Syria: Prepare for Intervention

I have argued against US intervention in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, although not here in this blog. Unfortunately, things have now changed and I am being forced to rethink.

Reports have been coming in lately that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has used chemical weapons in Syria. Starting last August, President Barack Obama has stated that the use of chemical weapons, or their transfer to terrorist groups, would “change the equation” for Barack Obama and be a "grave mistake” for the Syrian regime. At the time the president first made these statements, the Syrian regime replied to them with its own deterrent demand, saying that it would never use chemical weapons unless Syria were invaded from the outside. Until now, that status quo seemed to be holding. Regardless of all the discussion over where the “red lines” actually lie, President Obama needs to give signs that the United States is actually serious about its threat not to allow the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Promises are important. This is because following through on past promises allows a person, state, or government to build a reputation for credibility. This, in turn, allows it to avoid, in this case, military action, and the death and destruction that come with it, in the future by simply being able to threaten action rather than constantly having to carry through with it.

The importance of promises can be overstated, however. There is evidence that, during the Cold War, the United States worried too much about its credibility and that this led it to act in an overly aggressive manner, leading to unnecessary escalation. Evidence from Soviet archives that opened up in the 1990s indicates that the Soviets actually rarely questioned US resolve when it came to core US interests (the safety of US territory, for example).

Some promises are important, however. When it comes to US interests in far-off places that are not vital to the US economy and do not host US bases, for example, the will of the United States to intervene is indeed questionable. Furthermore, this particular promise is also especially important. The US is interested in using deterrence in areas far away from its core areas of interest. The most important and salient example of this in current politics is Iran's pursuit of a nuclear bomb. The US has warned several countries against getting a bomb in the past, and yet states like Pakistan and North Korea have obtained nuclear weapons without suffering any US military intervention to stop them. Barack Obama would like Iran to think that this time is different. If the US is unwilling to stand up to a regime terrorizing its citizens with chemical weapons, however, this makes Barack Obama’s alleged commitment to stopping Iran from getting the bomb appear more questionable.

The promise is also important in a narrower way. There is an overriding moral interest in condemning the use of chemical weapons, preventing their use over time, and thus establishing self-maintaining norms against their use. The less the use of chemical, biological, nuclear, and other destructive weapons is permitted, the greater the taboo against their use becomes. As one of the few states in the world with the ability to attempt to enforce such global norms, there is a strong moral argument for the US to act.

So what must be done? The first step is publicly to prepare to intervene. Barack Obama should begin working on plans for military action in Syria, possibly shifting resources towards the eastern Mediterranean in preparation. This will send the right message to the Syrian regime. In the meantime, the US administration should continue to gather evidence that chemical weapons have been used by the Syrian regime, but it must be satisfied with clear and convincing evidence rather than evidence that goes "beyond a reasonable doubt,” as this may not be forthcoming. In addition, Obama should inform the rebel leadership that intervention will come only if it agrees to an international tribunal for war crimes, helping to set up institutions and the rule of law afterwards. All this must be more than posturing, however. If this does not bring peace, or at least the cessation of the use of chemical weapons (I leave it to the US Government to decide on these goals, though once intervention has begun, the goal must be an end to the conflict and this should be publicly stated) the US should impose a no-fly zone, while continuing to issue warnings of escalation coupled with a way out for the regime, perhaps in the form of an amnesty for those who abandon it. Such an amnesty must now exclude Assad, however, for he has crossed the line and mustn't be let off.

Failure to surrender plus attacks on US planes will mean greater military involvement, at first with targeted bombings of regime military targets where possible (missile launchers are often located in heavily populated areas). The next step would be to increase the bombing, warning residents by dropping leaflets to evacuate areas targeted for attacks. All this should give the rebels the upper hand. If this fails to turn the tide, a ground operation, preferably with the support of other countries like Turkey, would then be necessary (Britain and France have also encouraged action and should be included).

