Abortion as a right... and obligation?

I had a interesting (and somewhat fiery) discussion with a student the other day. We are both pro-choice, so it was a bit surprising that the excitement occurred while discussing abortion. She bemoaned that doctors in Austria are not required to perform abortions at the patient's behest. I said I thought that was just fine. She was angry, because abortion in Austria is still technically illegal, though it has been decriminalized, so there's apparently little problem in getting one in practice, especially in "liberal" Vienna. Well, she has a point, and as a pro-choice supporter, I think it should be up to the individuals involved to decide.

Still, abortion is not "just a medical procedure" like any other, as she tried to convince me. There are real ethical considerations involved, not to mention some very strong feelings (as she herself can surely attest). To brush others' concerns aside would be to commit the same bigotry that pro-lifers, in my view, do: wishing to force those who disagree with them to live by their rules.

To a certain extent, civilization requires that we do just that. Just a small example: I have been known to voice the opinion that speed limits in America are too low. Still, when I drive fast and am caught, I have to pay a fine. This is called the rule of law. It is definitely not tyranny, despite what some anarchists might have you believe. Again, though, abortion isn't just some ordinance. It is a topic that very often defies consensus. At the root of the problem are differing beliefs about when life itself begins. Such a question is almost impossible to answer in a way that will satisfy everyone. For this reason, the most logical conclusion for me seems to be to allow individuals to choose whether or not to have an abortion. At the same time, though, I think most people would agree that abortions are not wonderful things, but are instead a last resort. Efforts to encourage mothers to give up children for adoption, to help young mothers raise them themselves, etc., are all all right, so long as the mother, in the end, is free to decide.

So back to the doctors, now. Following the logic that abortion is controversial because the point at which life begins cannot really be defined, it stands to reason that doctors, too, may disagree on abortion. Some doctors may have deeply held convictions that tell them that abortion, when the mother's life is not in danger, is wrong. Maybe they just feel uncomfortable with it. After all, I have been told, and this seems very plausible, that few women choose to have an abortion lightly. It may be a decision that haunts them long afterwards. Why should we assume doctors are any different? They may also suffer from a moral dilemma and be robbed of sleep at night, even if they feel they've made the right choice, due to the difficulty of making such a decision at all. Because of this, I feel it is only fair that doctors be free to choose whether to perform abortions or not, assuming the woman's life is not in immediate danger (this caveat is crucial). Maybe they could be required to refer patients in a timely manner to another doctor who will do it. Another reason is that I suspect that the quality of a doctor's work might suffer if s/he were performing an operation s/he were strongly opposed to.

Let's remember that the guiding principle here is freedom. I know, it sounds really cliché and Bush-esque, but it's true. A woman's freedom to choose should not infringe upon a doctor's right to do the same.

In the long run, commodities are a bad bet

Commodities are booming at the moment. If you also happened to buy into silver at any time in the last year, you'll know this. It's seems as if the commodity boom will have no end. The "optimists" point out that we have a limited supply of natural resources, and demand for them shows no sign of declining.

True, but there is a serious flaw to this logic. There's a market adage that basically says if you bet raw materials are going to get more expensive, you are selling human ingenuity short, and you are also betting on political stupidity and greed. Over the past century, commodities have actually gotten cheaper in real terms, according to The Economist. This has been due to ingenuity (vast increases in efficiency, mining, transport, and production).

Political stupidity and greed seem like pretty good long-term (or any-term, really) bets. But hold on: if you are betting on commodity price increases and greed, you are also betting on economic growth to drive those prices up. Failing ingenuity, if prices continued to rise, this would eventually stall growth and cause them to fall again (much as they did a mere two years ago).

Commodity prices can only rise if ingenuity is insufficient while growth nonetheless remains strong (let's just assume government foolishness and avarice are a given). Since rising prices eventually destroy growth, commodity prices essentially check themselves over time. The questions are:

1. How long a time?
2. What's going to bring them down; ingenuity, or recession?

These questions matter a lot, because some answers are painful. One way or another, though, another old adage will surely hold true: what goes up, must come down.

Palestinian elections in the West Bank: An opportunity for Fatah AND Israel

There has been talk of legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank, which would occur in September. This is an opportunity for Fatah to strengthen its mandate. It is also an opportunity for Israel. The reason? Hamas is refusing to go along with elections. This is good news for moderates for two reasons:

1. Hamas cannot come to power in the West Bank if it does not run. The idea of Hamas actually coming to power there gives Israelis chills.
2. It shows Palestinians that Hamas is not a viable alternative. Hamas's failure to hold elections lays bare its lack of democratic credentials.

If done right, then, the Palestinian Authority can show that it is the legitimate representative of the people, at least in the West Bank, while calling Hamas's credibility into question, including within the Gaza Strip. Israel and the West would do well to support free and fair elections and to respect their outcome. The alternative would likely be Palestinian unrest caused by an increasing sense that their (nominal) government is not respecting their wishes. This would be bad news for Israel, too.

What happens if Hamas, recognizing that it is being shown up, decides to hold elections in the Gaza Strip and to campaign in the West Bank? This is Israel's nightmare scenario, ending with Hamas winning both Palestinian territories. It doesn't have to end that way, however. It is not certain that Hamas would win. Israel and the West cannot continue with the cognitive dissonance of claiming to support democracy and human rights and then refusing to recognize elected governments, however.

This does not mean it should sit idly by. Many Western governments provide financial support to Fatah in the West Bank. They should continue to do so to support its campaign there, while underlining Hamas's failings. Concessions from Israel would help put Fatah in a better light as well. Isn't this outside influence just another form of meddling in "free" elections? Yes, but the choice and power would still be with the voters in the end. Under normal circumstances, this sort of meddling would be unacceptable, but these are not normal circumstances, I think we can all agree.

What if Hamas participated and won both territories? I'm not sure how likely that is, especially if other things are done right. Still, it is a possibility. One positive result would be Palestinian unity that would give Hamas a stake in the outcome of talks regarding all Palestinian land. Sure, this strengthening of their position would by default mean a weakening of Israel's. I would note, however, that Hamas has actually done a good job of keeping violence at bay in the Gaza Strip and promoting stability there. Hamas's rhetoric is still horridly anti-Israeli and sounds dangerous. It would be naive to underestimate this. Still, we are seeing an age-old effect: once the terrorist-insurgent group becomes a government, it has a stake in stability and non-violence. Controlling a state tends to have a moderating effect if one looks past rhetoric.

Why? It's hard to threaten an insurgent group. Invade? Big deal. We're guerrilla fighters and want to bring down the state anyway! That would only HELP us! If a group controls a country, however, the calculus looks decidedly different. Now there is someone who can answer for misdeeds who is a legitimate representative of the people there. They can be held to account more easily.

There are dangers, but the situation will only get more heated over time anyway. It's not now or never, but it is now or at some-unexpected-and-inconvenient-time-in-the-future-selected-by-revolutionaries. It's a choice between risky but principled vs. dangerous and fiery-ideological. I know what I'd pick...

Why inflation outside the US is neither the Fed's fault nor its problem

There's been a lot of bellyaching around the world lately about the US and, to a degree, Europe exporting their loose monetary policies to the rest of the world and causing inflation. It's mostly the US that people complain about, and European commentators do their fair share of the complaining as well. An article in Der Standard, a daily paper based in Vienna, Austria, this week claimed that the US was attempting to solve its problems by pushing them onto others by devaluing its currency. The currency value is a separate (though related) issue, so I'll come back to that later.

World-wide rates of inflation are neither the US central bank's fault, nor are they something the Fed should really care about. Other countries' inflationary problems are just that: their problems. It may sound harsh, but it's actually not. It helps, too, that this is simply the truth.

The Federal Reserve, the US's central bank, has the responsibility of setting and targeting interest rates for the United States. Its concerns are ensuring price stability and low unemployment. Over the last few decades, it's done a pretty good job at both, though it definitely shares blame for the financial crisis and the high unemployment it caused. The past has been discussed enough here, however (see previous articles on the subject starting in 2008). The reason interest rates in America are at record lows is very simple: unemployment is high and core inflation is extremely low at 0.8%. Most banks in the rich world target rates of around 2%. The Federal Reserve is, very rightly, concerned about deflation at the moment. Deflation would mean falling prices. It is very dangerous because falling prices encourage people to save more and spend less, which causes prices to fall farther. This is because you would rather save your money a little longer, knowing that TV you wanted will get cheaper. Likewise, companies concerned about costs will be reluctant to invest, as the prices they can charge will fall in the future. All this makes spending now less appealing than spending later. Cue the vicious cycle of deflation and recession. Cue Japan since its financial crisis in the early '90s. What's more, interest rates cannot drop below 0%, meaning deflation would be extremely hard to fight once it got going. With unemployment high and people worried about the economy, booming demand is also unlikely to drive up prices. All good reasons for super low rates. This is the Federal Reserve's responsibility. If the US economy sinks into deflation, the whole world would suffer from that, too.

