(Cold) War with China Inevitable?

There is much debate in the world of political science about whether war with China, cold or otherwise, is inevitable. Must we fear the future?

Will China's rise be peaceful? Should the US and the world seek to accommodate China, or "contain" it, as was its policy against the Soviet Union? Is some sort of confrontation inevitable? If some sort of conflict is inevitable, then the only choice the rest of the world (lead by the US as its largest power) has is whether, to what extent, and how it can shape the type of conflict that emerges. Can it just be a situation of occasional "tensions," must and can we rely on our old Cold War friend deterrence to prevent WWIII, or is WWIII even inevitable?

 The idea that war may loom because there is a shift in what is called the global "balance of power" stems from an analysis of previous shifts among powers in Europe. A prime example is WWI. In the 19th century, the UK was the world's predominant power, particularly at sea. It used this power to "balance" threats, which then all originated on the European continent. It did this by shifting alliances so that no one power or group of powers could threaten it. There was a consensus among leaders at the time that an overall balance could prevent war by ensuring that no one leader saw a big advantage in waging it. They actively rebalanced in order to keep this. This is part of the reason why the UK, France, and, to some extent, Russia constantly divided and redivided the world among themselves (the UK and Russia for a while kept Afghanistan as a neutral buffer, for example).

It seems this worked until Germany rose in power and built up its navy. The Kaiser foolishly abandoned previous efforts to prevent France and Russia from formally allying against him. When they did so, Germany saw itself surrounded. Balance meant that the powers were indeed pretty well matched, so the war dragged on for years until the US helped to put an end to it. A similar thing happened in WWII, adding a rising Japan to the mix. Between the two world wars, there was no predominant power able to keep the peace. Many blame America for not taking on that role, a lesson it learned in WWII and thereafter, when it decided not to return to isolation but instead to actively manage world affairs in a bid to maintain relative peace and stability.

The big challenge, as the West saw it, after WWII was the increasing power and influence of the USSR. With both the US and USSR armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, a special type of deterrence thinking was devised. It was known as "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). The idea was that if one side attacked the other, there was no way to be certain of destroying all the latter's nukes. Both sides promised to retaliate with nuclear weapons if this happened, so neither could gain by using nukes for offensive purposes. In addition, it was thought that nukes would prevent conventional wars between the two sides, too, since neither would wish to risk escalation that might make one side or the other desperate enough to move to nuclear responses. War between the US and USSR did not happen, though a number of "proxy" wars did (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, as well as seeking influence by propping up each side's own dictators throughout the world).

 All this assumes that war would have broken out between the US and the USSR had it not been for deterrence. Not everyone agrees with this. There are a few reasons: The countries were far apart, vast, and had no direct territorial disputes. The first two features meant that it was difficult for either to mount a conventional attack on the other and even harder for one to overcome the other. Geography favored defense and the status quo, so the US and USSR had little to gain from attacking each other and thus nothing to fear. Nuclear weapons, of course, changed this. A few nuclear weapons could wipe out either country, bringing the prospect of successful offense nearer and giving both countries something to fear again. MAD provided the answer by removing any prospect for either party to attain victory by using nukes first.

On the face of it, then, neither side had anything to gain from attacking the other and virtually everything to lose, so there ought to have been little tension. But there was. The same scholars, like Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, who made the above points, also argued that deterrence was to blame for tension. By assuming that small commitments would tell opponents something about big commitments, both sides took tough stances, fearing that to give ground anywhere, even where few interests were at stake, would risk giving ground everywhere. The problem was that both sides often saw themselves as the defenders of these commitments, and thus wished to stand firm against the irrational "attackers" on the other side. This led to tough stances, tough talk, and escalations (like the Cuban Missile Crisis). Nuclear deterrence thus solved the problem of nuclear weapons, but using deterrence logic for every decision at every level caused unnecessary tensions and may have prolonged the Cold War.

