Hamas in the back seat--for now

Photo: Flickr/Creative Commons/Marsmet543

Jerusalem is Israel's Achilles Heel and Palestinian resistance may have moved into a new phase. Hamas's involvement in this has been minimal so far. Its ability to affect politics remains, however.

Hamas has been one of the main drivers of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1990s. Events in the past decade and, especially, in the past few months seem to be changing this. The replacement of suicide bombing attacks with rockets and the subsequent deployment by Israel of its Iron Dome missile defence system have dramatically reduced Hamas’s violent effect on Israelis’ everyday lives, not just when compared to the horror of the early 2000s, but also when compared to the 1990s. In addition, since the most recent round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, there has been a surge of violence from within the Israeli side of its security barrier. This violence has been carried out by Palestinians (with gruesome reprisals from Jewish vigilantes) who live on that side of the barrier. It is also notable that these latest attacks are mostly not carried out at the behest of Hamas or any other militant group. Has the threat from Hamas receded? Is the new threat from within the ‘wall’ now greater?

Jerusalem is potentially Israel’s Achilles Heel. Palestinians living there are not separated from Israelis by a security barrier. They are not coordinated by a governing authority that could be targeted in the same way that Hamas in Gaza can. ‘Civil’ measures like policing and intelligence are the only possibilities for deterrence. These, along with Jerusalem Palestinians’ separation from those in the rest of the Occupied Territories and their generally better quality of life, seem to have worked thus far in keeping violence originating from Palestinians in Jerusalem and from Arab Israelis to a minimum. Punitive measures, like imprisonment and home demolitions, can actually undermine deterrence as the situation escalates, however: If security at holy sites intensifies to the detriment of Muslim worshippers and punitive measures damage Jerusalem Palestinians’ way of life, they may feel they have less to lose by turning to violence. Such a move would have little to do with Hamas.

Palestinian resistance has gone through several phases, but it has appeared recently to be settling on pushing for international pressure. As the Jerusalem specialist Michael Dumper points out, the sheer density of holy sites in Jerusalem ensures that there is constant international attention on the city. Israel is limited in the harshness of measures it can implement there without incurring international opprobrium. Escalation in Jerusalem would further increase international attention and reinvigorate drives to resolve the situation by establishing a Palestinian state that would incorporate majority-Palestinian portions of Jerusalem.

As attention focuses on Jerusalem, then, might Gaza and Hamas slip into the background? This is unlikely. The confrontation cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of who controls Gaza and its relationship to any future Palestinian state. As long as Hamas remains in power there, it will therefore remain relevant and be capable of influencing, and quite possibly scuppering, any deal. No solution can thus be found without dealing with Hamas. Hamas has so far always acted as a spoiler in the peace process and rejects two states as a final solution to the conflict. Violence undermines the moral force of Palestinian demands for statehood upon which much of current international actions by Palestinians are predicated. Rising violence in Jerusalem could have this effect, or it could come from Hamas. Hamas may therefore seem less important at present, but it remains in a position to influence events in the larger conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and no solution could succeed that ignored it. It is not irrelevant yet.

Israel: Harsh sentences for stone throwers are a bad idea

The Dome of the Rock, Jerusalem. Photo by the author, ©February 2013

Israel's Knesset should vote against harsh sentences for stone throwers—for security's sake

The Cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently backed a bill that would allow the government to imprison stone-throwing protesters for up to 10 years even if it cannot be proved that they intended to cause serious harm (with a separate provision intended to make it easier to imprison those shown to have intended to cause bodily harm for up to 20 years). Given recent tensions in Jerusalem, it is no surprise that Netanyahu's government is taking action, but this is not the right action.

To see why, consider the options of an aggravated protester. Given few, if any, options for influencing Jerusalem policy via the political process, protests become the only way to voice dissatisfaction. Peaceful protests are the best way to do this, in my view, both because violence and destruction are bad and, more importantly, because partaking in them reduces the moral strength behind the protests, weakening their positive message. It is often impossible, however, to ensure that no one shifts to any form of violence. This is where the law can provide an additional incentive: The specter of punishment for violence may reduce its likelihood. Harsh sentences for small offenses, however, can actually lead to greater violence, not less, undermining Israel's security and interests over the long term (in addition to hurting Palestinians).

This may sound counter-intuitive, but it is actually relatively straightforward. If a protester decides peaceful protest is not enough, there are myriad ways to give a violent voice to his or her anger. One of these is throwing stones or other small objects. Another would be knife, gun, or bomb attacks. Throwing stones is certainly easier than attacking someone with a knife, gun, or bomb, as it requires little preparation, stones are readily available, and it can be done from a relatively safe distance. It is also much less damaging, which means it is less violent and thus normally carries less severe penalties. If this is not the case, the incentive not to resort to more violent means is blunted. A protester might be jailed for ten years for a knife attack. Under the proposed bill, s/he might also be jailed for ten years for throwing a rock at a police vehicle. If a protester has a knife, what's the incentive to use a rock instead? The knife will cause greater harm to the perceived enemy and will incur the same punishment. The rock becomes pointless.

If you've ever stuck your finger in a garden hose when it was on, you are familiar with the concept: Reducing the possibilities for the water to come out makes it shoot out with much greater pressure through the smaller holes left. By cracking down at the lower end of the violence scale, Israel risks increasing pressure at the top end. Israel would, of course, respond to higher levels of violence harshly as well. The result would be yet another area of increased escalation. Jerusalem could end up in a continuing state of considerable unrest, limiting Israel to just a few, unpalatable options. None of these would improve Israel's image, encourage Western backing, or thus improve its security in the long run. Such a move therefore runs entirely against Israel's own interests. Too bad it, like many measures meant to display toughness, runs in favor of Netanyahu's short-term electoral interests.