The reason the inflation in the rest of the world is not the Fed's problem comes in two parts. For one, it is simply not its mandate. More importantly (and less selfishly), however: other states can set monetary policies of their own independent of the Fed. It is only their reluctance to do so that is causing problems! Economic conditions vary around the world and call for varied monetary policies. Overheating developing countries should raise policy rates, allow their currencies to appreciate, and yes: instate capital controls. A good way to do this would not be caps, but rather taxes on capital inflows (as Brazil has done). This would make their currencies effectively more expensive, while not damaging exports or encouraging imports too much. This damage to exports and encouragement of imports is a worry for developing countries that are on the receiving end of cash looking for higher returns. (If cash inflows drive up the currency, the country's exports become more expensive and imports become cheaper.) It is a justified worry, but the solutions lie with the countries in question -- not with the Fed. If the Fed were to raise rates just to make others happy, it would destroy the US's meager recovery, which would hurt everyone else, too. It just makes no sense.

Since inflation and hot money in the developing world are not the Fed's problem and can be addressed by developing world central banks, it stands to reason that the "fault" lies with them, not the Fed. Case closed.

How about the dollar devaluation Europeans are moaning about? Far from "pushing its problems on others," the Fed is now actually moving America out of a position where it buys everyone else's stuff on credit (essentially subsidizing everyone else's economies while plunging itself foolishly into debt). The US dollar is overvalued, judging by America's current account (essentially trade) deficit with the rest of the world. America's consumers are broke. They can't keep buying everyone else's stuff anymore. Sorry. You'll have to look for customers elsewhere, perhaps in your own country (Germany and China!). A devaluation of the dollar would be part of the global process of rebalancing that needs to happen for the world economy to be on a stronger footing. America needs to consume less; and save, invest, and export more. Places like Germany and China need to do the opposite. Germany can't go on repressing spending and wages within its borders to sell more and buy less outside its borders. The Fed is (actually inadvertently) taking a step in that direction.

Have monetary problems? Then implement policies to address them and stop whining about the Fed. Unless you're whining about overly lax regulation and the Fed's tendency to inflate bubbles repeatedly. Those are legitimate criticisms (and the latter is admittedly related to loose policy). We can discuss those another day (and I have in the past as well, the posts are still on this site). For now, suffice it to say that the Fed's policy, while not without risks for America itself, is necessary and the only real option. What's more, other countries are not powerless in the face of any possible risks and have the ability to protect themselves, if this is even really necessary. They should implement sensible policies themselves. The world is changing. Get over it and start changing with it.

Saudi Arabia: The Elefant in the Room

The protests in Egypt, which now seem to be dying down, leaving the regime still in place, have sparked a lot of talk about what other countries in the Arab world might have their autocratic regimes toppled by protesters. Jordan and Yemen, having experienced protests already, are obvious candidates. Absent from most discussions, though, is Saudi Arabia. This is presumably because most view it to be rock-solid. Or is it because the idea of a revolution or civil war breaking out in Saudi Arabia is too frightening to contemplate?

Robert Baer famously argued in an article in the Atlantic Monthly back in 2003 that Saudi Arabia was not nearly as stable as many presumed/wished. Aside from concerns about Saudi money funding Islamist outfits all over the globe (read the article, it's an eye-opener), the assertions of the frailty of the regime, as well as of the importance of stability in Saudi Arabia for world political and economic security, are unnerving:

• "Saudi Arabia controls the largest share of the world's oil and serves as the market regulator for the global petroleum industry.
• If the Saudi oil spigot is shut off, by terrorism or by political revolution, the effect on the global economy... will be devastating.
• Saudi oil is controlled by an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional, and out-of-touch royal family that is hated by the people it rules and by the nations that surround its kingdom."

What's more, Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure is very vulnerable to attack. Shutting down just one or two major processing centers and pipelines could essentially stop the oil flow out of the kingdom. This could happen as a side-effect of a revolution (e.g. through neglect and a collapse in the support infrastructure between governments). Gasoline prices of $4 per gallon would then seem Utopian. The weak recoveries in the rich world could end with high inflation and higher interest rates. Unemployment would rise further.

Then there are the political consequences. Right now, US-backed Saudi Arabia can be counted on to act as a counterweight to Iran in the region and to ensure the free flow of oil and other goods off both of its coasts. Indeed, one theory about the reasoning behind the Iraq War was that some US policymakers feared the eventual collapse of Saudi Arabia and wanted to create an American ally (Iraq) to counterbalance Iran's influences in the region. If Egypt were ruled even by a moderate grouping including the Muslim Brotherhood, it could nonetheless be expected to take a decidedly less pro-Western stance. Now imagine losing Saudi Arabia as an ally, too, which has generally been willing to boost oil output when the US was in need and to provide a moderating political influence in the Middle East (at least through its official diplomacy, if not through the Islamist ventures it funds abroad!).

If Egypt and Saudi Arabia became real democracies (and this is a big "if," especially in the case of the latter), this would be something to celebrate, even as we learned to deal with the political and economic consequences as best we could. There is a whole range of possible scenarios. Some of them, though, border on the apocalyptic. Baer believes it's only a matter of time before Saudi Arabia collapses. It could be a turbulent and, at times, scary new world.

Egypt: a pretty pickle for America

Unrest continues in Egypt, sparked by the overthrow of the Ben Ali government in Tunisia. Egyptians want an end to the repressive regime of "President" Hosni Mubarak. Here in Vienna, protesters held up banners at Stephansplatz, the city's central square. The banners demanded "freedom for Egypt" and decried US and EU support for the Mubarak regime.

It looks like Egypt could conceivably head towards democracy. So why aren't the US and European countries rushing to push for this? The West's support for a repressive regime in Egypt began after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Then Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, facing a nearly bankrupt state, civil unrest, and an Israeli occupation of much of its territory, realized that his only hope for a solution to all these interrelated problems was to get the US interested in the matter. He ejected Soviet military advisors from Egypt. It didn't help. In 1973, he started a war with Israel and gained back some territory. He stopped short, however, thinking international diplomacy would take it from there. Instead, this gave Israel time to regroup. It fought back and made large gains. The Camp David Accords settled the matter, for the most part, giving Egypt back the Sinai Peninsula. This was seen as a sell-out by much of the Arab world. Egypt thus became politically isolated from the rest of the Middle East. This meant it was more reliant on the US.

The US, for its part, was now more interested in providing support because of a simple calculus: if Egypt had continued to move forward, the US might have gotten dragged into a war on Israel's side. This might have brought in the Soviet Union on Egypt's side. This could have happened the other way around as well. No one wanted a direct war between the US and USSR. The US, from the 1970s on, took a closer interest in the Middle East and supported Egypt as a military power to help maintain stability in the region. This was useful as Iran's revolution meant that it turned away from the US. Egypt and later Saudi Arabia began to be seen as bulwarks against instability and terrorism.

Things have changed a bit. What to do? The alliance with Mubarak has always been an uncomfortable one of convenience. The US promotes democracy where it can, but must consider when it may be better to promote stability over democracy. Stability may not longer be viable in Egypt, so perhaps the US can support stability by supporting democracy -- carefully.

US policymakers are worried about the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas, a Palestinian terror group-cum-political party (and rulers of the Gaza Strip), is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of its members are extremist. They would probably win an election in Egypt. The problem is: there's a good possibility that they would only have ONE election. Then we'd have a repressive regime again, but one that is also anti-American.

Maybe this is inevitable. Give the people of Egypt the chance to choose for themselves. In the long run, having a repressive regime that was NOT kept alive by America would be a good thing, and would help America out of the cognitive dissonance caused by propping up an authoritarian regime. Egyptians might then no longer see America as the enemy behind the scenes. The current regime, regardless of the outcome of the current unrest, is not sustainable, in any case. Perhaps the US can provide careful support and midwife true democracy? Sound overly optimistic?

Sources: http://english.aljazeera.net/ and

Cleveland, William, and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009. 

North Korea: Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain (China)

The situation with North Korea can seem confusing and infuriating. Why does North Korea provoke and then act friendly? Why is it so bent on getting nukes? Is Kim crazy? Why does China support North Korea, a would-be nuclear power in its backyard?

The answers to all these questions become pretty clear if you think of them as North Korean or Chinese leaders would. Why does North Korea yo-yo? Simple: it really wants nukes. Every time talks and improving relations get to the point where there's nowhere to go but giving them up, Kim starts the cycle from the beginning. He provokes, gets everyone riled up, then quiets down before a real mess starts and asks for negotiations again. All this buys time and has thus far avoided any real armed conflict. North Korea is closer to being able to launch nuclear warheads that can travel long distances, a considerable increase in its deterrent capability. At the same time, no one has attacked North Korea. A pretty successful strategy, from Kim's perspective.

But why is he so bent on getting nukes? This one is easy: no one invades a country with nukes, especially ones that pose a credible threat (they're borderline in North Korea, but still a risk), especially when no one is sure where they all are (the case in North Korea and Iran).

