Monday, December 19, 2011

Iranian Pickles: The Options for Handling Iranian Nukes

Stopping a country from developing nuclear weapons is hard -- and dangerous

Ah, the complexities of today's world. Wouldn't it be nice to go back to when things were simpler: When we only had to worry about Soviet nukes being fired from Cuba; or West Berlin, a city surrounded by communist East Germany, being attacked by Soviet forces thus testing the US commitment to treating Berlin as if it were New York, possibly causing nuclear war? If you haven't gathered this already: this is sarcasm. There may have been only "one" enemy during the Cold War, but it was, especially through the 1960s, a terrifying time for the entire world. Just a bit of perspective on Iranian nukes.

I am neither a hawk nor a dove, so let's address both extremes of the spectrum before we begin. First off, the doves: All signs point to Iran developing nuclear weapons -- even the IAEA, once reluctant to draw conclusions, has now verified this (see in particular point 43 of its report). If it is not developing nuclear weapons, then it is doing everything it can to give that impression, for example by keeping secrets and building underground nuclear facilities. Since Iran would gain little from such a ruse (pretending to already HAVE nukes could prevent countries from attacking you, claiming you are developing them when you're not, ENCOURAGES attacks), we must conclude that it is really doing it. Iran is NOT harmless, and talk from the US and Israel about its dangers is not a pretext for launching wars that both want to get into just for the hell of it, or whatever it is that leftists think is the conspiratorial reasoning for all this. Iran has supported insurgents in Iraq, as well as the terror/militia groups/political parties Hamas and, most notably, Hezbollah, which follows the lead of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The issue against the Hawks, who would bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, is a bit more complex because their line, unlike that of the leftist doves who think Iran's leaders are lovely, peace-loving people, is more credible. The main issue here, though, is that an attack would almost certainly not stop Iran from getting a bomb. For one thing, no one knows if there are additional secret enrichment facilities in Iran like the one discovered in September 2009. Iran is set to transfer production to an alleged number of secret facilities, which are reported to be bomb-proof, even if all of them could be found. Could Iran be bluffing to deter an attack by making it sound futile? Sure, this is international politics and diplomacy after all. Lies abound. But can we afford to assume it's a bluff? No, and that's the problem.

What's more, an attack on Iran carries incredible risks. Unless it were successful in completely wiping out Iran's nuclear development capabilities and killing most of its nuclear scientists, a near miracle if you think about it (and even then: once you've gotten through the complexities once, the second development run ought to be faster), Iran will simply be delayed -- and really angry. Sure, Iran spews hatred for the West and above all Israel, which carried out attacks on its nuclear facilities once before. Increasing its determination further still seems unwise, however.

Dr. Strangelove time
So what can we do? It seems ever more likely that Iran will get the bomb no matter what we do. This does not have to be the end of Israel or civilization as we know it. Keep in mind that only two atom bombs have ever been used in the history of nuclear arms. Further, it's important to note two factors in that case: Japan could not retaliate with nuclear weapons, and Japan and the US were locked in a brutal war and the US stood to bring the war to a quick end, preventing further US casualties and expense, by dropping two bombs. Whatever your feelings about the morality of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, the US had every incentive to do it, and there was essentially no risk. Iran has nothing to gain by using its nukes first or giving them to terrorist groups -- and everything to lose by doing either.

So what's the point of having the bomb in the first place if it is useless? Careful! I said that it makes no sense to use nukes first in the current situation, but that doesn't mean they're not useful. As Kenneth Waltz, the high priest of international political theory, points out: "the usefulness of force should not be confused with its usability... [that would be] comparable to saying that the police force that seldom if ever employs violence is weak or that a police force is strong only when policemen are shooting their guns... [or] that a man with large assets is not rich if he spends little money or that a man is rich only if he spends a lot of it."1 The main use for Iran's weapons, when they're finally developed, is deterrence: it becomes much more unlikely that anyone will attack a nuclear-armed Iran, giving Iran greater freedom of political mobility. That is hugely useful.

