Student in Slut Slur.” BBC, March 2, 2012, sec. US & Canada. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17241803.
Friday, February 3, 2012
Lucky Non-Ethnic Nations: Anglo-based Identities
Anyone coming to the UK, especially large cities like London, will notice the mix of cultures, races, and ethnicities there. This has been going on for a long time and has usually been celebrated: In 1933, journalist Glyn Roberts commented "I still think the parade of peoples and colors and tongues just about the best thing in London." Not only are lots of different peoples present in London, they mix. This may seem like nothing extraordinary to an American, Canadian, or Australian (I assume), but it actually is rather unusual and, in my mind, a very good thing. In many places, mixing is a bit more difficult. The reason, I think, has to do with national identities.
What does a German look like? The tall, geeky engineer type, maybe, or the stout beer-drinking Bavarian? The German of Turkish heritage at a kebab shop probably does not come to mind, although he or she is surely an integral part of Germany today. "German" is now changing to include people who don't "look" German, but it is not as easy as "American," or "Canadian," which have always been mixes. Many nation-states are composed of, well, nations, which usually have a common ethnic heritage. This makes it difficult to join the nation just by getting the passport (i.e. citizenship in the country). Countries that have built national identities on things other than ethnic heritage have an easier time integrating newcomers.
Americans and others from outside the UK, who are likely to mix up terms like "English" and "British," may not recognize that the UK has long been a place of (more or less) accepted multiple nations and identities, too. The term "British" can mean anywhere in the British Isles (though calling Ireland, technically a British Isle, "British" would ruffle feathers) but usually means someone belonging to the United Kingdom. Historically, these were white protestants (after Henry VIII and Elizabeth I broke with Rome) living on the island of Great Britain with differing identities: English, Welsh, and eventually Scottish. In much more recent times (in the last 20 years about, according to a recent article in The Economist), immigrants to the UK, unable really to feel part of the English "tribe," for example, have adopted hyphenated identities involving being "British." The nice thing is that the term British, always a wider tent to include more peoples, has more easily expanded to allow immigrants to feel they own the term as well. No one's shocked if a woman with dark skin says she's "British." If she says she's "German," however, we may be a little surprised (though our surprise may, rightly, embarrass us). Now how to make these other national identities more flexible?
What does a German look like? The tall, geeky engineer type, maybe, or the stout beer-drinking Bavarian? The German of Turkish heritage at a kebab shop probably does not come to mind, although he or she is surely an integral part of Germany today. "German" is now changing to include people who don't "look" German, but it is not as easy as "American," or "Canadian," which have always been mixes. Many nation-states are composed of, well, nations, which usually have a common ethnic heritage. This makes it difficult to join the nation just by getting the passport (i.e. citizenship in the country). Countries that have built national identities on things other than ethnic heritage have an easier time integrating newcomers.
Americans and others from outside the UK, who are likely to mix up terms like "English" and "British," may not recognize that the UK has long been a place of (more or less) accepted multiple nations and identities, too. The term "British" can mean anywhere in the British Isles (though calling Ireland, technically a British Isle, "British" would ruffle feathers) but usually means someone belonging to the United Kingdom. Historically, these were white protestants (after Henry VIII and Elizabeth I broke with Rome) living on the island of Great Britain with differing identities: English, Welsh, and eventually Scottish. In much more recent times (in the last 20 years about, according to a recent article in The Economist), immigrants to the UK, unable really to feel part of the English "tribe," for example, have adopted hyphenated identities involving being "British." The nice thing is that the term British, always a wider tent to include more peoples, has more easily expanded to allow immigrants to feel they own the term as well. No one's shocked if a woman with dark skin says she's "British." If she says she's "German," however, we may be a little surprised (though our surprise may, rightly, embarrass us). Now how to make these other national identities more flexible?
Thursday, January 26, 2012
Defining Poverty
"Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself," Winston Churchill apparently said. And he was right, even if the statistic is "true." One batch of statistics that gets me annoyed is that on poverty. One of the most central difficulties in using statistics is in turning real-world things into numbers. We do that by defining them. The problem: change the definition and you change the numbers. Change the numbers, and your "statistical analysis" can say completely different things. This is why experts often seem to disagree on basic issues.
One of these basic issues is measuring poverty. There is great debate on how to define poverty. The most fundamental question is: is it absolute or relative? Are you poor if you cannot afford any place to live and don't have enough food to keep your Body Mass Index (BMI) up in the healthy range? Certainly. How about if you have 3 children but they have to sleep in one bedroom because a larger apartment would be more expensive? Does a household need a computer (or at least the capacity to buy one) to not be impoverished? This is all certainly tricky and emotive.
