Want to Fight Extremism and Help Moves toward Middle East Peace? A Deal with Iran Might Help.

Photo: The Guardian - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/04/iran-suspend-uranium-enrichment

One of the reasons I have been arguing for action on Syria is because Iran is watching. If we're not willing to stop Syria from using chemical weapons, so the argument goes, Iran will know full well that we are not going to bomb it to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon. Now that our weak commitment to enforcing norms against weapons of mass destruction has become clear, however, it may be time to look for the bright side. In this case, the bright side has to do with the other half of the deterrence equation: the promise.

Most people focus on the threat side of deterrence because deterrence is, roughly, using contingent threats to prevent an adversary from taking a particular undesirable action. The "contingent" part (we will attack only if you do x) is often swiftly forgotten, but deterrence cannot work without it. "You won't like what we'll do to you if you do x" also means "if you DON'T do x, everything will be fine." Similarly, a lot of time is spent worrying about the credibility of threats, but almost no thought is given to the credibility of promises NOT to attack. This is a huge oversight, because if I believe you'll attack me either way, I have a strong incentive to hit you first, or do whatever it was you didn't like, in order to be stronger and appear defiant in the face of your threats.

I suspect so little attention is given to the credibility of promises because of an assumption made by deterrers that they are the good guys and are peace-loving, so of course our promise to be nice is believable, unlike conciliatory promises made by the other side, which, being the enemy, is not to be trusted. I'm not arguing that we should trust Iran. Everything about its nuclear program screams "weapons," despite its assertions to the contrary. What I AM saying is that we should not assume Iran ought to be able to trust us and that any concerns it claims to have are just posturing and nonsense.

Iran has at least two reasons to doubt the US. One is that we have successfully toppled its government once before (after a period of constant meddling my Russia and Britain) in the 1950s. The other is that the US has made no secret of its wish to see regime change in Iran ever since. The past two centuries of Iran's history have served as a lesson never to trust big foreign powers. What may seem to Americans like paranoia or fake worry looks to Iranians like sensible concerns about preventing subversion by foreigners.

The fact that the US obviously does not want to get drawn any further into Middle East conflicts is thus a cause for Iran to relax: The US attempting to topple the Iranian regime seems quite unlikely at the moment. The question is now whether Iran wants the bomb to have greater power over its neighbors (in which case a more conciliatory US stance is unlikely to help) or because it mainly fears the US and its allies (some also in the region), which could be helped by a more peaceful-looking United States.

That question is basically moot, however, because I don't see the US attacking Iran any time soon. The question thus becomes: Now that we have limited our options, what is the path to the best possible outcome? Even if Iran is seeking regional hegemony, as many in Israel believe, getting a bomb may not be the best way to get there, especially if this causes other regional powers like Saudi Arabia to go nuclear as well. The current sanctions on Iran are very painful. They would continue and intensify if Iran got the bomb. This weakens Iran and makes its people unhappy, increasing risks for the regime. If Iran feels safe from US invasion and attacks by Israel, cooperation on several levels could be possible and be a way for Iran to grow stronger. Al Qaeda is one of Iran's biggest enemies, just as it is to the United States. The same goes for other Sunni extremist groups. Given the apparent recent resurgence in Al Qaeda's strength, cooperation with Iran on countering those groups could be useful. At the same time, Shia groups like Hezbollah defer heavily to Iran's leadership. Iran is thus a central player in Middle East politics involving terror groups and other non-state actors and is THE power when it comes to Shia Islam.

Iran's pride would need to be protected in any deal. One possibility would be to leave Iran "stalled" at near break-out capacity for creating a bomb (broadly where it is today). Iran has continually insisted it does not wish to build a bomb, so this would not have to seem a climb-down and would save face. At the same time, Iran would not have a bomb and could perhaps slowly climb down from having one through increased cooperation on a civilian program. This would meet US goals and save US face and credibility. Reducing tension between the West and Iran could also help in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as Hezbollah defers heavily to Iran and Hamas also listens to it, covering two of Israel's most difficult borders. A removal of tension may make Israel feel secure enough to negotiate.