This leaves us with the last question: what's China's plan? Let's be China for a moment. What do we want? The same things most other countries want: autonomy in our internal affairs, security internationally, and to be able to trade freely with the rest of the world. North Korea would seem to cause insecurity, and America is a supporter of free trade, both ideologically and physically, with its naval presence in the western Pacific. This would seem to encourage China to take the US side on North Korea. It doesn't, because China dislikes US pressure to change its internal situation (criticism of the management of its exchange rate or its human rights record, for example) and sees its ability to project power in its region limited only by the US presence there, regardless of US intentions. These concerns seem to override, or at least ameliorate, China's worries over North Korea. The old diplomatic adage "let's you and him fight" applies here. China welcomes a distraction for America, while also free-riding on American action (it does not really want North Korea to become more powerful). China is also afraid of a collapse of the Kim regime because this might cause streams of refuges into China.

What should the US do? It is currently being duped by North Korea and China: paying for security in the region while not getting anywhere as far as its goals in the region. As I've argued previously, the US should make this China's problem. It should back up South Korea (and Japan) in the region where necessary, but it should not take the lead. This would force China to be more actively involved. It would make it impossible for China to free-ride on US peace-keeping and would also reduce the distraction-factor with regard to North Korea. It would also help to allay concerns about America's strong presence in the region because America would be speaking softly (while still carrying a "big stick"; Teddy Roosevelt would approve). China wishes to be a world power and claims to want peace. Here is its chance.

Unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian State may seem like a good idea -- it isn't

As Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem forever unable to settle their differences and agree to live side-by-side, and as Israeli settlements continue to go up in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, some states have begun to recognize a State of Palestine. In fact, the EU recently even seemed to imply that recognizing Israel implicitly meant recognizing Palestine. Wouldn't recognizing Palestine be a way to strong-arm the two sides into finally coming to an agreement and letting everybody get on with their lives? How likely is such an action?

As you may have guessed from the title, the answers are "not really" and "not very." First off, how good of an idea is unilateral recognition really? Recognition is a discretionary act. States are generally free to (not) recognize whomever they wish. Usually, though, one standard for recognition is that a state has a government that effectively controls its territory and the people in it. That can't be said for a would-be Palestine. There are three governments involved: the Palestinian Authority (Fatah), Israel, and Hamas.

"This is just legal doctrine," you might say. "Who cares?" It matters. By recognizing a Palestinian State, this would imply that relations between us and the Palestinian state are state-to-state. This would cause quite a legal pickle. States have a right to sovereignty and non-intervention. Doing business with Israel, whose presence would almost certainly be undesired within the new Palestine, could then be viewed as supporting an illegal breach of Palestinian sovereignty. This could conceivably allow the Palestinian Government to sue in, say, German courts companies and other organizations doing business with Israel deemed to support the government's occupation of another State.


This would force governments into uncomfortable situations. They should not recognize a Palestinian State unless they are ready for these situations and ready to be consistent with the implications for foreign policy. Most states in the "West" are not ready for this. They know this, too, which makes such a declaration unlikely until they are closer to being ready.

The other issue is more pragmatic: who would states do business with? Would they consider the PA the government of all of Palestine and ignore Hamas in Gaza (broadly in line with current policy)? Recognition by a majority of states around the globe might indeed force Israel out of Palestine, especially (and particularly) if the US were on board. This would cause a power vacuum, giving the PA and Hamas an opportunity to fight for control, but also opening up the possibility to further, smaller groups. International action could be required to stop the country from collapsing into violence, and Israel might simply go right back in.

In short: declaring that a Palestinian State exists would do nothing to solve immediate Palestinian problems. There still would be no unity and no viable government there. The border issue would still be unresolved, no matter what borders recognizing countries might unilaterally decide to recognize (if any, this is not a requirement of recognition). It would put additional pressure on Israel, which might cause less moderate groups to gain more power there, polarizing the situation further. Finally, it would cause legal conundrums at home. What would be the point of all that?

It is time to put more pressure on both sides to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But the issues must be resolved from the ground up, starting with borders. A top-down approach based on unilateral recognition is messy, risky, and quite possibly counterproductive. There are no shortcuts when real resolve is what is really needed.

Why We Still Need the Military

A common theme to be heard when talking about the armed forces in Europe and America is that we spend too much money on them. "Where's the enemy?" someone I know asked. The answer is often along the lines of "the only enemies we have are ones made up by the military industrial complex to give itself a reason for existing." Since this spending is unnecessary, so the reasoning goes, the money would be much better spent elsewhere.

While there is probably scope to cut spending in America, which spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined, the idea that much too much is spent on the armed forces in general is flawed. America only spends about 4% of its GDP on the military, less than it spent during the Cold War and much less than a great deal of other countries. Military expenditures in Europe have also been declining for decades as a percentage of GDP.

All very well, you might say, but why even have a military at all? It may come as a surprise that the first reason, while perhaps the most obvious, is the less important one: there are enemies. Just think of Iran and North Korea. Ask Eastern European countries how they feel about Russia, and they will tell you they are still nervous about its influence and its sheer capabilities. But aren't we just making these enemies? If world leaders were younger and more female, the world would surely be a better place (someone recently argued this to me).

This brings me to the second, and more important, reason why we still need a military: stability. Whether Iran is an enemy or a friend is something that can change over time. Surely no person of sound mind would argue that Iran, in the sense of Iranians themselves, are the "enemy." The primary driving force behind the existence of militaries is not, as many believe, a desire for power. The quest for power is more of a byproduct of the actual cause: fear. How do we know what the intentions of any given state are? In a changing world, how can we be sure that these intentions will not change? The world is an anarchic place. There is no global police force that will come help countries if they are attacked by others. Just look at Georgia. The UN cannot fill this role and was never designed to be able to. It is a club of nation-states and cannot rise above them.

This policing role has fallen to certain countries over the centuries. Britain had it until WWI, the United States has taken it on since WWII. "But who says the world wants the US to go around policing it? How arrogant!" Yup, I've heard that (and indeed, as a younger man, have said it myself), too. In fact, the US tried to just mind its own business and let everyone get on with their own business. The problem was, Britain had been keeping order but wasn't able to after WWI. The result? WWII. There was no one there to check German power or make European countries feel more secure. The US learned from this. Since WWII, it has been committed to providing stability, at first focusing on Europe, and now, increasingly, on Asia.

Take Japan. Japan has not spent much on its military, freeing it to spend money on social programs and the like. All very nice for Japan. The reason it has felt safe enough to do this, however, is because the US has long guaranteed its security. China is increasing its military spending and has an enormous population. This makes Japan nervous. For now, however, the US has the capability to make Japan (and South Korea and others) feel secure enough. If the US were to withdraw from Asia, those countries would look at the regional giant, China, and know that China could really boss them around if it wanted to and they, as much smaller countries without credible militaries, would be able to do little about it.

The point is not that China is the enemy (nor even that Iran is). The point is that China is (becoming) powerful. Will it remain peaceful? Will is always respect others wishes, even if contrary to its own needs? It might. The historical record indicates otherwise, however. The US provides stability, for now, in an uncertain world. Its military is needed to do that. We may think it would be nice to live in a world without militaries, but there is just no way to do that. That is not (yet) the world we live in.

Afghanistan: It's a game of chicken, and the U.S. doesn't seem to know the rules.

There has been some talk recently about a possible dialog between Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and the Afghan government and/or the Americans. This has generally been welcomed, though most seem to realize that this is not the beginning of real peace negotiations. The problem is: the beginning of peace negotiations is not going to begin anytime soon, and never on U.S. terms. The reason is simple: Afghanistan is a game of chicken. The Taliban understand this. The U.S., it seems, does not.

For those unfamiliar with chicken, it's a fantastically (and idiotically) macho game wherein two men (usually, but let's not be sexist, there are plenty of idiot women out there, too) get in cars and drive at each other full throttle. The first one to swerve loses. Of course, if neither swerves, both lose a lot more than the game: they lose their lives. The stakes are high for two individuals in the game of chicken. In the Afghan version, they are high for millions of individuals.

There are a couple strategies for winning the game of chicken. One is to limit your options by, say, removing your steering wheel and letting the other side know you cannot swerve. This will simplify the game for them: lose the game or lose your life. Simple equation.

The other is to appear to be crazy. If the other side really believes you would rather die than lose the game, they will swerve first.

The Taliban have almost no reason to agree to a settlement on anything other than their own terms. The reason? The U.S. has played the game using the opposite of the second strategy above: everyone knows the U.S. will not stay there forever, no matter the cost. Obama wishes to start pulling out next year. The Taliban know this. The Taliban on the other hand, while not crazy (fanatic, perhaps, but not crazy), can much more convincingly assert that they will fight to the bitter end, regardless of the cost.

The choices here, then, are also simplified: the Taliban can fight for another year, maybe two, or they can just give up now. That's it -- they must only hold out a year. The U.S., on the other hand, can fight until it's bled dry, or it can cut its losses and run. The winner is predetermined here because the U.S. has shown all of its cards (and yes, I'm aware of the mixed metaphor with poker, just go with it).

If you were a Taliban leader, when would you chose to negotiate a peace agreement? "How about never, is never good for you?" seems a likely response.