To get around this, European countries define poverty in relative terms. This seems reasonable. After all, our perception of poverty is relative: having less than my neighbors often makes me feel I am poor. Germany, for example (I believe), defines someone as impoverished if their income is less than two thirds of the median income for the country.
The problem, though, is that this definition of poverty encroaches on the territory of another term: inequality. I argue they are not the same thing and that poverty is absolute. Why? I'll give you an example. Let's say the median household income in a country is $40,000 per year. The poverty line would be $26,667. Let's say the Smith family earns $30,000. By either definition, they are not poor. Now let's say economic growth over five years lifts the median income to $50,000 per year. With inflation at 2%, that's a rise of nearly $6,000 per year. Let's say the Smiths' income only keeps up with inflation (something nice these days!). Their income would be $33,147. The new relative poverty line, though, will be at $33,333. The Smiths are now (just) poor. Yet in purchasing power, they have not lost anything! Society has become less equal, as others' purchasing power has risen and theirs has not, but they are no worse off than before.
What all this means is that statistics showing "rising poverty" might actually just be showing that rich people are getting richer faster than poor people. In fact, this definition of poverty could even show rises in poverty even if everyone in society were getting richer, adjusted for inflation, if the richest got rich faster and more people joined the rich at the top end. Everyone, including the poorest, is better off, yet poverty has increased? That doesn't seem right.
Poverty is definitely bad. Inequality is more ambiguous (getting into this would require a separate post). I suspect this is why some people like to use the word "poverty" instead--it makes for a stronger argument. This is a twisting of data and terms and is, I would argue, a misrepresentation of facts. People make decisions based on the facts presented (and represented) to them, so misrepresenting data is likely to cause bad decisions. Let's avoid that.
One of these basic issues is measuring poverty. There is great debate on how to define poverty. The most fundamental question is: is it absolute or relative? Are you poor if you cannot afford any place to live and don't have enough food to keep your Body Mass Index (BMI) up in the healthy range? Certainly. How about if you have 3 children but they have to sleep in one bedroom because a larger apartment would be more expensive? Does a household need a computer (or at least the capacity to buy one) to not be impoverished? This is all certainly tricky and emotive.
To get around this, European countries define poverty in relative terms. This seems reasonable. After all, our perception of poverty is relative: having less than my neighbors often makes me feel I am poor. Germany, for example (I believe), defines someone as impoverished if their income is less than two thirds of the median income for the country.
The problem, though, is that this definition of poverty encroaches on the territory of another term: inequality. I argue they are not the same thing and that poverty is absolute. Why? I'll give you an example. Let's say the median household income in a country is $40,000 per year. The poverty line would be $26,667. Let's say the Smith family earns $30,000. By either definition, they are not poor. Now let's say economic growth over five years lifts the median income to $50,000 per year. With inflation at 2%, that's a rise of nearly $6,000 per year. Let's say the Smiths' income only keeps up with inflation (something nice these days!). Their income would be $33,147. The new relative poverty line, though, will be at $33,333. The Smiths are now (just) poor. Yet in purchasing power, they have not lost anything! Society has become less equal, as others' purchasing power has risen and theirs has not, but they are no worse off than before.
What all this means is that statistics showing "rising poverty" might actually just be showing that rich people are getting richer faster than poor people. In fact, this definition of poverty could even show rises in poverty even if everyone in society were getting richer, adjusted for inflation, if the richest got rich faster and more people joined the rich at the top end. Everyone, including the poorest, is better off, yet poverty has increased? That doesn't seem right.
Poverty is definitely bad. Inequality is more ambiguous (getting into this would require a separate post). I suspect this is why some people like to use the word "poverty" instead--it makes for a stronger argument. This is a twisting of data and terms and is, I would argue, a misrepresentation of facts. People make decisions based on the facts presented (and represented) to them, so misrepresenting data is likely to cause bad decisions. Let's avoid that.
Monday, January 2, 2012
If Countries Can Print as Much Money as They Need, Why Does Debt Even Matter?
Whenever people start to learn about how the monetary system (i.e. central banks, money printing, etc.), there comes a point when they ask themselves or their teacher "so, wait, if a country can print as much money as it wants, how can it ever go bankrupt? Why default on your debts if you can just print more money to cover them?" The instructor (or Smart Alec at the right sort of boring dinner party) will then smile wryly at this allegedly stupid question and brush it off with something involving "inflation." In fact, this is not a stupid question at all. Not only that, the conclusion is, at its heart, correct. Theoretically, a country that prints its own money (not all countries do) cannot go bust! Yet countries throughout history, even those that printed their own money, have defaulted, in effect declaring bankruptcy and refusing to pay back all or some of their debts. Why?