Right Reasons, Wrong Response? US Action against Islamic State

Photo: Creative Commons via Voice of America

Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL, aka ISIS) is a brutal, deadly organization operating in Syria and Iraq. It is intensifying the refugee crisis in the region, which in itself threatens to destabilize countries like Lebanon and Jordan, which the group also wishes to conquer. This instability and bloodshed alone would be reason enough for the US to take action, but America also has a certain responsibility to help Iraq, as the political situation there that allowed IS to gain a foothold in the country has come about partly through US (in)action. The fact that the Iraqis requested US help leaves little question of the legitimacy of action against Islamic State within Iraq. Conundrums abound, however, and it is easy to see why US President Barack Obama has been so hesitant to get involved.

The US is now involved, however, with the stated aim of leading a broad coalition to "roll back this terrorist threat" and to "degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy." Obama also vowed to "hunt down terrorists who threaten our country wherever they are," explicitly allowing airstrikes in Syria as well as Iraq. He announced that 475 additional US troops would be sent to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces. The air campaign in Iraq could be expanded and Syrian rebels would also be trained and funded to attack IS.

These actions may be effective in "rolling back" IS--i.e. pushing it back out of Iraq--and "degrading" it, but they are unlikely to "destroy" it anytime soon. Furthermore, even if they did the latter, there is no guarantee that another group would not take its place. Militant groups like IS require support from the populations in which they operate. The flip-side of that coin, however, is that it is nearly impossible to eliminate them as long as they have such support. Furthermore, that support needn't be from anything like a majority of the population as long as there are enough people to hide, supply, and fight for the group. Support for such groups comes for political reasons (such as anger at repression or at a lack of power for a given group). To "destroy" IS, then, requires eliminating as much support for it as possible. Eliminating support for it requires addressing the political issues that have led to that support--in other words: political solutions are needed for political problems. These do not really seem to be part of the "comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy" Obama announced.

Retired British General Rupert Smith points out that armies can be used to assist governments or populations in difficulties, or in order to contain a threat, "without knowing the desired political outcome" or necessarily having a strategy for how the situation ends.¹ Even without a political solution, then, the US would still stand some chance at "rolling back" and "degrading" IS. As pointed out, however, "destroying" it would require a political resolution. A more inclusive government and security service within Iraq may be able to resolve the political issues that fostered support for IS there (if indeed these changes really come about). The situation in Syria, however, is much worse. Smith notes that "destroy" missions that lacked political strategies have tended to slide into being "containment" missions instead. Such a mission may be able to stabilize Iraq and secure its border to Syria while the war there rages on and IS continues to operate and occasionally threaten neighboring countries and even its enemies abroad, like the US. This doesn't sound like the aim Obama set forth.

It is hard to envision destroying IS as long as the civil war in Syria continues. For America to achieve its final objective, then, the war must end. At the risk of gross understatement, this is highly problematic because there are basically only two ways the war could end, and neither is particularly appetizing. The first way is that one group or coalition could win the war and impose its will on the rest of the country. Supporting such an iron-fisted imposition of "peace" would be unpalatable to a democratic country like the United States. The second way the war could end would be with a democratic system of checks and balances that protects minorities and provides assurances to the country's various interest groups. This would require broad support within Syrian society and, crucially, trust among the various groups in that society in the fairness and stability of a democratic government. The civil war and a history of authoritarian rule, however, mean that trust is in seriously short supply in Syria. Creating the conditions for such trust, including a government and institutions worthy of it, would be an enormous undertaking.

The easiest way for the US to end the war in Syria would be to throw all its support behind the Assad regime. It could save face by finding a way to work with Russia and Iran to force Assad out while keeping the rest of his regime in place. After the atrocities the regime has committed, which outstrip those of IS in scale, this would be hard to stomach and would strain the US's relations with Sunni allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the breaking point.

The harder way would be to support a pro-democracy coalition within Syria and give it all the backing it needed to win. This is sort of the current plan, but there is plenty of room to question how "democratic" the US-backed rebels are. The US generally speaks of "moderate" rebels, whatever that means, but conspicuously leaves out any reference to their democratic intentions if they were to take power. If these rebels beat both IS and the Assad regime to take control of Syria, they would be coming to power with numerous backers, many of whom, such as those from the Gulf states, who would not be particularly interested in supporting democracy. In order to influence things in that direction, the rebels would need to be supported by, and rely most heavily on, the West. This would almost certainly mean US troops in Syria and a lengthy, large-scale operation to stabilize the country enough to allow trust to be rebuilt and give all the groups within the Syrian population a stake in the success of a new system. Given the constraints on the US, from its budget tightening to the overwhelming opposition of its population to greater involvement in the region, coupled with the US's poor record in state-building and democracy promotion at gunpoint, this option is inconceivable and success would be far from assured if it were.

In the end, then, Obama's goal to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS should probably be seen as having a greater emphasis on the "degrade" part. The "ultimately" portion, along with the difficulties of "destroying" IS without extensive involvement in Syria or making unpalatable decisions, suggests this is more of a wish than something that is actually planned at any time in the near future.  As such, the current operation is likely to end up being one of containment, which will be open-ended, only being resolved when someone wins the Syrian civil war. If American-backed rebels win it, tough decisions will still lie ahead. If they don't, even tougher ones may, along with a lot of recriminations. Even the cautious option Obama seems to have selected is fraught with peril and tens of thousands of lives will still likely be lost. Doing something may be better than doing nothing, but it is still not very good.

1. Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Kindle Edition. London: Penguin, 2012, Chapter 7.

For Shame!

Shame is a powerful weapon. Like all powerful weapons, it should be used with great caution.

"Don't worry about it. He's just a builder. He probably doesn't even have a bachelor's degree."

I heard words similar to this (it was two years ago and I can't remember what I had for breakfast 30 minutes ago) when one of my coworkers "comforted" another after a brief exchange of words with a stand builder at a trade show. I was angry. My father used to be a builder and he is one of the smartest people I know. I later kicked myself for not having told him off. What made him think he was so much better than a builder? I should have put him in his place.

While I do still wish I had said something, I am now glad I did not "put him in his place." Shame is a powerful weapon. "Naming and shaming" is a diplomatic and political tool used by NGOs to get governments to do liberal things, after all, and it works surprisingly often. One need only look at reports by Amnesty International of the prisoners of conscience they have gotten released through no means other than torrents of pleading letters and bad global publicity. The World Bank even uses it to encourage governments to streamline their bureaucracies to make it easier for people in their countries to start a business. If I had snapped at my coworker, I'm sure it would have left a lasting impression. And I was right and he deserved it, right?

Those who live in glass houses...

I can very clearly recall the awful feeling of having said or done something offensive, inappropriate, or insensitive and being confronted (perhaps publicly) about it. It certainly does leave a lasting impression. Increasingly, though, that sinking feeling is accompanied by anger. Why? People say things they shouldn't, or in a tone or context they shouldn't, all the time. I don't think anyone is immune to this. So what right do we have to make other people feel ashamed? Presumably, the goal is to "enlighten" the other person and to make them think before saying something that could hurt others in the future. A lofty goal, perhaps. But is "enlightenment" and the prevention of future offense worth immediate shame? Too often, I fear that much of the real goal is the feeling of moral superiority and strength that comes from telling someone off. No lofty goal.

If our aim is to enlighten and raise the level of respect people have for others, surely we should begin with respect towards the person who, this time around, is "unenlightened"? In my experience, statements like the one above about the builder come more from a lack of thought than from malice. There is no need to use a sledgehammer. A joke can often be the best method. If you're not spontaneously funny enough, a non-public chat can also work. "Enlighten" comes from "light." It's supposed to be a positive thing. I try (try!) to think of how I might make someone aware that they've said something hurtful or ignorant without making them feel mean or stupid. Again, the goal is to make ourselves better, not put people down. It's what I'd like people to do when I say something hurtful or ignorant.

In fact, we have a right to expect that from others. So if someone shames you, tell them that, while their criticism may be valid, their approach could use some work. I know, it's not immediately as gratifying as verbally bashing them and sticking up for yourself, but trust me, this will raise the level of respect and comfort within your circle of acquaintances and you will all soon feel able to discuss anything with each other without fear of retribution. It is not about "not saying offensive things." There should be no risk of people feeling that they now "can't say anything." Quite the opposite: You are free to say what you think, safe in the knowledge that, if you are wrong, you will be swiftly corrected without being personally attacked. There are few things more gratifying than that.

P.S.: Acting in this way, too, is a work in progress. Which means: shaming someone for shaming someone is also not the best way to make the world a better place ;)

When military action is the more "peaceful" option

US President Obama has authorized limited air strikes against the "Islamic State" (IS), an extremist (to put it mildly) group that has taken control of much of northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. Some in his administration have apparently "toyed" with the idea of a limited troop deployment there to assist the Iraqi army as well, but Obama is a long way from approving this. If IS can be stopped without it, he is right to keep US troops out of harm's way, but it is not clear the Iraqi army is up to the challenge. If it isn't, being hesitant now could lead to heavier (and bloodier) US involvement later.

Many people fear another round of the Iraq War started by Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush. Others might think further back and fear another Vietnam. Afghanistan in the '90s might be a better nightmare scenario, and it is also often cited. If Obama is worried the US will get dragged into an unnecessary war, as it was in Vietnam, he should also keep in mind the old adage "a stitch in time saves nine." It may be much easier to defeat IS now than it will be in a year's time.

Syria provides a cautionary tale: for a while, Assad looked sure to fall. Now Syria is in such a mess (including much of it falling into the hands of IS) that many hope he doesn't, despite all the atrocities he has committed to stay in power. Not backing the moderates more heavily there means Assad is still in power and it has also allowed IS to flourish--the worst of both worlds. Not going to war is not always the option that leads to greater peace and it is not always more prudent. In Libya, there was no real alternative government (though I still believe, as I have argued here, that the limited intervention there was the right thing to do). Iraq is not Libya. It has a (albeit very imperfect) government. Furthermore, it is a government that the US helped bring to fruition. The US therefore carries some responsibility for aiding in its success if it can.

Going back to the Afghanistan analogy, there is a lesson there, too, that speaks in favor of being proactive (though one could hardly call missions against IS "proactive," they are now much closer to "re-active"): The US's failure to be concerned about Afghanistan once the Soviet "threat" there receded came back to haunt it. If IS continues to threaten Iraq, makes progress against the Kurds, or threatens Jordan, hesitation and "prudence," may come to seem very imprudent indeed.