Theory of Personal Relativity

This is a little break from the usual politico-economic musings of this blog. Unfortunately, this idea came to me in the night and I've forgotten most of the conclusions I came to and what I wanted to say. All I can remember is that I wanted to finally put this theory out there for the world. It's a theory I've had for a long time: time is relative.

No, I'm not talking about Einstein's relativity, I'm talking about personal relativity. We (it seems, at least) all know the experience: the older we get, the faster time seems to go. I have long thought that this has to do with our perceptions of our own lives. We can only conceive concretely of a time period as long as our own lives. Anything beyond that, though "conceivable" remains abstract. It remains abstract because we have never experienced it. This means that we perceive daily time as a fraction of our lives. For this reason, time seems to run ever faster.

Let's apply this in a very unscientific experiment. Do you remember when you were 5 years old and your mother took you shopping for AN HOUR?!? That's FOREVER! Now an hour can pass when I drift off in thought for a SECOND, I swear. The reason, as I've said, is simple: an hour is 1/43,800th of a 5-year-old's life. That doesn't sound like much, but an hour is a mere 1/262,800th of a 30-year-old's life. This means that an hour for a 5-year-old is equivalent to six hours for a 30-year-old (and 12 for someone who is 60).

Remember waiting for Christmas as a kid? I'm 28 now, and Christmas seems to whip around the year really quickly nowadays. Could it be that I'd have to have Christmas once only every 3.5 years to match my experience as a child? This is all a ballpark, but that really sounds right to me. It felt like I had to wait more than 3 years for Christmas to come when I was eight.

This also could help explain why children seem to learn so fast: for them, time is passing much more slowly! OK, there are a host of neurological explanations for that as well, so maybe this is pushing it. Still, if you are dealing with people significantly older or younger than yourself, using this formula might help put you in their shoes, especially if you're dealing with kids. This is also why a five minute time-out is so useful for a kid: it's an eternity for them already.

If the theory is right, there's bad news: life will keep flying by faster and faster. The good news is, the acceleration steadily slows as you age (an hour for a 30-year-old is only twice as long as it is for a 60-year-old). Still, not only are we not getting any younger, we're getting older faster and faster... :-/

Negative Interest Rates: Time for Japan to Experiment (again)?

As deflation has been feared in the last two years since the financial crisis, central banks have pulled out the stops to try to prevent and counter it. "Quantitative Easing (QE)" has been the name of the game. It basically involves buying up loads of debt, including direct purchases of government debt, by throwing on the printing presses to flood the market with cash. Normally when more and more currency chases the same amount of goods, prices should rise. Under the extraordinary conditions of the past two years, however, this has not been the case. Deflation has thus far been mostly avoided in the rich world outside of Japan, which has suffered inflation on and off for the past 20 years since its financial crisis in the early 1990s.

Japan has coupled QE with fiscal stimulus on and off for two decades, and yet still suffers deflation. There are also worries that Japan's capacity to stimulate with government spending may soon approach limits, though bond yields as of yet show no sign of this (Japan's debt is the highest in the rich world by far, but it is almost exclusively domestically held). Must Japan simply surrender itself to deflation, its economy a soufflé in a prematurely opened oven? Perhaps not. Japan has a few options. One would be more dedicated and aggressive QE. But there is also something else, something never tried before: negative interest rates.

Strictly speaking, there is no reason a central bank (or any bank, for that matter) could not offer negative interest rates. The problem is that many normal instruments of monetary policy would cease to function properly if this were done.

The problem with deflation is that people know that prices will be lower the longer they wait to purchase things. It also means that even small returns on investments are good ones because even stuffing money under the mattress makes you richer if prices constantly fall. This means riskier investments are unnecessary. All this means that people save and stay on the safe side, rather than borrow, spend, and engage in entrepreneurial activities. This devastates an economy, which requires some risk-taking and spending to keep it alive.

If a bank offers you a loan at an interest rate below inflation, that is an extremely strong incentive. It means it is cheaper for you to borrow the money, buy something today, and pay later than it would be to wait. That is why negative "real" (i.e. below inflation) interest rates give such a boost to an economy (and can normally spark strong inflation if overused).

If inflation is negative, however, this becomes problematic. A bank could, in theory, offer you a loan at -3% interest with an inflation rate of -2%. You could still buy a car at a lower price with the loan than without, and the car dealer would get to sell the car at a higher price now than it would later. The problem is: the bank would pay the difference. Why should it do that? True, it might receive loans from the central bank at -4% interest, earning a spread of just 1%, but that's a profit, right? The problem is: the bank would earn a 4% profit if it just left the money in the vault, didn't lend to anyone, and gave it back to the central bank (or rolled over the loan, taking on more). In short, the bank still has every incentive NOT to loan out the money at a negative rate, never mind a negative real rate.

Negative interest rates could help reduce government debt and allow a government to spend more. It is therefore possible that they might work. They would also help banks to re-capitalize and absorb debts, allowing them to then offer very low interest-rate loans, at perhaps even 1%, something not achievable in normal times. These measures might be enough. If negative interest rates needed to reach consumers, however, because deflation had become so entrenched and the currency continued to appreciate instead of inflation rising, the central bank would have to get even bolder. It would have to start lending to businesses and maybe even consumers directly. Absolute insanity? Perhaps, but if all else fails, this is something that would surely work to drive up inflation. If not done carefully, it could also spark huge investor panic. Desperate times?

Liberalism and the Rise of China

"Liberalism" is a word with sometimes contradictory meanings. In international relations, it refers to a school of thought that supports internationalism: free trade, international institutions and laws, and, by association, the decline of realism, with its concepts of power, national interests, and the nation-state in a world of anarchy. The United States, many or most European states, and other "western" countries like Canada and Australia are, more or less, liberal powers (though all of them bow to the exigencies of realpolitik when they deem it necessary). China, too, is liberal, at least in the sense of free trade. It was quick to understand the benefits and reap the rewards of free trade. On foreign relations, however, China is decidedly realist.

While the EU and the U.S. often make trade and aid agreements contingent on certain human rights standards being met, China relates with other states as it suits it, largely ignoring what is going on within those states. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two excellent examples. China has helped Pakistan build several nuclear reactors, even though China's membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means it has a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons and is barred from providing nuclear assistance of any kind to non-members of the treaty (such as Pakistan). Admittedly, this is partly a response to America's bending of the rules (nonetheless the "proper way," by getting a legal exception to them passed) to do the same for India, Pakistan's arch rival and also a non-member of the NPT. (America did this largely because it sees China as a counterweight to India in the Indian Ocean and in the world.)

In Sri Lanka, China has been selling weapons at low prices and donating handsomely to infrastructure investment programs there, no strings attached. The U.S. and the EU had halted such activity after concerns arose about alleged war crimes being committed by government forces when fighting (and finally, after decades) defeating the Tamil Tigers, a separatist militia group. China's generosity has more than made up for the West's cutoff, so Sri Lanka was unconcerned about the West's threats. Will the West have any influence anymore?

The difficulty with liberalism is that it requires worldwide cooperation (at least until a world authority, replete with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions arises to run and enforce things, a simultaneously Utopian- and somewhat frightening-sounding idea). Even one systemically important straggler can bring the liberal system to its knees. During the world's brief "unipolar moment," in which the fall of the USSR has left the United States the world's only "hyperpower," this has been less problematic. The U.S. has had the resources and the lack of opposition necessary to push for such cooperation. However, this has never been a complete success, and unipolarity is ending (aided in part by a broad interpretation of U.S. goals leading to overstretch of its resources). China is on the rise, India and Brazil are possible future Great Powers, and Russia is insistent on not being forgotten. Economically, the EU is a Great Power, but it lacks the political, foreign policy, and military unity to have a real enforcement-related presence in the world. As the center of economic and military gravity shifts away from the U.S. and the EU (in relative terms), it will be increasingly harder for the West to make sanctions stick if other powers do not cooperate. It will also become ever harder to cajole them into cooperation.

The question that presents itself is: how much longer will it make sense to attach strings to aid and trade? If the strings mean both are turned down, and the presence of generous, no-strings-attached opportunities from elsewhere means the deals are not effective in shaping the world, then what is the point? The passed-over deals would benefit China and other realist opportunists and hurt the U.S. and the EU. At some point, concern about this loss of influence, and about China's rising military and economic might, will cause a shift to more realism in foreign and economic policy.

Realists are not prescriptive. It's not that they think things should be this way, it's that they assess that they are, whether or not we like it. In such circumstances, unfortunately, sometimes looking out for one's own interests, narrowly defined, is the best anyone can do. This will likely be the future of the world in the coming decades.

The Road to a PhD Program: One Step Forward...

I took the airport bus from Vienna Erdberg to Bratislava Airport (€20 round-trip) to take the GRE on Tuesday. The good news: the GRE is finally over. The bad news: my score was not what I'd hoped for. My verbal score had been much higher on the practice test I took, which lulled me into a false sense of security. Had it not been for that, maybe I would have studied more vocabulary and taken more time preparing. There's always more you can do and also more you can blame yourself for not having done.