The brisk answer "inflation" is not incorrect. Usually, when a country starts printing money to cover purchases it starts to cause inflation because it spends beyond its means. "How can you have means if you can have as much money as you want?" you may ask. Another good question. The answer is simple: goods and services are not free. If everyone in the world were millionaires, they couldn't all have luxury yachts, penthouse apartments, and helicopters. There is just not enough oil, labor, or space atop tall buildings. Everyone can't have everything. If everyone had millions of dollars to spend, this would not change the fact that there is a limited supply of everything. Prices would just shoot up to adjust to the new status quo. Billionaire would be the new millionaire. "Poor" would be people living on a salary of just $900,000 per year. All the printing, and no better off. I hope that makes sense, as I know it's a tricky concept to wrap your head around.
Still, the inflation answer is incomplete. This is because printing money does not, in itself, cause inflation. Printing and spending too much money does. In other words, having more money in circulation than there are goods and services to be bought will bid up the price. So the key would be not printing too much money, but rather, enough money.
Much of the rich world currently finds itself in an ongoing economic crisis; a slow one, which just feels like a general uneasiness. The world financial system has not yet, at least, collapsed, but unemployment is still high and growth and spending are sluggish. It's become harder for optimism to prevail, even among optimistic Americans. The main reason for the slow growth and high unemployment is too little "demand." That means that consumers, government, and companies together are not buying enough to push growth forward. The reason for that is mainly that households and banks, who obviously cannot print their own money, are busy paying off debts and have become much more cautious about spending even when they have the money. But what about the government, which can print money?
Theoretically, the government could just borrow from itself, printing money to spend on infrastructure, education, housing, whatever. Since the current problem is not enough demand (i.e. people not buying enough), the government could take up the slack. In theory, as long as it didn't take up too much slack and spark inflation as described above, everything would be all right.
So why don't we do it? The main problem is that we would have to trust the government to cut spending and raise taxes to reduce inflation, and do the opposite to drive things on. At the moment, the US Government can't even get the necessary consensus to do things like maintain bridges so they don't collapse. The (justified) fear is: once you have free money, you can't stop the spending. History has borne this out, too: there are many cases of just that sort of thing happening, going back hundreds of years. And let's face it, if you could print as much money as you wanted, would you stop? Yeah, right, keep telling yourself that.
To stop all this happening, central banks are usually permitted to lend only to other banks. They also do not normally purchase government debt. Instead, they borrow it from other banks, never taking on the risk of government default (both the bank and the government would have to go bust for the central bank to lose money... which it could replace by printing more, anyway, if legally permitted to do so). This wall of separation prevents central banks from financing government profligacy. That prevents the dangers of out of control spending and inflation. If savers are concerned that the government is borrowing too much, they stop lending the government money and the rates it has to pay to borrow rise; that usually results in budget tightening.
So really, everything's true: if central banks were willing to lend governments unlimited cash directly, they could never go bust, but the worry is that massive inflation would come as a result, as it has in the past. At the same time, though, central banks could lend directly to governments in times of crisis when inflation is not a big worry. They could continue to lend in order to keep interest rates reasonable, too, no matter how high the debt. They could then still allow rates to rise to stop inflation. So theoretically (how many times have I used that word now?) the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan could lend directly to their respective governments during the current crisis, cutting off the supply if inflation threatens to return.
Central banks work on credibility, though. The expectation that inflation will remain stable is part of the reason that it does, in fact, remain so. Unorthodox operations like this by central banks could damage that credibility. Also, and this cannot be underestimated, there is a lot of political opposition (think most of the Republican party, the Tea Party, and followers of Ron Paul, just to name a few). So it's difficult, but theoretically possible, for a central bank to fund a government to push an economy forward after a crisis without sparking inflation -- regardless of how much debt has accrued, or to bail a government in a debt crisis out by lending it the necessary cash. Tricky, but possible.
Monday, December 19, 2011
Iranian Pickles: The Options for Handling Iranian Nukes
Stopping a country from developing nuclear weapons is hard -- and dangerous
Ah, the complexities of today's world. Wouldn't it be nice to go back to when things were simpler: When we only had to worry about Soviet nukes being fired from Cuba; or West Berlin, a city surrounded by communist East Germany, being attacked by Soviet forces thus testing the US commitment to treating Berlin as if it were New York, possibly causing nuclear war? If you haven't gathered this already: this is sarcasm. There may have been only "one" enemy during the Cold War, but it was, especially through the 1960s, a terrifying time for the entire world. Just a bit of perspective on Iranian nukes.