So what about China? Is China more like Germany in the early 20th century or more like the USSR in the mid 20th century? On most counts, it is more like the latter. The US and China are vast, far apart, have no common claims to territory, no interest in a war that would inevitably be catastrophic, and both have nuclear weapons. The real question then becomes "Is the US doomed to wage a 'cold' war against China?" There are promising signs. China and the US trade with each other, whereas the US and USSR did not. This means there's more to lose by fighting and more to gain by cooperating. It also means there are many contacts between the countries. This was also the case between European countries before WWI, however, and wasn't sufficient to prevent a war that nobody wanted then, either.

The big risk now is Taiwan. China desires its formal incorporation into China as soon as possible. Taiwan resists this. The US has agreed that Taiwan is a part of China, but the two countries made an agreement not to alter the status quo unilaterally. This means the US is theoretically obligated to fight for Taiwan should China decide to incorporate it by force. The risk is not so much that either side would choose a course that would bring such a confrontation, but that they might blunder towards it through a series of more minor events. US allies in the region are already asking the US for reassurances. Reassuring its allies in the region looks to China a lot like an attempt to contain and deter it--something aggressive. This has potential to slowly escalate into gridlock between the two countries.

One of the main conclusions from analysis of Cold War deterrence is that all commitments are not linked. In other words, China could be accommodated on certain issues without concluding the US is weak, giving it an opportunity to challenge it. It is also important to note this time that China is larger than the US in population and will soon have a larger economy. That means that, over time, the US is unlikely to be able to keep up with Chinese military spending should the latter decide to challenge it. The US is overextended throughout the world and very close to China's own shores. A new Cold War might end differently. The US and the world would do well to prevent one from reoccurring.

Taiwan's Fate Is Sealed

Taiwan will become a de facto (and not just de jure) part of China--the only question is how

Taiwan's chances of becoming a fully independent state are essentially nill. The island is currently only recognized by a very few countries as an independent state. For most of the world, then, Taiwan is already a de jure (by law) part of China. Taiwan is de facto sovereign, however, deciding over all its own affairs. The United States has taken it upon itself to protect this state of affairs. In a series of communiques during the 1970s, the United States agreed that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. The catch for China is that both it and the US agreed that neither Taiwan nor China was to decide on a change in the status quo between Taiwan and China unilaterally or by force. This means that the US cannot support Taiwanese de jure independence, but that China would theoretically be barred from "reunifying" Taiwan with the mainland by force. As long as everyone sticks to the bargain, things are OK, even if they are quite messy from an international relations or international law viewpoint.

The thing is, China expects unification with Taiwan to occur eventually and does not seem willing to wait forever for this to happen: "In 2005 China passed the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law, which commits it to a military response should Taiwan ever declare independence or even if the government in Beijing thinks all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" (The Economist, Apr 7 2012). This seems to be rather close to violating those communiques, since the latter part, at least, would be a unilateral Chinese move toward unification. On the other hand, the US was supposed to slowly reduce its arms sales to Taiwan over time--it has not. As is distressingly often the case in international politics, a tiny political entity has the power to set a frightening chain of events into motion.

What if Taiwan were to declare independence? This came close to happening under Taiwan's President Chen in 2002, when he declared that there was "one country on either side of the Taiwan Strait."¹ Disaster was averted, however, when US President Bush began to reign Chen in, making it clear that the US's stance on unilateral changes to Taiwan's status applied to Taiwan as well as China.

The people of Taiwan eventually voted Chen out, partly out of fear that his loose talk could prompt a Chinese attack. Fear that China would attack and clear signals from Washington that the US would not back Taiwan if it declared independence should be enough to prevent it from doing so. (At least, I hope those signals from Washington are clear!)

But what happens if China decides that "all possibility of peaceful unification has been lost" and decides to forcefully annex Taiwan? At the moment, this still seems unlikely due to the US's power in the region. But China is increasing its capabilities in its backyard quite quickly. It's not a case of China needing to achieve military parity with the US. It's only a case of being able to defend itself against a US attack on its immediate coastal area including Taiwan. That is considerably easier than achieving parity. Would the US really be able, or willing, to stand up against China for the sake of Taiwan?