Israel and Hamas: Moral questions

In my focus on deterrence, I have mostly taken a utilitarian approach to the conflict between Israel and Hamas (if your goal is X, then Y is or is not appropriate), intentionally avoiding moral questions. I could only advocate things that would enhance deterrence, however, if I believed deterrence to be a morally valid option (I may need to write a second post explaining why I think so). A recent Op-Ed by Alan Derschowitz, an American law professor at Harvard, in the Jerusalem Post led me to conclude that it was time to talk about morality. In the article, he asserts that there is no moral equivalence between Israel's actions and those of Hamas, because Hamas intentionally targets civilians and uses them as human shields, while Israel does the opposite. This is true, but does that mean Hamas bears 100% of the responsibility for the conflict and, as I will focus on here, for the current crisis? An analysis of the deterrence situation before the crisis, like that to be found in my article last Friday in Strife journal's blog, adds an additional dimension to the moral question.

In that article, I argue that the current round of escalation was not necessary from a deterrence standpoint unless Hamas's leadership had given the order to abduct the three Israeli teenagers later found murdered near Hebron. The murderers are indeed Hamas members and Hamas has talked about abducting Israeli soldiers and using them to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners and has apparently trained members in the West Bank to do so. Israel has presented no evidence to date, however, that would suggest that the Hamas leadership, external or, perhaps more importantly, within Gaza, ordered or authorized the kidnapping and murder. Instead, there is evidence that the kidnappers were members of a rogue Hamas branch that acted on its own. One has to wonder why the teens were murdered relatively shortly after their capture if the idea was to use them as bargaining chips. The fact that Hamas long said it did not desire an escalation with Israel, waited until after Israel struck several targets in the Gaza Strip before launching its first rockets at Israel in two years, and was already in a weakened state led me to conclude that the kidnapping probably was not planned, but a rogue action.

Be that as it may, surely Hamas must take responsibility for the actions of its members, even if they acted without authorization? Of course. We would expect this much from Israel or the United States as well, after all. The initial strikes against Hamas in Gaza thus made sense, as did an extensive search-and-rescue operation to find the teens. But Israel's response went beyond search-and-rescue, punishing the actual perpetrators, and making Hamas pay a price for its lack of control over its own militants. It instead ran an operation to attack Hamas "infrastructure" in the West Bank and continued to attack Hamas targets in Gaza. It arrested scores of Palestinians who were uninvolved in the kidnappings. Hamas is an organization that uses terrorism and intentionally targets civilians. Many of those arrested were in fact known terrorists who were re-arrested after having been released as part of a deal to free Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier Hamas held for ransom for several years. There is thus a moral logic to all of these Israeli actions.

At the same time, the escalation that has followed Operation Brother's Keeper (as the hunt for the three teens was known) and Operation Protective Edge (the current operation against Hamas in Gaza) has led to the death, so far, of nearly 100 Palestinians in Gaza and the wounding two Israeli soldiers (one seriously) as well as that of seven civilians injured in a rocket attack on the city of Ashdod. One must of course point out that Israel does not intend to kill civilians in Gaza and takes measures to prevent this, the opposite of what Hamas does when it launches rockets. Further, Hamas places rocket launchers and military facilities within civilian areas to try to prevent Israeli attacks. It also encourages Gazans to act as "human shields" against attacks. This means that if Israel did not use precision weaponry, the death toll would be even higher. Hamas actively tries to kill Israeli civilians and places its own civilians in harm's way to protect itself, while Israel actively tries not to kill Palestinian civilians while attempting to keep its own out of harm's way. Derschowitz is right that there is no equivalence between these two actions.

But if this is the fundamental moral level, then, as I've hinted, there is a second moral level as well. Some response to Hamas's involvement, even tacit, in the kidnappings makes moral sense as well as strategic sense from a deterrence perspective. But a response so large that Hamas sees no other option but to fight a losing battle against Israel is not just unnecessary, it is counterproductive. It undermines deterrence and, by leading to escalation, leads to unnecessary deaths. War, though always a tragedy, is sometimes necessary to protect the lives of the citizens represented by the military. This gives such wars a moral legitimacy. Unless Israel has good evidence of Hamas's involvement, this is an unnecessary war that destabilizes the situation and causes unnecessary death and injury on both sides. It thus lacks such moral legitimacy. Do I demand more of Israel than I do of Hamas? Of course I do. Israel is a liberal democracy. Hamas is a political/militant/social organization that advocates violence against civilians and the eventual destruction of the State of Israel. There ought to be no equivalency of standards between them.

The Unity Deal, Kidnappings, and a New Round of Escalation

About a month ago, I tweeted a link to an article in Haaretz that reflected a rather disturbing aspect of the recent deal between Hamas and Fatah to form a unity government. I was feeling cautiously optimistic about the prospect for this new government to be able to serve as the first unified partner in peace negotiations since Hamas's takeover of Gaza. Even now, this is still a possibility, but I could not shake the feeling that Hamas was attempting to have its cake and eat it to. As a Hamas source put it: "Hamas wants to avoid ministerial responsibility for civilian matters, but it wants to maintain its power as a popular-resistance group." This suggests Hamas wishes for the PA to take responsibility for any domestic difficulties while it avoids having to make tough choices about day-to-day government and can stick to "resistance." The problem with that, of course, is that Hamas's "return address" is still very clearly Gaza. This allowed me to remain cautiously optimistic, but if Hamas is behind the recent kidnapping of three Israeli teens, the unity government seems certain either not to last or to suffer a complete Israeli boycott.