I am neither a hawk nor a dove, so let's address both extremes of the spectrum before we begin. First off, the doves: All signs point to Iran developing nuclear weapons -- even the IAEA, once reluctant to draw conclusions, has now verified this (see in particular point 43 of its report). If it is not developing nuclear weapons, then it is doing everything it can to give that impression, for example by keeping secrets and building underground nuclear facilities. Since Iran would gain little from such a ruse (pretending to already HAVE nukes could prevent countries from attacking you, claiming you are developing them when you're not, ENCOURAGES attacks), we must conclude that it is really doing it. Iran is NOT harmless, and talk from the US and Israel about its dangers is not a pretext for launching wars that both want to get into just for the hell of it, or whatever it is that leftists think is the conspiratorial reasoning for all this. Iran has supported insurgents in Iraq, as well as the terror/militia groups/political parties Hamas and, most notably, Hezbollah, which follows the lead of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The issue against the Hawks, who would bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, is a bit more complex because their line, unlike that of the leftist doves who think Iran's leaders are lovely, peace-loving people, is more credible. The main issue here, though, is that an attack would almost certainly not stop Iran from getting a bomb. For one thing, no one knows if there are additional secret enrichment facilities in Iran like the one discovered in September 2009. Iran is set to transfer production to an alleged number of secret facilities, which are reported to be bomb-proof, even if all of them could be found. Could Iran be bluffing to deter an attack by making it sound futile? Sure, this is international politics and diplomacy after all. Lies abound. But can we afford to assume it's a bluff? No, and that's the problem.
What's more, an attack on Iran carries incredible risks. Unless it were successful in completely wiping out Iran's nuclear development capabilities and killing most of its nuclear scientists, a near miracle if you think about it (and even then: once you've gotten through the complexities once, the second development run ought to be faster), Iran will simply be delayed -- and really angry. Sure, Iran spews hatred for the West and above all Israel, which carried out attacks on its nuclear facilities once before. Increasing its determination further still seems unwise, however.
Dr. Strangelove time
So what can we do? It seems ever more likely that Iran will get the bomb no matter what we do. This does not have to be the end of Israel or civilization as we know it. Keep in mind that only two atom bombs have ever been used in the history of nuclear arms. Further, it's important to note two factors in that case: Japan could not retaliate with nuclear weapons, and Japan and the US were locked in a brutal war and the US stood to bring the war to a quick end, preventing further US casualties and expense, by dropping two bombs. Whatever your feelings about the morality of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, the US had every incentive to do it, and there was essentially no risk. Iran has nothing to gain by using its nukes first or giving them to terrorist groups -- and everything to lose by doing either.
So what's the point of having the bomb in the first place if it is useless? Careful! I said that it makes no sense to use nukes first in the current situation, but that doesn't mean they're not useful. As Kenneth Waltz, the high priest of international political theory, points out: "the usefulness of force should not be confused with its usability... [that would be] comparable to saying that the police force that seldom if ever employs violence is weak or that a police force is strong only when policemen are shooting their guns... [or] that a man with large assets is not rich if he spends little money or that a man is rich only if he spends a lot of it."1 The main use for Iran's weapons, when they're finally developed, is deterrence: it becomes much more unlikely that anyone will attack a nuclear-armed Iran, giving Iran greater freedom of political mobility. That is hugely useful.
"You're assuming Iran's leaders aren't nuts." You're right. And what is it about their actions that would lead us to think otherwise? Since I've pointed out that nuclear weapons are quite useful, even if this usefulness is not bound up with their actual use, the mere fact of them pressing on with the project implies paranoia about foreign influence or fear of attack -- but also rationality. Let's also not forget that Iran has been subject to heavy foreign interference in its affairs since the early 19th century, first by Britain and Russia, and later by the United States (the greatest example of which is the toppling of the Iranian government with US (CIA) assistance to re-instate the western-oriented Shah in 1953). So Iran has reason to be "paranoid," if the word can still be used to describe justified fear -- which would be an oxymoron; so no, it can't. Also, if you want to make people uncertain of your next move and encourage them to be extra cautious, it's a good idea to scare the crap out of them by making them think you're crazy. Kim Jong-Il (who has apparently just died!) was a master of this art, and the Iranian leaders may be, too. Note that Kim never really attacked South Korea, an easy target (Kim has tested South Korea's determination by firing at its ships and a small island near the border, but these tests showed South Korea was not just going to be pushed over).
We thought the Soviets were crazy enough to put ideology above reason, too, but they never did anything unreasonable. If Iran were to launch nukes at Israel, it would surely be completely destroyed by Israeli retaliation -- a pointless action. Likewise with an attack on Saudi Arabia, Iran's real arch rival in the region. The US could very well feel the need to launch a nuclear counterattack in that case as well. Or Israel might do it. In that case, too, Iran would have even less sympathy than it already does, for it clearly would be the aggressor. In the end, then, nukes are very useful for Iran in deterring foreign attacks and influence. They are not so useful if they explode, and that includes at the hands of Iran-linked terrorists. The bombs can be traced, and Iran would face a brutal retaliation if any of its bombs went off as a result of it giving them to terrorists. Plus: you have the most destructive weapon known to mankind, you've worked for years to develop it, in spite of tough sanctions and threats of attacks, and you're going to hand them over to a terrorist group over which you do not exercise total control? Not bloody likely!