There were also a couple of pleasant surprises, however. The first was that the experimental section of the GRE, which is usually hidden among the others, was stated explicitly and was optional. I found that fantastic. It came at the end, so I didn't have to worry about my score being dragged down by having the math section that counted come at the end of a three-hour test when I was worn out and ready to melt into the drain on the floor like that one Star Trek character from the show I obviously only watched once or twice. No really.

The other surprise was my math score: it was 90 points higher than on the practice test, which brought it up to where I thought I ought to be according to my own assessment of my math skills (nothing spectacular, but decent).

Overall, the total score was 20 points higher than the practice test score, but 450% of that gain was the math section. The actual verbal test seemed easier than the practice test, too! I was shocked when I saw the result.

For me, interested in a line of study/career that would involve a lot of analytical writing, the analytical writing section of the test is probably the most important. That has to be graded by a human, so I won't know about that score for another two weeks, probably. I am hoping essentially for a perfect score. That may be a little over-the-top, but that would save the rest of the GRE for me so... why not? I've aimed high and I'm hoping I've hit the target. If not, well, one of my favorite expressions is: "we'll cross that bridge when we come to it." You can't control everything (but you are free to try as much as you like ;-) ).

The North Korea Standoff: China's Moment?

After North Korea's alleged torpedo attack on its southern neighbor, it seems likely that tensions will increase between the two Koreas, which is likely to draw in China, Japan, the US, and Russia as well. This is the moment to encourage China to take on a more active role in maintaining stability in the world. China has not yet really demonstrated that it is willing or capable of doing this, but this is a situation in which I think the US ought to try to leave much of the work up to China. For one thing, China often uses North Korea as a bargaining chip in relations with the US and South Korea. You want to be responsible for North Korea? Fine, have at it!

There is more to this than cynicism, however. With the US still guaranteeing the security of South Korea, increasing its partnership if necessary, China will have even more riding on the North's stability than it does now. China dislikes having a nuclear-armed neighbor. Sure, the US and Russia have nukes too and may be too close for comfort, but they have shown themselves so far to be relatively responsible and predictable custodians. Not so the erratic Kim Jong Il. China also worries about the streams of refugees that might result from a collapse of the North Korean regime. Make this China's responsibility, and it might just take up the initiative and begin to act strongly, with US backing (as well as the backing of the rest of the Security Council, presumably).

Of course, the US should lay out a few clear conditions first, the main one being that, should the North Korean regime collapse (whether sooner or later), the people there will be guaranteed their right to democratic self-determination. They must be given the choice to become an independent state or to unite with the South, should the South agree to this as well. In such a situation, international aid, particularly from China, the US, and Japan, would be helpful in assisting South Korea in absorbing the devastatingly impoverished North.

With this foundational agreement set, the US could leave most of the footwork up to China. China is a major power, striving to Great or even Super Power status, at least economically. For the moment, it has shied away from pushing for these goals politically and militarily, content to simply make deals wherever the money is good and leave the US responsible for maintaining order and allow the free trade from which China (and everyone else, the US included, of course) so greatly benefits. It may be unsettling to some to imagine China as a Great Power (this author included), but there is an air of near inevitability about the progression. It is therefore better that China start practicing the work aspect that its weight brings with it. The US can help it do that while benefiting itself. Stepping back and letting China in would do nothing to reduce the relative distance between the two states in capabilities. Perceptions to this effect arising out of the appearance of a concession to China would be irrelevant and wrong. After all, how would it be a concession to nudge China to do more?

The Japanese-American Military Relationship: Call the Divorce Lawyer?

At the end of the Second World War, Japan was disarmed. Non-aggression clauses were even written into its constitution. Japan had no need of a large military because the United States vowed to protect it. At that time, the US was probably also the only force that would have been capable of attacking Japan in East Asia. Today, things look a bit different. Although China is rising and has been increasing military spending, Japan nonetheless remains a military lightweight, assured by security guarantees from the United States, much as Western Europe has been since the end of WWII.

Recently, however, there have been squabbles over American military bases in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. The previous government told the Americans the base could expand in size. Local residents, however, would rather see the base disappear altogether. Japan's new government at first agreed to review the case, putting off the Americans (though it has now reneged on this promise and plans to keep the base as previously planned). Is this a sign of further tensions down the road and the erosion of the Japanese-American security arrangement? In short: probably not. The Japanese know that the Americans insure not only their security, but the stability of the entire region. They are unlikely to kick them out any time soon, as evidenced by their eventual decision to let them stay, albeit possibly at a more remote location on the island. Even China has reason to wish for a US presence there. The strategic relationship is likely to recover and to remain at least as strong for the next two decades at a minimum. Whether the arrangement itself will be enough to stop an arms build-up and further tensions in the region, however, is in the stars.

America's presence in the Japanese archipelago is a central element in the area's security, part of the architecture of the modern "Pax Americana." Not only does it serve to protect Japan from outside attack, it also obviates Japan's need to build up its own defenses, which in turn makes other states in the region (notably both Koreas and China) feel less insecure and therefore less inclined toward military buildup themselves. South Korea's shipping lanes pass close to or through Japanese territorial waters and it is reliant on its trade links to the rest of the world.

It is not competition between Japan and South Korea, however, that is most worrisome. The elephant in the room is China. If the US were to depart from Japanese shores, is there any real doubt that the Japanese would start to feel nervous about their much larger neighbor to the west? The logical reaction to this insecurity would be a military buildup, of which Japan is certainly capable: it has the population (127 million), technology, and economic power. Japan's pursuit of security, however defensive its nature, would serve to make other countries in the region, namely China, but also both Koreas, feel less secure. Further insecurity in North Korea would make South Korea nervous. It is easy to see the chain reaction that would likely ensue.

Taiwan also relies almost exclusively on the United States to ensure that any change in its current status (in limbo between an independent state and a province of China) is not determined solely by the mainland Chinese. If Taiwan were to be wholly incorporated into the mainland, whether peaceably or not, this would extend China's reach into Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa (which in our extended scenario is no longer shielded by American forces). Leaving aside for a moment the worry that a democratic and open Taiwan might become an autocratic and oppressive Chinese province, this would be a serious destabilizing factor for the entire region.

Last but not least, China itself would not necessarily benefit from a US withdrawal. Although the Chinese would almost certainly rejoice if America removed its airbase from Taiwan and stopped supplying it with weapons, China, too, benefits from the Pax Americana. China would be faced with heightened diplomatic and military challenges if the region destabilized and Japan and the Koreas began building up their militaries. It would have to be very cautious not to drive on an arms race by becoming anxious and building its military might as well. The prospects for this restraint are not good. The security dilemma means tensions and even war would be hard to avoid in the absence of America's stabilizing power.

For all these reasons and more (habit, history, and cultural aspects), the Japanese-American connection is likely to remain strong as long as there are no truly severe (and foolish) diplomatic screw-ups. The only question then is: as America's (and Japan's) relative power declines in relation to China (assuming things continue to go well for China), how long will America's security guarantee remain credible? How long can America prevent a buildup and destabilization of East Asia? The continuation of strategic ties to the region may only delay the inevitable. The Pax Americana, like other paces before it (Britannica, Romana), will not last forever. The real issue is: what will replace it? Pax or bellum?

Rating Agencies: Why the Fuss Is Overdone

Ever since the financial crisis hit in 2008, the issue of the rating agencies has come up again and again. And yet: there has been little in the way of reform. This is for two reasons: one, there has been a lack of promising suggestions for replacing the current setup; and two, much of the hullabaloo has been overdone. The reason: the structure of the rating market itself is its most attractive attribute.

It's true: rating agencies are paid by the very people they rate. If this seems like an area for a potential conflict of interest, it's because it most certainly is. Producers and providers in competitive markets have to compete for customers by giving the customers what they want. There's just one catch here: the rating market is uncompetitive. It is, in fact, an oligopoly.


Oligopolies represent one of the three market failures (cure: anti-cartel authorities). The other two are one-sided information (cure: laws requiring transparency and information sharing) and externalities, which are goods or services that are either enjoyed by many but paid for by few or vice versa (cure: usage restrictions/regulations and externality charges). The rating market is oligopolistic, which is bad for consumers of its products. The good news: the direct consumers of its products are banks and its products are ratings, used by everyone and paid for only by the banks (a positive externality it makes sense to maintain).

Standard and Poors (S&P), Moodys, and Fitch, the big three ratings oligarchs, do not really have to compete very much for customers. Securities almost have to be rated by at least one of them in order for them to even have a chance of being traded, and many or most are rated by two or more, especially by S&P and Moodys. This puts the Big Three in a position of power. They do not have to offer better ratings for higher prices. In fact, doing so would be pretty much the only thing that could damage them because it would damage their credibility.

So why is their credibility already so damaged? Their ratings were horrendously inadequate and had not been adjusted to the new instruments that have been coming to the market over the last 15-20 years. They failed because of poor modeling and a system in need of updating (ratings are based mostly on past credit performance), not (or at least, not usually) because of collusion with the banks they were supposed to rate. The agencies now have every incentive to reform because their most valuable asset, their credibility, is at risk.