At the same time, the PA has talked about the unity deal in terms of a "weakened" Hamas attempting to save face by running for the PA's protection. This comes across as crowing. With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu now saying that the PA is responsible for terror attacks emanating from any part of "its" territory, including Gaza (never mind that the PA's control over much of Palestine is tenuous at best and non-existent in Area C where the teens were kidnapped), the perceived humiliation of Hamas via the unity deal, Hamas's apparent desire to return to "resistance," and comments by Hamas's then-Prime Minister that kidnapping Israelis (particularly soldiers) was Hamas's "top priority" to use them as "bargaining chips," it would not be surprising if Hamas were responsible for the disappearance of the three teens kidnapped last Friday. It is a way of showing it is not a spent force, contrary to what the PA suggests, and it would make sense as part of Hamas's stated strategy. That said, Hamas has long said kidnappings were a priority and it's not clear that this would necessarily be the right time. Other Palestinian political groups are also annoyed at being excluded from the talks between the two largest factions, Fatah and Hamas. Some of them are quite well organized. This could just as easily be an attempt by one of them to express displeasure at the deal, weaken it, and score points for continuing "resistance." And who knows? It could be a group a criminals or an unaffiliated group of activists.

Israel's response has been swift (after initial delays, it seems) and forceful: It has run a large search operation throughout the West Bank, focusing in particular on Hebron and, later, Nablus. It has arrested 240 Palestinians since the start of the operation, 180 of them Hamas men. As part of these operations, Israeli soldiers have not always acted in a way that will win them friends among Palestinians. For example, I have heard that some Israeli soldiers had removed three Palestinian families from their homes so they could sleep there. Maybe there was no other option and maybe this was an isolated incident, but it is definitely something that will increase tensions rather than ease them. (Though one must admit that "easing tensions" is understandably not currently part of Israel's agenda.)

All of this may backfire strategically. The PA's president Abbas has said that the kidnap victims must be returned and he had previously said that security cooperation with Israel is "sacred." A Palestinian academic I recently spoke with on the subject related to me that Abbas risks being seen as a "collaborator," further damaging his legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians. The PA's apparent cooperation with Israel while the latter seems determined to root out Hamas in the West Bank is almost certain to drive a wedge between the two Palestinian groups and destroy the unity government. This may be what Netanyahu wants: To force Hamas back out of an arrangement with Fatah. But it is not clear that weak, divided, and desperate opponents are always the best option for peace and stability over the long term. Israel is right to do whatever it can to rescue its kidnapped citizens and the Palestinian side has often been disappointingly cynical, sometimes denying that the boys were even kidnapped and at other times suggesting that this is entirely equivalent to Palestinians held in Israeli jails. Nevertheless, Netanyahu risks sparking a new round of violence and uniting Palestinians in anger, rather than a mood for conciliation, with his current, divisive approach.

How shorter prison sentences may REDUCE violent crime (and save money and destroy fewer lives)

There are at least four reasons we punish criminals: retribution, rehabilitation, prevention, and deterrence. We punish criminals out of a sense that this is just, regardless of the other effects. This is an emotional idea, but it is still useful to ensure a peaceful society: A society that citizens viewed as grossly unjust, in which criminals did not pay for their crimes, would be unstable and likely violent, full of vigilantes. The benefits of rehabilitation are obvious. This makes it unfortunate that that particular aspect usually takes a back seat to the other three. Prevention simply involves keeping dangerous people off the streets so they cannot re-offend. It is 100% certain (for that individual, obviously), but also, if permanent, removes the chance of rehabilitation and is quite sad, really. Prison is also horrendously expensive: It costs around $30,000 per inmate per year!*

The final aspect is deterrence: the idea that those who might be contemplating a crime are more likely to decide against it if there's a decent chance they will be caught and face unacceptable punishment. The approach to this in America has been "more is better": if short prison stays deter some, longer ones must deter more, right? Right, but only partly. There are at least two problems. The first: the longer prison sentences become, the less differences between them matter and the more abstract they are. One year in prison is surely a lot worse than six months. But what happens when we're talking 15 years versus 25? Sure, 25 is a lot more awful to contemplate than 15, but 15 horrendous years facing possible physical and mental violence on a daily basis is almost to horrible for most of us to contemplate. Those undeterred by that are those tough enough to excel at prison life. If that doesn't deter them, do we really think those last 10 years would make the difference? Studies suggest they do not.

The second problem is related to the first: From the beginning, criminologists have argued that different severities of crimes must carry different severities of punishment. This is not just fair, it also serves an important purpose in deterring violent crimes in particular. To see why, imagine you are robbing a someone's home. They are not home, but you are armed with a gun (after all, they might have one, too, and you may need to protect yourself). I've surveyed a few websites about penalties, but it's complicated, so this is purely  illustrative. This would be armed burglary, I guess, which carries a sentence of something like 5 years for your first offence. If you've bee caught before, it could be longer. Let's say it's double. Now, the owner walks in with a gun. You cannot run, or he may shoot. You point the gun back at him, potentially adding another 10 years to your sentence. Your only options now are to surrender, and face at least 10 but possibly even 20 years in prison, or kill him and face 25, but only if you are caught. In the spur and fear of the moment, it is more likely your personal attitude towards killing will make a bigger difference than 5-10 years more in prison, the prospect of which is anyway offset by the fact that you may be able to get away scot free if you commit murder. It may be that the difference between theft, threatening violence, committing violence, and committing murder is not great enough and not optimal. Many European countries have much shorter prison sentences combined with lower rates of violent crime.

Sure, there are lots of reasons for this: greater social spending probably makes people less likely to commit crimes. The lack of guns in Europe is a big reason for reduced gun crime (and higher rates of knife crime in the UK, at least). This is not THE answer, just an illustration of the idea that lower prison sentences are not always "soft on crime." In fact, they may sometimes even reduce it. Plow some of those savings into greater rehabilitation and education efforts, and crime and re-offending could fall further, saving more money and making everyone better off again. Some Republican states are already trying such things and the results are promising. In that regard, at least, more really is better.