Is this a happy compromise? No. But the other options are even worse. The world is not safe from nuclear weapons, but Pakistan and India provide further evidence that its destruction is probably not imminent: The countries hate each other, they are right next to each other, Pakistan is unstable and unpredictable, and yet no nukes have gone off. Instead, the conflict has been frozen. Both sides have become more cautious, and neither has been able to make any headway on its agenda. Frozen conflicts aren't great, either, but after a long freeze, future generations might forget what the fuss is all about and finally decide to resolve them peacefully, rather than letting them return to hot war or simply fester in the tundra. Nuclear weapons, then, force something like the Islamic concept of a hudna, or temporary cease-fire. The idea is to stop fighting and let the next generation decide how to take it from there. Strange love indeed.
Ah, the complexities of today's world. Wouldn't it be nice to go back to when things were simpler: When we only had to worry about Soviet nukes being fired from Cuba; or West Berlin, a city surrounded by communist East Germany, being attacked by Soviet forces thus testing the US commitment to treating Berlin as if it were New York, possibly causing nuclear war? If you haven't gathered this already: this is sarcasm. There may have been only "one" enemy during the Cold War, but it was, especially through the 1960s, a terrifying time for the entire world. Just a bit of perspective on Iranian nukes.
I am neither a hawk nor a dove, so let's address both extremes of the spectrum before we begin. First off, the doves: All signs point to Iran developing nuclear weapons -- even the IAEA, once reluctant to draw conclusions, has now verified this (see in particular point 43 of its report). If it is not developing nuclear weapons, then it is doing everything it can to give that impression, for example by keeping secrets and building underground nuclear facilities. Since Iran would gain little from such a ruse (pretending to already HAVE nukes could prevent countries from attacking you, claiming you are developing them when you're not, ENCOURAGES attacks), we must conclude that it is really doing it. Iran is NOT harmless, and talk from the US and Israel about its dangers is not a pretext for launching wars that both want to get into just for the hell of it, or whatever it is that leftists think is the conspiratorial reasoning for all this. Iran has supported insurgents in Iraq, as well as the terror/militia groups/political parties Hamas and, most notably, Hezbollah, which follows the lead of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The issue against the Hawks, who would bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, is a bit more complex because their line, unlike that of the leftist doves who think Iran's leaders are lovely, peace-loving people, is more credible. The main issue here, though, is that an attack would almost certainly not stop Iran from getting a bomb. For one thing, no one knows if there are additional secret enrichment facilities in Iran like the one discovered in September 2009. Iran is set to transfer production to an alleged number of secret facilities, which are reported to be bomb-proof, even if all of them could be found. Could Iran be bluffing to deter an attack by making it sound futile? Sure, this is international politics and diplomacy after all. Lies abound. But can we afford to assume it's a bluff? No, and that's the problem.
What's more, an attack on Iran carries incredible risks. Unless it were successful in completely wiping out Iran's nuclear development capabilities and killing most of its nuclear scientists, a near miracle if you think about it (and even then: once you've gotten through the complexities once, the second development run ought to be faster), Iran will simply be delayed -- and really angry. Sure, Iran spews hatred for the West and above all Israel, which carried out attacks on its nuclear facilities once before. Increasing its determination further still seems unwise, however.
Dr. Strangelove time
So what can we do? It seems ever more likely that Iran will get the bomb no matter what we do. This does not have to be the end of Israel or civilization as we know it. Keep in mind that only two atom bombs have ever been used in the history of nuclear arms. Further, it's important to note two factors in that case: Japan could not retaliate with nuclear weapons, and Japan and the US were locked in a brutal war and the US stood to bring the war to a quick end, preventing further US casualties and expense, by dropping two bombs. Whatever your feelings about the morality of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, the US had every incentive to do it, and there was essentially no risk. Iran has nothing to gain by using its nukes first or giving them to terrorist groups -- and everything to lose by doing either.
So what's the point of having the bomb in the first place if it is useless? Careful! I said that it makes no sense to use nukes first in the current situation, but that doesn't mean they're not useful. As Kenneth Waltz, the high priest of international political theory, points out: "the usefulness of force should not be confused with its usability... [that would be] comparable to saying that the police force that seldom if ever employs violence is weak or that a police force is strong only when policemen are shooting their guns... [or] that a man with large assets is not rich if he spends little money or that a man is rich only if he spends a lot of it."1 The main use for Iran's weapons, when they're finally developed, is deterrence: it becomes much more unlikely that anyone will attack a nuclear-armed Iran, giving Iran greater freedom of political mobility. That is hugely useful.