The rating agencies are likely to last, however, because there is no real alternative! Out of disgust over "speculative attacks" on Greece and Portugal after rating agencies downgraded both countries' debt (due to very real fears the countries may not be able to pay lenders back), European leaders recently stated their intention to create a European rating agency. As Austrian commentator Eric Frey put it, "That a European rating agency is called for in this particular situation illustrates that such an agency would be stillborn. If a rating agency has to first ask (French President) Sarkozy and (German Chancellor) Merkel before lowering a rating, no one will ever take it seriously."¹ It's not like government agencies did such a bang-up job protecting the economy from the crisis, nor did most experts anticipate the full extent of the crisis. Why should we expect some new goverment-run agency to do better, especially one that is politically compromised?

Is there scope for reform? Probably, on the micro scale. Perhaps agencies responsible for giving ratings could steadily rotate and other things could be done to prevent cronyism, etc. (author's note: I just saw that a proposal for rotation has actually been made that would include a provision for using the accuracy of agencies' ratings to decide how many future ratings they give. Has someone in Washington been reading my blog?). Still, even this is no guarantee - ratings work well until they don't, as this crisis has shown all too well. Our greatest comfort is still that the ratings market is so uncompetitive. Perhaps we could do with a less competitive baking sector as well? Or at least one that values debt and risk less highly for systemic, not personal, reasons?

1. Eric Frey, "Zynischer Kampf gegen Windmühlen," Krisenfrey (blog), 8 May 2010, http://derstandard.at/1271376262183/Blog-KrisenFrey-Zynischer-Kampf-gegen-Windmuehlen.

The Next Financial Crisis: the European Chapter?

European leaders have had it relatively easy in the recent crisis. The events that sparked the crisis occurred in America, and many of the effects of the crisis have been more severe there (big exceptions in smaller countries like Ireland, Latvia, and Greece, but also Spain). That the housing bubble triggered the crisis has made it easy to blame the entire crisis on America. Increasingly, though, Europe is beginning to look very weak. These problems, though, are homegrown.

Everyone is aware of Greece's current liquidity issues. It now appears that European leaders will head off a crisis in Greece by bailing the country out. Although many political and legal problems remain unresolved in doing this, it does look like it will be done. As The Economist argues, Greece will then have about three years to resolve its budget issues.

It also points out, however, that even with help from the EU and severe budget tightening (of which the actual application is questionable), Greece's debt will stabilize at around 150% of GDP, a huge amount by any standards (except Japan's, which is a different case, however, with lots of domestic savings, domestic financial repression, and assets abroad). Even assuming Greece manages to cut its deficit from something around 12% of GDP to under 3% in the next three years (a highly questionable assumption given the country's economic and political prospects), there is still every possibility the country could decide not paying back its debts was a better option. Indeed, that might even be true for Greece. Such a massive debt burden would hinder growth and spread economic and social malaise for years to come. In a country where social unrest bubbles beneath the surface, such austerity measures might simply be too unpalatable.

So why not let Greece default now and save ourselves the trouble (and extra money) of bailing it out? EU law stipulates that bailouts are illegal, and Germany has been opposed to them until recently. Why the change of heart? Cold calculation. Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has realized that a Greek default could sweep other countries with it, most notably Portugal, but possibly Ireland, Spain, or even Italy. Assuming that did not happen, though, the damages would be bad enough. European banks hold a lot of Greek bonds, and German banks are among the largest holders. If Greece goes down, bank bailouts may be necessary instead of a country bailout.

So a homegrown banking crisis could hit Europe. Apparently, Europe's banks are even more leveraged than American ones and even more thinly capitalized. Several banks would be unlikely to withstand a large-scale Greek default, never mind one involving several Euro-area countries. It seems the Europeans are not invulnerable to bad investment decisions, either.

Of course, this is no time for schadenfreude; such a disaster would ripple throughout the globe, nailing already weak economies and overly stretched government budgets. It was a couple of years after the 1929 crash before the Great Depression hit its deepest point. Let us hope that we are not about to repeat the false optimism that prevailed into 1930 again...

Time to Recognize Hamas

An article from this week's edition of The Economist provides a startling look into Hamas's success at providing the Gaza Strip with just about everything it needs. Prices have fallen, businesses have flourished, cafés and universities have re-opened. This adds yet another reason to the list of why the "West," insofar as it has not already done so (I believe Norway already has, for example), should recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Gaza Strip. It exercises de facto control over the territory and has apparently succeeded in bringing security and a degree of economic prosperity (when compared with the past few years) to the area. No other group (including the UN and the Israelis) could make this claim. These accomplishments have also made Hamas popular in the Gaza Strip, further diminishing prospects that Fatah could ever enjoy any real influence there again without serious (and deleterious) changes to conditions in Gaza. What are the other reasons Hamas should be recognized and worked with?

• It has moved away from the West and relies on other contacts for its stability and prosperity. This is working (comparatively speaking). While economic and personal security in Gaza are certainly to be welcomed, from a western political standpoint, this indicates that western influence in Gaza has waned even more than it had previously. If the Israelis and the US hope to have more influence in Gaza, they must engage with Hamas, which has effective control there. Furthermore, trying to force influence by removing Hamas would be transparent (i.e. Gazans would know what was going on and resent the action, making it counterproductive) and would lead to chaos and suffering, while carrying a very high risk of ultimate failure. Keeping Hamas in isolation would only further push it into the arms of other actors the West would rather it not deal with (e.g. Iran).
• Terrorists and extremest organizations become more moderate when they achieve real power. This could be seen with the PLO as well, which was also initially shunned by the West but was later accepted (albeit too late, I would argue, as its acceptance among the people it claimed to represent was already in decline). Hamas is now responsible for providing not just physical protection for the residents of Gaza, but also for their economic welfare. The constraints of power are already moderating its actions, if not its rhetoric.
• As The Economist mentions, Hamas may soon be embroiled in competition with Muslim extremist groups in Gaza. This implies that Hamas is a relatively moderate force there now (as would be expected from the logic of the point above). Denying recognition to Hamas will make it more likely that extremer forces will take hold in Gaza, making the situation there even worse for the people of Gaza and further harming any chance at cooperation with Israel and/or the US and their allies. As mentioned, this was the case with the PLO as well.

In conclusion, I am arguing to recognize Hamas not because I am an idealist and believe in the good of all people. On the contrary, I am a realist and believe that recognizing Hamas is in everyone's interests. It's a win-win situation, and Israel, the US, the UK, France, etc. would be fools not to take advantage of it. It is sure to be a short-lived opportunity in an ever-unstable Middle East. True, it is by no means a guarantee of success, but letting idealistic notions like "we don't negotiate with terrorists" get in the way of what is, granted, only a shimmer of hope for progress, would be reckless and unconscionable.

Waltz on Nuclear Defenses

"The best one can say about missile defenses is that they won't work. (If they did, an offense-defense race would result, with all too familiar consequences). Missile defenses are easily thwarted. In the nuclear business, offensive weapons are much cheaper than defensive ones. Other states can multiply their warheads; they can confound defenses by deploying decoys and spreading chaff; they can outflank defenses by delivering warheads in any of many different ways - by plane, by ships, by cruise missiles, by missiles fired on depressed trajectories. Missile defenses would be the most complicated system ever mounted, and the system would have to work with near perfection in meeting its first realistic test - the test of enemy fire. Some warheads may get through, and both the attacked and the attacker will know that. No president will rely on such a system but instead will avoid actions that might provoke an attack. With or without defenses, the restraints on American policy are the same."¹

So what could the point of the current missile defense shield in Europe be, including Obama's new plans for a primarily sea-based one? My guess is that it is purely a political gamble:

• Domestically: voters in the US like the idea of being "protected" from incoming nukes.
• Internationally: Bush and Obama might hope that Iran will scrap its nuclear ambitions if they can be made to believe that their weapons would be ineffective.

 This second idea seems unlikely. After all, Iran has nuclear ambitions because it feels insecure, not because it necessarily hopes to use the bomb. Anyway, it would be more likely to use its nukes against another Middle Eastern country (probably even excluding Israel!) than against the United States or Europe.

Conclusion? The "defense shield" is domestic political pandering for electoral gain. "But Bush couldn't get re-elected again after 2004, but continued to push the shield" you say? No problem, the shield was an aid to his party, and can still be used as evidence the republicans are tougher protectors of American safety than democrats (regardless of the fact that Obama's plans would eventually be more costly, but also more effective, than the land-based Bush plan).

Say "no" to "missile defense!" Say "yes" to arms control!

1. Waltz, Kenneth. "The Continuity of International Politics." In Realism and International Politics, 246-250. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Epidemiologists, Hyman Minsky, and Forest Fires in Yellowstone

Why do crises happen, and how can we stop them? This is the question asked in many a field, from economics, to epidemiology, to research on forest fires. The problem is, as Minsky has explained, epidemiologists fear, and forest fires in Yellowstone Park have illustrated: the safer we make things, the worse potential they have for damage.