*As a tangent, I would argue that, since many criminals end up in crime due to low educational prospects and opportunities, it would be cheaper and perhaps more effective to send them to (community) college! At least then they would emerge from their time with better job prospects, not worse ones. They'd then be less likely to re-offed, saving money, and they'd earn more, paying the government more in taxes. Massive savings all around and a life saved from wasting away uselessly in prison.

Is pushing people with intolerant views to resign just another form of intolerance?

When the CEO of Mozilla recently stepped down amid anger about his political views, many on the political left and right worried that this was a sign of intolerance, a sort of totalitarian progressivism. Is it?

 Philosophers call it the “paradox of tolerance”: defending tolerance may require intolerance of intolerance. Is this liberalism turning illiberal? 

Liberal democracies like the United States protect citizens’ freedom of speech, religion, and conscience. So you should be free to argue against gay marriage, right? Absolutely, at least as far as the government and laws are concerned. You are also free to believe and argue that all blacks should be deported to Africa if you like. Being a bigot is not a crime. But that doesn’t mean others cannot be angered by your beliefs and protest against them. Legal rights and protections put limits on the government, not the people. Views the majority in society see as distasteful will be punished in the court of public opinion. You are not protected from the consequences of your speech, only from the government trying to suppress it. That majority may be wrong, of course, but more on that below. 

The second problem is when people say things like “isn’t pushing a person out of a job because of his/her beliefs just as bad as doing the same to a gay person?” Frankly, no. Sexuality, like race, sex, gender, physical capabilities, ethnicity, etc. are immutable aspects of identity. They are NOT beliefs. Arguing with someone, pushing them out of a job, refusing them service, etc. on the basis of their identity is discrimination. It is unfair, unjustified, and unjustifiable in most circumstances (you may want a black actor to play a black role in a movie, so there are a few exceptions, of course). Beliefs are changeable and, unlike identities, they may be harmful to others. 

The harm caused by beliefs is how we judge where to draw lines. This is highly problematic, however. Throughout history, people have been harassed, cast out of societies, and even killed because they held beliefs that challenged the status quo. This continues today, though in “liberal” countries people, thankfully, are usually not killed for their beliefs. We rightly condemn racist beliefs. We also limit freedom of religion and speech when these may harm others, for example when Christian Scientists deny their children life-saving medical treatment or when fundamentalists incite violence in the name of their god(s).

But people have been treated poorly for all manner of beliefs many in society thought were harmful at the time. Where do we draw the line? The test is harm. Does preventing gays from marrying cause harm? Those effected would surely say so (take me, who was prevented for 10 years from moving back to my home country due to marriage and immigration discrimination). Does believing the sun is at the center of the solar system? Not directly, but if it spread, it would damage the progress of knowledge that benefits humanity. Likewise, creationism is not harmful unless it spreads by being taught to children who are then deprived of a proper education. You are thus free to teach your children creationism, but the government should not teach things for which there is a consensus that they are not true. At the same time, such beliefs should not be “respected” in the sense that they remain unchallenged. This is how a liberal society functions.

 What do I mean by “challenge”? The judgment about which beliefs are harmful will always, to some extent, be subjective and relative to current social conditions. Try as we might, we cannot escape the societal context in which we exist and cannot see things completely “objectively.” Harm is a good guiding principle, but it is imperfect. In most cases, the best move is to counter ideas rather than people. The best way to do that is through open debate. This means exercising our right to free speech to call out things we consider harmful. Beyond what the law says, however, we also need to listen and take time to consider. 

As for Eich, a gay commentator on the Colbert Report, an American comedy talk show with a large following, recently opined that protesting against and boycotting the state of Arizona for its proposed anti-gay law was OK, but suggested that what happened to Eich was not. In fact, Mozilla customers angry about its CEO’s political views protested and boycotted, exercising their rights to free speech and their economic right to choose. There was nothing illiberal about it. A portion of the United States has come to realize that preventing same-sex couples from marrying is just as wrong as preventing any other two consenting adults from doing so. Saying otherwise is increasingly indefensible (literally: there are no good reasons for it, that side has lost the debate). That is free speech and open debate in action, resulting in intolerance of an intolerant view. A liberal democracy in action, in other words.

Easing the Gaza Blockade

Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel and Egypt have enforced a blockade on the territory. The intention was to weaken Hamas by cutting it off from weapons and other supplies and to weaken support for it by making life difficult for Gaza’s residents. Hamas has still succeeded in arming itself and, though support for the group has fallen, it is not clear that this is due to the blockade nor is Hamas’s imminent downfall apparent (though this is a region where attempting to predict the future often proves to be a foolhardy endeavor). The blockade thus does not seem to be working. Israel has instead entered a tenuous deterrence relationship with Hamas, whereby retaliations for Hamas violence against Israel have mostly kept that violence to a minimum. The prospects for continued deterrence, albeit with occasional outbreaks of hostilities, are reasonably good, but the blockade does not necessarily help them. Given the massive cost of the blockade in terms of lost opportunities and economic hardship for the residents of Gaza and the damage this does to Israel’s reputation, one wonders if the policy can safely be eased—to everyone’s benefit.