"You're assuming Iran's leaders aren't nuts." You're right. And what is it about their actions that would lead us to think otherwise? Since I've pointed out that nuclear weapons are quite useful, even if this usefulness is not bound up with their actual use, the mere fact of them pressing on with the project implies paranoia about foreign influence or fear of attack -- but also rationality. Let's also not forget that Iran has been subject to heavy foreign interference in its affairs since the early 19th century, first by Britain and Russia, and later by the United States (the greatest example of which is the toppling of the Iranian government with US (CIA) assistance to re-instate the western-oriented Shah in 1953). So Iran has reason to be "paranoid," if the word can still be used to describe justified fear -- which would be an oxymoron; so no, it can't. Also, if you want to make people uncertain of your next move and encourage them to be extra cautious, it's a good idea to scare the crap out of them by making them think you're crazy. Kim Jong-Il (who has apparently just died!) was a master of this art, and the Iranian leaders may be, too. Note that Kim never really attacked South Korea, an easy target (Kim has tested South Korea's determination by firing at its ships and a small island near the border, but these tests showed South Korea was not just going to be pushed over).
We thought the Soviets were crazy enough to put ideology above reason, too, but they never did anything unreasonable. If Iran were to launch nukes at Israel, it would surely be completely destroyed by Israeli retaliation -- a pointless action. Likewise with an attack on Saudi Arabia, Iran's real arch rival in the region. The US could very well feel the need to launch a nuclear counterattack in that case as well. Or Israel might do it. In that case, too, Iran would have even less sympathy than it already does, for it clearly would be the aggressor. In the end, then, nukes are very useful for Iran in deterring foreign attacks and influence. They are not so useful if they explode, and that includes at the hands of Iran-linked terrorists. The bombs can be traced, and Iran would face a brutal retaliation if any of its bombs went off as a result of it giving them to terrorists. Plus: you have the most destructive weapon known to mankind, you've worked for years to develop it, in spite of tough sanctions and threats of attacks, and you're going to hand them over to a terrorist group over which you do not exercise total control? Not bloody likely!
Is this a happy compromise? No. But the other options are even worse. The world is not safe from nuclear weapons, but Pakistan and India provide further evidence that its destruction is probably not imminent: The countries hate each other, they are right next to each other, Pakistan is unstable and unpredictable, and yet no nukes have gone off. Instead, the conflict has been frozen. Both sides have become more cautious, and neither has been able to make any headway on its agenda. Frozen conflicts aren't great, either, but after a long freeze, future generations might forget what the fuss is all about and finally decide to resolve them peacefully, rather than letting them return to hot war or simply fester in the tundra. Nuclear weapons, then, force something like the Islamic concept of a hudna, or temporary cease-fire. The idea is to stop fighting and let the next generation decide how to take it from there. Strange love indeed.
- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): 185.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
The Difficulties of Deterrence
As my regular readers and friends will know, I am writing a PhD on the use and effectiveness of deterrent policies against terrorism. It's an important subject, because the way a state decides to fight terrorism can protect people from harm, but it can also cost vast sums of money, endanger the lives of soldiers, kill civilians, topple governments, cause global outcries, and quite possibly result in incentives leading to more terrorism, not less. It also might not even protect many people from much harm if the policy is flawed. In other words: it's a matter of life and death.
So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.
A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.
A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).
OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.
So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.
Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.
This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.
So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.
A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.
A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).
OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.
So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.
Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.
This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.
Saturday, November 5, 2011
Immigration and Its (European) Malcontents
I had a discussion with a pair of colleagues recently about immigration and immigrants in the US and various parts of Europe. I wasn't particularly surprised to be representing the most "pro-immigration" line. I put that in quotes because I don't see it that way myself. My view on illegal immigration is pretty hard-line, really. My issue is that the legal sort of immigration is full of difficult barriers and policies that overtly discriminate against the poor and are at base, though perhaps inadvertently, racist. Under such circumstances, it's not surprising that illegal immigration flourishes.
A quick overview of how immigration laws are too strict (if you think they're too lax, bear with me here, because I'll get to the legitimate concerns people have below): in America in particular, businesses complain that they cannot get the skilled workers they need because of immigration problems. We're talking about the bright, young, able, get-up-and-go people that have made America such a dynamic place. The backlash against illegal immigration in America has led to a clamp-down on all forms, including that of people who ought to be let in. This lack of workers for key areas has driven up wages for some people, while they have stagnated for others. This has increased income inequality, contrary to what some people seem to believe about immigration. As a gay man with a foreign partner, I also regularly bemoan the federal government's refusal to recognize us as a couple so that he may immigrate to the the US (he is also a well qualified, hard-working individual). But I recognize that I'm from a small subset of society, so I'll focus on the main things.