"You're assuming Iran's leaders aren't nuts." You're right. And what is it about their actions that would lead us to think otherwise? Since I've pointed out that nuclear weapons are quite useful, even if this usefulness is not bound up with their actual use, the mere fact of them pressing on with the project implies paranoia about foreign influence or fear of attack -- but also rationality. Let's also not forget that Iran has been subject to heavy foreign interference in its affairs since the early 19th century, first by Britain and Russia, and later by the United States (the greatest example of which is the toppling of the Iranian government with US (CIA) assistance to re-instate the western-oriented Shah in 1953). So Iran has reason to be "paranoid," if the word can still be used to describe justified fear -- which would be an oxymoron; so no, it can't. Also, if you want to make people uncertain of your next move and encourage them to be extra cautious, it's a good idea to scare the crap out of them by making them think you're crazy. Kim Jong-Il (who has apparently just died!) was a master of this art, and the Iranian leaders may be, too. Note that Kim never really attacked South Korea, an easy target (Kim has tested South Korea's determination by firing at its ships and a small island near the border, but these tests showed South Korea was not just going to be pushed over).

We thought the Soviets were crazy enough to put ideology above reason, too, but they never did anything unreasonable. If Iran were to launch nukes at Israel, it would surely be completely destroyed by Israeli retaliation -- a pointless action. Likewise with an attack on Saudi Arabia, Iran's real arch rival in the region. The US could very well feel the need to launch a nuclear counterattack in that case as well. Or Israel might do it. In that case, too, Iran would have even less sympathy than it already does, for it clearly would be the aggressor. In the end, then, nukes are very useful for Iran in deterring foreign attacks and influence. They are not so useful if they explode, and that includes at the hands of Iran-linked terrorists. The bombs can be traced, and Iran would face a brutal retaliation if any of its bombs went off as a result of it giving them to terrorists. Plus: you have the most destructive weapon known to mankind, you've worked for years to develop it, in spite of tough sanctions and threats of attacks, and you're going to hand them over to a terrorist group over which you do not exercise total control? Not bloody likely!

Is this a happy compromise? No. But the other options are even worse. The world is not safe from nuclear weapons, but Pakistan and India provide further evidence that its destruction is probably not imminent: The countries hate each other, they are right next to each other, Pakistan is unstable and unpredictable, and yet no nukes have gone off. Instead, the conflict has been frozen. Both sides have become more cautious, and neither has been able to make any headway on its agenda. Frozen conflicts aren't great, either, but after a long freeze, future generations might forget what the fuss is all about and finally decide to resolve them peacefully, rather than letting them return to hot war or simply fester in the tundra. Nuclear weapons, then, force something like the Islamic concept of a hudna, or temporary cease-fire. The idea is to stop fighting and let the next generation decide how to take it from there. Strange love indeed.
  1. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): 185.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

The Difficulties of Deterrence

As my regular readers and friends will know, I am writing a PhD on the use and effectiveness of deterrent policies against terrorism. It's an important subject, because the way a state decides to fight terrorism can protect people from harm, but it can also cost vast sums of money, endanger the lives of soldiers, kill civilians, topple governments, cause global outcries, and quite possibly result in incentives leading to more terrorism, not less. It also might not even protect many people from much harm if the policy is flawed. In other words: it's a matter of life and death.

So what the heck is deterrence, anyway? Deterrence is when I encourage you not to attack me by promising I will attack you back so hard you'll regret it. Sound brutal? Well, let's face it: it's not a happy, "I'm OK you're OK" kind of foreign policy. It has its merits, though. The greatest is that it is inherently defensive in nature, rather than offensive. "I will retaliate if you attack me" is not the same as "I will attack you." So the decision is left to the other party, which is crucial because this distinguishes deterrence from things like preemption and prevention (think of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam so that he can't even think about one day attacking the United States), which seek to control others, rather than simply coerce them.