The US policy on the topic is "strategic ambiguity," which basically means it says it could get pissed off about a number of things, it just won't tell anyone what things would lead to which responses. The advantage of this is flexibility and the belief that this uncertainty will make the Chinese wary of provoking the US. What it actually is, in my view, is a way for the US to prevent admitting that it could not stop China from taking Taiwan if the former really wanted to, especially if China decides to do this in, say, 10 years or so when its capabilities will have grown much greater. The US is a long way from Taiwan, but China's entire military force could easily and quickly be brought to bear on the island. Over the medium to long term, there is little the US could do to stop such an occurrence. "Strategic ambiguity" is a sponginess that allows the US to convince all parties that they will get what they want and deserve, while knowing full well that this is impossible.

1.Dumbaugh, Kerry. “CRS Report for Congress.” Federation of American Scientists. 20 April 2007. 14 Jun. 2008 <http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33684.pdf> cited in Kirchofer, Charles. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests Reharding Tensions in the Taiwan Strait”. Webster University, Vienna, July 10, 2008. http://www.english4you.biz/papers/taiwan.pdf.

North Korea: Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain (China)

The situation with North Korea can seem confusing and infuriating. Why does North Korea provoke and then act friendly? Why is it so bent on getting nukes? Is Kim crazy? Why does China support North Korea, a would-be nuclear power in its backyard?

The answers to all these questions become pretty clear if you think of them as North Korean or Chinese leaders would. Why does North Korea yo-yo? Simple: it really wants nukes. Every time talks and improving relations get to the point where there's nowhere to go but giving them up, Kim starts the cycle from the beginning. He provokes, gets everyone riled up, then quiets down before a real mess starts and asks for negotiations again. All this buys time and has thus far avoided any real armed conflict. North Korea is closer to being able to launch nuclear warheads that can travel long distances, a considerable increase in its deterrent capability. At the same time, no one has attacked North Korea. A pretty successful strategy, from Kim's perspective.

But why is he so bent on getting nukes? This one is easy: no one invades a country with nukes, especially ones that pose a credible threat (they're borderline in North Korea, but still a risk), especially when no one is sure where they all are (the case in North Korea and Iran).

This leaves us with the last question: what's China's plan? Let's be China for a moment. What do we want? The same things most other countries want: autonomy in our internal affairs, security internationally, and to be able to trade freely with the rest of the world. North Korea would seem to cause insecurity, and America is a supporter of free trade, both ideologically and physically, with its naval presence in the western Pacific. This would seem to encourage China to take the US side on North Korea. It doesn't, because China dislikes US pressure to change its internal situation (criticism of the management of its exchange rate or its human rights record, for example) and sees its ability to project power in its region limited only by the US presence there, regardless of US intentions. These concerns seem to override, or at least ameliorate, China's worries over North Korea. The old diplomatic adage "let's you and him fight" applies here. China welcomes a distraction for America, while also free-riding on American action (it does not really want North Korea to become more powerful). China is also afraid of a collapse of the Kim regime because this might cause streams of refuges into China.

What should the US do? It is currently being duped by North Korea and China: paying for security in the region while not getting anywhere as far as its goals in the region. As I've argued previously, the US should make this China's problem. It should back up South Korea (and Japan) in the region where necessary, but it should not take the lead. This would force China to be more actively involved. It would make it impossible for China to free-ride on US peace-keeping and would also reduce the distraction-factor with regard to North Korea. It would also help to allay concerns about America's strong presence in the region because America would be speaking softly (while still carrying a "big stick"; Teddy Roosevelt would approve). China wishes to be a world power and claims to want peace. Here is its chance.

Liberalism and the Rise of China

"Liberalism" is a word with sometimes contradictory meanings. In international relations, it refers to a school of thought that supports internationalism: free trade, international institutions and laws, and, by association, the decline of realism, with its concepts of power, national interests, and the nation-state in a world of anarchy. The United States, many or most European states, and other "western" countries like Canada and Australia are, more or less, liberal powers (though all of them bow to the exigencies of realpolitik when they deem it necessary). China, too, is liberal, at least in the sense of free trade. It was quick to understand the benefits and reap the rewards of free trade. On foreign relations, however, China is decidedly realist.