I'll move back towards the title topic now: there are "problems" that people have with immigration, and not all of them can be brushed off as racism. In some ways, the social systems of Europe make the problems more acute. They have less illegal immigration (hence the term "Fortress Europe"), but immigrants here are often stereotyped as a drag on the system all the same. One of the main worries goes something like this: A UK citizen from Bangladesh decides to marry a woman from his home village (presumably because UK women are too uppity). He does not make a whole lot of money, and his new bride does not speak English, has few skills, and will not bring money at all. With her and perhaps some children to support, they will rely on social spending. There are therefore laws in Britain that stipulate a minimum income for a sponsor before someone can immigrate as a spouse (the US has them, too). Some people think the bar should be raised higher, though, beyond the level that would get them off social support. They are right to point out that taxes on other people must be higher to support this non-integrated Bangladeshi family.
This is where I, the classic liberal, said "well, so what? He is a UK citizen and, like any other UK citizen, has the right to marry whomever he pleases and has the same rights as any other when it comes to the UK's social system. There are plenty of ethnic Britons who require assistance from the state as well!" I naively thought the argument might end there. It didn't. "Yes, but they're here already. That doesn't mean we have to let in more people knowing that they will be a burden on everyone else, too."
Ahh, here's the racist part: they're South Asian, so they'll be a burden, just like those dirty Eastern Europeans. Well, that comeback was a bit unfair of me, as my colleagues pointed out, because the estimation that a man on a low income would struggle to support a wife unlikely to get a job due to her low skills and lack of English is clearly reasonable! They are right, of course, and that is regardless of race or ethnic origin. Still, I wasn't completely wrong: one colleague insisted that certain people have not proved themselves to be hardworking. That is clearly racist, despite the ensuing arguments, because whatever the truth statistically (and I am unaware of the statistics on this), this fails to look at root causes and, here's the important part: is racist because it lumps an entire race or ethnicity together into one stereotyped class. Sorry guys, that's actually the definition of racism. "It's not racism if it's 'true' " is not how it works! There is a difference between recognizing that African American men are more like to go to prison than white American men, on the one hand, and deciding not to give an African American man a job because he is presumably criminal on the other. The former is not racist, the latter most definitely is -- regardless of whether or not there is some logic at the base of discrimination!
Glossing over the race issue for a moment, which I think (hope?) was just a muddled reaction to conclusions that are correct at base: are we obliged to accept anyone into our country (whichever one that is) even if we believe they'll be a burden on taxpayers? How about this: don't believe -- find out! That was my proposed solution. Make people learn at least a basic level of the country's main language before they immigrate. That seems fair. What? They won't have enough money in their home countries to go to classes? If it's a poor country, chances are classes are cheap. And they're marrying someone with a job from a richer country -- if s/he can't dish out for a few language classes, then I think we really do have a problem.
Once they're in the country, they're presumably not citizens overnight. There is no reason why they must be provided immediate access to social benefits, particularly if they have met minimum income requirements for sponsorship. Maybe there could be a probationary period in which they must show that they can support themselves without benefits before they are granted citizenship and "recourse to public funds" as they say here in the UK. This brings problems of having to deport people after they've lived in the country for a couple years already, which is painful and will always be a bit inhumane. But consider that the alternative may be to deny them access in the first place, simply because we "believe" they're not the sort to go out and get a job or start a successful business themselves upon arrival. The other alternative of just letting all married people in, I fear, ignores real anxieties that people have and opens the social system up to abuse and strain.
My liberal values tell me everyone should be given a chance, regardless of the "true" statistics about their group's traits, whether that group is defined ethnically, geographically, sexually, religiously, etc. As an economic liberal (a "conservative" in American terms), they also tell me that we are not obliged to provide equal outcomes for everyone. Not giving something to someone is not the same as taking something away. This doesn't mean, however, that it's all right to base these decisions on policies designed to appear economic, while looking suspiciously as if they were designed to ensnare specific ethnic groups in response to public pressure -- all while hiding behind "rational racism" based on statistical evidence.
For my next post, I plan to talk about Racism, "Culturalism" (a new term I've just heard that sounds suspiciously like a PC attempt to mask racism or apply the same ideas to a non-racial group), and value-relativism (the idea that everyone's ideas and values are equal, which is where I draw the line as far as being PC goes).
I look forward to any comments on either topic!