Deterrence relies on threats of punishment if an opponent alters the status quo. It also relies on a promise of no punishment if the status quo is maintained. This doesn’t mean a deterrer must reward an opponent for good behavior, but it doesn’t rule that out, either. What’s more, there are reasons that easing the blockade could even help bolster deterrence. This could work in three ways. Perhaps the most obvious is that, by making the status quo more tolerable, the threat of punishment becomes that much worse. An additional factor, however, and one that is often overlooked by overly hawkish deterrence practitioners and theorists alike, is that deterrence often breaks down due to “push” factors rather than due to opponents taking advantage of a perceived weakness. A Gaza resident I recently spoke to told me how Gazans felt in 2008 in the run-up to the 2008-09 Gaza war: People were so fed up and angry, and had grown so accustomed to the idea that a war with Israel was coming, that many felt that any change, even a war, was better than the status quo. If your opponent prefers a war with you to leaving things as they are, deterrence will be difficult to say the least, and an eventual reconciliation or peace deal even more so.

The final reason that easing the blockade can help deterrence is that it may grant Israel greater leeway in the case of future escalation. A gracious Israel that, despite having previously been attacked by its neighbor, eases restrictions on it, ought to have an easier time gaining support for future reprisals if it suffers violence. This also provides the opportunity to wrong-foot anti-Israel campaigners: If they continued to claim Israel was acting unjustly in Gaza, it would be clearer that their problem is more about what Israel is than what it does—a sign of prejudice behind a veil of humanitarianism.

Easing the blockade needn’t mean dealing with Hamas or easing sanctions on it. It needn’t happen all at once, either, and could be reversed in steps as easily as it is eased in steps, provided more possibilities for deterrence-related reprisals. This means there is little risk in easing the flow of goods and people across the border and much to gain in terms both of security and quality of life. One caveat though: Easing must only be done during periods of quiet and it should be done then. Easing after a period of escalation rewards that escalation. Given recent rocket barrages from Gaza, now wouldn’t be the best time, but if things settle down again soon, soon would be a good time.

Russia, Georgia, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine: Cold War Redux?

I study deterrence, mostly in its non-nuclear, non-Cold War variety. (Deterrence is, to oversimplify, using threats to discourage an opponent from taking certain undesirable actions. Ex: "I'll cut off your oil supply if you attack my neighbor.") I am not an expert on Ukraine or Russia, but I will try to analyze the situation using my knowledge of deterrence, as I think this can tell us a lot about Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. For the most part, it still has little to do with nuclear weapons, but, this being Russia vs. the United States in many ways, they are always lurking in the background.

Some of Barack Obama's critics in America, like John McCain, claim that Russia invaded Crimea because Putin knew America would do nothing about it. The reason Putin knew this was because America "lead from behind" in Libya, hesitant to get involved or commit, and, more importantly, issued a "red line" warning over chemical weapons in Syria and then failed to carry through with the ultimatum, which could weaken America's ability to deter other aggressors, as I myself argued in this blog last September. Is this true? Would Putin have been deterred if Obama appeared tougher or if, say, George W. Bush were still in the White House? Hardly.

I say this not because I twice voted for Barack Obama, but because to say it is his fault is either disingenuous, meant only to hit him politically, or betrays a complete lack of understanding of how deterrence works. As The Economist points out, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 while G.W. Bush was in the White House and has occupied 20% of the country ever since. Not only did the bellicose President Bush not deter Russia from invading, he also did little to punish it as a result. Russia is much more interested in Crimea and Ukraine than the United States is. What's more, and as can be seen on the map above, Russia has easy access to Crimea and the whole of Ukraine. It can easily launch an invasion or incursion, whereas the United States would require a massive logistical operation just to get troops, ships, and equipment to Ukraine. Considering Americans' war-weariness and financial constraints, such an operation was always unlikely, regardless of how committed the President seemed to other causes or how aggressive his rhetoric. Putin has still been careful, in some ways: He did not invade all of Ukraine and reinstall its ousted president, for example. He took control of an area of Ukraine with a majority Russian population that was long part of Russia and hosts its Black Sea Fleet. He rightly calculated that the US and Europe would be angry, but not so much that they felt forced to undertake real action. In sum: Russia could not have been deterred from this unless there had been US/NATO troops on the ground in Crimea and eastern Ukraine prior to the crisis--something that would never have happened because it would have angered Putin and brought on a crisis by itself and because the US and its allies have never cared enough to risk that. In other words: Russia has deterred NATO and Ukraine from expanding NATO to include Ukraine. And without having Ukraine in NATO, Russia could not have been deterred from taking over Crimea. This is not Obama's fault.

So deterrence has failed. Or has it? Deterrence never realistically applied to all of Ukraine, especially Crimea which, with its Russian population, "Autonomous Republic" status, and Russian bases, was always only tenuously controlled by Ukraine. Deterrence can now work to protect the rest of the country and this is where the US, NATO, and the EU must take a stand. There must be diplomatic consequences for the occupation of Crimea. There must be much more severe consequences for actions in the rest of Ukraine, including attempts to coerce it away from a deal with the EU again. This does not mean war. As I mentioned, Russian nukes are lurking in the background and Russia has a massive geopolitical advantage in Ukraine and an enormous and powerful army. The US should be careful never to threaten war, either, as this would then be a further empty promise it could not back up. An embargo on Russian oil and natural gas would be the biggest step for the most severe case: a Russian invasion of Ukraine (which Putin has darkly called a "last resort"). This would hurt Europe quite badly, particularly countries like Slovakia, who get almost all of their natural gas from Russia, but also Germany, which imports a great deal of it. If Russia invaded Ukraine, however, this would have to be done.

Barring that horror scenario, freezes on assets held abroad by Russian oligarchs in its parliament or close to Putin would be a first step. Visa bans on travel to the US, EU, and other allied countries would be another significant step. These could be used in response to threats on Ukraine or attempts to manipulate it. At the same time, the US and EU should provide Ukraine with economic and technical assistance and promote a functioning democracy there.