With any luck, the above steps will not all be necessary. We must accept that they may be, however. There is much at stake in keeping to this promise and so it must be done. Allowing chemical weapons to be used offensively once again with impunity sends the wrong message to the world. And allowing aggressive regimes to cross red lines set by the US without suffering any consequences also sends the wrong message to the US’s adversaries and allies alike. There are many countries in the world that have refrained from building their militaries because of their faith in the US’s ability and willingness to protect them from external aggression. If those countries were to lose that faith, the world would become a much more unstable and dangerous place.

North Korea: Keeping the Peace

Deterring the wretched regime requires clear, tough, automatic, and non-negotiable sticks, but also clear, automatic, and somewhat negotiable carrots. Most of all, however, it needs a promise not to act against the regime as long as it does not endanger anyone else.

You might be forgiven for thinking the North Korean regime was stark-raving mad. After all, why does it keep acting so belligerently when things could be so much better for North Korea? No one can be entirely sure, but fear of losing control of the country it's kept so well under its thumb for decades is one strong possibility. The regime clearly doesn't care much about the survival or lot of its people, so this suggests it cares mostly about itself.

This is why there need to be clear, automatic, and non-negotiable sanctions levied against it for nasty behavior. The problem is, though, there's not much more that can be done to the country without using force. This, perhaps, is the reason for the rush to nukes and missiles, and it's perhaps the regime's biggest fear.

That, in turn, is why there must be clear rewards. It is impossible to take more away, so positive reinforcement looks more promising. In addition, giving rewards creates a stake in keeping them--there would be something to take away later.

North Korea has made use of this before, making promises in exchange for aid, only to renege on those promises as soon as the aid was received. This is why any rewards given ought to affect the regime directly and ought to be designed so as they can be taken away automatically. Strategists are not stupid, and this has already been tried and will be again. But it almost doesn't matter: The door should always be left open, with it up to North Korea whether it wishes to walk through or to leave again. This can allow North Korea to trust the US over time.

A final ingredient is a promise--the FINAL promise: Not to invade or otherwise attempt to effect regime change in North Korea as long as it does not attack the South, Japan, Taiwan, China, or US bases or the mainland, etc. If fear of losing control is the big driving factor, which I am guessing it is, this is an important ingredient. All this gives North Korea the security to decide to come around. It can also quietly climb down from its war horse, saving face. The US, China, and all those who wish the North to remain peaceful are strong and credible enough to make "concessions" from that strength. If Kim Jong-Un thinks the US wishes to topple him regardless of what he does, he will have no incentive to be moderate. This is the missing piece of the puzzle. It should be put in place. John Kerry's professed willingness to talk to North Korea directly is thus to be applauded, if done right.

(Cold) War with China Inevitable?

There is much debate in the world of political science about whether war with China, cold or otherwise, is inevitable. Must we fear the future?

Will China's rise be peaceful? Should the US and the world seek to accommodate China, or "contain" it, as was its policy against the Soviet Union? Is some sort of confrontation inevitable? If some sort of conflict is inevitable, then the only choice the rest of the world (lead by the US as its largest power) has is whether, to what extent, and how it can shape the type of conflict that emerges. Can it just be a situation of occasional "tensions," must and can we rely on our old Cold War friend deterrence to prevent WWIII, or is WWIII even inevitable?

 The idea that war may loom because there is a shift in what is called the global "balance of power" stems from an analysis of previous shifts among powers in Europe. A prime example is WWI. In the 19th century, the UK was the world's predominant power, particularly at sea. It used this power to "balance" threats, which then all originated on the European continent. It did this by shifting alliances so that no one power or group of powers could threaten it. There was a consensus among leaders at the time that an overall balance could prevent war by ensuring that no one leader saw a big advantage in waging it. They actively rebalanced in order to keep this. This is part of the reason why the UK, France, and, to some extent, Russia constantly divided and redivided the world among themselves (the UK and Russia for a while kept Afghanistan as a neutral buffer, for example).