The best way to illustrate this is with a very visual (and uncontroversial) example: forest fires in Yellowstone. In the early part of the 20th century, officials in national parks began to suppress any and all forest fires that developed. This seemed to make sense, since forest fires could be very destructive to the forest and dangerous for people visiting it or living nearby, as well as for some endangered species living in the park. For years, every small fire was extinguished. The problem, we now know, is that this led to a buildup of dry, dead wood in the forest -- an enormous pile of fuel waiting to be ignited. The fires soon became harder and harder to control until a fire in 1988 destroyed 36% of the park's forested land. With that much fuel, it was just a matter of time before a drought (like the one in 1988) and other environmental conditions set the stage for a nearly unstoppable fire. Eradicating small fires over years made a really big one not only possible, but essentially inevitable.

Epidemiologists have the same fears. They know that the first time a disease strikes a "virgin population" (i.e. one that has never been exposed to the disease before), the effects are devastating. This effect contributed in no small part to Europeans' success in conquering the Americas: diseases like smallpox, brought by Europeans who were resistant to it, killed and weakened vast proportions of the native populations there.

Throughout human history, infectious diseases have been among the leading causes of death. Cities, in fact, were unsustainable because so many people died of diseases there; they required a steady stream of immigrants from the countryside to persist. By the middle of the 20th century, scientists in America and Europe began to declare that infectious diseases would soon be a thing of the past. They were wrong. Just as humans can build up a resistance to disease (actually largely via natural selection: those who have no resistance die), diseases can adapt to various treatments such as antibiotics, insecticides (for Malaria), etc. Last year, for the first time, a larger proportion of the world's population lived in cities than in rural areas. As mentioned above, cities are a great place for pathogens to live. On top of this, the lack of infectious diseases over the past 60 years means that our bodies may be "out of shape" when it comes to combating disease. The question, then, is if we will be able to stay ahead of diseases with vaccines and other measures. We must constantly adapt and must not allow a virgin, non-resistant population to build up.

This brings us to Minsky. He posited that free markets would always be prone to financial crises because long periods of stability would lead investors to take on higher risks (as their memories of past crises fade or as new generations with no memories come onto the scene). Eventually, debts would pile up to an unsustainable level, requiring only a trigger to set off something akin to a financial forest fire. He believed government regulation was the key.

I will take this one step further, combining with theories of evolution and epidemiology, and say that regulation will probably be unsuccessful in the end as well. For example, one reason the recent crisis has been so bad is that central banks have done such a good job at smoothing the business cycle. Securitization seemed to be doing a good job at spreading, assessing, and pricing risk, and government guarantees, whether explicit (FDIC) or implicit (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) seemed to take care of the rest. This lowered people's perception of risk and raised their appetites for it. It can therefore be argued that by hauling out the fire hose and stopping all the previous fires (like the dot-com crash of 2000-2001), the Federal Reserve allowed a pile of "dead wood" to accumulate that needed only a trigger (declining house prices coupled with rising commodity prices) to ignite it. Voilà! Financial meltdown!

But don't stop here, these lessons can be applied to many other areas as well. This is just a hypothesis, but I bet Americans do more foolhardy things abroad than some other people because they are so used to everything being safe back home (e.g. "do not place house pets in your microwave"). The drive, often via lawsuits, to make everything safe in America could very well lead Americans to walk brain dead into dangers they no longer see. Here in Austria, I have another example. Austrians are so used to waiting for the light to turn green before walking across the street, and to cars stopping when the light is red (something I also expect in America), that they also no longer bother to look before crossing the street as long as the light is green. The typical response is "well, they have to stop. If they don't they'll go to prison." My response? A nice thought for you in the afterlife, I imagine.

The challenge now seems to be to control risks that are harder for individuals to see coming, while returning personal responsibility to those slammed by risks they really ought to have seen coming. What does this mean for the Viennese? Nothing, really, I'm certainly not advocating letting people who drive through red lights and kill people off easy. What does it mean for Americans? If you injure yourself by sitting on your folding chair after opening it incorrectly, it's your problem. What does this mean for the financial system? Look to Yellowstone. We need more small forest fires (recessions) and fewer explicit and implicit guarantees that give false security. Where guarantees are given, conservatism (as in low risk and low returns) needs to be enforced.

I'm sure there are more lessons. If you think of some, please comment.

The Road to a PhD Program: Update 1

All right, just a quick progress report: moving along on steps one and two. I've gotten the latest Cracking the GRE from the Princeton Review and have begun reading it. I also downloaded the program CueCard, which is a program that allows you to make computerized flash-cards. I'll be using it to study vocabulary, as that's a big part of the verbal test.

I took the online practice test today to get a baseline score, which I'm not going to share with you. Suffice it to say I didn't realize what I was supposed to be doing (the directions weren't displayed, which I think was a program error) and was trying to associate words rather than find their antonyms. First question (the most heavily weighted one) was therefore wrong! I also suck at basic math even though I can do calculus, apparently. So I'll be studying up on all that and now have minimum score goals in mind to work towards.

I've also already talked to a professor about Chicago. He suggested asking the admissions depts. there if there's a PhD student I could talk to. I should ask him/her about the experience there, then consider talking to my possible future professors as well. He also had some personal opinions about the schools, but I'll be keeping those to myself.

In sum: I've been making progress.

Next step: make an appointment to take the GRE in mid June.

Also: starting to fish around for a thesis adviser and make serious thoughts about my proposal, which must be turned in by July.

That's all for now. Glad to have a plan with goals and steps along the way!

Goodnight!

Soon to come: thinking about entries on Iran's nuclear program (already started a draft on that) and on East Jerusalem (Israel's facts on the ground). Stay tuned!

The Road to a PhD Program

Hi everybody (both of you). Today it's time for a "real issue" of a different variety: my real-life road to a PhD program. I'll be finishing up my coursework for my master's in international relations this spring, finishing the thesis this fall. In December, my applications for PhD programs are due. Even though that seems like a long way away, I'm still a bit overwhelmed. So I decided to start writing about the experience, because perhaps some others out there will find it beneficial (unlikely) and because it has a calming function for me to get this mapped out and "out there" (the real reason).

I'm looking at applying to PhD programs in political science at the University of Chicago and Northwestern, perhaps also at Illinois University at Chicago. I have a rather unusual restriction in that I'm not applying all over the place and then just going where I get in (which would be wise). Instead, because my partner and I are probably moving to Chicago next year, and because he has to go there because he'll have a visa to work for only that company, I'm applying only to schools in Chicago. That limits my options. Thank god for antacids and Valium, right? Just kidding. Fatty foods and alcohol suffice as well. JK again.

So here's my plan:

1. Start practicing for the GRE (it wasn't required for my master's program because this is Europe)
2. Talk to my professors here and ask them for advice and if they know anything about Chicago universities specifically (like, am I fooling myself thinking I can get in there?)
3. Take the GRE sometime this summer (there's a test center in Bratislava, apparently, which is a mere hour away by train).
4. Talk to program directors at the University of Chicago and Northwestern and ask them about the program and what they're looking for in a candidate. This seems like a suicide mission to me, but I think I read it was actually a good idea. It's probably true that having made contact with them, they might remember you when they look at your application, which might make them more likely to say yes. Unless or course you made a complete ass of yourself on the phone, in which case I heard that Wendy's is hiring -- in Canada.
5. Turn in my applications in December (U of Chicago is due on Dec. 28th, not sure about Northwestern).
6. Find religion.
7. Hopefully get accepted in the spring
8. Move to Chicago (one way or the other)
9. Hopefully start the grueling, several year task that is getting a PhD. Hopefully also transferring in as many classes from my master's as possible (the programs in Chicago are combined master/PhD programs).

So that's "it." Luckily, I've already ordered a GRE book from the Princeton Review on Amazon. Just 8 simple steps to go, on top of finishing my last master's class and writing my thesis.

Ahh, I feel more relaxed now, just as expected. No, wait, I feel worse...

To be continued...

Fixing America, Part IV

All right folks, as promised, here's part IV. I'm going to try to keep this one short, because I'm also writing a paper on organized begging and human trafficking in Vienna, which you'll soon be able to view online by clicking the link to "grad school papers" on the sidebar.

This section is supposed to cover a lot: budget and current account deficits, debt, and America's labyrinthine tax system. Luckily, all of these issues are related (isn't it funny how they all ended up on my part IV?). Once again, I will suggest some unpopular changes that probably would not be implemented, but hey, my job's to point out realistic solutions (in the sense that they are completely doable) to problems, it's the politicians' job to get it done.

So here we go: introduce a federal value-added tax system (VAT) like the ones seen in almost every other developed country in the world. Much of deficit-reduction will be tackled by measures mentioned in previous installments (individual private health accounts, later retirement age, paying social security benefits only to those who actually need them, etc.). A VAT is a tax that is applied to goods and services every step of the way. Sounds like it would accumulate, but it doesn't. Look at it like a chain: Producer A sells raw materials to producer B. Producer B pays a 10% VAT to producer A, who is obligated to deliver that amount to the IRS. HOWEVER, it will probably end up getting to keep much or most of the money. Everything producer A spends money on, from machinery, to contractors, to services, requires producer A to pay a VAT. Producer A simply writes down all that it has paid in VAT for business purposes and gets to keep that amount from the  VAT it has collected from sales. It sounds complicated, but it's actually much easier to manage than a system of tax-exemptions, which all have to be approved, revised, etc. What a headache!