While the EU and the U.S. often make trade and aid agreements contingent on certain human rights standards being met, China relates with other states as it suits it, largely ignoring what is going on within those states. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two excellent examples. China has helped Pakistan build several nuclear reactors, even though China's membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means it has a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons and is barred from providing nuclear assistance of any kind to non-members of the treaty (such as Pakistan). Admittedly, this is partly a response to America's bending of the rules (nonetheless the "proper way," by getting a legal exception to them passed) to do the same for India, Pakistan's arch rival and also a non-member of the NPT. (America did this largely because it sees China as a counterweight to India in the Indian Ocean and in the world.)

In Sri Lanka, China has been selling weapons at low prices and donating handsomely to infrastructure investment programs there, no strings attached. The U.S. and the EU had halted such activity after concerns arose about alleged war crimes being committed by government forces when fighting (and finally, after decades) defeating the Tamil Tigers, a separatist militia group. China's generosity has more than made up for the West's cutoff, so Sri Lanka was unconcerned about the West's threats. Will the West have any influence anymore?

The difficulty with liberalism is that it requires worldwide cooperation (at least until a world authority, replete with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions arises to run and enforce things, a simultaneously Utopian- and somewhat frightening-sounding idea). Even one systemically important straggler can bring the liberal system to its knees. During the world's brief "unipolar moment," in which the fall of the USSR has left the United States the world's only "hyperpower," this has been less problematic. The U.S. has had the resources and the lack of opposition necessary to push for such cooperation. However, this has never been a complete success, and unipolarity is ending (aided in part by a broad interpretation of U.S. goals leading to overstretch of its resources). China is on the rise, India and Brazil are possible future Great Powers, and Russia is insistent on not being forgotten. Economically, the EU is a Great Power, but it lacks the political, foreign policy, and military unity to have a real enforcement-related presence in the world. As the center of economic and military gravity shifts away from the U.S. and the EU (in relative terms), it will be increasingly harder for the West to make sanctions stick if other powers do not cooperate. It will also become ever harder to cajole them into cooperation.

The question that presents itself is: how much longer will it make sense to attach strings to aid and trade? If the strings mean both are turned down, and the presence of generous, no-strings-attached opportunities from elsewhere means the deals are not effective in shaping the world, then what is the point? The passed-over deals would benefit China and other realist opportunists and hurt the U.S. and the EU. At some point, concern about this loss of influence, and about China's rising military and economic might, will cause a shift to more realism in foreign and economic policy.

Realists are not prescriptive. It's not that they think things should be this way, it's that they assess that they are, whether or not we like it. In such circumstances, unfortunately, sometimes looking out for one's own interests, narrowly defined, is the best anyone can do. This will likely be the future of the world in the coming decades.

The North Korea Standoff: China's Moment?

After North Korea's alleged torpedo attack on its southern neighbor, it seems likely that tensions will increase between the two Koreas, which is likely to draw in China, Japan, the US, and Russia as well. This is the moment to encourage China to take on a more active role in maintaining stability in the world. China has not yet really demonstrated that it is willing or capable of doing this, but this is a situation in which I think the US ought to try to leave much of the work up to China. For one thing, China often uses North Korea as a bargaining chip in relations with the US and South Korea. You want to be responsible for North Korea? Fine, have at it!

There is more to this than cynicism, however. With the US still guaranteeing the security of South Korea, increasing its partnership if necessary, China will have even more riding on the North's stability than it does now. China dislikes having a nuclear-armed neighbor. Sure, the US and Russia have nukes too and may be too close for comfort, but they have shown themselves so far to be relatively responsible and predictable custodians. Not so the erratic Kim Jong Il. China also worries about the streams of refugees that might result from a collapse of the North Korean regime. Make this China's responsibility, and it might just take up the initiative and begin to act strongly, with US backing (as well as the backing of the rest of the Security Council, presumably).