A second benefit, which further argues for its morality, is that it is also inherently limited, potentially costing less in terms of both blood and treasure, but I will get to this below.

A policy based on threats of violence seems awful to us folks living in countries with the rule of law, where we're taught that violence is never the answer. I agree with that sentiment, by the way. I long considered myself a pacifist and still abhor violence. After all, we have recourse to police, courts, managers, what have you if there's a problem. That's the point of a state, really: to keep its people safe from external threats, and those emanating from its own citizens -- to order society so that it can be run peacefully. Outside of states, though, there is no police force. If a country is attacked and cannot defend itself (yes, this does still happen in today's world!) its only hope is to call another, stronger, country to its rescue. The reason the US has such a big military is that it often is that country and defines its "interests" broadly: Japan not getting freaked out by China and developing nuclear weapons, scaring the whole region into a destabilizing arms race, for example (to prevent this, America promises to protect Japan and mediate disputes in the region, making everyone relax a bit).

OK, so there's my defense of the morality of deterrence. How about the difficulties, as mentioned in the title? Well, there are plenty of them. For one thing, the threat deterrence is based on must be credible. This means I have to have the capability to retaliate and the will to do so. For a country like the US, it is mostly the latter that is problematic. When US troops were attacked in Lebanon and Somalia, the US pulled them out after public outcries. The impression was that the US had no stomach for casualties. In fact, al-Qaeda probably believed this when it launched the 9/11 attacks, hoping that it could encourage the US to pull its troops out of the Middle East. I have recently discovered that Hamas also doubted that Israel would launch a full-scale attack on it when it was launching lots of rockets from Gaza in the run-up to the '08-'09 Gaza War. This was because Israel had been forced out of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Israel was stuck in southern Lebanon and could not crush Hezbollah without re-invading, for which there was no political or diplomatic support, at home or abroad. It eventually had to withdraw.

So deterrence failed to stop rockets coming in from Gaza because Israel's deterrent threat was no longer credible, despite Israel's obvious military capabilities and the large numbers of Hezbollah fighters killed by Israeli forces. This brings me to the most difficult part of maintaining a credible deterrent: preventing getting yourself stuck in quagmires.

Realist theorists are the ones that often stress deterrence. They are also the ones who most advocate only limited intervention to protect core interests and maintain the credibility of a country's deterrent threat. For example: roll into Kuwait to eject Saddam Hussein from the country? Yes. Saddam's presence risked destabilizing the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia were alarmed, and Saudi Arabia asked the US to intervene to protect it), and US inaction would have wholly discredited its deterrent capability and given a green light to would-be invaders everywhere. Invade Iraq when it showed no signs of attacking the US, then overthrow its government and start a new one? No. This is a risky operation likely to be very costly and drawn out, and its effect on deterrent credibility is questionable as it is not in response to any attack. Attack Afghanistan for its role in harboring terrorists? Yes. If the US wished to demonstrate that allowing terrorists to congregate and act in a country is expensive, that's certainly one way to do so. From the perspective of deterrence, setting up a new regime in the country was not strictly necessary and also carried significant risks similar to those in Iraq, which should now be clear.

This brings me back to the second advantage of a deterrent policy: its inherently limited scope and the caution this promotes. Is it nice to leave dictators and regimes like the Taliban in power when we have the capability of removing them? Liberals and neoconservatives (liberals in wolf's clothing) think not. They may sometimes be right: If everything goes well, the people of a country might be freed, and a responsible democracy might set in. Everything doesn't often go right, however, and even if it does, can we be sure it was worth the bloodshed and cost? It should be obvious to anyone right now that the US cannot march against every dictatorship or reviled regime in the world and overthrow it -- it is just too expensive and would bleed the country dry, preventing it from maintaining peace in the rest of the world. Pick your battles. Realism and deterrence policies provide a guide on how to do so.