Producer B then sells its finished goods to the retailer. The retailer pays VAT to producer B, who gets to keep whatever VAT from those sales that it has also spent doing business. The same applies to goods sold by the retailer. In this way, only additional value added at any given stage is taxed, so the effect is not cumulative.

OK, fine, by why is this good? It's good for two reasons. The main one is that studies show that taxes on consumption slow growth less than taxes on income because taxes on income reduce your incentive to work and earn more. The second reason is that a company has to pay VAT to keep VAT, it has an incentive to pay VAT and report this, which makes fraud a bit more difficult.

There are always a few problems, and the main one here is this: consumption taxes are regressive, meaning they tax the poor at a higher rate (as a percentage of their total incomes) than the rich. This, by the way, is another way America is more "liberal" than much of Europe: America's tax system is actually more progressive! In any case, addressing this problem is fairly simple: exempt certain necessities from the VAT, like necessary food items (not potato chips, soft drinks, and TV dinners), clothing items under $50 apiece, prescription medications, etc.

This would allow America's income tax rate to be cut and/or exceptions to it to be removed, making the system simpler (it's one of the most complex and frustrating in the world at the moment, costing individuals and businesses a lot in tax consulting services and wasted time). At the same time, this would help encourage growth and wouldn't be overly regressive.

The other issue to be addressed is also addressed with this tax: America's current account deficit. A current account is made up largely of a country's trade balance. America imports quite a bit more than it exports. This could be due partly to the fact that America taxes income too much and consumption too little when compared to other countries. True, America is likely on the road to rebalancing as we speak, since consumers have no scope to boost consumption in the near future, but this might be a pleasant side-effect of a tax that would otherwise be beneficial anyway.

Nancy Pelosi had indicated last year that a VAT was "on the table." Since then, the discussion has been dropped. It's unpopular because it contains the word "tax," particularly hated by conservatives, and because it's regressive, which makes it unpopular with the left. If combined with income tax cuts, tax simplification, and exceptions to protect those who would be most adversely affected, I think the tax could appeal to a broad base of legislators... if they could explain it to the public. Maybe we can give it some ridiculously long name that excludes the word tax? Those plans are usually stupid, but Congress seems to like them anyway...

Who knows Ronald Reagan?

I am starting to become frustrated with the Right's persistent attempts to drag Ronald Reagan's policies back onto the main political stage. The McCain/Palin ticket resurrected the idea of Ronald Reagan to energize their base during an election year, and now the Republicans and Tea Party Movement continue to carry the torch, insisting that we need to return to the Reagan years. President Reagan had a lot of fascinating accomplishments during his Presidency. His foreign policy was a remarkable step forward. His economic policy, however, was much more controversial, and if we are just looking at some hard numbers, it baffles me why we are even bringing up the Reagan name if we are debating the Country's most crucial issue: fiscal deficits. I think we are at the point where no one really remembers what Ronald Reagan actually did during his presidency, which is the perfect storm for meaningless political rhetoric.

Most people remember Reagan's top-down approach to the economy with steep tax cuts, but he also oversaw one of the first real expansions of the deficit, which should cause us to shun his policies in light of today's issues. The Reagan legacy brought such phrases as "supply side economics" and "trickle down" to the national political conversation. This approach is centered on cutting taxes and government spending so individuals can reinvest in the economy. Similar to George H.W. Bush, Reagan was successful in cutting taxes dramatically, especially for the most wealthy Americans, but his true failure was the hard part: cutting spending. We often talk about the unprecedented growth in the national deficit from the Bush Jr. years, but rarely do Republican spinsters mention Reagan's inability to control federal spending. The deficit more than tripled under Reagan's watch, an unintended reality, but still a result of his leadership. Choosing a President that served more than TWENTY years ago may allow Republicans to augment reality, but it cannot escape a simple fact check. At the very least, they should shy away from a politician that made many of the same mistakes that led us to where we are today.

I would like to end with an entertaining video from last week:

Sure Pamela Geller is making a total idiot of herself, and, sadly enough, this interview sparked an embellished controversy about this non-issue, but there is a bigger point here. I think this exchange really drives home how difficult it is to put words in the mouth of a deceased President. It doesn't matter where you land on the political spectrum, if you thought Reagan was a great President or single handedly destroyed our economy, his policies from days ago are really no longer relevant. We shouldn't be asking what would Reagan do, or care about what he would think. We have today's problems, today's leaders, and today's America. We should start coming up with solutions that are tailored to the present instead of trying to turn back the hands of time... Or at the very least, if we are going to look back, can we at least pick a President who actually DID cut the deficit?!?

Blue Dogs and Tea Parties, Will New Forces Be For Good?

President Obama made a promise to the American people: a new era of political compromise. With the rise of splintered factions of Democrats and Republicans, I bet the President is now wishing for an old era of bipartisanship. The Blue Dog Democrats and the Tea Party Movement have accumulated massive power to taker control of progress (or lack there of) in Washington. As we look at the potential of these two movements, we can begin to see if they will they be a positive influence of compromise, or a paralyzing force of roadblocks.

President Obama made the following comments during his presidential acceptance speech, his promise to America.

“Let us resist the temptation to fall back on the same partisanship and pettiness and immaturity that has poisoned our politics for so long. Let us remember that it was a man from this state who first carried the banner of the Republican Party to the White House - a party founded on the values of self-reliance, individual liberty, and national unity. Those are values we all share, and while the Democratic Party has won a great victory tonight, we do so with a measure of humility and determination to heal the divides that have held back our progress. As Lincoln said to a nation far more divided than ours, "We are not enemies, but friends...though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection." And to those Americans whose support I have yet to earn - I may not have won your vote, but I hear your voices, I need your help, and I will be your President too[1].” (Emphasis added)

I do not think the new President could have ever expected what would happen during his next 12 months in office. Not only did he experience the entrenched factions within his own volatile party, but triggered the rise of a new, powerful, faction within the GOP.

The President made a few mistakes within his first year that triggered a rapid deterioration in the fragile cohesion within congress. It all comes down to the two emphasized words in his speech, “humility” and “determination,” with not enough of the former and too much of the later. I have been working within local government for a few years now. If nothing else, I have learned to manage my own expectations and set achievable goals. Obama thought he could reverse the course of the Country's hardest issues at breakneck speed. His determination to meet an unrealistic timeline was his own trap. As deadlines slipped, he lost his momentum and became vulnerable to a strong wave of attack from the right (and the left, I might add - IPE pundit). This past summer, he should have shown some humility issuing from this rookie mistake, set a new pace for his agenda, and taken a moment to readjust his priorities. Instead, he isolated the party on healthcare, pushing hard on a Democrat-centric solution, far from the Obama we knew from the campaign.

The State of the Union was a good attempt to reset the agenda, but the tone has already been set; and his speech was far from showing any humility. The President has lost a year without any real progress on his agenda and the political backlash from his first year in office may have changed the political landscape for a long time. Both major parties are now splintered. Blue Dog Democrats gained significant power from the healthcare debate, representing a less liberal, more centrist approach to spending. Representing a more extreme end of the political spectrum, the rise of the Tea Party Movement seems to be a growing force in America, and even has the potential to give birth to a new political party.

The Blue Dogs have the potential to bring balance to legislation as long as they bring reasonable compromise to the debate. If played correctly, the more center-leaning legislation can create a more moderate view of the Democratic Party. This is effective only if the Blue Dogs can be seen as part of a united front supporting certain legislation, instead of eating each other alive for political gain. If this new power is of true compromise, bringing legitimate objections WITH legitimate solutions to the table, they can be a strong force for good, centrist legislation. I have yet to really see this positive influence, but the possibility is there.

Unlike the Blue Dogs, which I think are a short term reaction to Obama's missteps, the Tea Party has some staying power. Now unofficially led by my favorite master of misdirection and rhetoric, Sarah Palin, new polls show the Tea Party brand is more valuable than the GOP. Still loyal to her party, Sarah resisted the idea of a Tea Party separation in her keynote speech at the Tea Party Convention last night, but I think this view can definitely change based on Sarah's future political ambitions. For whatever insane reason, Sarah is able to control her political/celebrity persona so well that she could definitely develop the Tea Party Movement into the Tea Party... Party! If she continues to lose support within the GOP this could be a platform to spring into a larger political career. Given the Movement's current distance from the center, and its choice of spokeswoman, I think this this new party has the potential of being a strongly polarizing force. Is the Rogue Maverick even capable of compromise?

Our Country seems to do best when we head down the center of the road. I see the Blue Dogs as a potential force for good, keeping the extreme liberal side of the Democratic Party in check, as long as they keep their own egos in check along the way. Unfortunately, if the Tea Party Movement is going to step in line behind Sarah Palin, I can only see that as a decisive, destructive force. Without compromise, I cannot see the potential for any real progress in this country, but let's hope I am wrong.

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[1] “Barack Obama's US Election victory speech: full text” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/3383629/Barack-Obamas-US-Election-victory-speech-full-text.html