Egypt: a pretty pickle for America

Unrest continues in Egypt, sparked by the overthrow of the Ben Ali government in Tunisia. Egyptians want an end to the repressive regime of "President" Hosni Mubarak. Here in Vienna, protesters held up banners at Stephansplatz, the city's central square. The banners demanded "freedom for Egypt" and decried US and EU support for the Mubarak regime.

It looks like Egypt could conceivably head towards democracy. So why aren't the US and European countries rushing to push for this? The West's support for a repressive regime in Egypt began after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Then Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, facing a nearly bankrupt state, civil unrest, and an Israeli occupation of much of its territory, realized that his only hope for a solution to all these interrelated problems was to get the US interested in the matter. He ejected Soviet military advisors from Egypt. It didn't help. In 1973, he started a war with Israel and gained back some territory. He stopped short, however, thinking international diplomacy would take it from there. Instead, this gave Israel time to regroup. It fought back and made large gains. The Camp David Accords settled the matter, for the most part, giving Egypt back the Sinai Peninsula. This was seen as a sell-out by much of the Arab world. Egypt thus became politically isolated from the rest of the Middle East. This meant it was more reliant on the US.

The US, for its part, was now more interested in providing support because of a simple calculus: if Egypt had continued to move forward, the US might have gotten dragged into a war on Israel's side. This might have brought in the Soviet Union on Egypt's side. This could have happened the other way around as well. No one wanted a direct war between the US and USSR. The US, from the 1970s on, took a closer interest in the Middle East and supported Egypt as a military power to help maintain stability in the region. This was useful as Iran's revolution meant that it turned away from the US. Egypt and later Saudi Arabia began to be seen as bulwarks against instability and terrorism.

Things have changed a bit. What to do? The alliance with Mubarak has always been an uncomfortable one of convenience. The US promotes democracy where it can, but must consider when it may be better to promote stability over democracy. Stability may not longer be viable in Egypt, so perhaps the US can support stability by supporting democracy -- carefully.

US policymakers are worried about the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas, a Palestinian terror group-cum-political party (and rulers of the Gaza Strip), is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of its members are extremist. They would probably win an election in Egypt. The problem is: there's a good possibility that they would only have ONE election. Then we'd have a repressive regime again, but one that is also anti-American.

Maybe this is inevitable. Give the people of Egypt the chance to choose for themselves. In the long run, having a repressive regime that was NOT kept alive by America would be a good thing, and would help America out of the cognitive dissonance caused by propping up an authoritarian regime. Egyptians might then no longer see America as the enemy behind the scenes. The current regime, regardless of the outcome of the current unrest, is not sustainable, in any case. Perhaps the US can provide careful support and midwife true democracy? Sound overly optimistic?

Sources: http://english.aljazeera.net/ and

Cleveland, William, and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009. 

North Korea: Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain (China)

The situation with North Korea can seem confusing and infuriating. Why does North Korea provoke and then act friendly? Why is it so bent on getting nukes? Is Kim crazy? Why does China support North Korea, a would-be nuclear power in its backyard?

The answers to all these questions become pretty clear if you think of them as North Korean or Chinese leaders would. Why does North Korea yo-yo? Simple: it really wants nukes. Every time talks and improving relations get to the point where there's nowhere to go but giving them up, Kim starts the cycle from the beginning. He provokes, gets everyone riled up, then quiets down before a real mess starts and asks for negotiations again. All this buys time and has thus far avoided any real armed conflict. North Korea is closer to being able to launch nuclear warheads that can travel long distances, a considerable increase in its deterrent capability. At the same time, no one has attacked North Korea. A pretty successful strategy, from Kim's perspective.

But why is he so bent on getting nukes? This one is easy: no one invades a country with nukes, especially ones that pose a credible threat (they're borderline in North Korea, but still a risk), especially when no one is sure where they all are (the case in North Korea and Iran).