A quick overview of how immigration laws are too strict (if you think they're too lax, bear with me here, because I'll get to the legitimate concerns people have below): in America in particular, businesses complain that they cannot get the skilled workers they need because of immigration problems. We're talking about the bright, young, able, get-up-and-go people that have made America such a dynamic place. The backlash against illegal immigration in America has led to a clamp-down on all forms, including that of people who ought to be let in. This lack of workers for key areas has driven up wages for some people, while they have stagnated for others. This has increased income inequality, contrary to what some people seem to believe about immigration. As a gay man with a foreign partner, I also regularly bemoan the federal government's refusal to recognize us as a couple so that he may immigrate to the the US (he is also a well qualified, hard-working individual). But I recognize that I'm from a small subset of society, so I'll focus on the main things.
I'll move back towards the title topic now: there are "problems" that people have with immigration, and not all of them can be brushed off as racism. In some ways, the social systems of Europe make the problems more acute. They have less illegal immigration (hence the term "Fortress Europe"), but immigrants here are often stereotyped as a drag on the system all the same. One of the main worries goes something like this: A UK citizen from Bangladesh decides to marry a woman from his home village (presumably because UK women are too uppity). He does not make a whole lot of money, and his new bride does not speak English, has few skills, and will not bring money at all. With her and perhaps some children to support, they will rely on social spending. There are therefore laws in Britain that stipulate a minimum income for a sponsor before someone can immigrate as a spouse (the US has them, too). Some people think the bar should be raised higher, though, beyond the level that would get them off social support. They are right to point out that taxes on other people must be higher to support this non-integrated Bangladeshi family.
This is where I, the classic liberal, said "well, so what? He is a UK citizen and, like any other UK citizen, has the right to marry whomever he pleases and has the same rights as any other when it comes to the UK's social system. There are plenty of ethnic Britons who require assistance from the state as well!" I naively thought the argument might end there. It didn't. "Yes, but they're here already. That doesn't mean we have to let in more people knowing that they will be a burden on everyone else, too."
Ahh, here's the racist part: they're South Asian, so they'll be a burden, just like those dirty Eastern Europeans. Well, that comeback was a bit unfair of me, as my colleagues pointed out, because the estimation that a man on a low income would struggle to support a wife unlikely to get a job due to her low skills and lack of English is clearly reasonable! They are right, of course, and that is regardless of race or ethnic origin. Still, I wasn't completely wrong: one colleague insisted that certain people have not proved themselves to be hardworking. That is clearly racist, despite the ensuing arguments, because whatever the truth statistically (and I am unaware of the statistics on this), this fails to look at root causes and, here's the important part: is racist because it lumps an entire race or ethnicity together into one stereotyped class. Sorry guys, that's actually the definition of racism. "It's not racism if it's 'true' " is not how it works! There is a difference between recognizing that African American men are more like to go to prison than white American men, on the one hand, and deciding not to give an African American man a job because he is presumably criminal on the other. The former is not racist, the latter most definitely is -- regardless of whether or not there is some logic at the base of discrimination!
Glossing over the race issue for a moment, which I think (hope?) was just a muddled reaction to conclusions that are correct at base: are we obliged to accept anyone into our country (whichever one that is) even if we believe they'll be a burden on taxpayers? How about this: don't believe -- find out! That was my proposed solution. Make people learn at least a basic level of the country's main language before they immigrate. That seems fair. What? They won't have enough money in their home countries to go to classes? If it's a poor country, chances are classes are cheap. And they're marrying someone with a job from a richer country -- if s/he can't dish out for a few language classes, then I think we really do have a problem.
Once they're in the country, they're presumably not citizens overnight. There is no reason why they must be provided immediate access to social benefits, particularly if they have met minimum income requirements for sponsorship. Maybe there could be a probationary period in which they must show that they can support themselves without benefits before they are granted citizenship and "recourse to public funds" as they say here in the UK. This brings problems of having to deport people after they've lived in the country for a couple years already, which is painful and will always be a bit inhumane. But consider that the alternative may be to deny them access in the first place, simply because we "believe" they're not the sort to go out and get a job or start a successful business themselves upon arrival. The other alternative of just letting all married people in, I fear, ignores real anxieties that people have and opens the social system up to abuse and strain.
My liberal values tell me everyone should be given a chance, regardless of the "true" statistics about their group's traits, whether that group is defined ethnically, geographically, sexually, religiously, etc. As an economic liberal (a "conservative" in American terms), they also tell me that we are not obliged to provide equal outcomes for everyone. Not giving something to someone is not the same as taking something away. This doesn't mean, however, that it's all right to base these decisions on policies designed to appear economic, while looking suspiciously as if they were designed to ensnare specific ethnic groups in response to public pressure -- all while hiding behind "rational racism" based on statistical evidence.
For my next post, I plan to talk about Racism, "Culturalism" (a new term I've just heard that sounds suspiciously like a PC attempt to mask racism or apply the same ideas to a non-racial group), and value-relativism (the idea that everyone's ideas and values are equal, which is where I draw the line as far as being PC goes).
I look forward to any comments on either topic!
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