It's not that far-fetched. Iran doesn't seem that sure on whether it wants to cross that final threshold and obtain a bomb. There's a decent chance it won't build one. The US and its allies should of course stick to the sanctions until concrete progress is made and make clear their commitment to protecting their allies in the region, including against nuclear threats. But if the US seizes such an opportunity, further cooperation would be more probable than at any time since 1979.

Hawks are not always the best deterrers

While considering where to look for evidence that Israel is deterred by Hamas, I thought of something that seems totally obvious once it is said: If the reward I offer you for not attacking me is worse than my attacks against you if you do, you will keep attacking me. In other words: Deterrence is not only about threats of punishment, it is also about rewarding "good" behavior. In order for Israel to decide not to attack Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has to offer something more enticing to Israel in return. If its alternative is "dissolve yourself," Israel is obviously not going to choose to be deterred.

Again, this may seem obvious, but it is an interesting nuance because most people associate policies of deterrence with so-called foreign policy hawks. This is because the main feature of the type of deterrence that has dominated world politics for decades is threats of unacceptable retaliation for attacks (think of the US and Soviet policy of Mutually Assured Destruction when it came to nuclear attacks). Deterrence is certainly not a cuddly, "let's let in the Age of Aquarius" sort of foreign policy stance. But the alternative to attacking the US in the case above was peace, since deterrence was mutual. Peace is a pretty nice alternative to nuclear war, so it stuck. Crucially, destroying the Soviet Union was not a US policy (though many in the US openly wished for it).

The case with the US also illustrates another factor: Further alternatives must be less palatable than accepting deterrence. The main alternative was wiping the US out before it could strike back, thus removing the threat and the constraint of US deterrence on Soviet policymaking. This policy was unrealistic, and the US explicitly made sure of this by ensuring that the Soviet Union could never be certain of wiping out the whole US nuclear arsenal, meaning its own destruction would likely be imminent if it attacked the US. No realistic alternative there.

The main things required to block the alternative route of wiping out an enemy are power and resilience (two things the US nuclear arsenal had and has in abundance). In light of this, Hamas's strengthening in recent years may actually be a blessing in disguise for peace in the Middle East, if not necessarily for Israel's ambitions. Hamas has shown that, with occupation or without it, Israel cannot eliminate the organization without taking measures that it would not consider (like wiping out the entire Gaza Strip). For a while in the early to mid-2000s, with Israeli security stopping the vast majority of suicide bombings by 2005, it looked like Israel might be able to defeat Hamas militarily and thus need not be bound by any Hamas attempts to deter it. Rocket attacks have changed this prospect. Bombers could be stopped from entering Israel, rockets cannot. Even the Iron Dome missile defense system could not stop a concerted effort: A massive number of rockets flying toward Israel would overwhelm the system.

It therefore seems that Israel would be extremely hard-pressed to either eliminate Hamas or deny it the ability to attack Israel. This means that the choice of accepting a sort of truce with Hamas has become more palatable.

Going back to the main point of this post, the "peaceful" alternative has also become more available from Hamas's side as it has moderated its actions (if not much of its rhetoric) over the years to allow for short- to medium-terms cease-fires with Israel. In other words, Hamas needed to become more dovish to stop Israeli attacks.

Will this be a permanent change? Anyone who tries to predict the future in the Middle East is a fool. Hamas's continued grip on the Gaza Strip is not assured, and there are other, less moderate groups, who are too Hawkish to deter Israel. Dovishness on the part of Hamas has also been encouraged by Israel's massive superiority. This differential, too, is not written in stone. Over time, things could change and destabilize the current situation. Finally, since this set-up is based on both sides' perceptions of their and their opponent's power and the credibility of their threats, a change simply in the perception of the situation could spark another round of violence. My guess would be that such a round would eventually return to a tenuous peace, but how peaceful is a situation that repeatedly erupts into violence every few years?

For these reasons, the future is dependent on whether or not Israel and Hamas take further steps towards cementing peace. Everyone knows this, so there is no need to discuss it. My hypothesis, however, is that deterrence may help give the two parties the breathing room they need to move forward--if they are bold enough.