Of course, the US should lay out a few clear conditions first, the main one being that, should the North Korean regime collapse (whether sooner or later), the people there will be guaranteed their right to democratic self-determination. They must be given the choice to become an independent state or to unite with the South, should the South agree to this as well. In such a situation, international aid, particularly from China, the US, and Japan, would be helpful in assisting South Korea in absorbing the devastatingly impoverished North.

With this foundational agreement set, the US could leave most of the footwork up to China. China is a major power, striving to Great or even Super Power status, at least economically. For the moment, it has shied away from pushing for these goals politically and militarily, content to simply make deals wherever the money is good and leave the US responsible for maintaining order and allow the free trade from which China (and everyone else, the US included, of course) so greatly benefits. It may be unsettling to some to imagine China as a Great Power (this author included), but there is an air of near inevitability about the progression. It is therefore better that China start practicing the work aspect that its weight brings with it. The US can help it do that while benefiting itself. Stepping back and letting China in would do nothing to reduce the relative distance between the two states in capabilities. Perceptions to this effect arising out of the appearance of a concession to China would be irrelevant and wrong. After all, how would it be a concession to nudge China to do more?

The Japanese-American Military Relationship: Call the Divorce Lawyer?

At the end of the Second World War, Japan was disarmed. Non-aggression clauses were even written into its constitution. Japan had no need of a large military because the United States vowed to protect it. At that time, the US was probably also the only force that would have been capable of attacking Japan in East Asia. Today, things look a bit different. Although China is rising and has been increasing military spending, Japan nonetheless remains a military lightweight, assured by security guarantees from the United States, much as Western Europe has been since the end of WWII.

Recently, however, there have been squabbles over American military bases in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. The previous government told the Americans the base could expand in size. Local residents, however, would rather see the base disappear altogether. Japan's new government at first agreed to review the case, putting off the Americans (though it has now reneged on this promise and plans to keep the base as previously planned). Is this a sign of further tensions down the road and the erosion of the Japanese-American security arrangement? In short: probably not. The Japanese know that the Americans insure not only their security, but the stability of the entire region. They are unlikely to kick them out any time soon, as evidenced by their eventual decision to let them stay, albeit possibly at a more remote location on the island. Even China has reason to wish for a US presence there. The strategic relationship is likely to recover and to remain at least as strong for the next two decades at a minimum. Whether the arrangement itself will be enough to stop an arms build-up and further tensions in the region, however, is in the stars.

America's presence in the Japanese archipelago is a central element in the area's security, part of the architecture of the modern "Pax Americana." Not only does it serve to protect Japan from outside attack, it also obviates Japan's need to build up its own defenses, which in turn makes other states in the region (notably both Koreas and China) feel less insecure and therefore less inclined toward military buildup themselves. South Korea's shipping lanes pass close to or through Japanese territorial waters and it is reliant on its trade links to the rest of the world.

It is not competition between Japan and South Korea, however, that is most worrisome. The elephant in the room is China. If the US were to depart from Japanese shores, is there any real doubt that the Japanese would start to feel nervous about their much larger neighbor to the west? The logical reaction to this insecurity would be a military buildup, of which Japan is certainly capable: it has the population (127 million), technology, and economic power. Japan's pursuit of security, however defensive its nature, would serve to make other countries in the region, namely China, but also both Koreas, feel less secure. Further insecurity in North Korea would make South Korea nervous. It is easy to see the chain reaction that would likely ensue.

Taiwan also relies almost exclusively on the United States to ensure that any change in its current status (in limbo between an independent state and a province of China) is not determined solely by the mainland Chinese. If Taiwan were to be wholly incorporated into the mainland, whether peaceably or not, this would extend China's reach into Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa (which in our extended scenario is no longer shielded by American forces). Leaving aside for a moment the worry that a democratic and open Taiwan might become an autocratic and oppressive Chinese province, this would be a serious destabilizing factor for the entire region.