This leaves us with the last question: what's China's plan? Let's be China for a moment. What do we want? The same things most other countries want: autonomy in our internal affairs, security internationally, and to be able to trade freely with the rest of the world. North Korea would seem to cause insecurity, and America is a supporter of free trade, both ideologically and physically, with its naval presence in the western Pacific. This would seem to encourage China to take the US side on North Korea. It doesn't, because China dislikes US pressure to change its internal situation (criticism of the management of its exchange rate or its human rights record, for example) and sees its ability to project power in its region limited only by the US presence there, regardless of US intentions. These concerns seem to override, or at least ameliorate, China's worries over North Korea. The old diplomatic adage "let's you and him fight" applies here. China welcomes a distraction for America, while also free-riding on American action (it does not really want North Korea to become more powerful). China is also afraid of a collapse of the Kim regime because this might cause streams of refuges into China.

What should the US do? It is currently being duped by North Korea and China: paying for security in the region while not getting anywhere as far as its goals in the region. As I've argued previously, the US should make this China's problem. It should back up South Korea (and Japan) in the region where necessary, but it should not take the lead. This would force China to be more actively involved. It would make it impossible for China to free-ride on US peace-keeping and would also reduce the distraction-factor with regard to North Korea. It would also help to allay concerns about America's strong presence in the region because America would be speaking softly (while still carrying a "big stick"; Teddy Roosevelt would approve). China wishes to be a world power and claims to want peace. Here is its chance.

Unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian State may seem like a good idea -- it isn't

As Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem forever unable to settle their differences and agree to live side-by-side, and as Israeli settlements continue to go up in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, some states have begun to recognize a State of Palestine. In fact, the EU recently even seemed to imply that recognizing Israel implicitly meant recognizing Palestine. Wouldn't recognizing Palestine be a way to strong-arm the two sides into finally coming to an agreement and letting everybody get on with their lives? How likely is such an action?

As you may have guessed from the title, the answers are "not really" and "not very." First off, how good of an idea is unilateral recognition really? Recognition is a discretionary act. States are generally free to (not) recognize whomever they wish. Usually, though, one standard for recognition is that a state has a government that effectively controls its territory and the people in it. That can't be said for a would-be Palestine. There are three governments involved: the Palestinian Authority (Fatah), Israel, and Hamas.

"This is just legal doctrine," you might say. "Who cares?" It matters. By recognizing a Palestinian State, this would imply that relations between us and the Palestinian state are state-to-state. This would cause quite a legal pickle. States have a right to sovereignty and non-intervention. Doing business with Israel, whose presence would almost certainly be undesired within the new Palestine, could then be viewed as supporting an illegal breach of Palestinian sovereignty. This could conceivably allow the Palestinian Government to sue in, say, German courts companies and other organizations doing business with Israel deemed to support the government's occupation of another State.


This would force governments into uncomfortable situations. They should not recognize a Palestinian State unless they are ready for these situations and ready to be consistent with the implications for foreign policy. Most states in the "West" are not ready for this. They know this, too, which makes such a declaration unlikely until they are closer to being ready.

The other issue is more pragmatic: who would states do business with? Would they consider the PA the government of all of Palestine and ignore Hamas in Gaza (broadly in line with current policy)? Recognition by a majority of states around the globe might indeed force Israel out of Palestine, especially (and particularly) if the US were on board. This would cause a power vacuum, giving the PA and Hamas an opportunity to fight for control, but also opening up the possibility to further, smaller groups. International action could be required to stop the country from collapsing into violence, and Israel might simply go right back in.

In short: declaring that a Palestinian State exists would do nothing to solve immediate Palestinian problems. There still would be no unity and no viable government there. The border issue would still be unresolved, no matter what borders recognizing countries might unilaterally decide to recognize (if any, this is not a requirement of recognition). It would put additional pressure on Israel, which might cause less moderate groups to gain more power there, polarizing the situation further. Finally, it would cause legal conundrums at home. What would be the point of all that?

It is time to put more pressure on both sides to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But the issues must be resolved from the ground up, starting with borders. A top-down approach based on unilateral recognition is messy, risky, and quite possibly counterproductive. There are no shortcuts when real resolve is what is really needed.