Israel and Palestine: What's the Strategy?

I have argued before (and I'm not the only one) that it is impossible for a conflict to be settled if one side thinks it would do better to continue the conflict. My previous example was Afghanistan, in which all Afghans, including the Taliban, know that the US will not remain forever (see post). The Taliban know that time is on their side. Whenever a disagreement seems intractable, something like this probably lies behind the scenes.

Take the long fight between the Israeli government and authorities representing the Palestinians. There seems to be no ending this fight. But why? It is easy to see why Palestinians believe time is on their side, if for none other than demographic reasons: the Palestinian population of the region, including inside of Israel proper, is increasing more quickly than the Israeli population. Beyond that, there seems to be a general, but gradual, shift in world politics away from unquestioning support of Israel. This has a couple reasons, among them a relative decline of the "West" along with the slow slippage of the Holocaust into something only read about in history books.

In this environment, it would seem wise for Israel to talk tough but to try to find a solution as quickly as possible, allowing it time to mend relations with antagonistic neighbors. Instead, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that Israel will not accept a path to peace that his predecessor had already essentially agreed upon. In effect holding up hopes, then changing the terms at the last minute. There seems to be no rush for peace. What is going on here? There are a few possible explanations:

1. Israelis, too, feel that time is on their side and that the Palestinians will eventually give up hoping for a better solution. This may also fit in with creating "facts on the ground" by continuing settlements on the West Bank, making their eventual removal politically all but impossible in the future. This is like a game of chicken.
2. Another possibility, and this is one that I seem to hear coming from Israel, is the one I call the panic strategy. Israelis are well aware that time is not on their side. Furthermore, they do not believe that even a two-state solution will convince their hostile neighbors to leave them alone. Better, then, to try to push for all concessions they can, now, while they still have clout This, too, is a somewhat different game of chicken.

One of the most important concessions for Israel, and one that is entirely understandable, is that Hamas renounce the use of violence and recognize Israel's right to exist before it even begins to negotiate with it. Ironically, diminished US and European support for Israel might actually end up helping Israel in this regard: as long as the US was seen to be 100% behind Israel, the Palestinians did not feel there was any way to be sure that their concessions would be met with real concessions from Israel. With President Obama putting public pressure on Israel, while still leaving no doubt as to his support for Israel's security, Palestinians may become less uncomfortable with making concessions, while still seeing that Israel is not about to be weakened to the point of making more concessions than it has hinted at in the past.

In such an unstable place, a little more trust could go a long way.

Unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian State may seem like a good idea -- it isn't

As Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem forever unable to settle their differences and agree to live side-by-side, and as Israeli settlements continue to go up in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, some states have begun to recognize a State of Palestine. In fact, the EU recently even seemed to imply that recognizing Israel implicitly meant recognizing Palestine. Wouldn't recognizing Palestine be a way to strong-arm the two sides into finally coming to an agreement and letting everybody get on with their lives? How likely is such an action?

As you may have guessed from the title, the answers are "not really" and "not very." First off, how good of an idea is unilateral recognition really? Recognition is a discretionary act. States are generally free to (not) recognize whomever they wish. Usually, though, one standard for recognition is that a state has a government that effectively controls its territory and the people in it. That can't be said for a would-be Palestine. There are three governments involved: the Palestinian Authority (Fatah), Israel, and Hamas.

"This is just legal doctrine," you might say. "Who cares?" It matters. By recognizing a Palestinian State, this would imply that relations between us and the Palestinian state are state-to-state. This would cause quite a legal pickle. States have a right to sovereignty and non-intervention. Doing business with Israel, whose presence would almost certainly be undesired within the new Palestine, could then be viewed as supporting an illegal breach of Palestinian sovereignty. This could conceivably allow the Palestinian Government to sue in, say, German courts companies and other organizations doing business with Israel deemed to support the government's occupation of another State.