It seems this worked until Germany rose in power and built up its navy. The Kaiser foolishly abandoned previous efforts to prevent France and Russia from formally allying against him. When they did so, Germany saw itself surrounded. Balance meant that the powers were indeed pretty well matched, so the war dragged on for years until the US helped to put an end to it. A similar thing happened in WWII, adding a rising Japan to the mix. Between the two world wars, there was no predominant power able to keep the peace. Many blame America for not taking on that role, a lesson it learned in WWII and thereafter, when it decided not to return to isolation but instead to actively manage world affairs in a bid to maintain relative peace and stability.

The big challenge, as the West saw it, after WWII was the increasing power and influence of the USSR. With both the US and USSR armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, a special type of deterrence thinking was devised. It was known as "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). The idea was that if one side attacked the other, there was no way to be certain of destroying all the latter's nukes. Both sides promised to retaliate with nuclear weapons if this happened, so neither could gain by using nukes for offensive purposes. In addition, it was thought that nukes would prevent conventional wars between the two sides, too, since neither would wish to risk escalation that might make one side or the other desperate enough to move to nuclear responses. War between the US and USSR did not happen, though a number of "proxy" wars did (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, as well as seeking influence by propping up each side's own dictators throughout the world).

 All this assumes that war would have broken out between the US and the USSR had it not been for deterrence. Not everyone agrees with this. There are a few reasons: The countries were far apart, vast, and had no direct territorial disputes. The first two features meant that it was difficult for either to mount a conventional attack on the other and even harder for one to overcome the other. Geography favored defense and the status quo, so the US and USSR had little to gain from attacking each other and thus nothing to fear. Nuclear weapons, of course, changed this. A few nuclear weapons could wipe out either country, bringing the prospect of successful offense nearer and giving both countries something to fear again. MAD provided the answer by removing any prospect for either party to attain victory by using nukes first.

On the face of it, then, neither side had anything to gain from attacking the other and virtually everything to lose, so there ought to have been little tension. But there was. The same scholars, like Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, who made the above points, also argued that deterrence was to blame for tension. By assuming that small commitments would tell opponents something about big commitments, both sides took tough stances, fearing that to give ground anywhere, even where few interests were at stake, would risk giving ground everywhere. The problem was that both sides often saw themselves as the defenders of these commitments, and thus wished to stand firm against the irrational "attackers" on the other side. This led to tough stances, tough talk, and escalations (like the Cuban Missile Crisis). Nuclear deterrence thus solved the problem of nuclear weapons, but using deterrence logic for every decision at every level caused unnecessary tensions and may have prolonged the Cold War.

So what about China? Is China more like Germany in the early 20th century or more like the USSR in the mid 20th century? On most counts, it is more like the latter. The US and China are vast, far apart, have no common claims to territory, no interest in a war that would inevitably be catastrophic, and both have nuclear weapons. The real question then becomes "Is the US doomed to wage a 'cold' war against China?" There are promising signs. China and the US trade with each other, whereas the US and USSR did not. This means there's more to lose by fighting and more to gain by cooperating. It also means there are many contacts between the countries. This was also the case between European countries before WWI, however, and wasn't sufficient to prevent a war that nobody wanted then, either.

The big risk now is Taiwan. China desires its formal incorporation into China as soon as possible. Taiwan resists this. The US has agreed that Taiwan is a part of China, but the two countries made an agreement not to alter the status quo unilaterally. This means the US is theoretically obligated to fight for Taiwan should China decide to incorporate it by force. The risk is not so much that either side would choose a course that would bring such a confrontation, but that they might blunder towards it through a series of more minor events. US allies in the region are already asking the US for reassurances. Reassuring its allies in the region looks to China a lot like an attempt to contain and deter it--something aggressive. This has potential to slowly escalate into gridlock between the two countries.

One of the main conclusions from analysis of Cold War deterrence is that all commitments are not linked. In other words, China could be accommodated on certain issues without concluding the US is weak, giving it an opportunity to challenge it. It is also important to note this time that China is larger than the US in population and will soon have a larger economy. That means that, over time, the US is unlikely to be able to keep up with Chinese military spending should the latter decide to challenge it. The US is overextended throughout the world and very close to China's own shores. A new Cold War might end differently. The US and the world would do well to prevent one from reoccurring.