Last but not least, China itself would not necessarily benefit from a US withdrawal. Although the Chinese would almost certainly rejoice if America removed its airbase from Taiwan and stopped supplying it with weapons, China, too, benefits from the Pax Americana. China would be faced with heightened diplomatic and military challenges if the region destabilized and Japan and the Koreas began building up their militaries. It would have to be very cautious not to drive on an arms race by becoming anxious and building its military might as well. The prospects for this restraint are not good. The security dilemma means tensions and even war would be hard to avoid in the absence of America's stabilizing power.

For all these reasons and more (habit, history, and cultural aspects), the Japanese-American connection is likely to remain strong as long as there are no truly severe (and foolish) diplomatic screw-ups. The only question then is: as America's (and Japan's) relative power declines in relation to China (assuming things continue to go well for China), how long will America's security guarantee remain credible? How long can America prevent a buildup and destabilization of East Asia? The continuation of strategic ties to the region may only delay the inevitable. The Pax Americana, like other paces before it (Britannica, Romana), will not last forever. The real issue is: what will replace it? Pax or bellum?

George Bush, India, and Crumbling Nuclear Non-Proliferation: What China's Deal with Pakistan Teaches Us

By Charles Kirchofer, Nov. 3^rd, 2008

China has recently planned a deal with Pakistan to sell it two nuclear reactors (article). This was in some ways a predictable outcome because of George Bush's previous deal with India, allowing India to benefit from sharing nuclear technology without the restrictions of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This foolish move has completely destabilized the treaty and reduced the hopes the world has of maintaining a nuclear peace.

China technically is not allowed to sell reactors or any other nuclear technology to Pakistan as a signatory of the NPT. Parties to the treaty agree not to spread atomic weapons to any other countries or even share any technology related to atomic weapons. They are also forbidden from selling or sharing any information about any nuclear technology to any country outside of the treaty (e.g. Pakistan). At the moment, there are five powers officially permitted to possess nuclear weapons: The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council). There are also four countries that are not part of the treaty: Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. North Korea was originally part of the treaty, violated it, and has now withdrawn. Israel, Pakistan, and India have each developed nuclear programs and have remained unpunished (and unencouraged, theoretically at least) as they did not sign the treaty and were therefore not obliged to abide by it. Recent moves by the Bush administration and the Chinese government are cracking the already weak foundation of the treaty and making the world a considerably more dangerous place.

The first blow from the sledgehammer
In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush made a deal with the Indian government to exempt India from the restrictions of the non-proliferation treaty. But why? Bush had a few reasons, the most important probably that India is the world's largest democracy, and could perhaps in the long run provide a counterweight to a rising, fairly cooperative, but authoritarian, China. The fact that no liberal democracy has yet waged war against another liberal democracy probably factored into the logic: if nuclear power is going to be in someone's hands, why not in India's? The idea was also that the NPT was bound to fail eventually anyway, especially as nuclear power becomes more popular in light of increased energy needs and scarcer energy resources. The argument that this was just another capitalist deal in the interests of big business doesn't hold water: a U.S. company hasn't built a nuclear reactor in several decades. The nuclear experts these days are the French, among others. No, Bush did this for balance-of-power reasons and out of the belief in the inherent peacefulness of democracies.

These reasons do have their merits. India generally seems to be a country that is responsible with its nuclear weapons. It does, however, have conflicts with Pakistan. These have come to a nuclear stalemate, much in the way the U.S. and Russia both restrained themselves during the Cold War. But there are other reasons, whether India is good-natured or not, to be concerned. The NPT, like all of international law, requires a consensus to maintain it. Bush's actions have undermined the treaty by showing the United States (probably the most important member as a role model) is not completely serious about non-proliferation, and that it is willing to play favorites when it sees that as in its best interests. This gives other states a reason to make exceptions for deals they see in their own interests as well. The first state was China; more may follow. Once deals are made, they're hard to turn back. Unfortunately for the world, treaties are easily destroyed by exceptions. I plead to the next President to think carefully about non-proliferation and act quickly. The treaty may be far from perfect, but it's the best thing we have to prevent a nuclear war. China's deal with Pakistan has shown that Bush has indeed set the ball rolling. It is up to the next president to stop it.