This would force governments into uncomfortable situations. They should not recognize a Palestinian State unless they are ready for these situations and ready to be consistent with the implications for foreign policy. Most states in the "West" are not ready for this. They know this, too, which makes such a declaration unlikely until they are closer to being ready.

The other issue is more pragmatic: who would states do business with? Would they consider the PA the government of all of Palestine and ignore Hamas in Gaza (broadly in line with current policy)? Recognition by a majority of states around the globe might indeed force Israel out of Palestine, especially (and particularly) if the US were on board. This would cause a power vacuum, giving the PA and Hamas an opportunity to fight for control, but also opening up the possibility to further, smaller groups. International action could be required to stop the country from collapsing into violence, and Israel might simply go right back in.

In short: declaring that a Palestinian State exists would do nothing to solve immediate Palestinian problems. There still would be no unity and no viable government there. The border issue would still be unresolved, no matter what borders recognizing countries might unilaterally decide to recognize (if any, this is not a requirement of recognition). It would put additional pressure on Israel, which might cause less moderate groups to gain more power there, polarizing the situation further. Finally, it would cause legal conundrums at home. What would be the point of all that?

It is time to put more pressure on both sides to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But the issues must be resolved from the ground up, starting with borders. A top-down approach based on unilateral recognition is messy, risky, and quite possibly counterproductive. There are no shortcuts when real resolve is what is really needed.

Time to Recognize Hamas

An article from this week's edition of The Economist provides a startling look into Hamas's success at providing the Gaza Strip with just about everything it needs. Prices have fallen, businesses have flourished, cafés and universities have re-opened. This adds yet another reason to the list of why the "West," insofar as it has not already done so (I believe Norway already has, for example), should recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Gaza Strip. It exercises de facto control over the territory and has apparently succeeded in bringing security and a degree of economic prosperity (when compared with the past few years) to the area. No other group (including the UN and the Israelis) could make this claim. These accomplishments have also made Hamas popular in the Gaza Strip, further diminishing prospects that Fatah could ever enjoy any real influence there again without serious (and deleterious) changes to conditions in Gaza. What are the other reasons Hamas should be recognized and worked with?

• It has moved away from the West and relies on other contacts for its stability and prosperity. This is working (comparatively speaking). While economic and personal security in Gaza are certainly to be welcomed, from a western political standpoint, this indicates that western influence in Gaza has waned even more than it had previously. If the Israelis and the US hope to have more influence in Gaza, they must engage with Hamas, which has effective control there. Furthermore, trying to force influence by removing Hamas would be transparent (i.e. Gazans would know what was going on and resent the action, making it counterproductive) and would lead to chaos and suffering, while carrying a very high risk of ultimate failure. Keeping Hamas in isolation would only further push it into the arms of other actors the West would rather it not deal with (e.g. Iran).
• Terrorists and extremest organizations become more moderate when they achieve real power. This could be seen with the PLO as well, which was also initially shunned by the West but was later accepted (albeit too late, I would argue, as its acceptance among the people it claimed to represent was already in decline). Hamas is now responsible for providing not just physical protection for the residents of Gaza, but also for their economic welfare. The constraints of power are already moderating its actions, if not its rhetoric.
• As The Economist mentions, Hamas may soon be embroiled in competition with Muslim extremist groups in Gaza. This implies that Hamas is a relatively moderate force there now (as would be expected from the logic of the point above). Denying recognition to Hamas will make it more likely that extremer forces will take hold in Gaza, making the situation there even worse for the people of Gaza and further harming any chance at cooperation with Israel and/or the US and their allies. As mentioned, this was the case with the PLO as well.

In conclusion, I am arguing to recognize Hamas not because I am an idealist and believe in the good of all people. On the contrary, I am a realist and believe that recognizing Hamas is in everyone's interests. It's a win-win situation, and Israel, the US, the UK, France, etc. would be fools not to take advantage of it. It is sure to be a short-lived opportunity in an ever-unstable Middle East. True, it is by no means a guarantee of success, but letting idealistic notions like "we don't negotiate with terrorists" get in the way of what is, granted, only a shimmer of hope for progress, would be reckless and unconscionable.