In the end, Russia will probably keep Crimea, as it has Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This should come at a price, but Putin surely expects this and is willing to pay it. Further damage and influence over Ukraine can and should be prevented, however. Deterrence can only work when you have the power to back up your threats. This means it's important to chose your threats wisely and not to overplay your hand. Threats of visa bans, asset freezes, and sanctions are credible, and the latter would be quite severe. War is not, and is this is a good thing. There is hope for Ukraine yet.

And what about the title? It is possible that this crisis could lead to steady hardening of positions, especially if it gets carried over into negotiations with Syria and Iran, the former of which Russia supports directly, the latter of which Russia supports more indirectly as a bargaining chip. This would be a much-diminished "iron curtain," however, and Russia is not looking to retreat into economic or political isolation behind it. If you've read this, however, then the "Cold War Redux" part of the title did its job ;-).

Do we have too much faith in the US Constitution?

I'll start with what I mean by faith. Faith is believing something to be true or right without adequate evidence. If you have evidence for something, you don't need faith. The US Constitution is a wonderful document. It sets out to create the world's first liberal democracy, seeking to guarantee individual freedoms by anchoring them in the founding document itself and creating a government with divided branches all meant to keep each other in check. It is at once a reflection of human hopes for a better world, an attempt to make those hopes reality, and an implicit acceptance of the fallibility and corruptibility of individuals, especially those in power. It looks to the light, but the very need for it suggests a darkness it was meant to prevent (the darkness of tyranny, authoritarianism, and plain old bad governance).

Judged by the standards it set out, the Constitution is an incredibly successful document. The United States has not become a dictatorship, nor has it ever succumbed to dangerous ideologies like communism or fascism. It has remained flexible, changing as the times required to maintain a functioning society. The Constitution itself has also changed over time as the citizens of the United States sought to improve their democracy, something the Founding Fathers anticipated when the wrote the document and specified ways in which it could be changed.

But perhaps the success of the United States, which derives so heavily from its founding document, has led us to revere the Constitution as if it were an immutable holy text. Ideas (and I am taking no position on whether they are good or not) that might change how members of Congress are elected or would abolish the Electoral College are often rejected as if they were heresy rather than viewed according to their merits. The right to bear arms (which I actually support, by the way) is defended not so much on grounds of reason but because it is seen as an inalienable right given, not by god, but by the Constitution. It's almost as if the Founding Fathers were prophets.

What do you think? Do we view the Constitution as if it were something mere mortals ought not to change? Is this good or bad?

Is America still the world's lone hyperpower?

Recent US failures and infighting give the impression that the US is weaker than it is.

 

 

For a moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was talk of the United States as the "last superpower" or even the world's "hyperpower." At the time, it seemed the US was free to shape the world as it wished because there was no longer opposition from another country nearly as powerful as itself. This feeling persisted, Blackhawk Down notwithstanding, until the US seemed unable to finish the job in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sense of decline was then intensified by the financial and economic crises of the late 2000s and the political gridlock that has ensued in the US since 2010. The rise of China, with its growing military and tougher rhetoric, also seemed to suggest that a multipolar world had arrived. If the US can't get what it wants and is continually constrained abroad, can it really be a hyperpower?

The answer is "yes," and here is why. Throughout the world, countries have two choices: ally with a regional power or ally with the United States (or both if that regional power is also a US ally--a sign in and of itself). Countries that have an affinity for (or whose economies are perhaps too closely linked with) the regional power side with that power. If others are worried, they seek closer ties with other worried countries and with the United States as a guarantor of their security and interests. The fact that this occurs in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia shows that the US is seen globally as a power that can provide extra security. There is no other country that currently does this. So while there are regional powers that challenge US authority within one part of the globe, the single solution to regional fears remains the United States. Only when that changes (e.g. China begins to be seen as an alternative to an alliance with the US and this outside of China's backyard) will the world be multipolar.

The failure of the US military to solve political problems was a sign of US hubris, foolishness, and naivete, but it was not a sign of failing US power. Political problems require political solutions. Military force can defeat an enemy or clamp down on violence, but it cannot, in the end, provide a political solution, especially if that solution is supposed to be democracy rather than an iron-fisted dictatorship. This has always been the case. Without an internal readiness and cultural preparedness for democracy, democracy cannot come about. By its very nature (since it exists at the behest of the people), democracy cannot be forced. No amount of power in the world could have changed that. (State building may bring a country to democracy over years or decades, but it is an uncertain and incredibly intensive and expensive endeavor and requires civic education and institution-building--political solutions, in other words.)

Finally, that the US cannot always get what it wants and is constrained by international politics is also not in itself a sign that the US is not a hyperpower because this misunderstands the term. All states are subject to others' influence and demands and are not free to act as they please with complete impunity. States have varying degrees of freedom of action, however, and the US is freer than others due to its power. The US can, when it chooses, act alone militarily anywhere in the world. No other country can do this (except to a certain extent, perhaps, for Russia, which is however much weaker in other respects). When France and the UK got together to support rebels in Libya, their combined power was not enough: They needed US assistance to be effective.

The US is rightly chastened by its foolhardy experiment with neoconservatism and its inflated belief in the ability of the military to solve the world's problems. It has perhaps now swung too far in the opposite direction, but this is probably also temporary. In the end, however, its underlying power and ability to affect the world has only been lightly diminished, and this more by the damage to its reputation caused by the wars in the Middle East, political infighting in Washington, and its own (faulty) acceptance of its loss of power than by any real changes in fundamentals. US power still underwrites the international system and that will continue to be the case for at least another decade or two. Beyond that, anything could happen (even including a continued unipolar world with the US at its head--or not).